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The EU-Thailand Relations: Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism 
focuses on the so-called new bilateralism, a foreign policy develop-
ment widespread since the mid-1990s. The main puzzle addressed 
in the book is why the policy trend of new bilateralism has been 
pursued in spite of the widely accepted views on political and eco-
nomic advantages of multilateralism. Methodologically, the book 
introduces a two-level analytical framework derived from foreign 
policy theories at the unit level and the mainstream ir  theories at 
the international system level. The case study of eu -Thailand rela-
tions shows that in times when multilateralism is in crisis shifts 
towards a foreign policy pragmatism occur and that the prospects 
of bilateral engagement, identity formation and rhetorical action 
facilitate such behavioral change. 
Chaiyakorn Kiatpongsan is a former recipient of the Royal Thai 
Government scholarship and has completed his PhD studies from 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Germany).
“Chaiyakorn Kiatpongsan has submitted a thorough study that ex-
cellently shows how Thailand skillfully develops strategic bilateral 
relations with the European Union for mutual benefit. It provides 
most valuable insights into a new and little studied type of bilat-
eral relations in which regional organizations have become major 
actors.”
— Joern Dosch, Professor of Asia Pacific Studies and Director of the 
Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Leeds, UK
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I Introduction
A phenomenon called new bilateralism has been observed across regions
since at least the mid-1990s and it is remarkable how this phenomenon
has affected international relations. In a theoretical discourse, the use
of the term new bilateralism has been perceived with much skepticism,
literally as well as conceptually. In a way, the channel of interaction of
new bilateralism may not differ from the one conventionally explored
by great powers upon weaker states, but at the moment, it is interesting
to observe that not only the former but also a series of individual states
that have never engaged in such a struggle are eagerly and extensively
seeking to initiate bilateral FTA or specific political arrangements (Lloyd
2002; Ziltener 2004). The wave of new bilateralism includes bilateral
ties that seemed to be unlikely a decade earlier, such as, for example,
Thailand and Israel who signed an agreement on investment promotion
and protection in August 2003, or Singapore and Panama who became
parties to a bilateral free trade agreement in March 2006. Moreover, it
is not uncommon that both parties of new bilateral FTAs belong to the
same pre-existing regional trading arrangements, for example, the US-
Chile Free Trade Agreement or the New Zealand-Thailand Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership, with all of these parties also being co-members of
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). After all, the impact of
the resulting proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) – with a
number of new bilateral arrangements continuously emerging on the
sidelines of multilateral negotiations – is not negligible in terms of its
practical implications for the multilateral order that has dominated in-
ternational trade relations for more than a half century.
Terminologically, the novelty of new bilateralism often comes under
attack. In retrospect, the term new bilateralism itself first entered the
language of International Relations in the mid-1980s. Haggard and
Cheng (1989: 306), for instance, used this term to describe the US’ eco-
nomic policy toward East Asian newly industrializing countries during
the second Reagan administration (see also Gills 1996: 671). From this
period, the definition of ‘new bilateralism’ delivers a sense that bilater-
alism had once again become an important feature of the administra-
tion’s foreign policy primarily aimed at solving trade and economic con-
flicts in a more flexible but forceful way. Later, Smith and Tsatsas
(2002) brought attention to the ‘new’ bilateral relations among the EU
member states in response to the EU’s politics and decision-making
process since the early 1990s and began to point out the emergence of
new depth and scope of new bilateralism (see also The Economist,
March 24, 2001). Placed in a broader context of foreign policy, the
state’s ‘new bilateralism’ virtually embraces an overall policy drift from
the long propagated multilateral approaches toward a more extensive
use of formal and informal instruments of ‘bilateralism’ (Ravenhill
2003: 199-200; Haggard and Cheng 1989).
Beyond the introduction of these defining elements of new bilateral-
ism, much attention has been paid to the impact of new bilateralism
upon the international system. As part of the International Relations
tradition, the importance attached to it has been conceptualized against
the changing structures of international politics. In particular, the argu-
ment of ‘trade institution failures’ – perceived in a confluent manner
after the widely criticized misconduct of the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) crisis management in the Asian Financial Crisis and the
slowdown of the multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) – gives rise to the question of the potential of new bi-
lateralism either as a building block’ or a ‘stumbling block’ for the inter-
national system. On the one hand, among others, Bhagwati (1995, see
also Bhagwati and Panagariya 2003) has already warned against a policy
drift away from multilateralism to a flux of bilateral or regional agree-
ments, referred to as a ‘‘spaghetti bowl’’ phenomenon, in which diver-
ging rules and tariffs resulting from a wide range of separate agree-
ments may negatively cause complexity and perplexity in the global
trading system. On the other hand, more optimistic scholars like Dent
(2003, see, for a more recent account, Dent 2006) have argued that,
due exactly to the aforementioned complexity and ambiguity in rules
and tariffs, new bilateralism may eventually develop a renewed forum
for multilateral trade negotiations and thus lead to a rationalizing pro-
cess leveling preferential trading arrangements to an ever greater inte-
grative development of regionalism, called ‘lattice regionalism’. The two
diverging views of new bilateralism, each with its own line of argumen-
tation, have gained ground for further theoretical discussions.
Research Agenda
This book focuses on the impact of the emerging trend of new bilateral-
ism on international relations, based on a case study of EU-Thailand re-
lations. In effect, EU-Thailand relations stand for relations between a re-
gional organization and a third country outside that region, so that with
the emergence of new bilateralism, they can bring into play the dy-
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namics of interregionalism relevant for the policy orientation between
multilateralism and bilateralism in international relations. To start with,
the main puzzle is why the policy trend of ‘new bilateralism’ has been
pursued despite the widely accepted views on the political and econom-
ic advantages of ‘multilateralism’.
From an economic viewpoint, the international trade literature mostly
reaches a general agreement that free trade – defined briefly as ‘a situa-
tion in which there are no artificial barriers to trade’ (Deardorff 2007) –
strengthens market mechanisms and so increases the efficiency of the
production to benefit consumers. In short, the international trade theo-
ry, as postulated by Ricardo almost a century ago (1911, see also Gerber
2002: 56), suggests that whenever countries trade with each other they
are always better off because of the logic of relative comparative advan-
tage between any two traded goods. Since all of the parties involved can
always optimize their welfare gains by specializing in the production of
goods where they have a comparative advantage, international trade
should exist in the interest of all countries and is desirable for them as
a policy orientation, at least, in the long run. Likewise, in the political
sphere, the positive impact of multilateralism was earlier recognized in
the Madisonian tradition of federalism where the government’s strategy
of governing at a higher level of interaction may actually strengthen the
collective character of itself and improve the flows of information both
domestically and internationally (Madison 1787: no. 10, 63; see also
Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2007). Following the arguments of
constitutional democracy, the commitments of states to multilateral in-
stitutions can then also contribute to ‘‘the limitations of special inter-
ests’’, ‘‘the protection of individual and minority rights’’ and ‘‘the pro-
motion of collective deliberation’’ (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik
2007).
Against this background of the merits of multilateralism, it is often
argued that a state’s foreign policy decision to strive for new bilateral-
ism merely serves as a second-best solution while the best one, the mul-
tilateral approach, has proved not viable (Bhagwati and Panagariya
1996: 53). In response, this book argues that this statement of new bila-
teralism as a second-best policy is only partially convincing because of
the continued relevance of multilateral institutions and the emerging
interplay between new bilateralism and multilateralism. Focusing on
the case study of EU-Thailand relations, the phenomenon of new bila-
teralism shall be investigated here more thoroughly, in terms of the two
parties’ foreign policy motivations that have led to it and the systemic
implications of their new bilateralism for international relations. Ac-
cordingly, this book seeks to address two sets of research questions in
particular:
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The first set of questions focuses on identifying the factors that un-
derlie foreign policy decisions in favor of new bilateralism and thus ex-
plain how each of them shapes the recent developments in EU-Thailand
relations. Thus far, a number of factors have already been identified in
other related studies. For example, Ravenhill (2003) sees new bilateral-
ism as a response to (a) ‘‘an increasing awareness of the weakness of
existing regional institutions and initiatives’’, (b) ‘‘perceptions of posi-
tive demonstration effects from regional agreements elsewhere’’, and
(c) ‘‘changing configurations of domestic economic interests’’, while
Lloyd (2002: 1284) also includes factors like ‘‘regional security’’ or ‘‘fear
of exclusion from major markets’’. These factors will be re-classified in
this book in a more comprehensive framework of foreign policy the-
ories derived from the mainstream international relations theories; each
of these will in turn be put to the test to conduct a foreign policy analy-
sis of EU-Thailand relations.
The second set of questions focus on EU-Thailand relations as such
as the unit of analysis and initiate an essential debate on the functions
that new bilateralism performs, and is expected to perform, with regard
to the structures of international relations. To approach this debate, the
book shall theoretically condense and categorize functions ascribed to
new bilateralism by the major schools of international relations at the
level of the international system. In this vein, Rüland (2001b) has, for
example, proposed a comprehensive set of functions of interregionalism
including ‘balancing’, ‘rationalizing’, ‘institution-building’, ‘agenda-set-
ting’ and ‘identity building’. In the EU-Thailand relations case study,
the functional analysis conducted here shall help to assess the system-
oriented relevance of new bilateralism and, in a way, answer the ques-
tion of which theoretical school most convincingly explains the perfor-
mance of new bilateral relations in the international system.
Introducing the EU-Thailand Relations
The choice of EU-Thailand relations as the subject of an empirical case
study on new bilateralism was not random but carefully justified by a
country-specific argument on the Thai side as well as arguments of new
policy orientation and institutional presence on the EU’s side. Thailand
has apparently been recognized as one of the two forerunners in the
‘new bilateralism’ trend in Southeast Asia, along with Singapore. A tell-
ing step has been taken by former Prime Minister Thaksin’s govern-
ment under which, as one of its foreign policy cornerstones, a series of
efforts have been made to set up bilateral FTA negotiations with a num-
ber of countries worldwide (Na Thalang 2004). There is evidence to
suggest that the Thai government became interested early in exploring
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the practice of economic bilateralism, but it is not until the late-1990s
that a significant change in the nation’s trade policy became observable
(Dent 2006: 121).1 Thus, after, for example, the Thai government signed
an ‘Early Harvest’ framework agreement with India in October 2003,
concluded a comprehensive FTA with Australia in 2004 and a similar
one with New Zealand in April 2005, and has been in the process of ne-
gotiating another FTA with Peru since November 2006,2 Thailand’s
FTA strategy seems to signal a new chapter in the history of Thailand’s
foreign policy, in sharp contrast to traditional bilateral German-Thai or
British-Thai relations. In this connection, the choice of the EU seems at
first glace an unconventional, though interesting, choice as a party to bi-
lateralism in general and new bilateralism in particular. Since the EU’s
existing bilateral arrangements – apart from those thus far established
with strategic partners such as the US – have been limited in number
and predominantly directed geo-strategically toward neighboring coun-
tries and regional organizations, it is clearly of great significance to ob-
serve one of the recent messages of their Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson’s speech in Berlin in September 2006, which underlines
‘‘the need [ for the EU] to go beyond the EU’s existing bilateral free
trade agreements, by setting out the case for new free trade agreements
designed to deliver more open markets and fairer trading conditions in
new areas of growth, particularly in Asia.’’3 The evidence of the EU’s
gradual policy shift toward new bilateralism can be found in the recent
attempts to upgrade the EU-Israel Association Agreement (see also Per-
ry 2007) as well as the prospects of the EU’s FTA negotiations with ris-
ing Asian economies such as India and China (European Commission
2006j; Asia Times 2006).
More importantly, the relevance of bilateral EU-Thailand relations has
been well reflected in the conceptual links between bilateralism and re-
gionalism as well as interregionalism. Technically speaking, there is a set
of multiple channels through which the EU and Thailand have inter-
acted: The first channel refers to the bilateral ties between Thailand and
almost all of the EU member states, for example, German-Thai, British-
Thai and French-Thai relations, most of these ties having a much longer
lineage than those with the EU itself. Second, the EU, if perceived as an
international actor in its own right, has since the 1970s participated in di-
rect diplomatic dialogues with the Thai government, and their formal
dialogues are mainly channeled through the European Commission-
Thailand Senior Officials’ Meetings. Third, the EU and Thailand may
have a chance to interact through their memberships in various shared
regional, trans-regional and global groupings such as the ASEAN-EU dia-
logues, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the United Nations (UN) or the (WTO). Focusing on the formal
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EU-Thailand relations that consider the EU an actor in its own right, this
book shall concentrate on the second and third channels of interaction.
Moreover, it is observable that together, the EU and Thailand have
undergone a multidimensional development of their relations that may
in effect lead to a new stage of bilateralism. Currently, a bilateral ‘Part-
nership and Co-operation Agreement’, which is aimed at strengthening
the EU-Thailand bilateral dialogues and cooperation programs, is being
negotiated as a supplement to the framework of the 1980 EC-ASEAN
Co-operation Agreement (Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand 2006g; Akkarasriprapai 2004). In retrospect, although the EU
and Thailand have not actually signed a bilateral FTA or a comprehen-
sive cooperation agreement, the bilateral relations that were already es-
tablished in the 1970s in the form of development assistance in the
agricultural sector have quickly intensified and expanded so that they
now include (a) a wide range of cooperation projects in areas such as the
environment, health, energy, education or technology, (b) political dialo-
gues and (c) trade and foreign direct investment relations (Delegation of
the European Commission to Thailand 2005d). To emphasize the ever
increasing levels of bilateral trade, in 2008, the EU was Thailand’s third
most important trading partner, after ASEAN and Japan, and accounted
for 12.14% of its total trade while Thailand’s exports to the EU almost
doubled during a five-year period from 2003 and 2008 and stood at c.
$ 23.39 billion (Ministry of Commerce, Thailand).
Literature Review
In the international relations literature, there has been a long series of
studies on EU-ASEAN relations but only a small number on bilateral
EU-Thailand relations. Moreover, it is evident that most of the studies
thus far conducted on EU-Thailand relations have predominantly ad-
dressed trade relations. Most of them have either focused on analyzing
recent developments and patterns of bilateral trade or have suggested
policies that promote bilateral trade and investments. Chaipan (1984),
for example, focuses on the economic impacts of the Agreement on Vo-
luntary Export Restraints between Thailand and European Economic
Community. In his Master’s thesis, Liamsoongnern (1991) focused on
trade relations between Thailand and the European Community after
the introduction of the European Single Market in 1992, with the focus
on possible implications for Thai exports. Kontein (1995) in her Mas-
ter’s thesis also chose to concentrate on Thailand’s manufactured goods
in the context of their export performances for the EU.
Among a few more recent studies on the bilateral EU-Thailand rela-
tions, Wisaweisuan et al. (2005)’s ‘The Fifth Enlargement of the Eur-
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opean Union and Its Impact on the Thai Economy’ (in Thai) seems to
be the most comprehensive effort to date in documenting bilateral trade
relations between the EU and Thailand after the EU’s enlargement in
2004. Likewise, Thailand and Europe: The Political and Security Dimen-
sions edited by Nuchpiam (2002, in Thai) can be seen as an important
first step in approaching EU-Thailand relations from a viewpoint of se-
curity politics. It is important to note that there is also the comprehen-
sive study by Nuansuwan (1990) called ‘The Relations between Thai-
land and the European Community’ (in Thai), but the publication date
hints that her study could not have addressed post-Cold War EU-Thai-
land relations.
Methodology
To answer the research questions we have outlined above, the book em-
ploys a two-stage approach. The first stage is a theoretical one for the
purpose of conceptualizing the ‘new bilateralism’ phenomenon and
constructing a comprehensive framework for the later analysis of EU-
Thailand relations. At this stage, working hypotheses and working defi-
nitions about the concepts of new bilateralism shall be formulated in or-
der to guide and orientate the analyses that follow throughout the in-
tended study. The second stage is an empirical one, during which the
empirical study of EU-Thailand relations shall be presented and as-
sessed within the proposed theoretical framework. The detail of each
stage of the approach is as follows.
The first stage starts with construing terminology and defining the le-
vels of analysis. As far as terminology is concerned, some authors such
as Ravenhill (2003) and Lloyd (2002) commence by putting together a
comprehensive list of significant features of the new bilateral relations
that basically appear to differ from traditional ones while others like
Haggard and Cheng (1989) and Okediji (2004) more specifically seek
to justify the novelty of new bilateralism in geographical terms, in his-
torical developments or in specific patterns found in different policy is-
sue areas. Thus, chapter II first introduces the defining principles of
new bilateralism, in contrast to traditional bilateralism and multilateral-
ism, and then classifies its main characteristics in terms of (i) new ac-
tors, (ii) new content and (iii) new instruments:
(i) New Actors. Bilateral ties are claimed to expand from geographi-
cally conditioned ties to ‘geographically dispersed’ ones between the
parties of two distant regions (Lloyd 2002; Aggarwal and Koo 2005).
There is also a trend that, especially in the Asia-Pacific, the two parties
of new bilateralism are often members of the same trans-regional trade
arrangements such as APEC and, at the same time, they may appear in-
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significant for one another, politically or economically, e.g., because the
shares of total exports between the trading partners sometimes account
for less than 5% (Ravenhill 2003: 309; Lloyd 2002: 1282).
(ii) New Content. The scope of new bilateralism may become wider
than traditionally assumed while its depth varies issue-specifically, with
much attention being paid to economic issues. For instance, the con-
ception of security is no longer limited to the traditional conduct of
military resources but takes into account other non-military security as-
pects, which integrates – although inward looking – political, social, and
economic issues. In the economic field, the focus on the elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers in trade relations is now broadened to in-
clude additional issues such as trade facilitation, investment promotion
and a wide range of economic cooperation programs involving taxation,
standards, intellectual property rights, competition policy and e-com-
merce (Dent 2003). Similarly, the development policy has undergone
operational changes, shifting from aid grants to technical and economic
assistance projects in the promotion of economic growth and sustain-
able development.
(iii) New Instruments. New bilateralism employs a more diverse and
complex set of means and principles. In a way, it can ‘break up’ a com-
prehensive agenda into so-called ‘multiple issue-specific alliances’
(Smith and Tsatsas 2002: 29), so that a higher degree of reciprocity
with certain dispute settlement mechanisms is more likely and, as a re-
sult, it is not surprising to observe an increasing number of bilateral
agreements as well as an ever faster pace at which they have been con-
cluded. Moreover, in principle, the conduct of new bilateralism seems
to avoid military or economic sanctions and at times opts for the princi-
ples of ‘flexibility, consensus-building and consultation’ (Ferguson
2001; Emmers 2004).
In constructing the analytical framework, chapter III introduces a
two-level scheme: the unit level and the systemic level. Provided that
there have been a number of ways to introduce levels of analysis (Waltz
1959; Singer 1961; Jervis 1976: 13-31; Putnam 1988), the choice of these
two levels of analysis here is not random but expected to serve the pur-
pose of theoretically deducing two sets of variables in accordance with
the two sets of research questions mentioned above. In the course of
the analysis, it should at least become clear that the two levels of analy-
sis are not unrelated but complementary. Therefore, when it comes to
conclusion, the findings at each level of analysis will be combined to
achieve a more complete picture of bilateral EU-Thailand relations as
such and in the broader context of international relations.
At the unit level, the focus is particularly directed toward the primary
units of action, i.e., the EU and Thailand, which, in this book, are taken
as the two parties involved in the bilateral relations, which will account
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for the factors that determine the developments of EU-Thailand rela-
tions and the extent to which the foreign policies of the EU and Thai-
land following this trend of ‘new bilateralism’ can be explained in terms
of their respective domestic economic, political and social characteris-
tics. With regard to the EU’s actorness, it should be noted beforehand
that the book is not designed to test the concepts of actorness and any
one actor’s presence and that the EU shall thus be considered an actor
in its own right. To complete the picture, however, the arguments based
on the relevant behavioral criteria on the EU’s actorness will be briefly
listed here in order to give an idea of the specific conditions on the
EU’s institutional order varying across policy areas and, as far as the
question of delegation is concerned, the principal-agent approach will
also be introduced here to clarify the extent to which the EU can as-
sume the roles of intergovernmental and supranational bodies, both in
its internal or external relations (see also Bretherton and Vogler 1999:
37; Caporaso 1996: 35).
The framework of foreign policy theory is thus proposed at this unit
level to focus more attention to the domestic aspects – especially inter-
est structures and political motivation – of the two parties that essen-
tially shape their foreign policy behavior and decisions in favor of new
bilateralism. There have been several efforts to construct a comprehen-
sive theory of foreign policy (see, for example, Synder, Bruck and Sapin
1954; Rosenau 1966). However, most of them appear to follow the be-
haviorist tradition and are not directly applicable in this study. This
book thus proposes a modified framework comprised of three foreign
policy theories based on the arguments of three major schools of inter-
national relations – realism, liberalism, and social constructivism.
With regards to the emergence of new bilateralism, realists would
primarily explain it in terms of the power interests of both parties that
are concerned most about their survival and sovereignty. Their so-called
national interests are perceived as raison d’e´tat in pursuit of specific eco-
nomic or political goals. In the case of non-hegemons, for instance, for-
eign policy is expected to strive for a strategic and political means of re-
assuring their autonomy and regional security by bringing the other
party into the balance-of-power calculations. Thus, according to Bau-
mann, Rittberger and Wagner (2001: 38), a state's foreign policy beha-
vior can appear in three forms: influence-seeking, autonomy-seeking or
voicing-opportunities-seeking. In contrast, liberals would argue that
states are no longer unitary actors and would thus underscore the inter-
ests and preferences of relevant state and non-state actors in a decision-
making process (see also Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997). A liberal for-
eign policy theory thus explains policy shifts toward new bilateralism in
terms of the engagement of the state emphasizing net welfare effects or
the efforts to correct domestic ‘market failures’. In a reflectivist ap-
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proach, social constructivism stresses the importance of beliefs, ideas,
and norms as well as the dynamics of mutual definition and social
learning (Wendt 1999: 313). With the help of the role-theoretical applica-
tion, constructivist foreign policy theory contends that the state's for-
eign policy decisions may not always follow the rationality assumption
and instead apply the logics of appropriateness, arguing and rhetorical
action and that they are to be understood in the context of the endogen-
ous process of interest and identity formation (March and Olsen 1989;
March and Olsen 2006; Sedelmeier 2004: 124-125; Risse 2000 Schim-
melfenning 1997; Kiste and Maull 1996).
Moreover, it is apparent that bureaucratic institutions have played an
important role in the day-to-day operations of EU and Thai foreign pol-
icy. The bureaucratic politics model, following the paradigm of Allison
and Halperin (1972), will be briefly introduced here in order to refine
the analysis of their bilateral relations, as an actor-oriented approach to
re-considering bargaining elements among members of an organization
and internal dynamics of a foreign policy-making process in general
(see also Brandt 2001).4
At the systemic level, the analysis concentrates on the interaction be-
tween the EU and Thailand as the unit of analysis and so the interplay
between this bilateralism and multilateralism, with a view toward asses-
sing the extent to which the trend of new bilateralism may affect the
structures of the international system and vice versa. In this connection,
the concepts of new bilateralism shall first be positioned in the main-
stream neorealism-institutionalism debate in order to deduce the func-
tions that new bilateralism is expected to perform, and has performed,
in relation to regionalism, interregionalism and globalism.
In the proposed framework, the choice of EU-Thailand relations as a
new bilateralism case study is partly premised on the arguments of in-
terregionalism, because not only do the developments of interregional-
ism underline the increasing relevance of recent relations between var-
ious regions including those between a regional organization and a
third country, but, more importantly, the theoretical approach applied to
the study of interregionalism offers an important insight into the paral-
lel logics of regionness and multiple-level systemic structures. For in-
stance, in the context of relations between the EU and ASEAN, Rüland
(2001b) refers to the ‘proliferation of regional actors’ and the conse-
quent emergence of a ‘multi-tiered system’ with new interregional fora
and institutions being created in its midst. New bilateralism is expected
to perform the following functions in the international system, which
have been borrowed from the framework of interregionalism proposed
by Rüland (2001b), who derived them systematically from the three
main theories of international relations: (i) ‘balancing’, (ii) ‘institution-
building’, (iii) ‘rationalizing’, (iv) ‘agenda-setting’ and (v) ‘identity-build-
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ing’. In short, neorealists believe that new bilateralism will serve as an
opportunistic balancing instrument in response to changes in interna-
tional structures as a result of changing power configurations among
states. By contrast, neoliberal institutionalists predict a positive impact
of institutions on the international system and would thus argue that
new bilateralism is a rational process to enhance cooperation. This can
be achieved by creating an institution with a set of norms and rules or
performing the functions of rationalizing and agenda-setting in relation
to other levels of interaction. By rejecting the rationality assumption,
constructivists prefer to see the significance of new bilateralism in its
ability to provide a new channel for interaction and thus contributing to
the process of building a collective identity in international relations.
Furthermore, the recent proliferation of bilateral and regional FTA
negotiations increasingly raises the question of the practical implica-
tions that this kind of bilateralism and regionalism has on the multilat-
eral trading system – mentioned above as the ‘stumbling block’ versus
‘building block’ debate (see, for example, Bhagwati 1995; Bhagwati and
Panagariya 1996). In response, international trade theory is briefly in-
troduced here to elaborate three aspects: (i) the impacts of bilateralism
on world welfare, (ii) the extent to which new bilateralism can be ac-
commodated in the multilateral trade liberalization agenda and (iii) me-
chanisms necessary to manage the conduct of bilateralism.
In the second stage, based on the empirical evidence found, chapters
IV and V focus on analyzing EU-Thailand relations within the proposed
theoretical frameworks at the unit and systemic levels, respectively. In
applying the above three foreign policy theories, chapter IV focuses on
the EU and Thailand's approaches to their bilateral relations and is di-
vided issue-specifically into three fields of relations: the political, eco-
nomic and developmental. With the focus on the functions that bilater-
alism offers the international system, chapter V mainly discusses the re-
levance of bilateralism to the developments of ‘regionalism’ in the
ASEAN and East Asian regionalism, ‘interregionalism’ in the ASEM
and ARF and ‘globalism’ in the UN and WTO. Chapter VI presents the
conclusion.
The time frame of the research mainly covers the period from the
Asian Crisis in 1997 through 2007, a period of nearly ten years, with
the last event included in this book being the announcement of the
Council’s (2007) conclusions regarding recommendations to open the
FTA negotiations with ASEAN countries in April 2007. Although, in
other cases, the new bilateralism was supposedly begun a few years ear-
lier or later, the reason for choosing this period of time is twofold. First,
it is the period during which Thailand, as one of the fastest growing
economies in the 1990s, began to attract the EU’s attention for various
reasons while the EU also sent out signals that it was seeking new part-
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ners in Asia, as is clearly seen in the launching of the ASEM process in
March 1996. Second, this roughly ten-year period contains numerous
contrasts of the policy changes of both parties before and after the
Asian Crisis, the WTO trade talks in Seattle and Cancun as well as the
9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, all of which presented important events
on both the domestic and international levels as far as new bilateralism
trends are concerned.
The study is methodologically designed to be a documentary re-
search. It makes use of primary and secondary literature available on-
line and in various libraries and archives. The following institutions
were very relevant and important sources: (in Thailand) Delegation of
the European Commission to Thailand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the Tourism
Authority of Thailand, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany,
the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Chulalongkorn University
and Thammasat University’s libraries, the Center for European Studies,
and the archives of various Thai newspapers including Machiton, Thair-
ath, the Bangkok Post, and The Nation; (in Germany) the libraries at the
Universities of Freiburg, Konstanz, Munich and Frankfurt, the Institut
für Asienkunde in Hamburg, the Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Ar-
chiv, the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin; (in Belgium) the Royal Thai Em-
bassy and the Mission of Thailand to the European Communities, and
the library and the historical archive of the European Commission in
Brussels, and the libraries at the College of Europe and the United Na-
tions University in Comparative Regional Integration Studies in Bruges;
(in the UK) the University of Birmingham and the European Resource
Centre of the European Research Institute in Birmingham and the Cen-
tre of the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University
of Warwick; and (in the US) Harvard University. As far as the most re-
cent developments of EU-Thailand relations are concerned, internet
sources have been very useful in the writing of this book, including
those of the European Commission, the Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand,
the Mission of Thailand to the European Communities, and the Office
of Commercial Affairs of the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand in
Brussels. For information regarding developments in bilateral and re-
gional FTAs, several websites such as ‘bilateral.org’ website also pro-
vided a very useful overview and helpful links to corresponding
sources.
In addition to the documentary research, 39 informal interviews were
conducted between April and October 2006. Twenty of the interviewees
are officers in various relevant ministries and institutions, nine of
whom worked for Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Finance and the Tourism Authority of Thai-
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land, while the other 11 worked for the EU at the Delegation of the Eur-
opean Commission to Thailand in Bangkok and the Directorate-General
for External Relations in Brussels. The other 19 interviews consisted of
‘expert interviews’ including university professors, businesspeople and
experts in the relevant fields; seven of the interviewees were Thai and
12 were European. Of the 39 interviewees, 8 were female. The inter-
views averaged about 30 minutes each, ranging from 10 minutes to
about 2 hours. In most of the cases, the interviews were face-to-face
and of a semi-structured type, that is, the interviewer had an individual
set of relevant questions for each interviewee and could adjust them
during the interview where necessary. This type of interview was chosen
because it allowed the interviewer to guide and control the direction of
the information and created a stimulating atmosphere which also gave
him access to the interviewees' personal thoughts and feelings (Taylor
and Bogden 1984). Most of the interviews served primarily as ‘back-
ground’ in the sense that they help provide an overview of EU-Thailand
relations and stress the important aspects of this particular bilateralism.
However, as will be clearly indicated in the footnotes, some of the inter-
views not only raised issues that would have been hardly addressed in
written documents, but also qualitatively complemented the quantitative
data that are otherwise available mostly.
Moreover, I had the opportunity to carry out two subsequent intern-
ships at the Royal Thai Embassy and the Mission of Thailand to the
European Communities in Brussels in April – May 2006 and the Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand in Bangkok in June –
July 2006. These two internships were not only invaluable experiences,
but they also provided background information and personal contacts
for the subsequent field research. The relevant information that arose
from those internships and the field research will be clearly indicated
in the footnotes.
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II Depicting New Bilateralism
II.1 Terminology
II.1.1 Bilateralism and Multilateralism
Like ‘unilateral’ or ‘multilateral’, ‘bilateral’ is an adjective that modifies
interstate relations in general and phonologically hints at the number of
parties involved. For example, in the realm of diplomatic relations, ‘bi-
lateral diplomacy’ is defined as ‘‘the conduct of relations’’ or ‘‘commu-
nication limited to two parties at any one time’’ (Berridge 1995: 19).
The term ‘bilateralism’, however, stands for an organizing principle of
bilateral conduct and, as postulated in political science literature, ap-
pears to have a more implicit meaning on institutional form than just
‘relations involving two states or parties’. As Baumann (2002: 5) indi-
cated in the context of multilateralism, bilateralism may carry with it
two generic senses: The first one refers to the patterns of relations
among states in international relations while the second describes the
orientation of a state’s foreign policy conduct.
In a more systematic way, according to Pasvolsky (1936), Diebold
(1988) and later Ruggie (1993: 6), there are basically at least two ways
to define terms such as unilateralism, bilateralism, and pluri- and mul-
tilateralism.1 The authors call this first version a ‘formal’ or ‘nominal’
definition whereby the number of parties appears to be the primary cri-
terion for categorization. Keohane (1990: 731) offered a well-known de-
finition of multilateralism: ‘‘the practice of coordinating national poli-
cies in groups of three or more states’, so that, analogous to this defini-
tion, bilateralism may also be defined as a practice of coordinating
national policies between two states or parties. The second version is
called a ‘substantive’ or ‘qualitative’ definition which takes into account
the different ‘kinds of relations’ between any given number of players,
stressing the qualitative dimension of institutional principles (Ruggie
1993: 6; see also Diebold 1988: 1). Bilateralism is sharply differentiated
from multilateralism in the second definition in terms of the operating
principles of coordination such as ‘specific’ versus ‘diffuse’ reciprocity
or ‘discriminatory’ versus ‘nondiscriminatory’ character.2 For instance,
in contrast to the first far-reaching version, this definition would not ca-
tegorize the German Dreikaiserbund [League of Three Emperors] in Bis-
mark’s government in the 19th Century under multilateralism (Ruggie
1993: 6) or the new wave of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ led by
the US in the Iraq conflicts and the peacekeeping missions that fol-
lowed.
This study does not focus on justifying the aforementioned defini-
tions, even if they are just the beginning of an extensive list of possible
definitions of bilateralism and multilateralism. Instead, the aim of this
subchapter is to briefly provide an overview on the use of such terms in
political science literature and to clarify the moot points that may be
crucial for understanding the concepts of new bilateralism in the follow-
ing chapters. As illustrated above, bilateralism and multilateralism are
both very demanding concepts in terms of phonological conditions and
their organizing principles. Let us now turn to the term ‘new bilateral-
ism’.
II.1.2 New Bilateralism
The term ‘new bilateralism’ was first used in the mid-1980s. It is inter-
esting to note, in retrospect, that the US has promoted multilateralism
as one of its foreign affairs principles since 1945 and thus strongly ob-
jected to the primordial bilateral approaches, which they claimed were
discriminatory and prone to exploitation in an asymmetrical relation-
ship (Kahler 1993: 295). The very policy drift back to bilateralism be-
came obvious under the second Reagan administration, as indicated by
US economic policies regarding the newly industrializing East Asian
countries (Haggard and Cheng 1989: 306) when this policy trend was
already being called the ‘new bilateralism’. In this sense, ‘new bilateral-
ism’ generally refers to the US’ re-introduction of bilateral approaches,
which aided its attempts to solve trade conflicts with its partners by put-
ting direct pressure on them, for example, to open their markets or to
consider trade-related issues such as intellectual property rights. In the
case of South Korea, the US’ new bilateral approaches are often men-
tioned in the context of liberalizing the automobile sector and the open-
ing up of capital markets (Gills 1996: 671).
The use of the term ‘new bilateralism’ began to increase in the late
1990s, especially in the field of international economic relations, as sev-
eral bilateral trade negotiations have taken place on the ‘side-lines’ of
those at the multilateral level. The politics of ‘new bilateralism’ became
a leading economic policy trend; a number of countries in the Asia-Pa-
cific region turned to it in the aftermath of the so-called ‘trade institu-
tion failures’ – especially after multilateral trade negotiations at the
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WTO slowed down and the IMF’s crisis management misconduct in
the Asian Financial Crisis was exposed (Dent 2003). In response to
these developments in the world economy, it would not be surprising to
discover that, in an effort to push trade liberalization forward, a ‘new bi-
lateralism’ has been pursued as an instrument of discriminatory prefer-
ential trading arrangements (Lloyd 2002; Ravenhill 2003). With regard
to the two definitions of bilateralism mentioned above, the term ‘new
bilateralism’ clearly transcends the definition of ‘formal bilateralism’,
moving toward a definition of ‘substantive bilateralism’ due to the rele-
vance of the operating principles attached to bilateral free trade agree-
ments – for instance, the discriminatory character of preferential trad-
ing arrangements or the principle of specific reciprocity.
In later scholarly discussions, the term begins to refer to a broader
and more diffuse phenomenon and is no longer concentrated around
the area of intergovernmental economic relations but generalized to
cover other issue areas of cooperation such as security and at different
levels of the decision-making process, although not yet to the same ex-
tent. Meanwhile, the use of ‘new bilateralism’ can also be found in a
study conducted by Smith and Tsatsas (2002), which describes Great
Britain’s new bilateral approaches with other EU countries. In response
to the changing nature of the EU’s decision-making process, London’s
foreign policy also seems to be subsumed under ‘new bilateralism’ as it
‘has concentrated on trying to bypass the Commission, and instead to
develop stronger inter-governmental ties with other EU countries’ (The
Economist, dated 03 and 24 and 2001).
Due to the broad and diffuse nature of the term ‘new bilateralism’, it
is not surprising that the use of the term has been perceived with much
skepticism in the public arena. ‘New bilateralism’ for the media, for in-
stance, rather connotes a re-introduction or a return of a country’s for-
eign policy approaches to bilateral channels. The term ‘bilateralism’ it-
self has not been a very popular approach given purported arrange-
ments of multilateral trade liberalization, as Smith and Tsatsas (2002:
xi) put it: ‘‘bilateralism’ was an approach that dare not speak its name’.
What is really ‘new’ about ‘new bilateralism’ is the debate issue, which
will be addressed in the following section.
II.2 The Major Characteristics of New Bilateralism
There have been several studies that have attempted to justify the ‘new-
ness’ or to identify the underlying ‘new’ qualities of different phenom-
ena in international relations. This is also one of the aims of this sec-
tion with regard to ‘new bilateralism’. Considering a related phenomen-
on such as ‘new regionalism’, it is worth listing the four criteria which
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Rüland (2001) uses to describe ‘new regionalism’: (i) more diffuse
membership, (ii) growing agenda complexity, (iii) development of its
own organizational infrastructure, and (iv) emergence of new indepen-
dent actors. Along this line, the following section represents an attempt
to empirically outline the main characteristics of ‘new bilateralism’ par-
ticularly in terms of its actors, agendas, and policy instruments.
II.2.1 New Actors
Of the forerunners in the ‘new bilateralism’ trends, it is interesting to
see not only the great powers – e.g. the US – still decisively pursuing
its goals of trade liberalization even after that apparent slow-down of
multilateralism. In the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore and Thailand are
considered the first nations to share the WTO’s views regarding the
slowness of various processes and, not surprisingly, also the first ones
to support the trend of new bilateralism. Meanwhile, there are many
small countries and, more importantly, many developing countries that
have actively joined these trends, many of which have done so very ra-
pidly. Even though some countries such as Japan or Malaysia used to be
very skeptical about the conduct of ‘new bilateralism’, it would not be
wrong to say that all countries, including those that were once strong
opponents, now belong to at least one regional or bilateral preferential
trading arrangement (Frankel 1997: 4). This fact makes it clear that we
are engaged in these trends and that most of the countries are active
participants. A few remarks may be helpful in helping us better under-
stand the key players of new bilateralism.
First, although factors like historical relations, geographical proximity,
convergence of national interests, similarity of political party back-
ground and good personal relations have been identified as crucial for
successful bilateral relations (Smith and Tsatsas 2002: 30), it is arguable
whether the significance of the first two elements are on the decline.
That geographical proximity plays an increasingly less important role in
the formation of bilateral ties can be observed in the examples of the
Singapore-Panama Free Trade Agreement signed in March 2006 or the
Thailand-Bahrain Framework Agreement on Closer Economic Partner-
ship signed in December 2002. With regard to GATT Article XXIV,
which deals primarily with ‘regional’ trade agreements, it is interesting
to note that no requirement of geographical contiguity or proximity is
mentioned and that no proposed free trade agreement has ever been re-
jected by GATT's authorities (Frankel 1997: 4). However, in some
authors’ eyes, a good percentage of these seem rather ‘unnatural’ (Bhag-
wati 2002: 112; See also Frankel 1997: chapter 8).
Moreover, it is evident that individual states in a particular region
seek to initiate not only intra-regional but far more extra-regional ties
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with influential states outside of the region. The patterns of new bilat-
eral relations seem to show the so-called ‘hub-spoke’ structures, which
is also referred to as ‘hub-spoke bilateralism’ (Dent 2006: 84, 105). It is
not uncommon that, in most cases, the two parties of the recent bilat-
eral agreements are members of the same multilateral groupings else-
where. For example, all of the parties in the Singapore-New Zealand
Free Trade Agreement (2000) and the Australia-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (2004) are members of the transregional trade forum
APEC.
Second, the trend of ‘new bilateralism’ was early adopted by the de-
veloping world. And rapidly, it has extensively extended to them as an-
other venue for their bilateral relations among themselves, which under
circumstances may also contribute to the strengthening of the South-
South relations in the global economy (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005:
2). However, in order to judge the active participation of those states,
some authors including Dent (2006: 108) point to the fact that despite
their great willingness to engage in the free trade agreements trends,
not all of the countries can afford it due to their technocratic or bureau-
cratic deficiencies. In Southeast Asia, the examples given by Dent (ibid.)
of those who seek to initiate free trade negotiations but end up playing
only a passive role due to the aforementioned deficiencies are the Phi-
lippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Furthermore, there
is a question of each individual state’s economic performance and gen-
eral outward orientation, which seem to be a ‘prerequisite’ to entering
into free trade agreements. In the case of Vietnam, for instance, Japan
in the 2003 negotiations required that Hanoi first accede to the WTO
before it would establish a bilateral free trade agreement (Dent 2006:
108).
Third, it becomes evident that the game is not only being played on a
government-to-government basis. The increasing relevance of ‘track
two’ diplomacy has been observable, introducing corresponding offi-
cials, academics or experts as important players. Also, the proliferation
of bilateral and regional trading arrangements contributes significantly
to the participation of business and nongovernmental actors in the pol-
icy-making process. Their business interests are discussed regarding
their perceived disadvantages as soon as the competitors are granted
preferential treatment in foreign markets after a free trade agreement
has been concluded (Ravenhill 2003: 303). Depending on national eco-
nomic structures, if net benefits from a bilateral free trade agreement
are concentrated in a few particular sectors, it can be a major driving
force for the affected industries to lobby the government or relevant po-
litical entities in favor of a free trade agreement (ibid. 303-304, See also
Wall 2002).3
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II.2.2 New Agendas
II.2.2.1 Economic Agenda
Economic interests appear to dominate the overall agendas of ‘new bila-
teralism’. As mentioned above, pioneers of this trend – the US, Singa-
pore and perhaps also Thailand – consider the WTO processes to be
‘too weak’ and ‘too slow’ to cope with current issues such as informa-
tion technology or e-commerce. As far as the ‘new’ agenda is con-
cerned, it is perhaps important to clarify that the attribute ‘new’ is put
here in comparison to traditional bilateral diplomacy. In fact, it is often
the case that the issues in question were or have also been discussed in
international forums elsewhere, multilaterally or unilaterally.
Considering the factual economic agendas of ‘new bilateralism’, three
general developments can be highlighted here: the first one being the
introduction of the very recent specific issues present in the world econ-
omy. Second, the special treatment of issues that have been impeded or
failed to receive attention in other forums, mostly the WTO, and third,
the free combination of issues in the bilateral economic agendas.
First, some recent issues have been addressed too slowly to be in-
cluded in the WTO framework, and here is where the ‘new bilateralism’
can serve as an alternative way to accommodating these issues in a
more skilful and timely manner. The apparent domains of ‘new’ issues
used to be, or have been among others e-commerce, the environment,
intellectual property rights, science and technology, and trade and in-
vestment promotion (see also Dobson 2001: 1010). Given the broad
range of aspects in international trade relations, the choice of which is-
sues should be included in the bilateral free trade agreements is by no
means random. It is clear that the agreements tend to focus on a set of
particular issues that make it intrinsically important to both parties. For
example, the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (2003) urges Singa-
pore to partially lift its ban on chewing gum, but it excludes agriculture
because this is not really relevant to Singapore (Dent 2006). Also, it is
interesting to observe that some bilateral agreements are negotiated for
specific objectives and interests and may be concluded separately from
the comprehensive free trade agreement. For example, the EU-China
Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (2000) or the long list
of the US’ bilateral intellectual property rights agreements with its de-
veloping partners since the early 1990s.4
The second development refers to attempts to include issues such as
agriculture or the environment in a contentious or sensitive bilateral
framework, which has thus far been impeded or has failed to receive
the attention of the WTO. In the case of agriculture, there is indeed a
WTO framework called the ‘Agreement on Agriculture’ (1995), which
lays down some international norms and rules on agricultural trade.
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However, this Agreement generally lacks precision in its formulation
and strong binding commitments. It is not surprising that a number of
countries would begin to bilaterally negotiate preferential arrangements
subject to particular commodities or the agricultural sector as a whole.
As is the case in the WTO negotiations, however, agriculture remains
highly sensitive and a lot of bilateral deals have been put on hold just
because of the agriculture issue (Josling 2004). These deals include, for
example, the delay in signing the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement
(expected February 2006), the long debate on whether or not to exclude
agriculture from the Australia-Japan Free Trade Agreement, and the res-
ignation of the Agriculture Minister of Panama while negotiating the
US-Panama Free Trade Agreement. An example of a bilateral free trade
agreement that successfully includes agriculture in its liberalization pro-
gram can be seen in the South Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement
(2004), despite massive protests by farmers before its ratification by the
National Assembly.
Another controversial point in the Millennium Round is undeniably
the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’, which were first proposed at the 1996
Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference. The Singapore Issues focus on
four main points: (i) investment protection, (ii) competition policy, (iii)
transparency in government procurement and (iv) trade facilitation. The
first two points appear to be especially sensitive issues, which sharply
divide the positions of the developed and developing world. This is why
relations between investment and trade as well as other essential trade-
related issues are increasingly included within a bilateral free trade
agreement framework, for example, the US-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement (2003) or the Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement
(2004).
The third point is that the ‘new bilateralism’ economic agenda may
reveal a palpable widening of the definition of what constitutes econom-
ic issues. That is, the free combination of the economic agendas is
clearly seen in the emergence of a number of free trade agreements,
which are not limited in scope to setting up a free trade area as such.
In fact, they also include some relevant elements, which are aimed at
developing linkages between trade and investment, such as Japan’s
‘Economic Partnership Agreements’ with Mexico (2004) or Malaysia
(2005). Another step toward this trend was taken with the signing of se-
parate bilateral agreements with particular objectives such as ‘Trade and
Investment Framework Agreements’ (TIFAs) or ‘Bilateral Investment
Treaties’ (BITs), sometimes called ‘Investment Promotion and Protec-
tion Agreements’ (IPPAs).5 Moreover, there is a stronger link between
international trade and finance, as international transactions based on
exports and imports may affect exchange rates and, more specifically,
national monetary policies. The attempts to set up bilateral or regional
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cooperation in international finance and the monetary system can be
observed especially in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis (Dobson 2001:
108-109). An example would be the US-Singapore Free Trade Agree-
ment (2003) in which one of the most consequential concessions by
the second party was that capital controls in the currency markets be
made more restrictive (Dent 2006: 106).
II.2.2.2 Security Agenda
In contrast to international economic relations, security cooperation
does not have an equivalent institution that has been as far-reaching
and firmly developed as, say, the WTO. In the Asia-Pacific, there is evi-
dence to suggest that regional security cooperation has been faced with
several institutional challenges and thus predominately relies on bilat-
eral alliances (Emmers 2004: 12-13). Bilateral security approaches imply
that by establishing bilateral defense arrangements, the two parties at-
tempt to turn away from an ‘unconditional collective response’ to a bi-
laterally agreed solution.6 But the conduct of bilateral alliances is not
new. They indeed played a significant role in holding together regional
security during the postwar period. Under the San Francisco System,
for example, the US signed a long list of bilateral alliances – under the
designation of ‘Mutual Defense Treaties’ – with the Philippines in Au-
gust 1951, with Japan in September of the same year, and with South
Korea in 1954. The fact that these alliances were primarily set up
against various communist fronts during the Cold War supports the
realist view of alliance formation with regard to the underlying threat-
oriented strategies of nation states.
Security agendas supposedly undergo significant changes according
to new security understandings and consequently new approaches de-
signed for security cooperation. To start with, during the interwar peri-
od, the concept of ‘collective security’ emerged under President Wil-
son’s proposal for establishing the League of Nations, and it principally
refers to a common response by all participants against any aggression.
In reality, most nations objected to such commitments especially in
terms of political and military obligations and thus began to seek alter-
native security concepts. Of the most dominant concepts, ‘common se-
curity’, ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘cooperative security’ have been
developed based on different security understandings under various cir-
cumstances. The main difference between ‘common security’ and ‘com-
prehensive security’ is that the first was defined in the Cold War context
and so, as in the OSCE model, contained certain values on the socio-po-
litical subjects while the second is an Asian alternative proposed by Ja-
pan in the 1970s, the focus of which is rather inward-looking (Emmers
2004: 8) but was extended to include political, economic, and social
matters without regard to the aforementioned values.7 The concept of
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‘cooperative security’, which was first adopted by Canada in 1990 and
later by several countries in the Asia-Pacific including Japan, is the
most recent among the three approaches and seemingly also the most
promising one. The four main principles of ‘cooperative security’ may
be worth mentioning briefly: (i) the slow and gradual institutionaliza-
tion of security relations, (ii) the use of new institutions to complement
existing regional alliances,8 (iii) the principle of inclusiveness, and (iv)
the introduction of informal diplomacy (Emmers 2004: 8). To sum up,
three important points can be made that outline the recent develop-
ments of a ‘new’ security agenda, as follows:
First, ‘new bilateralism’ appears to follow the modified versions of se-
curity understanding which are no longer limited to the primordial con-
duct of military resources. As a matter of fact, the increasing impor-
tance of the ‘non-conventional security issues’ becomes evident and to a
large extent begins to rule out traditional political-military conflicts
(Wattanayagorn 2001). Undoubtedly, there has been a widespread trend
to include security concerns in most interstate dialogues since the 9/11
attacks, turning their focus toward new types of threats caused by inter-
national terrorism, for example, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. In a more general sense, this development of international
security challenges is referred to as ‘non-conventional’ security threats,
which are characterized as follows: ‘(i) They tend to be of a transna-
tional nature, (ii) governments are challenged by non-state actors, and
(iii) non-state actors often rely on asymmetric strategies, such as terror-
ism, guerrilla warfare and informal activities’ (Münkler 2002: 49, cited
in: Rüland 2005a: 552).9 The term ‘non-conventional security issues’ is
also employed to describe a new set of diverse transnational challenges,
which mostly go beyond the realm of traditional military conduct. The
new approaches also take into account non-military security aspects in-
tegrating – though still inward looking – political, social and economic
issues in a framework of cooperation. Examples of these non-conven-
tional issues to which special attention has been paid in recent interna-
tional relations include international migration, environmental degrada-
tion, and pandemics (Rüland 2005: 558).
Second, it is often the case that security agendas have been pursued
in direct or indirect relation to other policy areas such as economics or
development. Especially after the terror attacks of 9/11 and the Bali
bombing in October 2002, it was noticeable that security interests be-
gan to gain much more attention, for example, in the negotiations of bi-
lateral or regional free trade agreements (Desker 2004: 19). In building
up the ‘coalition of the willing’, for instance, the US is alleged to supply
its allies with aid packages, financial credits or trade benefits, should
they support it in the 2003 Iraq invasion (Ziltener 2004: 1473). Some
have noted that the consequent profits of multinational and national
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military firms as well as non-military reconstruction and oil reserves
are what is essentially at stake (Singer 2005).10 The linkages between
different policy areas can also be found in the rhetorically wide-reaching
formulation of some bilateral cooperation frameworks. For example, in
an interview with the Thai former Prime Minister Thaksin during his
China visit on the 30th Anniversary of Sino-Thai bilateral relations: ‘We
want to move it [the Joint Plan of Action] forward in the area of interna-
tional politics, security, economic cooperation and culture, and the issue
is high on my agenda to discuss with my counterpart Wen Jiabao dur-
ing my visit’ (People’s Daily, Beijing, 28 June 2005).
Third, although it is not always part of the focus, one can note that
bilateral negotiations are starting to ‘touch upon’ certain political values,
including issues considered highly sensitive in international relations.
There have been impulses to include and discuss sensitive issues such
as human rights, democracy and good governance in the bilateral agen-
das. In the German-Indonesian relationship, for instance, the Germans
have concentrated on Indonesia’s decentralization progress as being
one of the four priority issues in development cooperation.11 Moreover,
in the area of human security, Germany has contributed significantly to
the establishment of Indonesia's Tsunami Early Warning System in
2005 or to fighting Avian Flu a year later. Furthermore, in the case of
the EU, ‘European Consensus’ Article 13 stresses the importance of po-
litical values in cooperation frameworks with third countries as follows:
‘EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote com-
mon values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace,
democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity
and justice’. For example, since the EU-Russia Summit in November
2004, the two parties have been engaged in human rights dialogues
and consultations on a regular six-month basis.12
II.2.2.3 Development Agenda
Development aid used to be one of the cornerstones of bilateral rela-
tions in the postwar period. Of the early development aid programs, the
classic examples were based on bilateral ties between the former colo-
nial powers and their now independent colonies (Lukas 1988: 65-66).
Also, it is important to note that there was a series of financial aid
packages and transfers of resources, which need to be looked at against
the backdrop of East-West conflicts. In this light, it is not surprising
that the development programs were to a large extent historically condi-
tioned in the form of donors-recipient relations and that the develop-
ment policies were normatively designed to contribute to maintaining
stability and security in that particular region or country. They were fun-
damentally aimed at capacity-building in the social and economic devel-
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opments of each recipient country, and in some cases, regional integra-
tion as well.13
This picture began to change during the 1980s. In the Asian context,
the outstanding economic performance in some East Asian developing
countries seems to explain the fact that the aforementioned donor-reci-
pient relations began going into decline and the overall development
programs have thus been re-adjusted and re-accentuated (Andersen
2000: 86; Development Assistance Committee 2005). Today the devel-
opment policy no longer has the same degree of relevance in the inter-
national relations literature, but it is still worth investigating more dee-
ply because, as a matter of fact, several former recipient states became
key players in the current trend of ‘new bilateralism’ in the mid-1990s.
Also, in spite of recent attempts to promote multilateralism in develop-
ment cooperation and a consistent increase in multilateral development
programs, it is should be noted that bilateralism has been and remains
the dominant form of the development framework (ibid.).
To start with, the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ development
agendas is most evident by a ‘change of emphasis’ (Stokke 2005).
Although it continues to focus on particular issues, the ‘new’ agenda
has apparently undergone modifications that were realized in the New
Poverty Agenda, the policies and initiative toward highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs) and, in a more general sense, the commitments to
the Millennium Development Goals. They generally comprise issues
concerning poverty, health, education, and gender equality with the
priorities having changed with regard to the so-called ‘revival of the so-
cial dimensions of development’ and the emphasized aspects of ‘good
governance’ (ibid.).
It also seems that the ‘new’ development agenda is diversified and is
often combined with other policy fields. The first combination is devel-
opment and security, pointing out the close links between peace promo-
tion missions and capacity-building development programs (Ambert
1997). Taking the same example, it is an ironic but yet interesting ex-
ample to see that in the formation of the ‘coalition of the willing’ led by
the US has promised the participating countries a generous set of afore-
mentioned benefits in return for their support in the Iraq invasion in
2003 and the later peacekeeping missions (Ziltener 2004: 1473). As the
statistics show, the US also increased its ODA from about 0.10% of
gross national product in the 1990s to 0.13% in 2003 and 0.14% in
2004 (OECD, in: Stokke 2005: 47).
Another well-known combination is development and trade, meaning
that a good number of the development programs are increasingly
being designed to support international trade and political economic re-
lations. As is the case in several East Asian states and later in a lot of
developing countries, one significant policy orientation concerns the
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pursuit of an export-oriented industrialization strategy. From the eco-
nomic viewpoint, this strategy poses a serious challenge with regard to
the instability of external demands and therefore calls for sound macro-
economic and industrialization policies (Greenaway and Morrissey
1993; Siriprachai 2000). In the Asian Crisis, a series of developing
economies were inescapably tested on their global market vulnerability.
Since most of them appeared to have sizable deficiencies, there has
been an increase in bilateral development cooperation aimed at
strengthening these economies. While, it is obvious in the IMF’s policy
prescriptions that neoliberal trade powers led by the US hope to see the
development agenda go hand in hand with tax reform, fiscal discipline,
privatization, deregulation or even liberalization, that is, in strong accor-
dance with the ‘Washington Consensus’ model (see also Dieter 1998),
this is indeed an important incentive for several economies to seek al-
ternative approaches in ‘new bilateralism’. For example, the German
agency for development cooperation, the GTZ, has proposed various
programs focusing on sustainable development and the promotion of
small and medium-sized enterprises in China, Indonesia, Thailand,
Vietnam, etc.14
Along this line, cooperation in scientific and technological research is
clearly on the increase and, for both the economic and development di-
mensions, it suggests a wide range of ‘new’ issue linkages. This ex-
plains the terminological nuance between conventional development po-
licies and the programs in scientific and technological cooperation,
which have been promoted in recent bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. In the APEC framework, for instance, the economic and techni-
cal cooperation (ECOTECH) agendas are comprised of capacity-building
and information-sharing programs that are primarily designed to help
its developing members pursue the Bogor objectives of region-wide
trade liberalization by 2010. Based on its content,15 the ECOTECH
agenda can basically be subsumed under the scope of development poli-
cies. As for the bilateral channel, there is also a long list of bilateral
agreements on scientific and technological cooperation, including the
US, which signed the ‘Bilateral Science and Technology Framework
Agreements’ with some 33 countries up to 200116 and the EU, which
has similar agreements with China (2000) and Brazil (2003).
II.2.3 New Instruments
Given that traditional bilateralism has a very wide range of instruments
itself, it is very unclear to what extent a diverse set of instruments is re-
levant and determines the conduct of ‘new bilateralism’. Formally, the
inherent and usual way to initiate new bilateral relations is to negotiate
the corresponding bilateral agreements. But this is not new and very
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unoriginal. In a broader sense, however, a ‘new’ instrument refers to
the important means and principles, which have recently been devel-
oped to pursue the agendas mentioned above. In practice, it is also sup-
posed to explain the significant number of these bilateral agreements
and their rapid deployment. The following is an attempt to recapitulate
the significant character of the ‘new’ instruments of these bilateral ap-
proaches.
Since new bilateralism has the advantage of dealing with the particu-
lar issues of the two parties involved, it tends to ‘break up’ a compre-
hensive agenda into so-called ‘multiple issue-specific alliances’ (Smith
and Tsatsas 2002: 29). It is not uncommon for new bilateral agree-
ments to focus on one particular policy area, be it economic or security-
related matters. In international economic relations, there has been an
increase in bilateral agreements and partial agreements that specifically
address single issues such as intellectual property rights, investment
promotion or those on certain agricultural products.17 This trend can
also be observed in development cooperation insofar as the new pro-
grams agreed upon become more specific in terms of project goals and
guidelines, for example, the bilateral agreements on science and tech-
nology or the HIPC initiatives mentioned above. Moreover, the specifi-
city of issues seems to lead to the increased participation of bureau-
cratic actors beyond the traditional state-to-state diplomatic levels. ‘Pro-
miscuous bilateralism’ as coined by Smith and Tsatsas (ibid.) refers to
the meetings which, in contrast to traditional bilateral diplomacy, are
launched additionally at the ministerial bureaucratic or parliamentarian
levels and exist mostly in the short term and on ad hoc basis. It is gen-
erally hoped that they will support cooperation within a specific issue
area. In this light, the instance of the FTA policies of the Southeast
Asian states can be regarded as a strategic instrument to expand and
strengthen the network of bilateral economic partnership relations with-
in and beyond the region (Dent 2006).
As an instrument that responds to the perceived weakness and slow-
ness of multilateral groupings such as the WTO, new bilateralism in-
creasingly adopts the principle of reciprocity and in some cases also the
dispute settlement mechanisms. In the contrasting nature of reciprocal
relations between bilateralism and multilateralism, the latter mostly
generates the participants’ expectations of the so-called ‘diffuse recipro-
city’, i.e., ‘rough equivalence of benefits in aggregate over time’, while
the former is noted for relying on the commitments of ‘specific recipro-
city’, i.e., ‘the simultaneous balancing of specific quid pro quos by each
party with every other at all times’ (Ruggie 1993: 11; see also Keohane
1985). One implication of ‘new bilateralism’ is that bilateral agreements
would be and indeed are preferred as ‘[differentiated] case-by-case based
precisely on a priori particularistic grounds or situational exigencies’
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(ibid.). In the economic realm, the shift toward ‘specific reciprocity’ is
expressed by the fact that a number of states, including the major
ASEAN states, intentionally ignore the implementation of the MFN
principle while negotiating bilateral free trade arrangements. The trend
of reciprocal relations can also be observed in new development coop-
eration patterns, which increasingly provides loans instead of grants or
project-oriented activities instead of financial aid transfers, as not least
discussed in a contentious issue of conditionality. Moreover, it is not
surprising that in order to strengthen reciprocal relations the same un-
derlying principle influences the introduction of dispute settlement me-
chanisms to some extent. In the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership
Agreement, for example, there is a chapter on dispute settlement in the
form of general consultations (Article 140), good offices, conciliation,
and mediation (Article 141), specific consultations (Article 142), and the
establishment of an ‘Arbitral Tribunal’ (Article 143).18 Still, the establish-
ment of dispute settlement mechanisms in all of the relevant policy
fields seems very controversial but has yet to develop to a fully function-
ing stage.
As for security cooperation, the choice of instruments is mostly deter-
mined in accordance with different security concepts mentioned above.
The differences in security understanding are also likely to lead to dif-
ferent approaches in security cooperation. Let us take security coopera-
tion in the Asia-Pacific as an example, in which the two dominating
views are that of ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘cooperative security’. In
terms of security instruments, both concepts object to the use of force,
stressing the importance of consultations, consensus and confidence-
building instead (Tow 2004: 22). The concept of ‘cooperative security’
is, for instance, designed to accommodate track-two forums and gener-
ally avoid military or economic sanctions (Ferguson 2001; Emmers
2004). Against the background that most Asian states have traditionally
relied on ‘national security’, it is not surprising that they would regard
the ‘new’ security concepts as promising alternatives to the ‘West’s for-
mulation of ‘collective security’ or the value-containing ‘common secur-
ity’. However, recent progress in the region can best be described as
‘creeping moves toward “cooperative security”’, which ‘occurred mainly
in the area of conventional military security and, more recently, to some
extent, in the war against terror’ (Rüland 2005a: 557).
On the other side of the coin, it is important to note that ‘new bilater-
alism’ also faces considerable legal and institutional constraints and has
to follow certain instructions prescribed by relevant multinational for-
ums, especially in the fields of trade and development. In the case of in-
ternational trade relations, it is evident that due to the predominance of
the WTO, the MFN principle, which primarily suggests non-discrimina-
tory trade polices,19 does not leave much room for bilateral free trade
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agreements. Still, forming a preferential trading arrangement is possi-
ble but under the condition that it must conform to the WTO’s Article
XXIV.20 More specifically, this Article XXIV sets out three main require-
ments: (i) that trade barriers be eliminated in ‘substantially’ all the trade
among the members (Article 8b), (ii) that trade barriers against non-
members not be made more restrictive than before (Article 4 and 5b),
and (iii) that there be a plan and schedule to attain a free trade area or
customs union within a ‘reasonable’ length of time (Article 5c), which
were defined after the Uruguay Round in 1994 as a maximum of ten
years (Frankel 1997: 3). In reference to the last point, the example of
the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement demonstrates the US’ ‘phase-
out strategy’ for its duties on Singapore’s imports, that is, the least sen-
sitive products may become duty-free immediately upon the agree-
ment’s entry into force while the most sensitive products must undergo
a ‘phased-out’ process over a period of ten years.21
Bilateral development cooperation also has certain organizational con-
straints posed by relevant multilateral groupings. For instance, the
OECD has set up the Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
which is, among others, responsible for criteria and guidelines for de-
velopment cooperation programs. As far as the financial assistance is
concerned, the DAC agreed to loans with an interest rate of 2% for a
period of up to 30 years and an initial grace period of ten years (Ander-
son 2000: 86-87). Along this line, the World Bank-based International
Development Association (IDA) also provides comparable conditions
for loans, that is, zero interest with an annual service charge of 0.75%
for a period of up to 40 years as well as an initial grace period of ten
years (see also Anderson 2000: 87; Vandemoortele 2002).
II.3 Current Developments
In sheer numbers, it is remarkable how bilateral free trade agreements
have been extensively proposed, negotiated, and entered into force with-
in the last decade. Preferential trading arrangements in the past were
very limited in number and in most cases were historically or geogra-
phically conditioned, for example, the ‘Australian-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)’ (1983), the ‘Cana-
dian-United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA)’ (1988-89), or the Chile-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement (1991).22 There were only 124 regional
trade agreements notified to the GATT by 1995, but this number in-
creased to 196 just a decade later (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005: 2-3).
As of February 2005, 170 regional trade agreements are in force, 132 of
which entered into force after 1995 (ibid.). These figures clearly indicate
unprecedented growth in the proliferation of regional trade agreements.
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In relation to ‘new bilateralism’, it is unmistakable that the majority of
regional trade agreements are bilateral in nature. Of all the regional
trade agreements approved by the WTO up to February 2005, about
75% of the total active agreements and about 90% of those currently
under negotiation are bilateral, regional trade agreements (Crawford
and Fiorentino 2005: 4-5).
Geographically, there has been an increase of new bilateral free trade
agreements throughout the world, but the most striking occurred in the
Asia-Pacific region. Several authors including Llyod (2002) or Dent
(2003; 2006) have focused on the new free trade agreements policies
of Asia-Pacific countries over the last decade. The statistics show that by
1998 there had been only five free trade agreements concluded among
Asia-Pacific countries. But in the period from the end of 1998 through
2004, 21 more free trade agreements were concluded in the region,
summing up to a total of 66 FTA projects at all stages of negotiation
(Dent 2006: 93). As mentioned above, Singapore and Thailand are the
key actors participating in this trend, with Singapore involved in 12 free
trade agreement projects and Thailand six, putting them at number one
and two in Asia (Asia News Network 06 and 12 and 2004; Dent 2006:
93). It is notable that the recent proliferation of these free trade agree-
ments is concentrated in the Asia-Pacific because the majority is cross
regional by nature. Based on WTO statistics, the cross-regional trade
agreements account for almost 60% of those proposed and about 30%
of those negotiated and signed as of February 2005 (Crawford and Fior-
entino 2005: 5-6).
Besides trade, there has also been a significant rise of new bilateral
approaches to security and development cooperation. Especially after
the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, and the Bali bombing in
October 2002, security concerns led to a series of anti-terrorist coopera-
tion. The fact that the US set up the ‘coalition of the willing’ is regarded
as its attempt to establish or strengthen security ties through bilateral-
ism (Castro 2004). It is also apparent that many recent US foreign rela-
tions agreements have been closely linked and overshadowed by the
war on terrorism (Desker 2004: 19). Considering the list of free trade
agreements that the US has signed recently with its strategic partners,
Higgott (2003) calls it the ‘securitisation of the US international eco-
nomic policy’ (see also Desker 2004: 19). These developments and the
new security conditions also suggest that the participating countries, in-
cluding some Asian states, have vowed to revise their security ap-
proaches. The gradual move toward ‘new’ conceptions of comprehen-
sive security or cooperative security have, as we mentioned above, be-
come increasingly evident.
In recent discussions, the relevance of development cooperation
might not seem to be as important as economic or security cooperation.
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However, DAC statistics illustrate that the total volume of bilateral aid
among DAC members increased by 7% from 2001 to 2002 and by 5%
in 2003, whereby the most important factors of this rise include the
consistent growth in general bilateral grants, the increase in HIPC debt
relief programs, and the offsetting contribution of multilateral funds
(Development Assistance Committee 2005: 72). These developments
confirm the moves toward the commitments made at the Monterrey
Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 (ibid. 72-73). More-
over, it is crucial to note that a significant portion of aid flows is closely
linked to current issues in other policy areas, for example, the coopera-
tion programs in science and technology and the increased aid flows in
the war on terrorism (ibid. 74).
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III The Conceptualization of New Bilateralism
III.1 Defining Levels of Analysis
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990: 22) refer to the level of analysis as a
‘fulcrum point’, a very crucial starting point for constructing a research
design. In the disciplines of international relations and other social
sciences, the level-of-analysis problem has not only been addressed in
the search for an appropriate level to methodologically place an analysis
in any particular study. Moreover, it gives rise to the theoretical discus-
sions about the relevance and value of each level of analysis. This is ap-
parently because of the multi-level nature of these disciplines, which
underlies the so-called ‘multi-causality’ of events with respect to their
response and explanatory variables, as basically known under the classic
distinction between micro- and macroeconomics or psychology and so-
ciology (ibid.; Buzan 1995: 198-199; see also Singer 1961). Since it is
not infrequently the case that the analysts – intentionally or uninten-
tionally – relax and expand their focus on one single level of analysis to
accommodate variables from other levels, an important warning has
been raised that they cannot resolve the level-of-analysis problem with-
out looking at the costs of methodological complications (Singer 1961).
We have … roamed up and down the ladder of organizational
complexity with remarkable abandon … the moment required.
And though most of us have tended to settle upon the nation as
our most comfortable resting place, we have retained our propen-
sity for vertical drift, failing to appreciate the value of a stable
point of focus. Whether this lack of concern is a function of the
relative infancy of the discipline or the nature of the intellectual
traditions from whence it springs, it nevertheless remains a sig-
nificant variable in the general sluggishness, which characterizes
the development of theory in the study of relations among na-
tions (Singer 1961: 78).
In the same light, Harnrieder (1968) and Moul (1973) also underline
the ‘grave methodological consequences’ that would otherwise occur as
a result of mixing up different analytical environments, for example, in
making inferences from the relationships involving an aggregate of
units to those involving individual units. The point here is that it is of
the utmost importance for an analyst to clearly identify the level(s) of
analysis prior to his or her examination. Although statements resulting
from different levels of analysis may not be mutually exclusive, the fail-
ure to construct and define clear levels of analysis would otherwise lead
to an ‘inaccuracy of estimation’ and, more importantly, ‘the logical er-
ror’ (Moul 1973: 496).1 Along this line, Nye (1988: 242) also asserts that
‘it is a mistake to mingle structural and unit levels’.
In the literature of international relations, it should be noted that the
terms ‘unit of analysis’ and ‘level of analysis’ are often used inter-
changeably and that both conventionally refer to the manner in which
the subject matter is to be dealt with in a given analysis. However, this
is not simply a matter of phonological denotation but of deeper philoso-
phical nature as to whether the level-of-analysis problem should be un-
derstood in epistemological or ontological terms, that is, whether the
observed levels of analysis are to serve as sources of explanation or ob-
jects of analysis respectively (Moul 1973; Yurdusev 1993; Buzan 1995).
In practice, beyond the philosophical debate on the level of analysis as
an approach, there is only a subtle but ‘blurred’ distinction between the
two understandings so that, pragmatically, a level of analysis is defined
in less restricted terms and assumes a broad and rather ‘inclusive’ char-
acter (Buzan 1995: 203; see also Yurdusev 1993).
As the discussions proceed, the level of analysis concept itself be-
comes very broad and fluid. For a great part of the debate on the level-
of-analysis problem, there have been suggestions regarding how many
and what levels of analysis should be operating in the study of interna-
tional relations. To start with, Wolfers (1959), for instance, posits two le-
vels of analysis: the level of ‘states’ and that of ‘human beings’, whereby
the former are organized bodies of the latter while the latter’s psycholo-
gical reactions are eventually the basis of the former’s behavior. Mean-
while, in one of his classics Man, the State and War (1959), Waltz pro-
pounds a three-level approach, which is known as a classification of the
three images of international relations. Jervis (1976) proposes four le-
vels of analysis that include the following levels: decision-making, the
bureaucratic, the nature of the state and the workings of domestic poli-
tics, and the international environment. In a slightly different classifica-
tion, Rosenau’s Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy entail five le-
vels of analysis: the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and sys-
temic levels (Rosenau 1966: 43). As things stand, no definite number
of levels of analysis has been agreed upon thus far.2 Interestingly,
Singer (1971: 16) later came up with a very tolerant definition where a
‘level of analysis’ refers to ‘nothing more than the point along that verti-
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cal axis from the single individual to the global system at which one’s
objects of analysis are to be found’ (Cited in Yurdusev 1993: 81).
The study that follows is structured in a two-level scheme between
the unit level and the systemic level. This choice is by no means arbi-
trary, but it is dependent on the contribution of their two sets of vari-
ables in addressing the two sets of research questions as follows:
1. At the unit level, the focus of attention is particularly directed to-
ward the primary units of action, i.e., the EU and Thailand, which,
in this study, are taken as the two parties involved in the bilateral
relations. The first set of research questions includes questions on
factors that determine the developments of EU-Thailand relations
from their early stages on to their current state of bilateralism and
to what extent the foreign policies of the EU and Thailand as well
as the new policy trends of ‘new bilateralism’ can be explained in
terms of each party’s domestic economic, political and social charac-
teristics. The unit-level analysis is thus an attempt to concentrate
on foreign policy behavior on both sides and identify the underlying
mechanisms, which includes motivation and goals that explain
their possible policy shifts toward ‘new bilateralism’. In this respect,
like the study of foreign policy analysis, the frame of reference is to
focus on the domestic aspects – especially the interest structures
and political motivations – of the two parties that essentially shape
their foreign policy conduct.
2. At the systemic level, the analysis is designed to focus on the inter-
play between bilateralism and multilateralism and therefore to pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of the interaction taking place within
the international system. The second set of research questions seeks
to assess the extent to which the trends of ‘new bilateralism’ may af-
fect the structures of the international system and vice versa, that is,
the questions are focused on (i) the emerging patterns of the sys-
tem after the new wave of bilateral arrangements, (ii) the functions
that ‘new bilateralism’ is expected to perform, and is performing, in
relation to regionalism, interregionalism, or globalism, and (iii) the
relevance and implications of ‘new bilateralism’ for international re-
lations. Evidently, the main advantages of systemic-level analysis –
although it is inevitable that a certain degree of the deterministic
nature in the agent-structure relationships and uniformity across
the states’ foreign policy behaviors be accepted – lie in the possibi-
lity of studying the aggregated form of unit-level entities and the
overall patterns of international relations.
The two sets of questions to be addressed at two levels of analysis are
obviously not completely unrelated. However it would be wrong – in
the words of Singer (1961: 91) – to ‘add the two kinds of statements to-
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gether to achieve a cumulative growth of empirical generalizations’.
After all, the challenge here is putting the findings together again to
achieve a more total picture of the bilateral relations between the EU
and Thailand. It is hoped that the two sets of questions mentioned
above will complement each other and be helpful in describing bilater-
alism in the broader context of international relations. Since one party
of this bilateralism is not always considered ‘an actor’ in its own right,
the next chapter specifically turns to the EU in order to discuss the the-
oretical conceptualization of its actorness in more detail and lay down
some relevant pre-assumptions for later analysis.
III.2 The European Union as an Actor: The Principle-Agent
Approach
The EU as an international actor is both an approach and an attitude. It
is an approach because it captures and assesses the capabilities of the
EU to act as an actor at the international level (see also Sjöstedt 1977;
Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970). The con-
cept of actorness has been discussed on behavioral and ontological
grounds in the literature of international relations in general, but the
extent to which the concept may apply to the EU in particular appears
relatively less explored. It has been noted that, although the EU enjoys a
range of competence and legal personality in various policy areas, it is
‘hardly sufficient’ to define actorness solely in terms of international law
or other legal perspectives (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 18). Rather, be-
yond the predominating statist models, the attempts to characterize ‘ac-
tor-generated behaviour’ comprises a set of behavioral criteria such as
the autonomous foreign policy-making capacities (Cosgrove and Twitch-
ett 1970: 12-13, 38-39; Merle 1987: 296) or some particular resources
necessary to ‘act’ externally as an independent actor (Sjöstedt 1977;
Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 22, 36-38; see also White 2004: 18). At
this point, ‘actorness’ may be linked to the concept of ‘presence’ in the
way that the latter is a precondition of the former (Bretherton and Vog-
ler 1999: 33) and that an actor’s particular presence hints at the kind of
actorness of that actor (ibid.: 37; Allen and Smith 1990). Put together,
the concepts of ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ help us to explore a possible
‘process of structuration’ in the EU’s complex agency and may contri-
bute significantly to the identification and classification of an interna-
tional actor.3
The EU as an international actor is also an attitude in the sense that
the EU, as a non-state but collective entity with growing institutional de-
velopments, is alleged to have emerged as a new kind of actor to per-
form significant international roles. This attitude is related to a widely
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perceived imperative for the EU particularly due to its economic
strength and geopolitical influence. Not surprisingly, the EU is often re-
garded – at least in some particular policy areas – as an international ac-
tor in its own right and, to some extent, as one of the major global
powers (Jervis 1991 and 2; Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996; Galtung
1973; see also Bretherton and Vogler 1999). From within, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the EU is also aware of the need for it to assume
more significant international roles. For example, as stated in Agenda
2000 published by the European Commission (1997: 27), the EU ‘must
increase its influence in world affairs, promote values such as peace
and security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least de-
veloped countries, defend its social model and establish its presence on
the world markets’.
It is apparent that the aforementioned attitude toward the EU and its
institutions presupposes a certain degree of the EU’s actorness. In the
meantime, there is evidence to suggest that the political order of Europe
is changing, or is ‘europeanizing’, in the context of the EU as it under-
goes a range of significant institutional changes. ‘Europeanization’, ac-
cording to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 3), is referred to as ‘the
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures
of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions asso-
ciated with the problem solving that formalize interactions among the
actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authorita-
tive European rules.’4 The phenomenon takes on a broader range of as-
pects about the in- and outward integration of the EU as well as the var-
ious views on the capacity and actual performance of EU institutions.
In the latter respect, the term ‘Europeanization’ is related to another
concept coined by Allen (1998) as ‘Brusselisation’ which means that the
EU is said to be in process of gradually strengthening the Brussels-
based decision-making bodies, that is, assigning increasing importance
to the EU’s institutional arrangements (ibid.: 56-58).
Taking one step back, ‘Europeanization’ can be viewed as a process
that gives way to the delegation of the member states’ interests in the
EU’s institutions such as the European Commission or the European
Court of Justice. This kind of delegation touches upon the principal-
agent model in which the interactions among the member states and
the supranational institutions may be explored in terms of contractua-
lized relationships between principals and agents.5 More specifically, as
Kassim and Menon (2002: 5-6) note, the principal-agent approach is
very helpful in explaining (i) the extent to which the member states are
in control of the politics at the EU level and (ii) the performance of the
EU institutions as they are expected to act, and actually act, indepen-
dently. The same authors identify at least four applications within the
principle-agent approaches that have been dominating the discussions
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about the workings of the EU: (i) liberal intergovernmentalism, (ii) in-
stitutional intergovernmentalism, (iii) historical institutionalist suprana-
tionalism, and (iv) rational choice institutional supranationalism (Kas-
sim and Menon 2002; see also, for each application: Moravcsik 1993;
Garrett 1992; Pierson 1996; and Pollack 1997, respectively.)
Following the intergovernmental tradition, the first two applications
are generally in agreement regarding the predominant roles of nation
states in constructing and maintaining an international institution.
With regard to the EU, both maintain the assumption that the perfor-
mance of the supranational institutions at the European level remains
subject to the interests of, and in the control of, member government
principals, with ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ convinced by the overall
advantages of cooperation through supranational agency and ‘institu-
tional intergovernmentalism’, which adopts a more critical view of how
cooperation can face the problem of distributive gains (Kassim and Me-
non 2002; see also: Moravcsik 1993; Garrett 1992). By contrast, the
other two applications contend that the supranational agents are not
simply an ‘institutional instrument’ or ‘neutral arbiter’6 but rather an
independent body with a distinguishable set of interests. The suprana-
tional interpretation of the EU generally bestows increased decision-
making autonomy and political influence on the main EU institutions
so that the member states meanwhile lose substantial control over these
supranational agents. In this light, the use of expressions like ‘a run-
away Commission’ or ‘an activist Court’ (Pollack 1997: 99) describes
the possible view that the EU has gone beyond the intergovernmental
explanations to assert more independent roles of the EU institutions
very well. The ‘historical institutionalist’ (Pierson 1996) and ‘rational
choice institutionalist’ (Pollack 1997) stances of supranationalism differ
insofar as the former argues that it is difficult for the member states to
reassert their authority because of ‘change-resistant’ institutional devel-
opments, while the latter suggests identifying ‘rational choice’-based
conditions under which the supranational institutions are able to act in-
dependently as new actors (see also Kassim and Menon 2002).
Applying the principal-agent approach to the EU, a growing number
of studies that underscore the subtly intertwined relationships between
the member states and EU institutions begin to link them to the con-
cepts of contract. According to Coase (1937: 391), a contract is designed
to make clear the agent’s rights and responsibilities. The so-called ‘prin-
cipal’s problem’, which refers to the principal’s loss of control over the
agent when there exists asymmetric distribution of information be-
tween the two sides (Ross 1973; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; see also
Kassim and Menon 2002), can be observed here to the extent that the
apparently contractualized relationships between the member states
and the EU’s institutions become blurred as a consequence of the lat-
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ter’s increasing decision-making autonomy. The EU presents a case in
which the principal is gradually stronger in view of becoming an actor
under certain circumstances. The member states also find themselves
in negotiable positions ideologically regarding the matter of the ‘delega-
tion of sovereignty’ at the EU level, as seen in the continuous debate
about the EU’s competence in certain external trade issues (Meunier
and Nicolaïdis 1999: 485).
The following study focuses on the bilateral relations between the EU
and Thailand, with the EU designated as a party of this bilateralism and
thus being a supranational player in its own right. Although the study
is not designed to ‘test’ the above-mentioned concepts of actorness and
presence as such, it is important to consider the arguments based on
the relevant behavioral criteria as regards the EU’s actorness. As far as
the theory of delegation is concerned, the principal-agent approach
helps to clarify the extent to which the EU can play both roles as an in-
tergovernmental and as a supranational body, whether it assumes these
roles in its internal or external relations. In theory, the ideal ‘intergo-
vernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’ types offer two lines of argu-
mentation regarding the EU’s institutional political order. However, in
practice, the EU represents a complex field of study with specific condi-
tions varying across policy areas. The intergovernmentalism-suprana-
tionalism debate seems to be bridged and less controversial at the point
where the EU’s institutions can operate under the logics of both schools
(see also Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 37; Caporaso 1996: 35). The study
now turns to the main part of the construction of the two theoretical
frameworks.
III.3 Framework I: Unit Level Analysis
The theory [of international politics] explains why states similarly
placed behave similarly despite their internal differences. The ex-
planation of states’ behaviour is found at the international, and
not at the national, level. That is why the theory is called a theory
of international politics. In contrast, a theory of foreign policy
would explain why states similarly placed in a system behave in
different ways. Differences in behaviour arise from differences
of internal competition. Foreign policies are governmental pro-
ducts. A theory has to take the performance of governments as
its object of explanation in order to be called a theory of foreign
policy (Waltz 1996: 54-55).
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II.3.1 Realist Foreign Policy Theory
Realism has a very long tradition in political science. This school of
thought can be traced to Thucydides’ work on the Peloponnesian War,
in which states find themselves in a permanent power struggle and are
strategically driven by insecurity and necessity rather than morality and
justice (Orwin 1994; Monten 2006). The later works of Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Meinecke, Carr or Morgenthau, which basically continued with
Thucydides’ perceptions on state and power politics, creating a proto-
type of the realist foundations and establishing the research agenda for
later theoretical developments (Gilpin 1986; Keohane 1986; Walt 2002).
They are all convinced that the logic of power politics is central to a
state’s political conduct, hence always considered a key factor behind in-
ternational relations. What the political realism of today inherits from
early realism includes the balance of power theory and the understand-
ing of power and realpolitik. Realism is also named the ‘school of con-
flict’ because of how it views states as naturally power-based and that
the anarchic structure of international politics leaves little choice for
survival-oriented nations but to develop a ‘self-help system’.
One of the first and most dominant authors to further develop rea-
lism after the World War II was Morgenthau (1978) who reasserts the
conception of power-based human nature and political reality and ap-
plies this to explain the power-seeking behavior of states in interna-
tional politics. Not only does his work Politics Among Nations make a
significant contribution to the tradition of political realism in general, it
is also an important source to this chapter’s notion of constructing a
realist foreign policy theory. Ironically, the most well-known criticism
comes from Waltz (1990: 26), a leading neorealist, who views realism
as a theoretical school that traditionally maintains the ‘autonomy of pol-
itics’, but instead of developing a theory of international politics and
conceptualizing the whole international system finds itself dedicated to
explaining the foreign policy of states. Morgenthau himself, for exam-
ple, wrote a series of publications that was focused on US foreign policy
and its post-Second World War developments (see, for example, Mor-
genthau 1960, 1962, 1969).
In developing a foreign policy theory, the realist school offers a long-
standing approach that adheres to the above-mentioned conception of
power in explaining the foreign policy behavior of states. Morgenthau
(1978) believes that power remains above all the driving force of inter-
national politics and that the underlying quest for power is biologically
rooted in human nature. Although not always clear, the alleged applica-
tion of this anthropological assumption about human nature to a state’s
foreign policy conduct draws attention to the relevance of political acts
of statesmen and follows the assumption that ‘[they] think and act in
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terms of interest defined as power’ (Morgenthau 1978: 5). Statesmen,
as Morgenthau (ibid.: 6-7) posits, are in a position to consider both per-
sonal and national interests, but it is the latter which – together with
morale – binds them to the rational conduct of their nation’s foreign
policy. In a sense, realism contends that states are generally considered
primary unitary actors that are capable of performing rational, purpo-
sive acts. National power, in terms of Realpolitik, is defined by a nation’s
‘geographic realities’ including population, natural resources and indus-
trial capacity as well as its ‘organizational coherence’ in terms of na-
tional character, national morale, military preparedness and the quality
of government and diplomacy (Morgenthau 1978: chapter 9; see also
Madden 1996: 1145; Keohane 1990: 169-170). Taking into account these
integral parts of national power, a realist version of foreign policy analy-
sis is grounded in the conception of power and power politics of the
state in relation to its foreign policy behavior.7
For realists, anarchy signifies the absence of central international
authority that otherwise would prevent the use and counter-use of force
among states. When a state’s foreign policy comes to terms with the in-
ternational system’s anarchic structure, a power-driven state is expected
to permanently preserve and/or increase its security maintain its survi-
val. In this regard, Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner (2000) have iden-
tified at least two forms of policy orientation of the state, i.e., (i) autono-
my-seeking and (ii) influence-seeking foreign policy behavior. The for-
mer describes the attempt by state ‘to preserve or reinforce [its]
independence of other states’, while the latter refers to a state’s attempt
‘to gain control over the behavior of another state’ (ibid.). It is telling
that both concepts of autonomy and influence are instrumental and re-
sources used for the protection of a state’s security, but the fact that a
state in effect prefers one to the other is related to contrasting view-
points of the respective defensive and offensive realists (ibid.; see also Gil-
pin 1981; Mearsheimer 1995; Schweller 1996). The study that follows
considers autonomy-seeking and influence-seeking foreign policy beha-
vior as the two typical forms of power politics that states are likely to
pursue based on a realist prognosis.
These forms of power politics must also be understood in the context
of the typical realist ‘relative gains’ considerations. That is, realist for-
eign policy analysis involves a calculation in which any further gains of
a state’s autonomy or influence beyond its status quo are cautiously
considered against the relative losses of respective autonomy or influ-
ence of another state (Baumann and Rittberger and Wagner 2000; see
also Grieco 1988). As Jervis (1978) asserts, the resulting foreign policy
behavior of the state takes into account the political-military postures
that other states adopt, thus it also depends on the extent to which de-
fensive and offensive postures in terms of weapons and policies can be
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distinguished. If the distinction remains doubtful, states are purported
to be skeptical of, and thus only reluctant to engage in, international co-
operation. Viewed from a simplified game-theoretical perspective, it is
also possible for rational players to have incentives to deviate from that
internationally agreed path if – for example, a prisoner’s dilemma – the
two players are rewarded with higher pay-offs in case of ‘defecting’ than
in that of ‘cooperating’ (Grieco 1988; Synder 1971). Despite the some-
what different predictions that other modified models (Russet 1983;
Brams 1985; see also Grieco 1988) provide, the basic prisoner’s dilem-
ma – while explaining the ineluctable dynamics of the arms race and
the possible emergence of a so-called security dilemma – sheds light on
the competitive nature of states’ foreign policy behavior.
But the realist notion of the political-military competition among
states does not completely exclude the possibility of international coop-
eration or stability. Traditional realists like Thucydides or Morgenthau
hold possible that the stability of the international system can be cau-
tiously achieved by states’ foreign policy orientations toward ‘a balance
of power’ – a classic realist viewpoint that a long list of renowned states-
men and stateswomen still uphold through their political conduct (see
also Mesquita 2006: 639). A balancing foreign policy maintains or re-
stores the equilibrium of power relations once this equilibrium is threa-
tened. With regard to bilateralism, a balancing policy can be expected to
take place directly between the two countries themselves (Kitson and
Solomou 1995: 200) or it contributes to the systemic balance, which in
some realist interpretations is viewed as ‘a necessary outcome’ of a
struggle for power between states (Hoffmann 1968). In a related line of
argumentation, realists believe that at least two forms of international
cooperation based on the state's rational, power-based behavior are pos-
sible. The first one is the conception of ‘alliance’, which, according to
Morgenthau (1978: 189), renders a ‘community of interests’ more pre-
cisely and so – mostly on a temporary basis – enables nations to pre-
serve or increase their relative power and security. In this respect, it is
possible and historically evident that two nations with shared security
interests unite themselves against a third nation, which appears to be a
threat to the balance (ibid. 190). The second form of cooperation has its
roots in the theory of hegemonic stability as under certain circum-
stances a hegemon may find the incentives to invest its resources and
assert its influence in order to create and maintain an international in-
frastructure (Gilpin 2001: 99-100). These incentives in a state-centric
hegemonic stability theory include economic interests and the security
concerns of the hegemon, so that it can perceive the need to promote –
and, more importantly, encourage other states to obey – the internation-
ally agreed-upon rules (Krasner 1978; Gilpin 1987).8
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With the emergence of new bilateralism, realists seem to have re-
gained credibility in explaining the alleged policy shift toward a more
explicit use of state-to-state power instruments and power politics. Tra-
ditional realists have taken a rather skeptical view of multilateral institu-
tions and multilateralism in general. They argue that great powers are
likely to exploit advantages in bilateral negotiations with smaller nations
and that the logic of leveling powers in multilateralism operates poorly
within the hierarchical structures of international politics (Kahler 1993:
296). A realist foreign policy theory that focuses on a state’s policy or-
ientation toward new bilateralism at least offers three explanations that
are based on the arguments previously presented. The first one is de-
ductively asserted from the notion of the autonomy-seeking foreign pol-
icy behavior of the state while the second and third are based on influ-
ence-seeking foreign policy behavior.
(a) In adopting autonomy-seeking behavior, a state’s foreign policy is
expected to manage its bilateralism in a way that will promote self-suffi-
ciency and independence. In a more critical scenario, a state whose na-
tional survival is threatened may also find the incentives to form and
maintain an alliance with a bilateral partner against a powerful third
(Baumann and Rittberger and Wagner 2000; see also Morgenthau
1978: 188-189). Once these bilateral ties proliferate, they will create their
own network in which the state’s survival and economic and security in-
terests will be (re-)assured. Historically – in Germany in 1934 for exam-
ple – bilateralism was pursued extensively in the form of numerous bi-
lateral trade deals under the so-called ‘New Plan’, the objectives of
which were ‘to increase national self-sufficiency and withdraw from the
network of world trade’ (Kitson and Solomou 1995: 209-210).
(b) With the asymmetric distribution of power that is presumed to ex-
ist between the bilateral parties, the more powerful state will – true to
form –pursue attempts to assert its authority and influence upon the
weaker (see also Baumann and Rittberger and Wagner 2000). As a mat-
ter of fact, circa the mid-1980s, the term ‘new bilateralism’ was first
used to describe American economic policy toward the East Asian new-
ly industrializing countries during the second Reagan administration
(Haggard and Cheng 1989: 306; Gills 1996: 671). More specifically, in
this period of perceived marginal success of multilateral and regional
institutions, the United States began to regard bilateralism as an effec-
tive new instrument that could resolve trade and economic conflicts
with those Asian countries (ibid.).
(c) For weaker and smaller states, new bilateralism provides the op-
portunity to initially establish and/or strengthen bilateral dialogues and
relations with powerful partners. This view can be extended to the situa-
tion in which a weak state strategically seeks to bring those powerful
states into play against each another in other multilateral settings prob-
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ably for its own benefit.9 This idea is closely related to the concepts of
‘clientelism’, which has been proposed by various authors to describe
various types of patronage-client relationships among and/or within
states (Lemarchand and Legg 1978; Ravenhill 1985; Martz 1996). Inter-
estingly, clientelism has also been discussed in the context of Thailand’s
foreign policy and its diplomacy. Some claim that Thailand pursues a
traditional approach to gain flexibility, which always maintains good but
balanced relations with and among great powers, known as the politics
of ‘equidistance’ (Herrmann 1996) and implicitly that of ‘bending with
the wind’ (Rüland 2001a; Cheow 1986). According to Baumann, Ritt-
berger and Wagner (2000), this type of influence-seeking foreign policy
behavior by weaker states is referred to as voicing-opportunities-seeking.
III.3.2 Liberal Foreign Policy Theory
While realism has been criticized for its pessimistic views on human
nature and negative views on cooperation in international politics, liber-
alism offers another set of ideas that can possibly maintain interna-
tional order and justice of progress and rationality. The theoretical de-
velopments of liberalism, however, proceed in a diversified manner and
are not particularly aligned with any dominant texts that would be re-
presentative of the tradition as a whole (Doyle 1986: 1152; Stein 1990:
7; Zacher and Matthew 1995: 107-108). The early works of the liberal
tradition such as Locke’s Two Treaties of Government, Kant’s Perpetual
Peace and Bentham’s Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace only provide
a general foundation that suggests an extensive understanding of hu-
man freedom and a more restricted role for the state in political and
economic realms (Dunne 2005; Zacher and Matthew 1995). They
mainly assert the importance of international trade and international
law in promoting peace, prosperity and justice (ibid.; see also Keohane
1990b; Howard 1987).10
After the First World War, liberalism and idealism became closely in-
tertwined with regard to their shared values of tolerance, freedom and
constitutionalism and the shared view of the possibility of progress and
that states have the ability to move toward a harmonized system of in-
ternational politics and cooperation. In a programmatic approach, liber-
al idealism as advocated by President Woodrow Wilson in his ‘Fourteen
Points’ speech (1918) normatively frames the conditions for re-creating
peace and security, for instance, through assuring self-determination of
all nation states or establishing an international organization with col-
lective security mechanisms (Dunne 2005: 191-192; Zacher and Mat-
thew 1995: 115). However, the experience during the interwar period
fostered a new research agenda for the post-1945 liberal literature,
which theoretically commences with the functional and neo-functional
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schools that focus on the patterns and implications of interdependence
and integration (ibid.; see also Mitrany 1943; Haas 1958). The recent lib-
eral and neoliberal research projects have been very much dedicated to
critically scrutinizing the so-called ‘democratic peace thesis’ (Czempiel
1986; Doyle 1986; Maoz 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999).
One difficulty involved in constructing a liberal foreign policy theory
is the vast diversity of liberalism itself. But it is not just a random
choice to start with commercial liberalism rather than the other divergent
strands of liberalism such as republican liberalism, military liberalism,
cognitive liberalism, regulative liberalism, sociological liberalism, or in-
stitutional liberalism.11 These strands of liberalism generally contend
that cooperation is possible in international politics, but they offer dif-
ferent explanatory factors and manners in how these may contribute to
the realization of cooperation (Keohane 1989: 11; Zacher and Matthew
1995). In the case of EU-Thailand relations, it is empirically evident that
this bilateralism is much driven by growing trade relations between the
two parties. As a matter of fact, bilateral trade has consistently contin-
ued to grow so that in 2003, the EU became Thailand’s third most im-
portant trading partner, after the US and ASEAN, and accounted for
about 15% of its total trade. Thailand’s exports to the EU doubled dur-
ing the mid-1990s to 2003 and now consists of some E 11 billion (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand 2005).
In theory, commercial liberalism focuses on market incentives, which
are crucial in determining the political conduct of state and non-state
actors (Moravcsik 1997: 528). The development of commercial liberal
theory underscores the positive effects of trade, since it is possible for
states to co-benefit from world economic growth and there is evidence
to suggest that, after 1945, it becomes more costly for them to engage
in warfare (Nye 1988; Rosencrace 1986). Already in the 18th century
Philosophy and later Enlightenment ideas, the conduct of liberal trade
that included (re-)holding open contacts across borders was highly re-
garded a key factor contributing to domestic economic welfare and in-
ternational cooperation. Montesquieu (1748) believed that ‘the natural
effect of commerce is to lead to peace’ while Hume (1741) stressed the
significance of commerce as a ‘reason of state’ and Kant (1795) similarly
thought that ‘it is the spirit of commerce that cannot coexist with war’
(cited in Keohane 1990b: 177). As positive as it has been, commercial
liberalism proposes that an open international economy can create in-
centives for states to undergo constitutional changes and accommodate
peaceful policies (Keohane 1990b: 178; Richardson 1995). Moreover, it
proposes that it is rational for both governments and firms to pursue
particular trade measures and foreign policy. The liberal perspective
also gives more room to individual actors and non-state entities whose
interests and preferences are also significant in the process of foreign
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policy making. Although today’s commercial liberalism no longer pre-
sumes trade and the associated free trade ideology as necessary criteria
for international cooperation, it does develop a more sophisticated ap-
proach to considering market structures as an explanatory variable for
how states respond to international trade challenges (Moravcsik 1997:
528-529).
The emergence of international trade attacks the national grounds of
economic mercantilism and the belief that trade was a zero sum game
for all of the participating nations. In the development of modern eco-
nomic theory, Adam Smith (1776) recognized the relevance of the in-
dustrial revolution in the 18th century. He pointed out that specializa-
tion, technological progress and wealth creation were dependent on the
size of the market beyond a nation’s trade barriers (see also Gerber
2002: 40-41). Conventionally, the theory of comparative advantage has
explained the dynamics of international trade. According to Ricardo
(1911), with the trade of two different goods between two countries one
party always has a comparative advantage over the other in the one good
that the former’s opportunity costs of producing are lower than the lat-
ter’s (see also Gerber 2002: 50). This means that positive gains from
trade can be realized by both parties and that nations can maximize
their welfare by specializing in the production of the good that gives it
its comparative advantage (ibid. 56).12 Beyond the theory of comparative
advantage, a nation’s international trade policy may also focus on other
trade structures such as ‘intra-industry trade’, which takes advantage of
internal economies of scale and product differentiation, or ‘industrial
clustering’, which makes use of external economies of scale based on
regional agglomerations of firms (ibid. 84-107). The concepts of com-
parative advantage and economies of scale are helpful in understanding
the logic behind a nation’s international trade policies as well as the ex-
tent to which national differences in relative factor endowments have
implications for the patterns of international trade relations.
There is no doubt that, although they come from two different disci-
plines, political liberalism and economics are closely related. The ‘em-
bedded liberalism’ thesis, as Ruggie (1982) argues, brings to our atten-
tion the relevance of an international political context, which postwar
liberalism finds itself in and thus presents certain forms of state inter-
vention. As the interdependence among states increases, the so-called
‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ requires that the states – apart
from their delimited roles in maintaining domestic economies – take
into account the implications of international agreements and rules and
to intervene to enhance governance, social institutions and international
exchange (Gilpin 2001: 98; Keohane 1990b: 184). In contrast to rea-
lism, however, liberalism sees national security beyond military and
strategic concerns and draws attention to the emergence of nonmilitary
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issues of the post-Cold War period such as drug trafficking, immigra-
tion, the environment or the AIDS epidemic (Holsti 1995). The increas-
ing relevance of these new national security threats, in a way, implies
cooperation among domestic actors, which may include public opinion,
ethnic, religious, economic, and regional pressure groups (ibid.). The
trend toward a security conception transcends national security and gra-
dually recognizes the relevance of human security, a concept conven-
tionally defined in the liberal-individualistic tradition (Suhrke 1999; see
also, in the Asian context, Rüland 2005a).
New bilateralism, in liberal terms, is thus based on the converging
interests of two parties. The proliferation of the phenomenon reveals
that pairs of countries have been enraptured by the underlying dy-
namics and the associated benefits of a new bilateral foreign policy.
That bilateralism allows the participating parties to negotiate on a ‘case-
by-case’ and ‘product-by-product’ basis, for instance, brings about the
ad hoc bases of negotiations and, to some extent, ensures a high degree
of reciprocity (Ruggie 1993: 9). But the extent to which the EU and
Thailand can be counted as ‘natural trading partners’, despite their geo-
graphical distance and considerable associated trade costs, remains very
doubtful and thus raises the question of the two parties’ motivations in
adopting a foreign policy toward a new bilateralism.13 A liberal foreign
policy analysis systematically revises the concept of preference and the
interest constellation and uses this to explain a state’s foreign policy de-
cisions. The following are two examples of foreign policy considered ty-
pical liberal state conduct.
(a) States driven by market incentives are likely to pursue a foreign
policy that technically helps them to engage and manage their commer-
cial ties in international trade relations. Structural changes based on
technological change, capital mobility and transnational communica-
tions in particular have increased overall competition in the traditional
state-to-state relations and have given rise to the broadening state-firm
and firm-firm dimensions of diplomacy (Strange 1992; see also Tavorn-
mas 2006). In stark contrast to the realist notion of state-centric power
politics, a liberal foreign policy theory is in a less difficult position be-
cause it takes into account these two new dimensions of diplomacy and
thus contends that foreign policy decisions of the state can be explained
simply as a matter of ‘engagement’.14 The resulting policy goals and
outcomes, however, can be very different depending on the decision-
making procedures and interest structures among social, industrial and
governmental actors.
Moreover, it is clear that the cost-benefit calculations of relevant ac-
tors – i.e., the distribution of these costs and benefits among them –
play a crucial role in these games. There is evidence to suggest that in
the case of free trade negotiations, for example, the opening up of the
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market depends significantly on the constellation of domestic political
constituencies with regard to the key actors’ net benefits and losses and
that free trade is thus mostly achieved in settings with ‘strong competi-
tiveness, extensive intra-industry trade, trade in intermediate goods,
large foreign investments, and low asset specificity’ (Moravcsik 1997:
529; see also Milner 1988). The same logic can also be applied in other
policy fields beyond trade; however, it should be noted that there are al-
ways similar calculations involving the associated costs and benefits of
the key players and that the expected ‘societal allocation’ may, to a con-
siderable extent, also set the ball rolling (ibid.).
(b) An inward-looking version of ‘engagement politics’ is expected to
contribute to the correction of domestic ‘market failures’. Technically,
‘market failures’ refer to situations in which a market on its own is
claimed to be incapable of providing efficient mechanisms while the
state is capable.15 At least from an economic point of view, it is generally
agreed that market failures can be accepted as a justification for state
interventionism (Wellisch 1999). To this end, a liberal foreign policy
theory also accounts for the implications of the decisions and actions
made by the state in the domestic political sphere. For example, the
state’s foreign policy can be considered a government’s attempts to in-
troduce internal reforms that would otherwise be prevented by strong
domestic pressures (Putnam 1988: 447-448) or it may promote certain
industries that it considers crucial for the nation’s future with the help
of the so-called ‘industrial policy’ (Gerber 2002: 107). In the latter case,
a government may identify and actively engage in some – not necessa-
rily economically efficient – industries by providing direct or indirect
subsidies or other policy tools (ibid. 107-108).
III.3.3 Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory
Constructivism primarily attacks the material reality and rational-deter-
ministic grounds underlying realism and liberalism, and later neo-rea-
lism and neo-liberalism. The roots of constructivism can be found in
the works of Durkheim and Weber, which basically provide innovative
views on the socially conditioned nature of ideas and interests (Searle
1995; Ruggie 1998). Durkheim – while explaining social phenomena –
emphasized the crucial roles of moral and intersubjective relationships
and, more importantly, the relevance of ideational factors in interna-
tional relations (ibid.). Weber’s concept of Verstehen as well as his postu-
late of Objektivita¨t put the methodological accent on the social sciences
in a way that, unlike the natural sciences, take the significance that indi-
viduals, as cultural beings, may ‘lend’ to the world for their social prac-
tices and self-understanding into account (Weber 1969: 81; see also
Ruggie 1998: 860; Kasler 1988: chapter 6; Barnett 2005: 260). Con-
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structivist authors continue to draw the fundamental elements of iden-
tity- and interest-formation from sociological and critical theory (Wendt
1992: 393). Despite some skepticism expressed during its early theoreti-
cal developments, constructivism managed to develop a well and care-
fully established research agenda by the turn of the millennium.16
Constructivism is also known as a reflectivist approach and offers a
theoretical framework in which the identities and interests of states are
no longer exogenously but endogenously defined; in other words, they
are no longer given but socially constructed (Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1992;
Wendt 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002: 57). It stresses the relevance of
ideas and interests in a process of collective identity building; therefore,
the reality is considered constitutive and not only material but idea-
tional (Wendt 1994, 1999). Notably, this process of collective identity
building is a dynamic one so that the identities of states, although partly
historically conditioned, can change over time through international in-
teraction and by the notions of appropriateness and adequacy. Wendt’s
key statement Anarchy is what states make of it (1992), significantly re-
vises the understandings of anarchy, self-help and power politics in the
manner that the anarchical structure of the international system does
not always prescribe self-help or competitive power politics, but should
be conceived as a given social arrangement, which leaves it open for
mutual (re-)definition between agent and structure – a point which has
been discussed with regard to the agent-structure problem (see also
Wendt 1987). The subsequent developments of the constructivist tradi-
tion continue to explore new theoretical aspects such as the roles of in-
ternational norms (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998),
regulative versus constitutive rules (Onuf and Klink 1989; Onuf 1998)
or epistemic communities (Haas 1989; Haas 1992).
A constructivist foreign policy theory, which will be developed here
based on the premises of the constructivist theory of international rela-
tions, illustrates an attempt to critically revise, and under certain cir-
cumstances transcend, the rational explanations of a state’s foreign pol-
icy behavior. Constructivists see a state’s foreign policy as something
that emerges in social arrangements and is subject to the constitutive
and endogenous definition of collective identity, that is, a product of ‘in-
tersubjective beliefs’ (Ruggie 1998: 862, 869) and ‘collective intention-
ality’ (Searle 1995: 24-25). In this respect, they also tend to ascribe the
formation of collective identity to a so-called ‘situated activity’ and con-
sequently argue that foreign policy interests are not primarily structu-
rally determined, but defined through interaction and the actors’ defini-
tion of given situations (Alexander and Wiley 1981; Wendt 1992: 398,
407). Another conceptual difference between rationalism and construc-
tivism is that the latter holds that culture and norms contribute – more
than they do to the shaping of state foreign policy behavior – to the de-
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fining of its foreign policy identities and interests as well as construct-
ing the international system (Morrow 1988: 89; Wendt 1992: 407).17
Along these lines, constructivists emphasize and give a deeper meaning
to the concepts of ‘learning’. In the process of foreign policy making,
‘learning’ does not simply embody – as conventional theorists contend
– a state’s adaptation to the relevant constraints and imitation of suc-
cessful models, but rather a dynamics of problem solving and commu-
nicative acts (Ruggie 1998: 868).
The constructivist concepts of state identities are also present in a
role-theoretical approach. Indeed, identities of state are assumed to be
role-specific and account for social understandings and expectations
that it collectively holds about itself (Wendt 1992: 397-398). As Wendt
(ibid. 398-399) described it, ‘the absence or failure of roles makes defin-
ing situations and interests more difficult, and identity confusion may
result.’ For foreign policy analysts, role theory is a very useful approach
to focusing on the pertinence of national role conceptions perceived
and prescribed in foreign policy-making process. Holsti (1970), in his
seminal article, was one of the first role theorists to describe the funda-
mental claims that national role conceptions are highly relevant in the
decisions and actions that foreign policymakers make and that they
emerge not only from conventional variables – such as ‘graphical loca-
tion’, ‘socio-economic needs’, ‘public opinion mood’, ‘capabilities’, ‘sys-
tem structure’ – but also from idiosyncratic variables including ‘ideologi-
cal principles’ and ‘personalities of the leaders’ (see also Walker 1987b:
242). Most importantly, role theorists stress the dynamics of mutual de-
finition among role perceptions, role conceptions and role prescrip-
tions, a complex relationship that takes place in interaction between ego
and alter and infers the twofold consequences of national conceptions
for a nation’s foreign policy behavior and the stability and change of the
international system (ibid).
Methodologically, role theory claims to offer a complementary ap-
proach to bridging the gap between rationalist and non-rationalist mod-
els of foreign policy analysis (Walker 1987a; Walker 1987b: 249). More
specifically, the role-theoretical application helps us to understand the
different stages of foreign policy decisions and actions among ‘the mo-
ments of intuition’ and ‘the longer periods of logical and empirical ex-
planation’, that is, the so-called ‘cyclical process’ (ibid.). In contrast to
the traditional single-role assumptions on state foreign behavior, role
theorists contend that it is possible – and indeed very likely – that a
state will acquire a set of roles and has multiple identities that depend
on institutional and social contexts (Holsti 1970: 277; see also Wendt
1992: 398). Wendt (1992: 419), in introducing the critical strategic theo-
ry, posits that states will consider changing – i.e., ‘transforming’ or
‘transcending’ – their roles if, the advantages of doing so are foresee-
60 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
able and the expected outcome of the cost-benefit calculation of such
changes is positive. As a matter of fact, states in a position of ‘character
planning’ always have the choice whether to adopt particular roles and
subsequently undergo – with these roles ‘taken’ – the dynamic process
of identity and preference definition (ibid.). Sociologically speaking, Se-
delmeier (2004: 124-125) points out at least three mechanisms that are
crucial in convincing actors to conform to institutional roles. First, the
‘logic of appropriateness’ organizes the exemplary actions of actors
through interrelated institutional rules and routines (March and Olsen
1989; March and Olsen 2006). The second and third mechanisms are
derived from ‘interaction role theory’, by which actors behave in accor-
dance with institutional norms and generally follow the ‘logic of ar-
guing’ (Risse 2000) and ‘rhetorical action’ (Schimmelfenning 1997).
From a constructivist perspective, new bilateralism is largely driven
by ideas and interests. The choice of a state’s new bilateral foreign pol-
icy demonstrates a social act in which that state comes to terms with
particular definitions of identities and interests in the intersubjective
construction of bilaterally vested relationships. Constructivism, in parti-
cular, gains credibility in explaining precedents that do not seem to fol-
low a rational explanation based on actors’ ‘material bargaining’ or ‘uti-
lity-maximizing’ behaviors but instead require the understandings of a
state’s non-material incentives such as its ‘desire for acceptance’, ‘sym-
bolic legitimacy’ and ‘status’ (Sedelmeier 2004; Barnett 2005). In bilat-
eral cases, there is evidence to suggest that a state adopts ‘affinity’ or
‘aloofness’ for another state or another region, as discussed on the long
tradition of the EU’s responsibility – rather than material incentives –
toward the enlargements (Sedelmeier 2004: 127; See also Fierke and
Wiener 1999). The following are two typical constructivist explanations
of a state’s foreign policy orientation toward new bilateralism.
(a) New bilateralism can be considered a bilateral foreign policy or-
ientation that contributes to the process of identity formation. As pre-
viously mentioned, this process is an endogenous one in which identi-
ties and interests are defined by social arrangements and through inter-
action. The logics rest upon interactionist theories which, although
originally developed at the micro-level of sociological analysis, holds that
actors in social acts agitate for the construction of situated and intersub-
jective reality rather than simply reacting and adapting themselves to
structures (Bolton 1958: 54; see also Stryker 1980; Layder 1982). To con-
stitute its collective identities and interests, a state is expected to make
use of intersubjective knowledge and relevant commitments to the bilat-
eral framework’s norms and rules.18
Interactionist theoretical insights also link the process of identity for-
mation with that of role attribution insofar as the identity of ego and al-
ter is constructed by the inferences drawn from their role conceptions
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and prescriptions (Wendt 1992: 404; see also Stryker and Gottlieb 1981;
Crittenden 1983; Turner 1974). Against the role-theoretical background,
an identity-building foreign policy of a state can be explained in terms
of the kind of role conceptions that are adopted and prescribed and the
resulting role performance. In this context, Holsti (1970) identifies at
least 17 possible national role conceptions for 71 countries including
‘bastion of revolution-liberator’, ‘regional leader’, ‘regional protector’,
‘active independent’, ‘liberator supporter’, ‘anti-imperialist agent’, ‘de-
fender of the faith’, ‘mediator-integrator’, ‘regional-subsystem collabora-
tor’, ‘developer’, ‘faithful ally’, ‘independent’, ‘bridge’, ‘example’, ‘inter-
nal development’, ‘isolate’, and ‘protectee’. Along these lines, Kirste and
Maull (1996; see also, in the EU case, Télo 2006) introduced the con-
cepts of ‘civilian power’ as another national role conception that inclines
a state to develop certain foreign policy characteristics of purposes, goals,
ends, interests, values and means.19
(b) It is possible that – apart from the process of identity building – a
state may also adopt a new bilateral foreign policy orientation because
of ‘rhetorical action’. Wedged in between the theories of rational choice
and communicative acts, the approach of rhetorical action is very help-
ful in explaining foreign policy behavior of the state subject both regard-
ing its purpose-oriented rationality and its value-based interaction
(Schimmelfenning 1997). New bilateralism, in its application implies a
state’s foreign policy response that strives for success-assured acts in
terms of ends and means but that it, in turn, renders rational in defense
of its values and identities. In symbolic terms, this concept of rhetorical
action is related to that of ‘image’. Image theory postulates that an ac-
tor’s image is cognitively and affectively constructed and that the mental
representation of image and its projection give rise to interpretations of
motivation and interests based on social psychological arguments (Herr-
mann and Fischerkeller 1995). The assumption of prevailing imagery
makes it possible to map state foreign policy decisions on the rhetoric
and verbal behavior of its political leaders (ibid.). In this regard, a state
may be willing to adopt ‘dominant’ ideas and norms in international
politics such as those that underlie the trends of new bilateralism.
It is important to note that for both (a) and (b) intersubjective knowl-
edge allegedly contains a certain degree of ‘self-perpetuating quality’
(Wendt 1992: 411). In this context, the theory of path dependency helps
explain the prevalence of certain socially inefficient outcomes and iden-
tify the conditions under which the congruity of strategy profiles re-
quires an intuitive interpretation of actors’ behavior and new ideas do
not always arise or bring about new understandings and expectations
(ibid.). That is, the endogenous process of defining identities and inter-
ests needs to take as well historical conditions into account.
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III.3.4 Theoretical Refinement: The Bureaucratic Politics Model
In addition to the aforementioned foreign policy theory models deliv-
ered by three major schools of international relations, the bureaucratic
politics model will be introduced here as a refining theoretical approach
to the analysis of their bilateral relations. The model represents an ac-
tor-oriented approach that accommodates bargaining elements among
the members of an organization and thereby proposes to revise the in-
ternal dynamics of the policy-making process beyond ‘state as a unitary
actor’ views (Brandt 2001). As seen in its day-to-day functioning, the
foreign policy conduct of the EU and Thailand has been specifically
based on numerous bureaucratic interactions. It is frequently argued
that some actions on both sides occur in the absence of high-level deci-
sions and that they can be seen as a product of routine bureaucratic be-
haviors. This is a point of contention that has also been raised else-
where among mainstream international relations. At the heart of the in-
dividualism-holism debate, the irreducibility of actors and phenomena
has been questioned on both ontological and epistemological grounds.
The principle of reason of state, for instance, used to mark a conceptual
difference between the realist and liberal schools of international rela-
tions, but it becomes increasingly apparent that even classical realists
like Morgenthau (1978: 107) have recognized the empirical notion of in-
dividuals in a position of a nation’s power projection and foreign policy
formulation. The debate reveals that the construction of social reality
depends on theoretical premises and the methodology posed by the two
extreme positions (see also Searle 1995).
With regard to its theoretical developments, the bureaucratic politics
model has a long tradition as an analytical paradigm in sociological ana-
lysis (Merton 1957; see also Allison and Halperin 1972: 44). In the disci-
pline of political science, the popularity of bureaucratic politics as a re-
search method must be credited to Allison’s seminal publications on
three conceptual decision-making models – i.e., (i) rational policy, (ii)
organizational process, and (ii) bureaucratic politics – as applied in the
analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1970, 1971). During roughly the
same period, economists also began to explore the concepts of bureau-
cracy in a great variety of studies, ranging from actor-oriented, budget-
maximizing models (e.g., Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983) to those
that bring into play coordination mechanisms in the form of contractual
relationships between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents
(e.g., McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989; see also Shepsle and
Bonchek 1997). In the study of foreign policy, the bureaucratic politics
model has been applied in a series of lengthy works on specific empiri-
cal events (Halperin and Kanter 1973; Beard 1976; Bergerson 1980, ci-
ted in Welch 1998). However, within the background of some criticism
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against the bureaucratic politics model, later developments have con-
centrated on the attempts to strengthen cause-effect propositions as well
as falsifiable hypotheses and thus promote more elements of a positive
science in the model’s conceptual framework (Welch 1998; Schneider
1997; see also Krasner 1972).
Not only does the model provide important insights into the analysis
of bureaucratic politics, it also contributes to the construction of deci-
sion-oriented approaches in international relations. Although it seems
that the model has affinities with the liberal school because of its focus
on the dynamics of domestic politics and societal factors (see also
Schneider 1997: 108-109), the critical views of a state’s decision making
portray the model as a cross-cutting approach to explaining foreign pol-
icy behavior in terms of its underlying interests and processes, e.g., the
realist notion of ‘intra-governmental balance of power’ or the constructi-
vist concepts of ‘roles’ and ‘shared values’. The rational explanation of
utility-maximizing behavior has been applied in the realist and liberal
concepts of interests so that actors are assumed to have a set of exogen-
ously defined interests and preferences. In a constructivist view, the no-
tion of the ‘portfolio of interests’ may still need to be further clarified
because actors are not regarded as being bound by a stable set of beliefs
and desires and are, instead, capable of defining a situation in a social
context (Hindess 1989: 20; Wendt 1992: 398; Sedelmeier 2004).
Our study generally follows the bureaucratic politics paradigm of Alli-
son and Halperin’s ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications’ (1972).20 As stated in the article, its underlying premises
and arguments can be found in part in the works of Allison’s ‘Concep-
tual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1969), ‘Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1971) and Halperin’s ‘Bureau-
cratic Politics and Foreign Policy’ (1974). The Allison and Halperin
paradigm focuses on the bureaucratic politics model, which is pre-
sented and well known as the third model in Allison’s works (1969,
1971). Our choice of this paradigm has not been random but carefully
considers the helpfulness of bargaining and organizational schemes as
a fresh departure for the investigation of bureaucratic decision-making
structures (see also Brandt 2001). The subchapters that follow will pro-
vide a brief overview and a workable framework for the bureaucratic
politics model. The page numbers refer to Allison and Halperin (1972).
III.3.4.1 Players
Against the background of a state that has been regarded as a unitary
actor, the bureaucratic politics model points out the possibility of policy
bargaining and coordination in practice. The departure from the tradi-
tional state-centric views leads to a new conception of political actors.
The model contends that national governments decision makers are no
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longer single individuals but a ‘conglomerate of large organizations and
political actors’ (41, 42).
The notion of ‘a player is an individual in a position’ (47), implies
that a player’s perceptions and preferences are subject to two sources:
(i) individual characteristics and (ii) the position of that player. Provided
that different players pursue specific interests depending on the issue
and the type of game, the model is also designed to accommodate a
variety of players at a point in time and thus illustrates the pre-settings
in the form of action channels that determine a game’s players, their
advantages and handicaps (47). The main players not only include im-
portant political figures and heads of national organizations but also re-
levant government officials, the members of legislatures, the press, spe-
cial interest groups as well as surrogates for these groups (47). Further
insights into the bureaucratic politics model point out that all of these
players hierarchically constitute concentric circles around the center of
the game being played and that other individual players have a chance
to – on a regular or ad hoc basis – enter the central arena because of
their personal relations with the chief executive (43, 47). While the
model pictures that senior players are encircled by junior players, the
distinction between senior and junior players helps to explain the con-
centration of formal authority in terms of their shares of decision-mak-
ing influence. Nevertheless, the model also holds possible that the ju-
nior players can play a crucial role in certain action games.
III.3.4.2 Interests
In the bureaucratic politics model, the logics of multiple role concep-
tions imply that organization-based actors are subject to a diverse set of
interests simultaneously. Political decisions not only revolve around a
single issue of strategic concern but on a diverse set of intra-national
and international matters (43). The different ‘faces of an issue’, which
may also raise different sets of interests, complicate a player’s decisions
in a way that this player determines particular stands based on the
stakes at hand (48, 49). The model identifies four specific sets of inter-
ests, as follows:
(i) National security interests. In principle they are widely accepted,
and the issues that relate to national security are considered very impor-
tant such as the US’ interest in avoiding foreign domination and its in-
terest in supporting collective disarmament (43, 48). It is possible, how-
ever, that other sets of interests may influence a player’s perception of
national security interests (48).
(ii) Organizational interests. These interests are essential to disposing
of the bureaucratic politics model. That members of an organization –
such as career officials – regard the health of their organization as cru-
cial for national interests, leads their interests to wanting to maintain
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autonomy and influence, fulfilling its roles and missions, and securing
the necessary capabilities in terms of the organization’s essence21 and
budgets (48).
(iii) Domestic interests. Only some bureaucrats, particularly senior
players, are concerned with domestic affairs and their implications for
domestic politics (48). The openness of governmental systems is a sig-
nificant factor in determining the extent to which players are vulnerable
to external interests and pressures and dependent on their approval or
acquiescence (49).
(iv) Personal interests. Besides the conception of other political roles,
a player is concerned about his or her personal interests (48). In certain
governmental systems, it is possible that some players have an incentive
to remain in politically influential positions or to become chief execu-
tives themselves and that their personal interests are predominantly dri-
ven thereby (49).
In addition to these four sets of interests, players are assumed to hold
certain shared values that underlie their attitudes, assumptions and
images about basic values and facts (56). Shared values are often taken
for granted, but they in fact are accepted by most of the involved players
and have significant implications for the interpretations of other na-
tions’ actions, e.g., the images of friends and enemies, the perception
of their capabilities and intentions (56).
III.3.4.3 Organizational Processes
The aggregation of the position of the involved players is central to un-
derstanding the processes in which governmental policies and decisions
are organized and subsequently lead to a particular outcome. The bu-
reaucratic politics model argues that there are regularized circuits in
bargaining whereby the issues once recognized typically proceed within
established channels and are subject to certain fixed rules (50). For-
mally, decisions are defined as ‘authoritative designations, internal to
government, of specific actions to be taken by specific officials’, and pol-
icy as ‘authoritative aspirations, internal to government, about out-
comes’ (46). In decision and policy games, a series of players’ activities
are illustrated in the form of action channels that lead to government
decisions and policies. All of the players start out by calculating the
stakes based on their resources and reputations, and thus determine
their positions in a game and decide whether or not to enter it (50).
The paths to a certain policy or decision include a number of decisions
that need to be made by several relevant officials and eventually by
mostly senior players (43, 46). In the action games that follow, specific
senior or junior players are assigned to carry out – i.e., implement – a
specific course of action. Depending on the decisions made, these as-
66 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
signments can be general or very specific as regards the prescriptions
about responsible subordinates and subsequent actions (51, 53).
Based on these logics, the bureaucratic politics model provides at
least three important insights into the policy-making process:
First, the decisions and actions of governments rarely represent a
conventionally single rational choice but a result of what can be called
‘pulling and hauling’ (43). Consequently, players engaging in various
maneuvers are expected to attempt to change the viewpoints of others
via argumentation (51). In established action channels, certain entrance
points into the game are determined at which prospective players may
consider the possibility of participating and obtaining bargaining advan-
tages (50). Their bargaining advantages are said to come from (i) the
control of implementation, (ii) the control over information, (iii) the
persuasiveness with other players, and (iv) the ability to affect other
players’ objectives in other games including domestic political games
(50).
Second, the aforementioned bargaining dynamics reveal that an ac-
tion can be affected by decisions on other issues and that the corre-
sponding action channel has the capacity to accommodate alternative
procedures for producing different classes of that action (45). In game-
theoretic terms, decision or policy games that may seem unrelated to
the prospective outcome often serve as important sources of explanation
in the decision-making processes as well as in the implementation of
those decisions (46). That a government's action is metaphorically re-
ferred to as ‘an amalgam of several strands of action’ (52), also implies
that by decoding backwards it is possible to resolve a single issue
through more than just one channel.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the bureaucratic politics model
has demonstrated that a considerable proportion of governments’ ac-
tions of are subject to the routine behavior of organizations. The model
hypothesizes that, even in the absence of high-level decisions, certain
government actions follow from low-level ones and that in some action
games junior players are in a position to implement specific decisions
on their own and thus assume a more crucial role than senior players
(46-47). The so-called organizational standard operating procedures give
an idea of bureaucratic instructions about how an organization’s rou-
tines make a contribution to shared values and internal coordination
but can also be constraints for decision and policymakers in terms of
information and policy options (51). Nonetheless, the problems of moni-
toring and enforcing the behavior of bureaucratic agents have been re-
cognized and will be discussed below.
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III.3.5 Foreign Policy Theory and the Bureaucratization of Foreign Policy
In the Weberian tradition, the delegation of authority to bureaucracy has
been discussed in the context of legislative attempts to usurp expertise
and knowledge in response to policy-making complexity (Weber 1958:
232-235; See also Lupia and McCubbins 1994: 91). Bureaucratization
and professionalization are considered – if not antithetical – comple-
mentary with both contributing in one way or another to the rationaliza-
tion of society (Ritzer 1975). The ideal type of bureaucratic organization
specifically presents an idea of routinization and mechanization and
helps to identify the related causes and consequences of growing ration-
ality (ibid.) The emergence of such institutions takes place in the form
of bureaucratizing transformations of policy-making processes and sub-
stance. The characteristics of bureaucratic organizations can be distin-
guished from the traditional forms of administration in specific terms
of division of labor, hierarchy of authority, and written rules and regula-
tions (Meyer and Brown 1977: 364). Tellingly, the process of bureaucrati-
zation has important practical implications for the accommodation of
these features in modern society. For instance, the formalization of
large-scale personnel procedures is central to understanding the differ-
entiation of hierarchical and decision-making authority (ibid. 365-366).
Foreign policy analysts have also recognized the relevance of bureau-
cratization in decision-making processes and implementation proce-
dures. As illustrated in the works of Allison (1969), Allison and Halper-
in (1972) or Halperin (1974), the study of foreign policy can be enriched
by the insights of bureaucratized organizational structures and their in-
stitutional values. More specifically, the bureaucratic politics model has
made a contribution to the theoretical application of an organizational
bargaining scheme in a state’s conduct of foreign policy (Brandt 2001).
Moreover, it becomes apparent that the joint dynamics of bureaucratiza-
tion and institutionalization brings along a broader scope of concepts of
power and public interests. As Putnam (1988: 431) notes, the proposed
model’s focus on the overlapping nature of intra-national games under-
scores the significance of bureaucratic interests for foreign policy-mak-
ing processes and relations between nations (see also Allison 1971:
149). The constructivist touch can be found in the model’s introduction
of shared values within society and bureaucracy, according to which
most bureaucrats are expected to act and argue (see also Allison and
Halperin 1972: 51, 56). The increased roles of ideas and the shared va-
lues help to infer the possibility of bureaucratized interest and identity
formation.
In practice, an important question has been raised on the main driv-
ing forces of bureaucratization as regards some bilateral relations.
There are at least two different lines of argumentation in this regard.
68 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
First, a low level of political attention paid to a particular region or
country is likely to leave the management of established bilateral rela-
tions to specialized bureaucrats because of efficiency and expediency
reasons. State foreign policy responds to the absence of high-level deci-
sions under the increasing influence of bureaucracy, particularly when
chief executives face time constraints and/or have a greater interest in
regions or countries elsewhere (Schraeder 1994: 13-14). The govern-
ment’s reliance on specialization of bureaucratic bodies is expected to
expedite the running of bilateral relations as in various tasks on fact-
finding and policy development (Alt and Alsena 1996: 658). In this
light, bureaucratization is meant to cope with issue-specific complexity
with regard to social and national benefits. The redistributive concerns
do not disappear, however, the idea that there may be common interests
in addition to group interests gives rise to the accentuation of efficiency
and rationality in the public policy arena (Majone 1996: 613). The ad-
ministrative officials are considered to be in a position of combining
ethical and political discourses and thereby yielding practical conse-
quences in the form of social and demographically based solutions
(ibid. 613-614).
The second line of argumentation widely discussed in the field of
public policy explains the process of bureaucratization in terms of pol-
icy credibility and delegation legitimacy. The matter of so-called ‘time
inconsistency’ refers to a situation in which discretionary policy creates
a negative incentive for the actors involved to behave differently than ex-
pected due to their anticipation of unrestrained policy change (Majone
1996: 614). In this respect, bureaucracy – because of its relative invul-
nerability to domestic pressures and election returns – has the credibil-
ity advantages of ensuring domestic commitments and enhancing over-
all policy continuity (ibid. 617; see also Alt and Alesina 1996: 658-659).
This issue of policy credibility crucially gives rise to a government’s
willingness to delegate certain policy-making capacities to technocratic
entities at the national or supranational levels (Majone 1996: 616). For
example, as some intergovernmental regulatory agreements are often
subjected to the problems of defection and lacking credibility, it is sug-
gested that independent monitoring authorities be established in re-
sponse (ibid. 617).
The consequences of bureaucratization, as found in the important de-
velopments of public administration, are not always straightforward re-
garding the bargaining schemes in operation. It is possible that under
the conditions of organized procedures, policy objectives may be differ-
ently pursued in the processes of legislative formulation and bureau-
cratic implementation. From a public policy perspective, bureaucratiza-
tion can involve agency losses in terms of agency costs of delegating
policy-making authority. In a sense, the potential benefits of delegation
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can be offset by the possibility of abdicating policy control (Lupia and
McCubbins 1994). This is an institutional choice in response to the
principal-agent problem, with ‘the enacting coalition’ and ‘the bureau-
cratic entity’ looking to create a new mission and agency as well as to
ensure the implementation of durable arrangements (McCubbins and
Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989). The term bureaucratic drift depicts the
strategic moves of bureaucratic agents implementing an organization-
ally preferable policy that departs from the one officially agreed upon
but still remains in an acceptable range for avoiding political retribution
(ibid.; see also Shepsle and Bonchek 1997: 365). That bureaucratization
in itself reflects the political will to insulate bureaucratic entities from
interference and to grant them the relating capacity to act as indepen-
dent bodies, can be viewed not only as a rationalized approach of ad-
ministrative efficiency but more importantly as a ‘tradeoff’ of a bureau-
cratic drift in defense against shifting coalitional political alignments of
a so-called coalition drift (Majone 1996: 612-617; Shepsle and Bonchek
1997: 373-5). In the question of the distribution of power, Pollack (1997)
calls attention to two possible extreme positions: (i) the ‘runaway bu-
reaucracy’ thesis and (ii) the ‘congressional dominance’ school, where
the former is also called the ‘abdication hypothesis’, which underscores
the autonomy of bureaucracy while the latter characterizes the relation-
ships as the continued authority of legislators. The aforementioned
agency costs are said to involve structuring, bonding and monitoring
the contracts between agents and incurring the imperfect enforcements
of contracts (Jensen 1983; see also Alt and Alesina 1996: 658). In this
light, the principals may find an incentive to create certain mechanisms
that enable them to retain control over their agents (Pollack 1997; Moe
1987).
In foreign policy analysis, bureaucratization is expected to contribute
to the disposition of foreign policy-making mechanisms and organiza-
tional structures, and thereby gains its own internal dynamics in main-
taining relations with particular countries. In the context of US foreign
policy toward Africa, Schraeder (1991) has introduced the concepts of
‘bureaucratic incrementalism’ to explain the bureaucracy’s self-
interested nature that leads to the attainment of its increased organiza-
tional roles in policy-making processes. As soon as bilateral relations
have been established, the process of bureaucratization not only pre-
vents the relations from becoming irrelevant but also helps to strength-
en them in order to sustain bureaucratic influence as well as promote
organizational integrity (Shraeder 1994: 25). Because of these organiza-
tional interests of bureaucracy, the arguments of incrementalism may
also be applied to explain the bureaucratic trends of resisting policy
change and so maintaining the status quo (Shraeder 1991: 384; see also
Halperin 1974). This is apparently inherent to bureaucratic cultures,
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which partly embrace the bureaucracy’s reliance on the established lo-
gics of foreign policy formulation and evaluation as well as on the orga-
nizational standard operating procedures (Schraeder 1994: 21). In
game-theoretical terms, the relatively high discount rate of certain se-
nior political players arguably signifies their short-term horizon on any
issue and implies that they tend to be less influenced by organizational
interests than bureaucrats and career officials usually are (Allison and
Halperin 1972: 50).
As mentioned above, the foreign policy conduct of the EU and Thai-
land – in particular the day-to-day running of bilateral relations – is of-
ten seen as a product of bureaucratic dynamics. In their bilateral rela-
tions, several actions are taken in the absence of high-level decisions
and are thus subject to bureaucratic routine behaviors. It is evident that
both the EU and Thailand have undergone manifold processes of bu-
reaucratization – although in significantly different ways.
– Thailand has a long tradition of bureaucratization, which can be
traced to the country’s modernization agenda near the end of the
19th century. Thailand’s preserved national independence signifi-
cantly contributes to the self-determined developments of its bu-
reaucracy as a ‘unique’ administrative institution (Shor 1960: 66-
67; see also Riggs 1966; Eisenstadt 1968; Evers 1987). As regards
the foreign policy conduct, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
managed to establish a well-defined relationship among domestic
institutions and attain a high degree of professionalization during
the 1980s, has become the country’s main bureaucratic institution
– responsible for full-fledged organizational structures in various re-
gional and functional departments (Ru¨land 2001a: 1027-1028).
– In the EU case, the process of bureaucratization is in part the result
of the developments of interrelationships between the member
states and the EU supranational institutions. The European Com-
mission is frequently considered the EU’s main bureaucratic insti-
tution because, as a new decision-making body, it has attracted sig-
nificant transfers of regulatory competence in various areas such as
the environment, consumer protection, and labor rights (Tsebelis
and Yataganas 2002: 291). The roles of the European Commission
are expected to increase further as ‘head of the EU bureaucracy’
after the Treaty of Nice, given that the Council decisions have be-
come more complicated by the so-called ‘triple majority rules’ – i.e.,
the qualified majority of weighed votes, the majority of member
states, the majority of the population – although the Commission’s
legislative agenda-setting functions may to some extent decrease in
view of virtually expanded legislative cores of the EU (ibid.).
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III.4 Framework II: Systemic Level Analysis
III.4.1 New Bilateralism in the Inter-regional Context
Typologically, EU-Thailand relations represent one of the ‘borderline
cases’ of interregionalism, although it is noted that they can also be
seen as simply a kind of ‘external relations of regional organizations’
(Rüland 2006b: 298; Hänggi 2006). The terminological ambiguity can-
not only be traced to the language use itself but lies in the variety of re-
cent interregional relations as observed in the international system. To
start with, a helpful distinction has been made between the forms of
interregionalism strictly defined as bilateral region-to-region relation-
ships and those that are less clearly recognizable: ‘regional organizations’
external relations with third states in other regions and relationships
among states, groups of states and regional organizations from two or
more regions are viewed as interregional relations in the wider sense,
whereas all types and forms of interregionalism that fall in between are
considered as interregional relations in the narrower sense’ (Hänggi 2003:
41; see also Rüland 2006b). In fact, it seems reasonable that while dif-
ferent interregional relations for their own part are placed in order
along a spectrum of interregionalism, EU-Thailand relations can be
considered ‘quasi-interregional’, as Hänggi (2006: 41-42) asserts:
At the ‘lower’ end of the spectrum, we find relations between re-
gional organizations and third states in other regions as border-
line cases of interregionalism – or interregional relations in the
wider sense. These relationships may serve as a substitute for
group-to-group relations because one of the two participating re-
gions is void of a regional organization or a regional group of
states that is able to act as a counterpart. ... Given the fact that
these relationships constitute an essential component part of
relations between two regions, they may be called quasi-interregio-
nal – they play a similar role as interregional relations in the nar-
rower sense.22
In the study that follows, the interpretation of EU-Thailand relations as
a new bilateralism at the international system level partly follows the ar-
guments of interregionalism because, not only do the developments of
interregionalism underline the increasing relevance of recent relations
between regions including those between a regional organization and a
third country, but, more importantly, its theoretical approach seems to
offer an important insight into the parallel logics of regionness and mul-
tiple-level systemic structures. There are at least three aspects that
greatly support the projection of new bilateralism into an interregional
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framework: (a) programmatic developments, (b) its membership pat-
terns, and (c) the functions of new bilateralism at the international sys-
tem level.
In the area of programmatic developments, new bilateralism, new re-
gionalism and interregionalism are interconnected on grounds of their
implications for regional integration efforts, recently assuming the in-
creasing relevance of regional as well as bilateral alternatives to existing
global institutions. The developments of ‘first generation’ regionalism
to ‘second generation’ regionalism – the so-called new regionalism –
not only underscore a greater degree of political coherence within the
region but also the multidimensionality across the fields of political,
economic and cultural regional cooperation in contrast to the apparently
separate logics of previous economic integration or security alliances
(Van Langenhove 2005; Van Langenhove and Costea 2005a; see also
Hettne 2003).23 There has also been a discussion about the emergence
of third generation regional integration, by which a regional grouping –
such as the EU in particular – is believed to reach the status of a global
actor and so, in practice, may behave accordingly as an actor at the in-
ternational system level (ibid.; Van Langenhove and Costea 2005a; Van
Langenhove and Costea 2005b). Following this trend, it is observable
that the EU’s increased actorness, in a sense, contributes to its own re-
gional integration efforts and that this development seems to also apply
to the external relations of the EU with a third country or a regional
grouping. In a further step, the concept of ‘multiregionalism’ has been
introduced by Hettne (2003) to predict a form of global governance
based on schematic relations among all regional groupings, presenting
the very idea of regionalism as a ‘third way’ forward between the two
hotly debated trends: global multilateralism and local bilateralism (Van
Langenhove and Costea 2005a; Van Langenhove 2005).
Second, the diffuse membership of new bilateralism seems to be to a
large extent explained in an interregional context regarding the emer-
gence of ever more complex territorial groupings and so the increas-
ingly blurred definition of regions as such. In his recent work ‘A World
of Regions’, Katzenstein (2005; see also Ikenberry 2005; Reiterer 2006)
argues that – in response to the American influence – the Asian and
European versions of regionalism, termed as ‘porous regionalism’, have
illustrated an increasing degree of openness to exchanges across bor-
ders and systemic transformations, and, based on this view, Katzen-
stein’s definition tends toward a pragmatic one that describes regions
as ‘not simply physical constants or ideological constructs, but … ex-
press[ing] changing human practices’ (cited in Reiterer 2006: 223-224).
As we have already mentioned, in contrast to traditional bilateral rela-
tions, the recent wave of new bilateralism hardly confines the two par-
ties involved to neighboring countries or, economically speaking, natur-
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEW BILATERALISM 73
al trading partners. In this light, the new bilateralism trend is said to ex-
pand from geographically conditioned ties to ‘geographically-dispersed’
ones connecting two distant regions (Lloyd 2002; Aggarwal and Koo
2005). The Thai government, for example, signed a framework agree-
ment combining an Early Harvest scheme with India in October 2003,
concluded a comprehensive FTA with Australia in 2004 and a similar
one with New Zealand in April 2005, and has been in the process of ne-
gotiating another FTA with Peru since November 2006.24 On the EU’s
side, there is also evidence to suggest that several new bilateral negotia-
tions have become decreasingly tied to the EU’s neighborhood policy
and the related agendas of intraregional integration. For instance, dis-
cussions have been raised in the recent attempts to upgrade the EU-Is-
rael Association Agreement (see also Perry 2007) and the prospects of
the EU’s FTA negotiations with the new rising economies such as India
and China (European Commission 2006j; Asia Times 2006).
Third, and most importantly, it can be argued that certain specific
functions that new bilateralism is expected to perform in the interna-
tional system are inducible from the framework of interregionalism. In
the context of the relations between the EU and ASEAN, Rüland (2001b)
points to the ‘proliferation of regional actors’ and the consequential
emergence of a ‘multi-tiered system’ with new interregional fora and in-
stitutions being created in-between. Premised on three main theories of
international relations, a very helpful set of five functions of interregion-
alism was introduced by the same author (ibid.): (i) ‘balancing’, (ii) ‘in-
stitution-building’, (iii) ‘rationalizing’, (iv) ‘agenda-setting’ and (v) ‘iden-
tity-building’. Although new bilateralism is often viewed as emerging in
response to the developments of multilateralism and, to a certain extent,
interregionalism, the relevant context of interregionalism itself can ob-
viously be described as a similar multi-layered setting in which new bila-
teralism also finds itself. This serves as the main focus of the next chap-
ter, which – based on the set of functions proposed by Rüland (2001b) –
is aimed at building up a second theoretical framework for the analysis
of new bilateralism at the international system level.
III.4.2 Theories of International Relations Revisited
III.4.2.1 Neorealist Approach
The foremost attempts to ‘systemize’ the realist theories of international
relations can be found in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979).
He has already suggested in his previous work, Man, the State and War
(1959), that the reasons for war – and thus the dynamics of interna-
tional politics – can be traced to three levels of analysis that are known
as three ‘images’. The third image depicts the framework for interna-
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tional politics, within which the first and second images account for
forces underlying foreign policy decisions and by which the importance
of these forces can be assessed and the predictions of their conse-
quences made (ibid. 238). Neorealist theory evidently remains true to
several key realist concepts of power politics including the primacy of
security interests, survival and self-help, however, its ‘systemizing’ ap-
proach gives rise to a theoretical foundation that seeks to explain the
foreign policy behavior of states in terms of structural determinants at
the international system level (Majørset 1988: 282; see also Buzan 1986
and 1987: 100). This approach has also been widely discussed in the
agent-structure debate; it maintains the conceptual emphasis that
Waltz’s neorealist theory placed on the international system and its ob-
vious decomposition of the system into units and structural constraints
that face them (Powell 1994).
If new bilateralism can be regarded as a systemic phenomenon, it il-
lustrates a specific pattern of bilateral alignments at the systemic level,
so that its emergence theoretically depends on the international political
structures and the arrangements within them. The Waltzian neorealist
theory identifies two important components that characterize the struc-
tures of the international system: (i) the ordering principle of the sys-
tem, that is, anarchy, and (ii) the distribution of capabilities across its
units that are states (Waltz 1986; see also Lamy 2005).25
1. Anarchy itself is a long-standing concept that gives an idea of the
lack of central authority to enforce rules and maintain order in the
international system (Lamy 2005). While traditional realists simply
consider anarchy a condition of the system under which states in-
teract and where a struggle for power is likely to occur, neorealists
attempt to theorize anarchy as a crucial structural factor that de-
fines the international system and consequently shapes and deter-
mines the international politics (ibid.; Keohane 1986). For Waltz
(1979: 87) the decentralized and anarchic nature of the interna-
tional system has implications that states are not functionally differ-
entiated and that the system can thus be seen as composed of ‘like
units’ (see also Wagener 2006). Moreover, this also relates to the
notion that international politics is preoccupied with the uncertainty
of states about the intentions of others and thus expresses a lack of
trust after all (Lamy 2005; Baylis 2005).
2. Regarding the second component, the neorealist focus on the distri-
bution of capabilities among states stresses that their differences do
not involve traditions, objectives, functions or forms of government
but capabilities (Waltz 1979: 94; see also Wagener 2006). Along
this dimension, the structures of the international system may dif-
fer because of changes in the distribution of capabilities thereby as-
suming the placement of a unit in relation to others, called a ‘posi-
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tional picture’ (Waltz 1979, in Keohane 1986: 15). With this struc-
tural conception of state capabilities, it is evident that the neorealist
theory goes beyond the traditional realist notion of power predomi-
nantly defined by geographic realities including population, natural
resources and industrial capacity as well as national character, na-
tional morale and military preparedness (see above). However,
while Waltz (1979: chapter 8) believes that military power remains
a useful power resource for a state, it becomes apparent that neore-
alists including Waltz himself – if only carefully – begin to discuss
the relevance of economic interdependence and military relation-
ships and the roles of great powers in the ‘management of interna-
tional affairs’ (Waltz 1979: chapter 7-9; see also Keohane 1986: 15;
Baldwin 2002).
Following these two components – the anarchic structure of the interna-
tional system and the orientation of states toward the distribution of
capabilities – the neorealist theory foresees competition among states
and contends that balances of power will inevitably emerge (Waltz
1979: 129; see also Keohane 1986: 15). We can also expect the concepts
of a new bilateralism to contribute to a balancing of powers in the inter-
national system. Beyond the realist discussions of power and balances
of power, the neorealist version of the balance-of-power theory seeks to
explain how the changes in the distribution of capabilities can lead to
different patterns of alignments and how they consequently entail the
formation of the balances of power in an international system (Waltz
1979: 119; Keohane 1986: 15).
By way of explanation, the emergence of alignments – such as new
bilateralism – reflects the strategic behavior of allied states in their ef-
forts to balance powers in the international system. As a matter of fact,
it is important to note that the balance of power theory ‘predicts balan-
cing, not balances, of power’ (Ruggie 1986: 137, cited in Bhansali 1987).
In the discussions of alliance choices, two possible strategies for states
that are externally threatened have been identified – to balance or to
bandwagon the threatening power. While the first strategy refers to the
alignment with the weaker side in order to deter and/or defeat that
threatening power, the latter is a metaphor for aligning with the domi-
nant power to appease it and possibly benefit from being on the win-
ning side (Walt 1988: 278).26 In the case of smaller states, the balancing
strategy has implications that they can enhance their influence because
of their relatively greater contribution within the coalition and that they
are apparently less vulnerable should the dominant power become more
aggressive (ibid.). Furthermore, the concepts of alliance formation have
also been extended to contrast the notion of ‘balance of power’ with the
‘balance of threat’. The balance of threat theory, by which states are ex-
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pected to behave in response to ‘imbalances of threat’ instead of ‘imbal-
ances of power’, is designed to offer a more general and abstract ver-
sion of, i.e., ‘subsumes’, the balance of power theory (Walt 1988: 281).
According to Walt (1985, 1988), the structural balance of power theory
has certain limitations insofar as it only concentrates on the distribution
of capabilities in terms of population, military, economic and technolo-
gical capability, and political cohesion. It seems to leave out some of the
other components such as proximity, offensive capabilities and aggres-
sive intentions – all of which are regarded as highly relevant in affecting
the capacity of the dominant power to threaten the sovereignty of other
states.27
The trends of new bilateralism have to some extent demonstrated
that a series of two parties may opt for new policy orientation and cer-
tain non-traditional measures in order to balance against the dominant
power. Beyond the conception of balancing threats, it mentions that sec-
ond-tier states may also adopt the so-called ‘soft balancing’ measures as
long as they do not regard the superpower as a threat to their sover-
eignty but are still concerned with that superpower’s unilateralism and
interventionist tendencies (Paul 2005: 71; Pape 2005: 15-16).28 It is
noted that, in principle, ‘soft balancing’ can expedite the convergence of
expectations among less powerful states and subsequently create a basis
for a potential ‘hard balancing’, should the superpower not cease its ag-
gressive policies and go beyond its stated goals (Pape 2005: 10, 17- 18;
Paul 2005: 47). In practice, ‘soft balancing’ mostly avoids unnecessary
provocation and thus seems less threatening than ‘hard balancing’, so
that, in contrast to the traditional ‘hard balancing’ measures of a mili-
tary buildup, a war-time alliance and military-related technology trans-
fers, the ‘soft balancing’ strategies tend toward the use of non-military
resources including institutionalist and diplomatic means such as inter-
national institutions, economic statecraft and particular interpretations
of neutrality (Paul 2005: 71; See also Pape 2005: 36).29 In the context of
interregionalism, it has been noted that the later developments of the
triad relations – e.g., the establishments of the APEC and, subsequently,
the ASEM – can be regarded as contributing to the ‘institutional balan-
cing’ of the interregional relations among the North American, Eur-
opean and Asian continents (Rüland 1996, 2006a). As Rüland (2006a:
50) asserts, this strategy of institutional balancing – although short-term
in nature – would give states an opportunity to transcend substantial
commitments as well as investments into institution-building other-
wise.
III.4.2.2 Neoliberal Institutionalist Approach
The post-war neoliberalism, also referred to as neoliberal institutional-
ism, emerges as the liberal theoretical developments that support new
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cooperation patterns in the international system. There seems to be a
generally accepted view among neorealists and neoliberal institutional-
ists that the international system is anarchic in its nature and that inter-
national politics underlies rationality assumptions. Yet while the former
– due mostly to the alleged power politics of states and their ‘relative
gains’ considerations – do not believe in a durable framework for coop-
eration, the latter suggests that institutions can, under certain circum-
stances, cope with those factors and contribute to generating and main-
taining cooperation. Hedley Bull’s (1977) concept of ‘anarchic society’
suggests that the anarchic structures of the international system do not
preclude communication and that states are, in fact, likely to find them-
selves bound to certain ‘basic rules of coexistence’ and to reach the ac-
ceptance of institutions through international law, diplomatic represen-
tation and international organizations. In retrospect, institutionalism
can be traced to the work of Hugo de Groot, who, in the early 16th cen-
tury, departed from the Hobbesian tradition of state-centric realism, to-
ward one of internationalism (ibid.; see also Krell 2004: 65). For if
states were considered to be subject to common rules and institutions,
it would be possible for them to overcome the permanent struggle for
power and security and to promote a peaceful, rules-based conduct of
international politics (ibid.). In economics, (neo-)institutionalism also
has a long tradition as a theory that – in contrast to that of individual-
ism – focuses on the complex dynamics of institutions with respect to
organizational skills, institutional arrangements, values, attitudes and
habits (Gruchy 1969; Junker 1968).
The emphasis that neoliberalism places on institutions and their
functions to pursue international cooperation must be understood in
the context of the early theoretical foundations of functionalism and
neofunctionalism. Mitrany (1976; see also Conzelmann 2001; Dunne
2005; Wessels 2006) has a normative approach in which he theorizes
that, because of the inefficient way that nation-states address particular
social and trans-boundary issues, international cooperation can be
achieved through the expanding dynamics of transnational cooperation
in one specific functional or technical area – for example, transnational
cooperation in postal services, transportation or water resources man-
agement – in another area. Functionalist arguments also stress that
joint problem solving gives rise to an increase in mutual dependence
transnationally and a related tendency of technical self-determination of
cooperation – as noted: ‘form follows function’ (ibid.). With the focus
on a community-building ‘process’ and thus the modifications of some
integratory concepts, the neofunctionalists have raised another argu-
ment that the spill-over mechanisms of the economy toward political in-
tegration create the re-orientation of political activities and loyalties of
elites and, more importantly, a certain transfer of resources and sover-
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eignty – from nation-states to supranational institutions (Haas 1964; see
also Conzelmann 2001; Christiansen 2005; Wessels 2006). Deutsch
(1962), in his theory of transactionism, emphasizes that institutions
and the plural communication practices within them also prepare
ground for the emergence of a political community, which can further
result in political integration (Deutsch and Burrell and Kann 1957; see
also Rosamond 2000; Schneider 2004; Baylis 2005; Ngoma 2005). In
the ASEAN context, there is evidence to suggest that these neofunc-
tional and neoliberal institutionalist approaches have increasingly out-
stripped the realist explanation with regard to the region’s increasing
economic interdependence and spilled-over cooperation instances and
that Deutsch’s concept of ‘security community’ appears to be helpful in
explaining the ASEAN in terms of value-based security complexes (Rü-
land 2005b: 156; see also Dosch 1997).
If viewed positively, the trends of ‘new bilateralism’ illustrate the
emerging patterns of interaction of states that can promote interna-
tional cooperation and, in a sense, the developments of multilateralism
in the international system. For neoliberal institutionalists, the emer-
gence of new bilateralism has implications for the ‘institution building’
dynamics, provided that the bilateral relations either form particular in-
stitutions on their own or help promote multilateral ones in a bottom-
up process. The importance of ‘institutions’ is widely acknowledged, as
noted here:
Successful cooperation … requires effective international institu-
tions to guide international behavior along a path of sustainable
development. By ‘institutions’ we mean persistent and connected
sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, con-
strain activity, and shape expectations. They may take the form of
bureaucratic organizations, regimes (rule-structures that do not
necessarily have organizations attached), or conventions (infor-
mal practices) (Haas and Keohane and Levy 1993: 4-5; see also
Lamy 2005: 214).
With them, institutions carry an extended set of functions that are also
significant for international cooperation. It should be noted, however,
that there are different approaches to defining, and thus assigning func-
tions to, institutions. As Keohane and Martin (1995: 42; see also Baylis
2005: 308; Dunne 2005) note, for example, the functions include speci-
fically ‘sharing information’, ‘reducing transaction costs’ and ‘reinfor-
cing reciprocity’. Furthermore, while sociological institutionalists would
stress the relevance of norms, rules and cultures, the historical and ra-
tionalist institutionalists prefer to focus on formal and – for the latter,
only to a lesser extent – informal rules (Schneider 2004). This explains
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the focus of institutionalists on rules and norms, which are likely to
play a role in forming and shaping institutions. It is often the case that
the discussions of institutional dynamics in part give an account of the
institutionalization of rules and the notion of norm embeddedness, so
that changes in international norms and institutions are inevitably re-
garded as crucial factors at the international system level (see also ibid.;
Nye 1988: 249-250). In other cases, it is observable that instead of the
attempts to construct institutions as such, loose arrangements based on
non-binding nature and declaratory statements – also referred to as
‘proto-regimes’ (Aggarwal 1993) – have been reached, for example, in
the later developments of ASEAN ministerial meetings and their paral-
lel track-two forums (Rüland 2005a: 558).
In addition to institution building and its related functions, the new
bilateralism phenomenon is expected to respond to a new challenge for
international relations as can be seen in the increasing importance of
agenda setting. In particular, Keohane and Nye (1989; see also Spindler
2003; Wagener 2007) observe that interdependence becomes more sig-
nificant with regard to the expansion of international transactions and
the associated costs on certain political activities and thereby reflects the
sensitivity and vulnerability of states and actors in interstate, transgo-
vernmental and transnational relations. By way of explanation, the lit-
erature of ‘complex interdependence’ – depicts an ideal-type scenario in
contrast to realism – reveals the multiple channels of contact in which
states are no longer primary actors in international politics but exist
along with other influential actors such as multinationals, banks and
academic expert groups (ibid.). It also suggests that the definition of
power can be extended beyond ‘military strength’ to a state’s ‘control
over outcomes’, so that the politics of military coercion is expected to
assume a less crucial role and be pursued only under stricter circum-
stances (ibid.). More significantly, the importance of agenda formation
has been widely recognized because the apparent lack of hierarchy be-
tween high and low issues in international politics makes it difficult for
foreign policy coherence and consistency and that agenda setting for
some disaffected groups may serve as a way of politicizing certain issue
areas within the domestic and international realms (ibid.).
III.4.2.3 Constructivist Approach
The constructivist theory of international relations focuses on the roles
of cognitive factors such as ideas, identities and norms in constructing
international reality. In comparison to the other two schools outlined
above, constructivism has increasingly gained attention with regard to
its reflectivist-cognitive approach to understanding state behavior and
explaining the dynamics of the systemic transformation of international
politics (Ruggie 1998: 874-876). This approach in principle suggests
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that the actors involved may not always follow a rational behavioral code
of conduct and, more importantly, that these actors as such can be re-
garded as subject to their ‘collective intentionality’ as constitutive units
at the international system level (Serle 1995: 24-25; Ruggie 1998: 869-
870).
For constructivists, new bilateralism thus combines two parties in the
dynamics of social construction and, in this sense, may contribute to a
key function of building a collective identity. The theoretical emphasis
placed on the intersubjective bases of social action suggests that the
identities and interest of states are not given but endogenously defined
and that the process of transformation is possible through interaction
and communicative acts. Considering the process of collective identity
formation, the constructivist explanation appears to have affinities with
the literature of neofunctionalism. For example, Deutsch and Burrell
and Kann (1957) who stressed the significance of shared values and ‘a
sense of community’ for the emergence of a security community, or
Haas’ (1958) theory of European integration that introduced the consti-
tutive and transformative elements of patterns of political integration
into a new political community (see also Ruggie 1998: 862; Rüland
2005b: 158). In principle, constructivists do not reject the neorealist no-
tion that the distribution of capabilities among states affects their for-
eign policy calculations but, in order to explain the underlying relations
between these two factors, it is crucial to focus on intersubjective under-
standings and expectations in order to constitute the conceptions of
‘self’ and ‘other’ and, in a sense, to develop and articulate distinctive
patterns of ‘affinity’ or ‘aloofness’ toward certain countries or regions
(Wendt 1992: 397; Sedelmeier 2004: 127).
In relation to its identity-building function, new bilateralism arguably
drives, and is driven by, ideas and norms and may contribute to a pro-
cess of norm diffusion in the international context.30 In contrast to the
rational views of imposition and competition, the constructivist explana-
tion comprises of four mechanisms for the diffusion of social institu-
tions, namely (i) formal and informal pressures, (ii) perception of suc-
cessful and legitimate models, (iii) symbolic standing, and (iv) profes-
sional associations and expert communities (Barnett 2005: 264-265).
Since this diffusion is expected to introduce transformation and system
changes, the relevance of new bilateralism may be observable at differ-
ent stages of norm internalization and in regional, interregional or in-
ternational settings. The life cycle of norms, as postulated by Finnemore
and Sikkink (1998: 894-905; see also Barnett 2005: 265-266), gives an
account of the evolving process in which norms are internationalized
through the three stages of ‘norm emergence’, ‘norm cascade’ and
‘norm internalization’: that is, in the first stage, an emergent norm is
called up or created by norm entrepreneurs and persuaded by a critical
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mass of states (i.e., norm leaders), then – once the critical threshold is
reached – that norm will be socialized, imitated by other norm followers
and cascade down to the rest of states in this second stage, and in the
third, the norm is internalized and thus has a ‘taken-for-granted’ qual-
ity. In discussing the contribution of new bilateral relations to the inter-
nationalization of norms, it seems relevant that the bilateral parties –
individually or collectively – can be seen as performing the functions of
‘norm entrepreneurs’, ‘norm leaders’ or merely ‘norm followers’ in
practice.
That is, the constructivist interpretation of institutions is a cognitive
one. They can be understood in line with actors’ ideas and conceived in
terms of internalized identities and interests, so that in effect they can
be cooperative or conflictual (Wendt 1992: 399). As far as new bilateral
agreements are concerned, one may expect that the bilateral parties will
define a considerable portion of the underlying interests through dialo-
gues and their behavior in accordance with the agreed upon norms and
rules. For constructivists like Onuf (1998), there seems to be a distinc-
tion between regulative and constitutive rules and, with it, the notion
that the former do not – while the latter in general may – change iden-
tity underscores the significance of the adoption of constitutive rules in
a process of collective identity formation. With regard to the above-men-
tioned possibility of norm diffusion, the so-called ‘institutional iso-
morphism’ suggests that divergent actors and institutions subject to the
same environment are likely to converge and that, over time, they may
eventually appear more like a single model (Barnett 2005: 264). More-
over, institutional isomorphism – and thus the decisions of states to
adopt institutions – may not serve as an efficient way of achieving the
stated goals but rather as a social path toward symbolic legitimacy and
that this sense of international community can be deepened through
the internationalization of norms implies the acceptance of certain stan-
dards of behavior and shared values in the international community
(ibid. 266).
Moreover, from a constructivist perspective, the conduct of bilateral
relations can contribute significantly to the promotion of exchanges of
views and experiences and the strengthening of the networks of aca-
demics and experts. This last point is related to the concept of epistemic
communities, which thus far have provided an approach to explaining
the increasing roles of such networks in several issue-specific interna-
tional efforts.31 By definition, epistemic communities are knowledge-
based transnational networks of experts with shared understandings
who may contribute to resolving particular complex problems by identi-
fying the operational content and potential issue interlinkages and de-
fining interests of states toward a preferred policy orientation (Haas
1992a; Ruggie 1998: 868; Greene 2005: 474). The relevance of episte-
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mology can be observed in the increasing demand for information in
order to ensure that policy makers understand the problems and the
cause-and-effect relationships involved (Haas 1992a). Furthermore, the
notion of the gradual progress of epistemes and thus the possible evolu-
tion of ideas – as partly introduced by the theorists of ‘evolutionary epis-
temology’ – emphasize the possibility of learning in the sense that ac-
tors are expected to learn through the evolution of consensual knowl-
edge and thereby to develop new patterns of reasoning necessary for re-
defining their interests (Haas 1992a; Campbell 1987).32 To this end, the
trends of new bilateralism may also underline these pragmatic elements
in international relations and with the emergence of networks of ex-
perts they are in a position to assume policy responses that support pro-
blem solving and mutual recognition efforts.
III.4.3 Bilateralism and International Trade Theory
The path leading to free trade has been hotly debated – nationally and
internationally. The logic of international trade theory can be traced to
Ricardo’s early concepts of comparative advantage, suggesting that any
two countries are always able to benefit from trade because of the rela-
tive comparative advantages of one party over the other. Ricardo (1911),
as mentioned above, points out the implications of international trade
that it can always generate welfare gains for all of the parties involved –
and that each of them can maximize their welfare – by specializing in
the production of the goods of their comparative advantage (see also
Gerber 2002: 56). Despite some of the theoretical limitations of the Ri-
cardian model,33 it is widely accepted that free trade – defined as ‘a si-
tuation in which there are no artificial barriers to trade’ (Deardorff
2007) – lies in the interest of all countries and is thus desirable as a
policy orientation in the long run.
The proliferation of bilateral and regional FTA negotiations has in-
creasingly gained attention in recent developments of trade liberalization.
It raises the question of the implications of bilateralism and regionalism
for multilateral trading arrangements – as discussed in the ‘stumbling
blocks’ versus ‘building blocks’ debate (see, for example, Bhagwati 1995;
Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996). In an overview, Bhagwati (1995; see also
Bhagwati and Panagariya 2003) has been clear in his warning against a
policy drift away from multilateralism toward bilateral or regional trade
agreements. The same author, for example, refers to a ‘spaghetti bowl’
phenomenon in which diverging rules and tariffs resulting from a wide
range of those bilateral and regional arrangements may negatively cause
complexity and perplexity in the global trading system (ibid.). Moreover,
it has further been argued that the political support for FTAs can be parti-
cularly observed in trade diverting cases and the subsequently adopted
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FTAs are likely to have rather negative effects on free trade (Krishna
1998; Grossman and Helpman 1995, in Cadot and de Melo and Olarrea-
ga 1998). In the contrasting views Ethier (1996), among others, (see also
Cadot and de Melo and Olarreago 1998) asserts that regionalism repre-
sents an endogenous response to the trends of multilateralism and can
thus promote multilateral liberalization through its coordinating me-
chanisms. Dent (2003) also argues that, due to the possible complexity
and ambiguity in rules and tariffs in bilateral and regional deals, new bi-
lateral relations will probably give an impetus to renewed multilateral
trade negotiations and to bring about a rationalizing process thereby le-
veling all of the preferential trading arrangements to a new kind of re-
gionalism, which is sometimes termed ‘lattice regionalism’.
There is no clear answer thus far to the aforementioned question
but, if anything, concerns have been raised about the future of multila-
teralism. More specifically, for this study, the following aspects seem
worth discussing: (i) the impacts of bilateralism on world welfare, (ii)
the extent to which new bilateralism can be accommodated in the mul-
tilateral agenda of trade liberalization, and (iii) if necessary, the mechan-
isms that would help transcend the negative effects of bilateralism on
world trade (see also Cadot and de Melo and Olarreaga 1998).
(i) In the long-standing Vinerian tradition, the impacts of bilateral
and regional trading agreements on world welfare can be explained by
the concepts of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’. As soon as a pre-
ferential trading arrangement – e.g., a customs union or FTA – is in
place, it not only means that the resulting trade between its members
generate trade gains as such, but that the tariff reduction within that
trading arrangement may lead to new patterns of trade relations, initiat-
ing some changes in the welfare of the countries involved. When a pre-
ferential trading arrangement provides an incentive for a member to re-
place its own production with imports from a partner country, the phe-
nomenon is called ‘trade creation’, which is, in principle, related to
welfare improvement for the importing country because of the reduced
costs of the imported good (Viner 1950; see also Deardorff 2007). If, by
contrast, a preferential trade arrangement makes it profitable for its
member to import from another fellow member country instead of its
current partner outside it, the effect is referred to as ‘trade diversion’,
which implies welfare reduction for the importing country because of
an increase in costs of the imported good (ibid.). The key distinction be-
tween trade creation and trade diversion underscores the two contrast-
ing movements regarding the costs of production, with the former mov-
ing toward lower-cost sources and the latter toward higher-cost ones
(Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). The extent to which any preferential trad-
ing arrangement’s internal liberalization is unmatched by external liber-
alization gives rise to both positive and negative welfare effects, so that
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it is important to weigh them against each other in order to analyze the
overall economic impacts of the bilateral or regional trade agreement in
question (Dent 2006).
This distinction between trade creation and trade diversion obviously
offers a less than comprehensive account of the economic effects of pre-
ferential trade arrangements. For example, it is considered oversimpli-
fied to represent only a partial view of real income comparisons (Won-
nacott and Lutz 1989). In other words, a trade-diverting scenario does
not necessarily mean that it is impossible to find grounds for qualifying
a preferential trade arrangement. Wonnacott and Lutz (ibid.), in fact,
identify four of them: First, the cut in tariffs arguably brings about a
lower price for consumers of the import country on some particular
products from its partner country, so that the switch to less efficient
sources of imports can be compensated by an improved pattern of con-
sumption or a more efficient production process (see also Meade 1955;
Lipsey 1957; see also Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). Second, with the help
of a preferential trade agreement and thus the ever-larger combined in-
ternal markets, a partner country that currently exhibits less efficient
production costs may be able to exploit the economies of scale and be-
come more competitive because of reduced total costs (Wonnacott and
Lutz 1989). Third, the extensive use of non-tariff barriers may blur the
overall effects of trade diversion, for example, in cases where other
kinds of quantitative restrictions such as quotas and voluntary export re-
straints have operated to re-divert low-cost sources of supply (ibid.).
Fourth, a country’s production with the lowest monetary costs does not
always yield economic efficiency, due to possible exchange rate misa-
lignments and balance of payments disequilibria, as well as the asso-
ciated opportunity costs for some deficit countries (ibid.).
While it is widely accepted that trade-creating arrangements are wel-
fare improving, while trade diverting ones are welfare worsening, their
implications for third countries may also need careful examination.
Although the adoption of external tariffs, as the Kemp and Wan (1976)
model suggests, can be designed to increase welfare among partners
and leave the quantity of trade with third countries unchanged, this is
always the case in a world of inward-looking and ‘closed’ blocs (see also
de Melo and Panagariya and Rodrik 1992). As a consequence, countries
that face considerable trade restrictions and transport costs in the out-
side world may be better off entering one of the preferential trading
blocs rather than pursuing unilateral trade liberalization (ibid.). In other
words, to put it more positively, regional integration in the form of pre-
ferential trade arrangements and FTAs may bring about strategic advan-
tages for the members in terms of increased ‘bargaining power’ and
‘market access’ (de Melo and Panagariya and Rodrik 1992; Wonnacott
and Lutz 1989). Moreover, the integration schemes allow compensatory
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEW BILATERALISM 85
mechanisms in some cases of asymmetric partners and are likely to
give them the opportunity of ‘arbitrage’ in internal markets and institu-
tions (ibid.). According to de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1992: 22),
the resulting regional institutions are in a position to alter the economic
outcomes via three channels: 1. the ‘preference-dilution effect’, that is,
factional interests become less relevant because of a larger political
community, 2. the ‘preference-asymmetry effect’, that is, the regional
policymaking tends toward a compromise that members agree upon,
and 3. the ‘institutional-design effect’, that is, policy makers may opti-
mize the choice of institutional settings in such a way as to create a cer-
tain degree of flexibility in domestic political decision making.
(ii) While free trade is, in theory, desirable for all, in practice we can
observe that not all of the steps taken thus far have led to free trade – at
least not in the first instance. The bilateral trend of preferential trade
agreements has posed a considerable challenge to the idea of free trade
regarding to what extent and how they can be accommodated within
the multilateral world order. Tellingly, the underlying forces of bilateral-
ism can be traced to the incentives of countries to improve their eco-
nomic welfare and – in a sense, if applicable – to benefit from the exter-
nal tariffs additionally imposed. To start with, if a Prisoners’ Dilemma
can be applied to explain the formation of bilateral trading blocs, it be-
comes apparent that, despite the notion that all economies should be
better off in one single free trade system, each pair of trading partners
has an incentive to form their own preferential trade arrangements
(Krugman 1989). The logics are as follows (ibid.): Given that the world
has four countries A, B, C and D, A and B will be better off if they bilat-
erally form a preferential trade arrangement, say, a customs union.
They have an incentive to maintain external tariffs against C and D as
non-members of the customs union – due obviously to additional gains
to the status quo. While this may improve the terms of trade for both A
and B, trade diversion is expected to occur and C and D will be worse
off. Analogously, C and D may follow the same intuition and end up
forming another customs union with similar external tariff patterns. By
way of explanation, this kind of ‘tariff war’ and the induced trade diver-
sion could have been prevented had all of the countries involved had
managed to avoid forming a customs union and maintained the struc-
tures of the existing system.
The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, as illustrated
above, to a certain extent, offer a helpful first step in analyzing the eco-
nomic impacts of preferential trade arrangements. That is, if trade crea-
tion exceeds trade diversion, we can expect that that arrangement will
improve the level of efficiency and world welfare. Most preferential
trade arrangements increase internal trade, however, it can be a com-
bined result of – and it is thus very important to differentiate between –
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the effects of trade creation in international trade and those of trade di-
version from outside to within the arrangement (Wonnacott and Lutz
1989: 65). From this, the accommodation of bilateralism into multilat-
eral frameworks relates to the degree in which the process of bilaterali-
zation is in a position of supporting or undermining world trade and
welfare. Quantitatively, the ‘trade intensity index’ has been used to iden-
tify the ratio of the bloc’s share of intra-bloc trade to its share in world
trade – that is, if the ratio is greater than one, the bloc is expected to
show trade diversion (Frankel 1997; see also Deardorff 2007). In the
background, there is a generally accepted view that trade between
neighboring countries seems ‘natural’ compared to trade between coun-
tries far apart and that, accordingly, geographical proximity plays a sig-
nificant role because of the associated shipping costs, transporting time
and cultural unfamiliarity (Frankel 1997: 40-46, chapter 7). By defini-
tion, ‘natural trading partners’ are countries between which trade is
subject to relatively low transport costs and other related costs and is
likely to be large in general (Deardorff 2007; see also Wonnacott and
Lutz 1989; Frankel 1997). In a way, a preferential trade arrangement
that reinforces natural trading patterns – for example, if its members
are natural trading partners or if they are already major trading partners
– is arguably likely to generate trade creation rather than trade diversion
and thus seems welfare-improving (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989; Krug-
man 1991; Frankel 1997). By contrast, despite the fact that transporta-
tion and communication costs have decreased significantly recently,
‘unnatural’ blocs need to be examined carefully and, in fact, are fre-
quently considered less efficient (ibid.). Furthermore, the grouping of
countries of different development levels raises some concerns about
the grouping’s economic success and the efforts to integrate less devel-
oped countries into such a grouping (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). As a
matter of fact, the division of gains, for example, is regarded politically
and economically as one of the profound matters for almost any groups
involving developing countries because of the different perceptions of
what ‘fair’ competition is or simply the difference in domestic trade
structures and preferences (ibid.).
In the discipline of political economics, the contrasting views on bi-
lateral and regional blocs can be summed up between the supporting
positions – as argued in terms of unilateral liberalization, the creation
of larger units for negotiations, the mobilization of regional solidarity,
the engendering of domestic political momentum through export con-
stituencies and competitive liberalization – and those against them – as
referring to the incentives of members to protect industries, their ma-
nipulation of the process by special interests, the use of scarce negotia-
tion resources and the possible creation of a political dead end (Frankel
1997). It seems obvious that the proponents of the former positions are
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relatively convinced of the effective accommodation of bilateralism with-
in multilateralism and would thus regard bilateral trading blocs as as-
suming the dynamics of ‘stepping stones’ in providing political support
and negotiating grounds for free trade (Frankel 1997: 150).
Interestingly, while international relations scholars discuss the impli-
cations of bipolarity and multipolarity for the international system, in-
ternational trade theorists have also addressed the question of the opti-
mal number of trading blocs and its impacts on world welfare. It has
been noted that, although a single trading bloc, i.e., free trade, is ex-
pected to yield the maximum level of welfare, fewer blocs do not always
lead to greater welfare. This is because the costs of a lack of free trade
may increase at a lower level of elasticity of substitution in world trade
(Krugman 1989). From his model, although certain restrictive assump-
tions are made, Krugman (1989) illustrates that the relationship be-
tween level of welfare and number of blocs follows a U-shaped curve –
with the minimum of welfare at a moderate number of blocs.34 This re-
sult is ‘surprising’ not only because a system with a large number of
trading blocs can yield a higher level of welfare than that of a moderate
number of blocs but also because – among all the values of elasticity of
substitution used in the study – three trading blocs always generate the
lowest level of world welfare (ibid.). Put in the triadic context of interna-
tional relations, Krugman’s study is very interesting in the sense that bi-
lateralism – and thus the emergence of bilateral and regional trading
blocs – does not necessarily mean welfare reduction in world trade.
(iii) In order to accommodate bilateralism in the multilateral trade
liberalization agenda, certain mechanisms appear to be particularly cru-
cial when following the above rationale of bilateral and regional trade ar-
rangements. First, and most obviously, it is always highly recommended
that the bilateral and regional free trade agreements include elements
of trade facilitation and in particular the international harmonization of
customs procedures (see also Frankel 1997; Casella 1996). As Frankel
(1997: 233) asserts, these measures contribute to raising economic wel-
fare for all of the groups of countries involved, promoting interstate
communication and mutual understanding, and – most importantly –
‘create[ing] natural trading areas’. It is also crucial to make bilateral and
regional FTAs compatible with one another, as far as the standards and
procedures – be they intellectual property rights protection, investment,
competition policy, dispute settlement mechanisms, or environmental,
sanitary and phytosanitary standards – are concerned, in order to
achieve the harmonization of those standards and bring together differ-
ent blocs into a broader multilateral framework in the long run (Frankel
1997; see also Goh and Olivier 2002).35
Second, the establishment of prospective preferential trade arrange-
ments is expect to follow GATT Article XXIV that for WTO members
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has served as official obligation as well as guiding principles in prac-
tice.36 That the formation of a new preferential trade agreement is re-
quired to cover ‘substantially all’ trade – although controversial – places
an emphasis on the comprehensive nature of the approach to eliminat-
ing the corresponding internal barriers. The efforts here will ensure the
expansion of trade-liberalizing effects by trade-creating tariff cuts and to
avoid biased negotiations that are otherwise likely to lead to trade diver-
sion (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). Furthermore, Article XXIV’s require-
ments that no tariff or other barriers to trade be raised against third par-
ties and that, if otherwise, the affected third parties be granted the ne-
gotiating rights to agree on compensation adjustments not merely
reaffirm the purpose of a customs union or a free trade area in itself
but more importantly help to protect the rights and interests of parties
outside it (ibid.; Cadot and de Melo and Olerreaga 1998). Maybe the
next step will emphasize that the barriers toward nonmembers should
not be left unchanged but sufficiently reduced to prevent export losses
and, in general, cope with the dynamic effects of intra-bloc trade poli-
cies on those policies among the blocs (Frankel 1997; Wonnacott and
Lutz 1989).
Third, it is important that bilateral and regional trade agreements
contain some kind of ‘accession clause’ to keep the membership open
to prospective partner countries (Dent 2006: 87; Frankel 1997: 238-
239). Moreover, the texts and provisions of these agreements often in-
clude the details of the terms of accession – such as the phase-in sche-
dules of trade liberalization or a diverse set of rules of origin – that to-
gether can play significant roles in encouraging or, if complicated, dis-
couraging the accession of third countries (ibid.; see also Yi 1996). As
with the concepts of ‘open regionalism’, the principle of inclusivity not
only emphasizes the willingness of members to expand their trade ar-
rangements to new applicants, but it can also reassure outside countries
in such a way to alleviate possible perceived threats (Frankel 1997).
Again, this mechanism is placed between the regionalization process
and the one that helps determine inter-bloc trade policies, so that the
potential outcomes do not simply indulge the static economic welfare
effects but eventually assume the dynamics underlying trade policies
between regions (see also ibid.).
III.5 New Bilateralism and International Relations
At the heart of the level of analysis problem, it is apparent that new bila-
teralism is not only a product of two parties’ foreign policy decisions
but in itself a trend that has significant implications for the interna-
tional system. The following is an attempt to bring together the two the-
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEW BILATERALISM 89
oretical frameworks that have been constructed above at both the unit
and systemic levels of analysis.
At the unit level, the focus of attention is particularly directed toward
the primary units of action, i.e., the EU and Thailand. The factors deter-
mining the developments of EU-Thailand relations in terms of domes-
tic interest structures and political motivation can be traced to the pro-
cesses of foreign policy making on each side. Three foreign policy the-
ories have been derived from the arguments of three major schools of
international relations: realism, liberalism, and social constructivism.
While realism and liberalism contend that states are subject to the ra-
tionality assumption and their interests and preferences exogenously
defined, constructivism follows a reflectivist approach stressing an en-
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dogenous process of interest and identity formation. Realist foreign pol-
icy theory focuses on the power interests of states and argues that their
foreign policies generally take the forms of autonom y-seeking, influ-
ence-seeking or voicing-opportunities-seeking. Liberal foreign policy
theory adds non-power incentives to the picture and suggests at least
two forms of foreign policy: engaging and correcting domestic market
failures. Constructivist foreign policy theory underscores the roles of
ideas and identity in the making of foreign policy decisions and thus
foresees the foreign policy in pursuit of identity formation or rhetorical
action. The bureaucratic politics model serves as a theoretical refine-
ment with regard to bargaining elements and internal dynamics of the
EU’s and Thailand’s foreign policy making processes.
At the systemic level, the analysis is designed to focus on the inter-
play between bilateralism and multilateralism and to study the overall
patterns of international relations. The main questions are about the
implications of EU-Thailand relations and the functions that this bilater-
alism is expected to perform, and is performing, in the international
system – as analyzed at the regional, interregional and global levels.
This study follows Rüland (2001b) who proposed a set of functions for
interregionalism. Notably, the connections between new bilateralism
and interregionalism are made here because of the categorization of
EU-Thailand relations as existing between a regional organization and a
third country and the parallel logics of regionness and multiple-level sys-
temic structures. According to three major schools of international rela-
tions – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism – the
functions to be investigated include balancing, institution-building, ra-
tionalizing, agenda-setting, and identity-building. The international
trade theory is briefly introduced in relation to three aspects: the im-
pacts of bilateralism on world welfare, the extent to which new bilateral-
ism can be accommodated in multilateral trade liberalization agenda
and the mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of bilateralism.
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IV The EU, Thailand, and New Bilateralism
This chapter is aimed at focusing on the EU’s and Thailand’s ap-
proaches to EU-Thailand relations and thereby providing a ‘test’ for the
three foreign policy theories constructed earlier. It is divided issue-spe-
cifically into three important areas of cooperation: political, economic
and development. The examples included in each section are chosen
for their relevance and with a view to reaching the widest possible cov-
erage of EU-Thailand relations.
IV.1 EU-Thailand Political Relations
EU-Thailand political relations have been very diverse, as far as their ap-
proaches and the issues involved are concerned. To start with, the first
section focuses on the EU’s responses to several issues in the political
developments of Thailand, in which the former mostly restricts itself to
raising formal or informal concerns. The second section touches on
three new issues that are of increasing relevance to the bilateral dialo-
gues: (i) environment, (ii) human security and (iii) the fight against ter-
rorism. The third section attempts to elaborate approaches of the two
parties in addressing the political situation in Burma, which has appar-
ently been one of the most controversial issues of their bilateralism.
The fourth section goes in the same direction as the second by stressing
the importance of individuals in bilateral relations and will be discussed
in the context of trends in tourism and migration.
IV.1.1 The EU’s Concerns in Thai Politics
The title of this section could be considered ironic. Since Thailand’s for-
eign policy position on some sensitive issues is often criticized for
being based on the so-called principle of non-intervention, several part-
ners in the dialogue may claim that they have almost no opportunity to
raise concerns through the existing bilateral and regional channels. In
the wake of the Asian Crisis and the later developments of the domestic
political situation in Thailand, it becomes apparent that ‘political dialo-
gues’ have sometimes been maintained in a narrow sense, arguably, in
defense of the country’s internal affairs.1 Moreover, the tradition of its
non-intervention principle falls in line with the ASEAN’s diplomatic
and security culture that – frequently called ‘the ASEAN Way’ – ac-
counts for several normative elements including non-confrontation,
consensus-building and a particular reluctance of its members regard-
ing issues that involve the transferring of sovereignty and political legiti-
macy (Haacke 2003; see also Acharya 1997). At the same time, it is not
surprising that the EU, aware of this long-standing principle, has come
up with a concept of the ‘partnership of equals’ as a way to describe the
changing nature of EU cooperation with Thailand (Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand 2006g). Several key issues in Thai
politics that are closely followed by the EU includes, among others, the
following three: (i) The political implications of the Asian Crisis for
Thailand, (ii) the situation in the southern Thailand, and (iii) the coun-
try’s domestic developments since the coup in September 2006.
The EU’s first response to the Asian Crisis was widely criticized as
rather ‘distant’ but quickly evolved as the global impact of the crisis be-
came clear (see also Bridges 1999). The EU’s contribution to Thailand
initially comprised of credit facilities worth E 24.5 million that were ac-
cumulated from the previous grants and the equity held in part by the
Bank for Agriculture and Cooperatives (Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand 1999). Later, the EU proposed the so-called
Social Support Project to allocate its funds of E 15 million in the areas
of technical assistance and human resources development, focusing on
poverty reduction and capacity building in rural communities (ibid.).
From a theoretical perspective, realists are likely to interpret the EU’s
concerns about the political impacts of the Asian Crisis primarily in
terms of regional security considerations due particularly to the develop-
ments of the domestic political situation. This is because the parties in-
volved were viewed as being sensitive to changes in regional power rela-
tions and driven by security concerns in the preservation of sovereignty
and self-reliance as well as a balance of power in the region. Although
there has not been much evidence, thus far, the appeal to non-interven-
tion principles implies that these parties seek, on the one hand, to set
aside suspicions of and resentments against interference among them-
selves internally and, on the other, to provide an outward-looking ver-
sion of the same policy orientation in order to avoid the intervention by
external powers (Haacke 2003). Another interpretation of this move can
be made for the case of Thailand in that it expresses an opportunity by
the EU to contribute to the crisis management effort by channeling
through multilateral fora such as the ASEM and the IMF. As Nicolas
(2000: 135) notes, the IMF, although not obviously bilateral, is signifi-
cant nonetheless, because the EU member as a whole assumes nearly
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30% of total quotas and thus total voting rights, while the US and Japan
account for 18.25% and 5.67% respectively.
In contrast, liberals may raise concerns as a rational response to is-
sues of potential bilateral relevance. From this perspective, the EU’s re-
sponse in withholding or raising concerns can be explained by the cost-
benefit calculation of engagement of each participating actor, that is,
with the total in trade-offs and compromises, the option to raise con-
cerns is chosen rationally as it does not require any further actions. The
EU’s post-crisis engagement is therefore expected to vary across the af-
fected Asian countries. For example, in Thailand, the EU’s engagement
seems relatively reserved in comparison with its engagement in some
other Asian countries such as South Korea.2 Statistically, this position
can be related to the fact that, in financial terms, there is a difference in
the types of involvement of the European banks in the three affected
countries, with the highest internal lending occurring in South Korea
($ 103 billion), followed by Thailand ($ 69 billion) and Indonesia ($ 59
billion) (Nicolas 2000: 132; Bridges 1999: 458). Considering this back-
ground, it is not surprising that at the bilateral level, the EU’s response
to the crisis in Thailand initially consisted of combining on-going and
planned cooperation projects with new efforts to provide assistance in
the country’s recovery programs after the crisis. Besides, the concerns
of the EU seem to lie mainly in the country’s economic performance
and the impacts of the crisis on bilateral trade and investment relations.
For constructivists, with respect to social dynamics, it may be rela-
tively difficult to situate a gradual process of developing mutual under-
standing or building a collective identity in a non-interventionist con-
text. From a different perspective, however, the principle of non-inter-
vention as such also highlights a form of sovereignty norms that, once
adopted in dialogues, can lead to the (re-)definition of identity and inter-
ests, at least in the long run.3 In reality, there is not much empirical evi-
dence to support these arguments. However, while the promulgation of
the new constitution in 1997 is regarded as a positive development, it is
apparent that the EU, along with Thailand’s other major trading part-
ners proceeded with caution in their attempt to propose social reforms
and/or introduce further plans in support of checks and balances, trans-
parency and public accountability, especially the adoption of regulatory
reform, new competition legislation, and the establishment of a Na-
tional Counter-Corruption Commission (see also Sally 2004).4
Let us turn to the other two cases. Regarding the situation in south-
ern Thailand, the EU has been aware of Thai sensitivities and, here
again, has followed the developments of the situation cautiously and
mostly in its own interest. In an interview with the European Commis-
sion’s desk officer for Thailand, it was emphasized that the situation in
the south was, in fact, one of the three main issues in Thai politics that
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the EU has followed with great concern – along with the recent domes-
tic political developments and certain issues along the Thai-Burmese
borders.5 For the Thai government, however, this issue appears to be
one of the most sensitive political issues and is part of the country’s in-
ternal affairs, which involves the above-mentioned non-intervention
principle.6
From a realist perspective, the EU’s concern is allegedly grounded in
the argument that the situation may not only assume serious domestic
but also regional and even global implications in its later stages. In this
regard, the EU’s particular concern is the extent to which the Thai gov-
ernment will be able to control the situation were it to turn into a con-
frontation or spill over into a larger sub-region.7 Indeed, the EU’s con-
cern becomes apparent in the case of Hambali, the leader of the Jammh
Islamiyah (JI), who was arrested in Thailand in 2003. While the Thai
government pointed out that it was merely being used as a ‘resting
place’ and was not part of the preparations involved in any international
terrorist activities, the EU’s concern has been about the possibility of
cross-border contacts and the extent to which the JI could take advan-
tage of the situation in the south, which was claimed to relate in part
with the governance issues in the Muslim communities.8 From the EU
perspective, however, Thailand is considered one of the most stable
countries in Southeast Asia, but there is no guarantee that extremist
movements would not cross borders if necessary and that the underly-
ing dynamics would not ‘spill over’ eventually.9
From a liberal perspective, it is possible that the EU engagement has
been given an incentive – albeit to a lesser extent – to raise concerns in
the converging interests of the Europeans in Thailand. The EU’s con-
cerns in part are considered to emerge from the notion that it would
then be very problematic if the JI were to attack Bangkok or popular
tourist destinations.10
In contrast, the constructivist explanation seems to be helpful in ex-
ploring the dynamics of mutual understanding but it is difficult to em-
pirically show the real impacts on interest and identity definition or na-
tional role conception in the process of foreign policy-making. In retro-
spect, it should be noted that the EU has also experienced transnational
conflicts – e.g., the Balkan conflicts – in which similar criminal, ethnic
and religious matters significantly complicated and exacerbated the early
stages of the situation.11 Therefore, in 2004, there were at least two oc-
casions in which the EU tellingly declared that it was willing to closely
cooperate with the Thai government in several related areas such as
education and police training: The first occasion was a meeting during
the visit of the EU Troika to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand,
while during the second, the same issues were introduced by HE
Klauspeter Schmallenbach, the then Ambassador and Head of Delega-
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tion of the European Commission to Thailand, to then Prime Minister
Thaksin during his farewell address and reportedly received generally
positive feedback.12 However, there is little evidence at this time to sug-
gest that the foreign policy conduct of the EU and Thailand helped
shape the ideas and interests of each other despite some opportunities
for interaction.
The third instance deals with Thailand’s coup on September 19,
2006, which has raised another concern in the international commu-
nity, the EU and other major powers. In a timely manner, the EU Presi-
dency made a statement with regard to the situation of Thailand on
September 20, 2006, which led to the Declaration by the Presidency on
behalf of the European Union dated September 28, 2006 (Council of
the European Union 2006). The then Thai Prime Minister General Sur-
ayud Chulanont announced the Policy Statement of the Council of Min-
isters to the National Legislative Assembly on November 3, 2006, in
which his cabinet’s foreign policy was comprised of five main points:
first, to ‘play a proactive role in bilateral and multilateral frameworks’;
second, to ‘promote friendship and cooperation with neighboring coun-
tries, the sub-region, the region, and among regions’; third, to ‘strength-
en ASEAN’; fourth, to ‘play a constructive role in the framework of the
United Nations as well as in other multilateral frameworks’; and, fifth,
to ‘protect the rights and interests of Thai citizens and enhance the role
of Thai communities overseas’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
2007a).
The theoretical discussions may follow a logic that resembles that of
the first two instances. For realists, the view that Thailand’s political
changes may significantly impact the country’s bilateral relations and
regional stability seems to support the interpretation of the EU’s deci-
sion to raise concerns because of its security-based influence-seeking
motivation. After having addressed the general political situation in
Thailand in the aforementioned Declaration, the EU contended that free
and democratic elections would be crucial for the country’s return to de-
mocracy and constitutional order. For Thailand, the above Policy State-
ment of the Council of Ministers clearly underlined the Thai govern-
ment’s intention to promote national interests by playing a ‘proactive’
role in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks in support of national
reconciliation and security, which can be generally interpreted as the
country’s autonomy-seeking foreign policy position toward international
and domestic audiences.
In a liberal framework, the EU’s engagement may be regarded as a
rational move stimulated by the co-benefits such as the market incen-
tives of both state and non-state actors. After the 2006 coup, the new
government’s reserved attitudes toward on-going free trade agreement
negotiations – as will be discussed in more detail below (see also Wong-
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Anan 2006) – can be seen as another reason for the EU’s engagement
on behalf of Europe’s business community. For Thailand, it also be-
came apparent that the then Prime Minister General Surayud’s Policy
Statement expressed the Thai government’s foreign policy as focused
on enhancing understanding and promoting confidence in Thailand for
the benefit of the international community, and involved individuals, in-
cluding businesspeople.
From a constructivist perspective, the extent to which the logics of ar-
guing could be applied here to support the process of building collective
identity is still very questionable. Constructivists would rather explain
bilateral foreign policy behavior in terms of mutual recognition dy-
namics, particularly since the principle of non-intervention seems to
have prevailed so that the EU’s role could never move beyond that of an
observer or, even at times, a dialogue partner. For example, the EU’s
Declaration expressed concern about Thailand’s adoption of martial law,
which allegedly restricted human rights and civil liberties, and the EU
further clearly underscored the country’s international obligations un-
der the UN and other international organizations. In this respect, the
above-mentioned Policy Statement showed that the government also at-
tached great importance to Thailand’s abiding commitments to interna-
tional law, e.g., the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights, and therefore reaffirmed the country’s continued efforts to
promote international cooperation by means of virtue, transparency and
democratic values (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2007a). In the
Policy Statement, the fourth point of the Foreign Policy section ex-
pressed several specific issues that the EU was concerned about regard-
ing issues such as democracy or human rights appear along with the is-
sues of humanitarism, environmental conservation, sustainable devel-
opment, the resolution of transnational problems and public health
(ibid.). However, it is less than clear to what extent the EU is deter-
mined and ever was in a position to deliver informal policy recommen-
dations to the Thai government and the relevant authorities on the Thai
side.
IV.1.2 Negotiating Non-Conventional Security Issues
The notion that states are primarily driven by national security interests
to preserve their sovereignty and self-reliance is inherited from the rea-
list school of thought. The long-standing tradition of realism contends
that the conception of national security is power-based and that security
may be achieved through a strategic set of military and political means.
However, some theoretical challenges have emerged from both the lib-
eral and constructivist schools. Liberals seem to define security in a way
that deflects state-centric premises and thus provides a broader view on
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security concepts including societal or human security than their con-
structivist colleagues. In this light, national security interests may trans-
cend military and strategic concerns and may have an impact on new is-
sues such as trade, drug trafficking, immigration, environmental con-
cerns, and epidemics (Holsti 1995). As a matter of fact, developments
in the post-Cold War period demonstrate that non-conventional security
issues are no less relevant than traditional ones proposed by realists
and that the emergence of new security issues also brings about in-
creased cooperation among non-state actors such as individuals, NGOs,
ethnic-religious or economic pressure groups, and regional organiza-
tions (ibid.). From a constructivist perspective, the conception of secur-
ity has to be understood in relation to the processes of identifying ‘self’
and ‘other’ (Wendt 1992: 399-400). In a way, this may complement the
realist and liberal views in terms of reflectivist-cognitive elements of se-
curity definitions.
The following section will discuss the implications of three non-con-
ventional issues for EU-Thailand relations: (i) environment cooperation,
(ii) human security-related issues, and (iii) counter-terrorism dialogues.
The issues of migration will be discussed in more detail in IV.1.4.
For the EU and Thailand, the environment has emerged as a new
area of interest in the attainment of long-term environmental sustain-
ability. Trans-boundary environmental issues such as pollution, haze,
and environmental degradation are recognized as important non-con-
ventional security issues – in part because of the ASEAN’s own political
discourse (Sukma 2000: 88). Evidently, the environment-related activ-
ities between the EU and Thailand have been implemented via a series
of cooperation projects under the former’s thematic lines ‘environment’
and ‘urban and rural development’ (see also Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand 2007a). In retrospect, Thailand was also one
of the first participating countries in the EU’s regional initiative called
‘Small Grants Programme for Operations to Promote Tropical Forests
in Southeast Asia’, which is designed to fund small forest-related pro-
jects that contribute to addressing negative development trends and re-
levant problems and promoting environmental sustainability (Delega-
tion of the European Commission to Thailand 2007j). Along this line,
Thailand has greatly benefited from further EU-funded regional initia-
tives such as ‘Asia Pro Eco Programme’ and ‘Asia Urbs’ that provide
grants to implement environment-related projects supplementary to bi-
lateral initiatives (ibid.; European Commission 2007g).
The approaches of the EU and Thailand can be categorized mainly as
liberal insofar as both sides aim to ensure the active participation of
communities and encourage their contribution in the process of mana-
ging natural resources. The engagement of both parties is also expected
to solve transnational environmental issues as well as to strengthen bi-
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lateral cooperation in general. Let us take the EU’s launching of the ‘Ac-
tion Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)’
as an example. In a liberal argument of converging interests, the EU
aims to strengthen the partnership between itself and timber-producing
countries while the interests of the Thai government obviously involve
those of the EU’s main wood and wood-related exporters. In statistical
terms, the annual value of Thai wood and wood-related exports to the
EU-25 averaged E 120 to 130 million over the last six years.13 It should
be noted that, in the EU-25 markets, Thailand – along with Indonesia
and Malaysia – has been one of the largest Southeast Asian exporters of
wood and wood articles including wood charcoal. As far as the South-
east Asian countries are concerned, the EU’s FLEGT initiative is ex-
pected to introduce a new solution by promoting sustainable forest
management as well as creating internal market incentives – e.g.,
through a licensing scheme on timber products – for exporting coun-
tries that engage in good practices.
Arguably, this environmental policy may also be explained from the
realist point of view of the EU’s influence-seeking actors engaged in the
subregional management of natural resources while constructivists
would stress the impact of cooperation projects and bilateral environ-
ment policies on the process of building a sense of ownership and re-
sponsibility in the relevant communities. In the bilateral dialogues, the
EU has shown an interest in Thailand’s participation in promoting this
initiative with a view to the subregion’s sustainable development and
stability insofar as Southeast Asia is widely recognized as a crucial re-
gion due for the FLEGT initiative to several issues of illegal logging, for-
est governance failings or deforestation.14 Because of Thailand’s signifi-
cant roles in the forestry sectors of neighboring countries Cambodia
and Burma, it is hardly surprising that there is a widely accepted view
within the EU that Thailand represents the first country in Southeast
Asia to engage in bilateral dialogues on the FLEGT Action Plan and
that, once they have received the mandate, the European Commission
may consider negotiating a FLEGT Partnership Agreement with the
Thai government.15
The new human security issues – e.g., natural disasters or epidemics
– loom large in the discussions of non-conventional security challenges.
The following section discusses two events that have had an impact on
EU-Thailand relations: the Tsunami and the Avian Influenza outbreaks.
On December 26, 2004, Thailand was one of the countries hardest hit
by the Tsunami. It should be noted that soon after the Tsunami disaster
former Prime Minister Thaksin publicly rejected all financial assistance
from aboard and pointed out that he would only accept technical coop-
eration and expertise (CNN 2005b; see also CNN 2004). Early on he de-
clared that the situation was under control and thus in his first inter-
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view before international news organizations he said: ‘Others need
more help than us’ (ibid.). While the EU quickly responded to the Tsu-
nami in the most affected countries, the EU mainly focused on the pro-
jects that would help to reconstruct the local communities in Thailand
(Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2005a), and Thai-
land accepted the condolence message from the President of the Eur-
opean Commission, José Manuel Barroso, on December 27, 2004 (De-
legation of the European Commission to Thailand 2004a). On January
5, 2005, the EU contracted an EU assessment expert in Italy and re-
vealed the other assistance that the member states were offering such
as search and rescue teams from Germany and Greece, medical equip-
ment and supplies from Italy, the ‘Monitoring and Information Centre’
teams from Belgium, Finland and Portugal as well as foreign expertise,
victim identification and evacuation teams from various countries
(ibid.). Former Prime Minister Thaksin’s statements reveal that the
scope of the EU’s post-tsunami reconstruction programs in Thailand
were relatively limited compared to more extensive disaster relief pro-
grams in other affected countries.16 Nonetheless, the European Com-
munity Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) allocated E 500,000 to
the livelihood recovery project to provide assistance to fishermen and
women in the affected coastal fisheries communities in two southern
provinces of Thailand (European Commission 2007j, 2007k). Moreover,
the EU managed to provide assistance through existing bilateral coop-
eration projects with Thailand such as the ‘Coastal Habitats and Re-
sources Management’ (CHARM) projects (E 240,000) and the ‘Small
Grants Programme for Operations to Promote Tropical Forests in Thai-
land’ (E 260,000) (ibid.). Among the CHARM projects, the establish-
ment of the Andaman Forum was very important in terms of coordinat-
ing efforts between donors and communities as well as providing op-
portunities for the member states to identify and channel their local
supporting projects (United Nations Country Team in Thailand 2005).
In addition, there were other EU-funded regional initiatives that made
funds available for the proposals on post-Tsunami reconstruction pro-
jects in Thailand, such as the ‘Social Support Project’ and the ‘EU-Asia
Pro ECO II B – Post-Tsunami Programme’, which account for total bud-
gets of E 3.5 million and E 1.5 million, respectively (European Commis-
sion 2007k).
There is no doubt that natural disasters have raised increased con-
cerns about human security. In theory, the liberal school of thought –
as part of a response to the state-centric notion of realism – relates the
significance of security concerns to individuals and groups of indivi-
duals. As of January 2, 2005 – there were purportedly at least 3,000
Swedish tourists missing while other European nations, and in particu-
lar the neighboring Scandinavian countries, were among those hardest
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hit by the Tsunami (CNN 2005a). In this context, the engagement of
the EU and Thailand expressed their moral responses to the emergency
of the situation that primarily focuses on providing humanitarian aid
and subsequently contributing to the country’s rehabilitation. Although
the EU responded more specifically by sending expert teams on the
ground and supporting a variety of rehabilitation projects along the af-
fected coastal areas, its approach was judged as having lacked the prop-
er time for consultation and the resulting development programs re-
mained mostly local rather than politically pushed through decision
making channels (Glasius 2006). As a consequence, there was little evi-
dence to identify strategically motivated decisions in terms of influence-
seeking or voicing-opportunities-seeking foreign policy behavior – a
point that crucially makes the realist explanation seem less convincing
than the liberal one in this case. While constructivists would stress the
significance of bilateral technical assistance and expert cooperation for
the construction of the EU’s identity and images, they did not seem to
present the long-term, substantial effects of the processes on building
collective identities.
About a year before the tsunami, EU-Thailand relations had already
faced another human security threat, the Avian Influenza outbreaks of
2003, to which the EU responded quite differently than to their re-
sponses to the Tsunami disaster relief programs. The EU – due to hu-
man security concerns for its citizens – immediately established a series
of protective measures including import restrictions on certain poultry
products, which clearly had significant implications for bilateral trade
relations with third countries. From a liberal perspective, the negotia-
tions between the EU and Thailand centered much more on trade, as
they mainly discussed the treatment of Thai exports that were at risk. It
is hardly surprising that upon the outbreak of Avian Influenza, the af-
fected businesspeople – in particular Thai exporters of poultry to EU
markets – would seek the government’s engagement in the negotiations
with the EU on the trade restriction measures. Immediately after the
confirmation of the Avian Influenza outbreaks in Thailand in January
2004, the European Commission decisively banned the import of fresh
poultry meat, wild and farmed feathered game, poultry meat prepara-
tions, poultry meat products consisting of or containing the meat of
other species, raw material for pet food production and eggs for human
consumption (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2004b). The EU agreed with this decision to only temporarily suspend
the export of uncooked poultry imports but to continue to allow cooked
products to be exported, which gave the business community a sense of
relief (ibid.).17 It should be noted that among Thai exporters, the poultry
exporters have been by far one of the most politically influential groups
and that Thailand has also recently been the largest exporter of cooked
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poultry to the EU, with the exports of cooked poultry accounting for
E 176.5 million and 61,105 tons in 2003 and E 265.86 million and
106,503 tons in 2005 with a projected growth of 54% in value and 74%
in volume during this period (Delegation of the European Commission
2006c).18 Ironically, even the EU-funded cooperation project of provid-
ing Avian Influenza-related technical assistance was aimed at develop-
ing compartmentalization models in line with the World Organisation
for Animal Health guidelines – because this would help to declare cer-
tain farms and enterprises in the country as Avian Influenza-free de-
spite the presence of the disease elsewhere (Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand 2005b). As things stood, the Standing Com-
mittee, which followed the European Commission’s decision, agreed
upon the prolonged import ban of poultry products from China, Malay-
sia and Thailand until December 31, 2007, for which the Committee
based its decision on the argument that the H5N1 virus was still present
in Southeast Asia (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2006d).
There is little evidence to show, as would realists predict, a balancing
or influence-seeking behavior of the EU and Thailand in their policies
toward the Avian Influenza outbreaks. One piece of evidence can be
found in the Thai efforts in 2004 to promote an idea of establishing a
‘South East Asian Centre of Expertise on Avian Influenza’, as planned
to be discussed during the 9th European Commission-Thailand Senior
Officials’ Meeting in December that year. In general, the European
Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, David Byrne, re-
acted positively to this idea, referring to Thailand’s highly developed
poultry industry and experiences in managing the disease.19 However,
it was also noted that because the ASEAN decision-making procedures
required consensus building among the member states, the EU was
rather reluctant to become actively involved in asserting its influence on
them in order to pursue the initiative at the end of the day.20
It is widely accepted that the attacks on 9/11 have dramatically intro-
duced another set of non-conventional security issues in relation to in-
ternational terrorist activities. Further transnational issues such as orga-
nized crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and
money laundering not only attract the public’s attention but raise the
academic criticism of the relevance of new security challenges in inter-
national politics. After the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the EU
started to seriously re-evaluate its responses to the threats of terrorism
and the EU’s commitments were specifically reaffirmed in the Council
Declaration of 25 March 2004 as well as the later revised ‘Action Plan
on Fighting Terrorism’.21 Apart from a series of internal measures to
promote police and judicial cooperation and intelligence sharing, the
EU also committed itself to external policy objectives in international ac-
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tion through regional and bilateral cooperation.22 More specifically, the
European Commission (2003c) planned to provide relevant technical as-
sistance to third countries and openly promote the implementation of
the UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and relevant UN Conventions
and Protocols.
From a theoretical perspective, the EU’s contribution here can be
viewed as a policy combination between the realist notion of strength-
ening the international coalition against terrorism, and the liberal
stances of providing technical assistance in counter-terrorism projects
and promoting the implementation of relevant international norms and
legal instruments. However, it is crucial to note that in the area of coun-
ter-terrorism the cooperation between the EU and Thailand has mainly
been limited to exchanging views and information.23 The EU seems to
be much more concerned with the implications of the terrorist attacks
in Bali and later in Jakarta because members of local groups such as
the Jammah Islamiyah had potential links with Al Qaeda.24 Meanwhile,
the EU has several on-going counter-terrorism projects that are ASEAN
funded through the ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ initiative, for example,
in the areas of terrorist financing and border management (ibid.).
Furthermore, in relation to the concept of conflict prevention, the EU’s
efforts are aimed at promoting the contribution of local governments to
regional cooperation within the ASEAN or ARF and supporting its part-
ner countries programs on social and economic developments. For ex-
ample, the EU’s so-called ‘root causes’ approach, aims to identify the
potential causes and risks of any violent conflict at the earliest possible
stage by the use of conflict indicators, country conflict assessments, and
rapid reaction mechanisms.25 For the European Commission, the poli-
tics of conflict prevention also gives rise to an increased degree of inter-
nal coordination that draws together the instruments of EU external po-
licies – such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid, trade policy
instruments, social and environmental policies – as well as those of the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).26
In addressing transnational organized crimes, there has also been an
increase in international efforts to tackle crosscutting issues between
the areas of security and trade relations. For example, the Kimberly Pro-
cess – in which both the EU and Thailand are participants – was estab-
lished as an international control regime for imports and exports of
rough diamonds in order to ensure that they do not contribute to the fi-
nancing of rebel movements, violent conflicts and wars (European
Commission 2007h). Notably, according to liberals, while the Thai gov-
ernment has joined as a trade-only participant, the EU has played a key
role in chairing the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring
and has served as the Chairman and Secretariat in this process since
January 1, 2007. The Kimberley Process, which is supported by both
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the UN and the WTO, represents another channel for bilateral interac-
tion between the EU and Thailand, as will be further discussed in
V.3.1.27
IV.1.3 Burma Issues
In an overview of EU-Thailand relations, the Thai Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (2007b) once officially noted: ‘there are several sensitive issues
in our relationship with Myanmar. However, Thailand is ready to con-
tinue to work with the European side to make more progress in solving
this matter.’ The puzzle that needs further investigation here concerns
the foreign policy motivations of the EU and Thailand that shape the
underlying patterns of bilateral interaction on such politically sensitive
issues. Against a background of human rights issues and interrupted
democratic transitions in Burma, the EU and Thailand differ in the
scope and substance and their foreign policies in their reasoning for
having adopted different approaches to bilateral relations.
In realist terms, the Thai government’s approach is expected to devel-
op a form of autonomy-seeking foreign policy behavior that strategically
induces the EU to embrace the subregion’s security outlook. As a mat-
ter of fact, the relevance of the Burma issues for EU-Thailand political
relations has been explicitly affirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Thailand (2007b), due in particular to the shared borders of about
2,401 kilometers between Burma and Thailand that invite an array of
further geopolitical issues ranging from human displacement, migra-
tion, border trade to drug problems around the ‘golden triangle’ area.
Later, after Burma was granted accession to ASEAN in 1997 and also
ASEM, although its representation remained at a low-level, in 2004, it
is now apparent that the EU contribution is a factor that leads to a more
balanced constellation of political relations among the major powers
present in the subregion. This concept appears to be in line with the
traditional politics of equidistance and the related notion of ‘benign
neutrality’, which, as coined by Wyatt (1984: 238), has often been used
to describe Thailand’s traditional approach to maintaining good but ba-
lanced relations with and among great powers (see also Wiessala 2002:
137).28 Empirically, in response to the EU’s insistence that Burma
should not participate in regional forums such as the ASEM as long as
the domestic political situation in Burma had not improved, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the Thai side has made use of the bilateral rela-
tions with the EU to promote the principle of equal and autonomous
status as a diplomatic code of conduct, which is extended to other
ASEAN member states (see also Petersson 2006). Bilaterally, the for-
mer spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has explicitly raised a
concern regarding the alleged double standards between the EU and
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ASEAN, both as members of the ASEM, for instance: ‘While the EU in-
sists that its 10 new members have to be admitted into ASEM, they re-
fuse to apply the same standard for the Asian side. They pick and
choose our ASEAN new members, not admitting Myanmar’ (Asian Eco-
nomic News, 28 and 06 and 2004). Moreover, at the regional level, the
promotion of Burma’s participation in the ASEM can be regarded as a
way of strengthening Asian ASEM members’ positions toward a more
balanced relationship with their European counterparts.
With regard to the EU’s foreign policy behavior, the realist interpreta-
tion would suggest a power-based pattern that focuses on seeking influ-
ence over Burma’s policies regarding other major powers and geo-strate-
gically relevant countries such as Thailand, with a particular view that
sharpens the EU’s restrictive measures on Burma. These measures in-
cluded the adoption of an arms embargo against the junta regime in
1990, the suspension of defense cooperation in 1991, the withdrawal of
GSP privileges in 1997, and the introduction of economic sanctions
and other conditions concerning humanitarian assistance as well as the
management of cross-borders issues (see also European Commission
2006d). According to the European Commission (2006d), it should be
noted that, above all, an official ‘prime goal’ of the EU is ‘to see estab-
lished a legitimate civilian government, which respects human rights,
effectively pursues the [Millennium Development Goals] and restores
normal relations with the international community.’ In this respect, the
main consideration on the regional impact of such restrictive measures
clearly gives an incentive for the EU to strengthen its ties with other
like-minded countries both within and outside the subregion, since as a
matter of fact, the EU has acknowledged that while being sanctioned by
the EU and other major powers, Burma remains economically relatively
open to the region and that there are in fact a number of Burmese im-
migrants working in Thai industries and agriculture (ibid.; see also Dil-
lon 2003; Englehart 2005). In practice, it can also be observed that the
EU was openly positive about Thailand’s affirmation that it would con-
tinue to provide land and space for displaced people along the Thai-Bur-
mese borders and that these people would be sent back if and only if in-
ternational standards are met, given in particular that Thailand then
had accepted thousands of Burmese citizens, with a considerable pro-
portion of them believed to consist of ethnic minorities driven out by
SPDC army attacks (see also ibid.).29
From a liberal perspective, EU-Thailand relations are viewed as being
motivated by the converging interests and preferences of both actors,
who are both state and non-state players including individuals, interest
groups, and NGOs. With regard to the Burma issues, the EU’s and
Thailand’s approaches can thus be explained in terms of interests of
players at stake and their resulting engagement. In short, Thailand has
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been the most important export destination for Burma's products, ac-
counting for 30.2% of total exports and Thailand was also Burma’s third
largest import partner (14%) after China (28.9%) and Singapore
(20.7%) in 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a). In that same year,
Thailand also had 56 investment projects in the areas of energy includ-
ing oil and gas, fishery, hotel and tourism industry, and transformation
of agricultural products – valued at $ 1,345.62 million or 17.8% of all
foreign investments in Burma, ranked third after the UK ($ 1,569.52
million) and Singapore ($ 1,434.21 million) (ibid.). Similarly, on the EU
side, there are several significant EU member state investments in Bur-
ma, including the French oil company Total and a variety of multina-
tional companies (Hyndman 2001).30
In the above-mentioned discussions of Burma’s participation in the
ASEM, for example, liberal theorists would argue that both parties are
aware of the potential benefits of the business community involved and
thus they have an incentive to cooperate in accommodating Burma
within the ASEM process eventually. Since EU-ASEAN relations wor-
sened considerably after the membership of Burma in ASEAN, as two
subsequent meetings of the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee
in 1997 were cancelled and the whole ASEM process was threatened,
the EU and Thailand along with other ASEAN members have made re-
lentless efforts to solve the issues involving Burma through various in-
stitutional and representational dynamics (see also Rüland 2000; Pe-
tersson 2006). Subsequently, a compromise on Burma’s low-level repre-
sentation at the ASEM Summit in 2004 was reached, indicating that
EU engagement managed itself to reconsider several political positions
and commitments that had been made thus far (ibid.). Moreover, non-
state actors in EU-Thailand relations have played an increasingly impor-
tant role with respect to issues involving Burma. A considerable portion
of cooperation projects has been increasingly carried out by transna-
tional NGOs and non-state actors regarding certain cross-border issues
such as the treatment of displaced people. The participation of these
new actors not only makes a series of cooperation programs on huma-
nitarian assistance possible but also contributes to policy coordination
between the private sector and the Thai government and the EU.
More specifically, while the Thai government primarily provides
space and security to these people, the EU tends to concentrate on sup-
porting, especially financially, the work of the UNHCR and certain –
mainly European – NGOs.31 Examples of EU cooperation projects in-
clude the ‘health project for displaced persons living on the Thailand-
Burma border’ with Médecins Sans Frontiers, the ‘health project for Ka-
ren and Burmese refugees along the Thailand-Burma border’ with Mal-
teser Hilfsdienst, the ‘assistance to people with disabilities and mine
risk prevention for refugees in the camps along the Thailand-Burma
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and Myanmar border’ with Handicap International and Action Nord
Sud, or the projects ‘rice and building materials for refugees from Bur-
ma in Thailand’ and ‘food and cooking fuel for Burmese refugees in
Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi provinces, Thailand’ with the Thailand
Burma Border Consortium (TBBC).32 The TBBC is a British registered
charity that incorporates nine international NGOs and its goal is to pro-
vide humanitarian assistance to displaced people from Burma in terms
of food, shelter or non-food items (Thailand Burma Border Consortium
2007). In the period from 1984 to June 2006, the EU’s contribution to
TBBC projects came via three main channels: (i) the ECHO (23.8%), (ii)
the European Commission’s funds for uprooted people (3.5%) and (iii)
the EU in cooperation with the UNHCR (1.1%) (ibid. Table B2).33
The constructivist explanation, in theory, may help to provide insights
into the roles of ideas and interests in the process of collective identity
formation. From an outward-looking perspective, the EU’s possible in-
volvement in political dialogues can be socially contextualized in a
broader view of bilateral relations as well as EU-ASEAN discourse. In
June 1998, for example, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Thailand, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, introduced the concept of
‘flexible engagement’ to his ASEAN counterparts to encourage active in-
volvement of the ASEAN member states and thereby strengthen the
dialogues between them – especially concerning the issues that have
significant cross-border implications for other ASEAN members and
the ASEAN as a whole (Haacke 2005). In the context of Burma issues,
for instance, the concept of flexible engagement clearly underlines the
importance of public discussion as a way of ‘delimiting’ stronghold
areas of non-intervention principles and thus addressing transnational
security threats in a more constructive manner (ibid.).
In contrast to the liberal views of the EU’s engagement politics, it is
interesting to observe that despite the fact that Burma has yet to show
much progress on the improvement of human rights and other contro-
versial political issues in meeting the internationally required standards,
the EU has made continued efforts to seek bilateral and regional dialo-
gues with Burma’s neighbors including ASEAN and Thailand in parti-
cular and to provide, as previously mentioned, assistance programs in
Burma’s education and health sectors. At this point, it can thus be ar-
gued that since trade relations between Burma and the EU had been
only of minor significance before trade sanctions were imposed, these
sanctions appear to have less economic impact on Burma. Instead they
assume a symbolic function in the promotion of certain political values
such as human rights and good governance (Petersson 2006: 571).
Along this line, the motivation of EU engagement is said to support the
thesis of ‘avoiding a lost generation’, which – as the European Commis-
sion’s Director General of External Relations, Eneko Landaburu, men-
108 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
tioned – underscores the significance of education and health prospects
for today’s younger generation who, in turn, may become potential
agents of the country’s future changes.34
In practice, however, a social process takes place on the condition
that, through interaction, an actor’s interests and identity are in a posi-
tion to define, and to be defined by, those of other actors. In the case of
the dialogues on Burma, the dynamics of the process of building collec-
tive identity – if applicable – seem to be less obvious to EU-Thailand re-
lations than in their individual approaches to EU-Burma or Thailand-
Burma relations. The human rights situation in Burma represents an
instance in which the EU and Thailand are concerned with fundamen-
tal values such as the individualism-communitarism distinction in so-
ciety, a culture-based understanding of democracy, and the development
of economic growth (see also Petersson 2006). The positions of the EU
and the Thai government, also as a member of ASEAN, have, in fact,
begun to interact on several occasions in the EU-ASEAN and later
ASEM and ARF dialogues. But the impact of the EU approaches on the
foreign policies of Thailand and other ASEAN states has generally re-
mained rather unclear – not in the least because of the notion that the
‘ASEAN Way’, i.e., the supporting principle of non-intervention – has
apparently prevailed (ibid.).
From a role-theoretical perspective, the foreign policy behavior of the
EU and the Thai government can be explained via their conception of
their roles and the corresponding process of mutual definition. Thus
far, Thailand’s subregional and regional roles – as self-perceived and
prescribed by the international community including ASEAN and the
EU – have been generally formed in accordance with its geographical
location and geopolitical position in the ASEAN, which are to some ex-
tent self-explanatory for the country’s provision of humanitarian assis-
tance along the borders and the attempt to manage related issues of dis-
placed people from Burma. At the same time, the EU and some like-
minded countries such as the US seem to have another set of role ex-
pectations for Thailand in the area of certain sensitive issues such as
human rights, the rights of ethnic minorities and displaced people and
good governance in Burma (see also European Commission 2006d). It
should be noted that in the background the EU became aware of and
openly announced the roles and related responsibilities early on in its
role as a global player.35 At the intergovernmental level, there is evi-
dence to suggest that the member states have bound themselves to ‘an
express commitment’ to address the Burmese issues of human rights
and civil liberty since the late 1980s – not least of which in support of
the implementing of the European Political Cooperation and later the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (Haacke 2006: 77; see also Smith
2001).36 In a sense, as Petersson (ibid.: 575-576) asserts, the EU not
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only ‘clearly went against its Common Defense and Security Policy on
Myanmar’ but ‘moreover, the EU went against its own treaties declaring
that human rights and fundamental freedoms were essential grounds
for any form of cooperation with third countries, non-governmental or-
ganizations and international organizations’. However, it seems difficult
to actually identify the extent to which Thailand’s role perception has
been influenced – through different channels of interaction – by the
EU’s role prescription and the resulting foreign policy behavior can be
seen as a product of bilateral role definition, not to mention that the
Thai government has always responded to such sensitive issues in a
rather reserved and careful manner.
IV.1.4 Individuals and Political Relations
The literature of political science has increasingly accommodated the
roles of non-state actors in international relations. Foreign policy analy-
sis also begins to provide several specific individual-based explanations
– not least of which in sociological and psychological terms (e.g., Farkas
1996; Stein 2002). In the broadest sense, EU-Thailand relations can
also be understood as the relations between the Europeans and the Thai
people, so that the roles of individuals are by no means insignificant.
The following section discusses two major trends in (i) tourism and (ii)
migration.
With regard to tourism, the realist power-based explanation of foreign
policy behavior does not, at first glance, seem to be very applicable in this
industry. However, it is clear that a series of tourism marketing strategies
include several influencing-seeking mechanisms in practice. As noted by
the Tourism Authority of Thailand, Thailand’s main efforts have been to
build up the potential of the tourism industry and to increase its competi-
tiveness in the world tourism market.37 Based on the statistics of the
Tourism Authority of Thailand in 2005, European tourists ranked sec-
ond in total numbers of tourist arrivals (2,686,567) behind East Asian
and ASEAN tourists (6,692,982) and finished first in terms of the
highest average length of stay (13.45 days), ahead of American (11.40
days) and Middle East (9.28 days) tourists.38 Moreover, the Thai autho-
rities have recently come to promote new tourism products with routes
that are linked to the neighboring countries including Laos, Cambodia,
Malaysia and Indonesia.39 From a marketing perspective, this new con-
cept is not only expected to attract visitors but can be regarded as of
geostrategic significance for Thailand’s positions in the region.40 In a
sense, Thailand can be considered a ‘gateway’ to the Greater Mekong
Subregion as well as the ‘Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth Trian-
gle’ (IMT-GT).41 It is not surprising that one of the objectives of the
Thai tourism industry is to become the ‘Tourism Capital of Asia’.42
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In liberal terms, the constant flow of tourists and business travelers
can be regarded as having its roots in decisions made on an individual
basis, in contrast to the conventionally realist notions of power incen-
tives and state-to-state relations. Several Thai authorities – particularly
the Tourism Authority of Thailand – are therefore assigned to engage in
the overseas markets for the promotion of the country’s tourism indus-
try aboard.43 Thus far, Thailand has generally attracted a steady increase
in European tourist arrivals: 1,585,915 in 1997, 1,888,673 in 1998,
1,990,449 in 1999, 2,191,433 in 2000, 2,327,680 in 2001, 2,475,319 in
2002, 2,293,913 in 2003, 2,647,682 in 2004, and 2,708,102 in 2005
(Tourism Authority of Thailand 2007). One of Thailand’s tourism stra-
tegies is aimed at penetrating the high-purchasing power market seg-
ments including high-end tourism, long-stay tourism, wellness and
spas, golf or diving.44 Also, several proactive marketing activities can be
observed in Thailand’s presence at major international travel fairs such
as ‘World Travel Mart’ (WTM) in London and the ‘International Tour-
ism Borse’ (ITB) in Berlin.45 This is indeed an area in which the gov-
ernment and the private sectors have an incentive to cooperate through
various policy coordination mechanisms – both in the formulation and
implementation of operational plans. The fact that there have been
plans to increase marketing personnel in high-potential countries also
indicates the increasing importance of advertising and public relations
for tourism's marketing plans.46 Currently, the Tourism Authority of
Thailand has 28 regional offices and coordination centers in Thailand
and 18 overseas offices with ten in Asian countries, five in the EU, two
in the US and one in Australia.47 It is apparent that the increasing com-
petitiveness between market areas and in new destinations not only
causes concern in the private sectors but can be seen as an important
driving force behind the Thai government’s engagement in the tourism
industry. Although constructivists may be right when they see Thai-
land’s identity becoming increasingly high profile, it is difficult to see
what the EU’s contribution is in this process.
In a way, the earlier liberal arguments are related to the neo-func-
tional theory of transactionalism, as postulated primarily by Deutsch
(1962). More specifically, factors including a great number of transac-
tions, a distinctive lifestyle but mutually compatible in the most impor-
tant values, mobility of population, above-average growth of its partici-
pants and development in core areas, expectation of common gains and
the existence of working communication channels contribute to an in-
crease in the political-administrative capacities of some relevant units
and thus leads to the creation of an ‘amalgamated security community’
(ibid.; see also Schneider 2004). The trend of tourism of outgoing Thai
nationals to European countries has also developed in a similar manner.
For instance, based on the Tourism Authority of Thailand's statistics,
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European countries rank second as a tourist destination with 245,567 of
the total of 2,936,189 Thai tourists in 2005, following the East Asian
and ASEAN countries (2,474,387) (Tourism Authority of Thailand
2007). The numbers of outgoing Thai tourists to European countries
decreased by approximately 30% in the wake of the Asian Crisis in
1997 but have consistently increased circa 10% each year since 1998.
In real terms, this equals 155,661 in 1997; 102,312 in 1998; 132,664 in
1999; 158,598 in 2000; 161,187 in 2001; 178,408 in 2002; 185,329 in
2003; 222,912 in 2004 and 249,205 in 2005 (ibid.). The statistics also
reveal that Thai tourists in European countries stayed an average of
8.92 days in 2005 and each tourist spends 4,477.53 Baths per day on
average, which is the highest average expenditure per person per day
among all of the top destinations (ibid.).
From an EU perspective, it is emphasized that the trends in tourism
cannot be fully accredited to EU-level engagement but are more likely
the result of the predominant strategies of the member states.48 Re-
garding the cultural aspects of tourism, it is obvious that the traditional
marketing plans always refer to the richness of ‘Europe’s culture’ across
the member states and that the conception of ‘Europe’ may transcend
the EU’s institutional profiles and EU-specific images. In a constructi-
vist view, the issue of EU awareness poses an important challenge for
the developments of EU identity itself as well as the processes of build-
ing collective identity. With regard to Thailand, it is mentioned that the
attempts of the EU to raise its profiles are crucial for the promotion of
EU identities along with those of the member states and that this task
requires cooperation between the EU and the embassies of the member
states and relevant cultural institutions, as has already been observed
with some joint events.49 It should be noted that while most major
member states have firmly established overseas agencies that help to
promote cultural exchange and language lessons, e.g., the Goethe Insti-
tute, the Alliance Française and the British Council – all of which can
be found in Bangkok – the EU including the European Commission
does not have the same means due to its assigned mandate.50 In fact,
the EU has only recently started to initiate cultural events, for example,
the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand organized a
charity concert ‘Europe and Thailand – United Through Music’ on De-
cember 8, 2005 (EU Today, no. 26, March 2006). This event was held
as a tribute to His Majesty the King in celebration of the 60th anniver-
sary of his accession to the throne and was presided over by Her Ma-
jesty the Queen (ibid.). It featured a European violinist, Wolfgang Da-
vid, and the leading Thai pianist, Indhuon Srikaranonda (ibid.). Other
cultural events such as the ‘European Union Film Festivals’ present se-
lected European films to Thai audiences in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Song
Kla and Udorn Thani as well as musical performances including the
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‘European Union Chamber Orchestra’ occasionally present perfor-
mances of young European musicians in Thailand (Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand 2007i).
Migration is a different story, however, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. In the early postwar period, emigration from ASEAN states to
Europe remained low and mainly for educational and professional occu-
pation reasons (Chantavanich 1999: 12). Yet, the new patterns of migra-
tion that emerged in the 1980s demonstrate a sharp rise in human traf-
ficking in the service sectors including the entertainment business and,
to a regrettable extent, the sex industry (ibid.). It is noted that, among
female workers from Asia, Thai and Filipino women are considered the
most numerous, with not a small number of them having entered un-
documented (ibid.). As mentioned above, the issues of illegal immigra-
tion have recently been referred to as one of unconventional security
challenges. There is evidence that, despite the receiving countries hav-
ing several legal procedures on migration in place, their legal systems
and structures often contain certain restrictions and thereby are prone
to disintegration, discrimination, and abuses – as seen in a series of
dramatic cases (ibid.). In this regard, we note that various efforts by the
governments and non-state actors including a variety of NGOs and indi-
viduals involved have been made to address and resolve these issues
(ibid.). For example, the ‘Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Wo-
men’, with its secretariat based in Bangkok, was established to serve as
a network of international NGOs that address the issues of human
rights in relation to migratory movements and human trafficking as
well as cooperate on changes in political and legal structures to ensure
the rights and safety of women migrants in particular.51
From a realist perspective, this transnational aspect of migration
raises a national security concern for the EU and Thailand and leads to
influence-seeking foreign policy behavior in the management of migra-
tion-related issues. The liberal view seems more appropriate because
the engagement of both parties can be regarded as their responses to
the interests of relevant actors such as NGOs, pressure groups and, of
course, individual migrants. The EU has been responsive to trends in
migratory flows in relation to human rights and other sociopolitical is-
sues. Because of their political, economic and social implications, the is-
sues of migration and trafficking of human beings are considered a part
of the justice and home affairs agenda. The statistics conducted by the
Groupe d’étude de Démographie Appliquée and the Berlin Institute for
Comparative Social Research (2007) reveal that Thailand belongs to the
ten largest groups of third country citizens in three EU-15 countries in
2003 – they are ranked tenth in Denmark (5,436), ninth in Finland
(2,055), and tenth in Sweden (8,306) (see also European Commission
2007i). The European Council meetings in Tampere in October 1999
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and in Seville in June 2002 acknowledged the relevance of migration is-
sues for the EU’s external relations and thus held crucial cooperation
meetings with the countries of origin and transit (European Commis-
sion 2003c: 39). The conclusions of the Commission’s Communication
‘Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union’s Relations with
Third Countries’ (European Commission 2002i), adopted by the Eur-
opean Council in May 2003, not only foresaw a wide range of political
dialogues for identifying the root causes and for the managing of mi-
gratory flows in general but believes that it is crucial to initiate coopera-
tion programs with third countries regarding the problems of legal and
illegal migration under their own budget heading.
In the context of Southeast Asia, the European Commission (2003c)
has subsequently published the Communiqué ‘A New Partnership with
South East Asia’ in which it is emphasized that migration needs to be
systematically incorporated into regional and bilateral dialogues with
Southeast Asian countries. In this respect, the European Commission
proposes three lines of action: (i) ‘The management of migratory flows
will be mainstreamed through all political, economic and social dialo-
gue opportunities with ASEAN and, individually with its member coun-
tries’; (ii) ‘Adequate provisions on migratory flows and readmission
shall be introduced in bilateral agreements with South-East Asian coun-
tries’; and (iii) ‘When appropriate and possible, the establishment of
specific and concrete actions of cooperation should be looked for, either
between the EU and ASEAN as such or on bilateral basis with South-
East Asian countries’ (ibid. 39). Although, between the EU and the Thai
government, there has thus far been little bilateral cooperation in mi-
gration as such, it is interesting that these three lines of action explicitly
regard bilateralism as an important policy instrument along with the re-
gional approaches such as in the ASEM process52 and that the second
point in particular suggests the accommodation of immigration-related
provisions within the prospective bilateral agreements with Southeast
Asia. The Communiqué (ibid.) also refers to the conclusions of the Se-
ville European Council that any future cooperation and association
agreements with third countries should include a clause on the joint
management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission for il-
legal immigration.
IV.2 EU-Thailand Economic Relations
EU-Thailand economic relations are widely considered to be the main
driving force of this bilateralism. The first two subsections of this sec-
tion are aimed at giving an overview of bilateral trade and investment
relations, respectively, thereby including examples of recent issues that
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have received public attention. The third subsection focuses on the bi-
lateral approaches in response to the Asian Crisis in 1997, which clearly
have significant implications for the later developments of this bilateral-
ism. The fourth subsection also deals with Thai responses to recent
challenges emerging from the EU’s economic integration, in the con-
text of the Fifth Enlargement and the introduction of the euro. The fifth
subsection highlights the new trend of developing private initiatives, in
which the EU and the Thai government have attempted to encourage
the participation of non-state actors in policy making. The sixth subsec-
tion sheds light on the FTA’s strategies of the EU and Thailand, with
the prospects of them being part of the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations or
opting for EU negotiations with each of the ASEAN countries individu-
ally.
IV.2.1 Profound Matters in Bilateral Trade
Market access seems to be the most important issue in the bilateral
trade relations between the EU and Thailand. As far as trade is con-
cerned, the EU has opened a relatively large percentage of its markets
to Thai exporters. Approximately 52% of Thai exports enter the EU duty
free because of the MFN agreement (34%) and GSP privileges (18%),
30% are subject to less than 10% import duty, and the other 18% sub-
ject to more than 10% import duty (Delegation of the European Com-
mission to Thailand 2007h). By comparison, 64% of Thailand’s tariffs
are bound by the GATT agreement at an average of 29% (26% for in-
dustrial products and 34% for agriculture) while 36% of Thailand’s tar-
iffs are unbound with a simple average applied rate of 16% (Sally
2004). Thailand’s peak tariffs are applied to agricultural and food pro-
ducts, alcoholic beverages, cars and car parts, and textiles whereby Thai-
bound tariffs are below the average for developing countries but above
those in east and Southeast Asian in general (ibid.). Evidence suggests
that the EU has recently shifted from being a user to being the target of
anti-dumping measures while Thailand rarely uses them or other kinds
of trade defense instruments (ibid.).53 The Thai government also ap-
pears to have a relatively complicated import regime of about 46 differ-
ent rates and, as far as non-tariff barriers are concerned, a complex li-
censing system as well as certain legal restrictions on foreign equity
ownership in the service sectors (ibid.).
Firstly, from a realist viewpoint, some influence-seeking mechanisms
in bilateral trade negotiations can be observed on both sides insofar as
either of the two parties has strategically asserted its powers against the
other or a third party. The EU’s negotiations with the Thai government
on the import regime for rice illustrate these elements of an influence-
seeking strategy among themselves and the principal rice suppliers.
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Rice, which is important both politically and economically, has clearly
been one of the most sensitive issues in the EU-Thailand trade negotia-
tions. For example, after its Common Agricultural Policy reform, while
the EU was obliged to negotiate with its principal trading partners and
submit a modified import regime as a compensatory adjustment ac-
cording to GATT Article XXVIII, it is apparent that Thailand and the
US as the EU’s principal suppliers of milled rice and husked rice, re-
spectively, seek to use their negotiating rights to come to a mutually sa-
tisfactory agreement with the EU.54 On the EU’s side, it is interesting
to observe that the EU had previously reached an agreement with India
and Pakistan on a new import system that sets tariffs at E 65 per ton
for husked rice, E 175 per ton for milled rice and unlimited duty-free
tariffs for nine varieties of husked basmati rice.55 As the negotiations be-
tween the EU and Thailand began in 2004, it is hardly surprising that
the latter party was particularly concerned with, first, the relatively high
milled rice tariffs because Thailand, in principle, was seeking to ensure
that Thai rice remained competitive on the EU markets.56 This is re-
lated to the fact that Thai rice – mostly quality jasmine rice – does not
receive the same preferential treatment as basmati rice coming from In-
dia and Pakistan since 1995.57 Second, a high tariff differential between
milled rice and husked rice made Thailand aware of the incentive for
EU importers to import husked rice instead of milled rice and process
it at local EU mills.58 The result was that the EU and Thailand came to
an agreement through cross-issue negotiations between milled rice and
canned tuna and sardines, so that, in this case, Thailand was granted
duty-free amounts of 1816 tons of canned tuna, 1410 tons of sardines,
and 1200 tons of milled rice in the EU markets (see below).
There are only a few cases in which the Thai government found a
way to assert its powers in negotiations with the EU. The Thai govern-
ment is obviously aware of its rising position and, accordingly, strives
for a strategic outcome in bilateral trade negotiations, particularly
through influence-seeking mechanisms across sectors and levels of in-
teraction. The first example can be found in Thailand’s negotiations
with the European Commission to regain GSP privileges for fishery
products in exchange for the purchase of Airbus airplanes in 2003. In
retrospect, the country used to enjoy low-tariff GSP privileges on var-
ious agricultural and industrial products, but based on the country’s re-
cent economic performance, the EU has decided to enforce Thailand
from this scheme by reducing tariffs privileges to 50% by January 1997
and totally by January 1999 for its three agricultural and six industrial
products (Office of Commercial Affairs 2005). Among these nine pro-
ducts, it is evident that the Thai government is particularly concerned
about the removal of the GSP in fish products including shrimp, be-
cause of the significant increases in tariffs from 4.2% to 12% for fresh
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and from 7% to 20% for preserved shrimps and, also significantly, be-
cause Thailand was the only country to see it GSP privileges for fish
products reduced and, therefore, probably make it uncompetitive versus
other shrimp exporting countries including its neighbors Indonesia,
Malaysia and Vietnam (ibid.; Pongvutitham 2004). In this respect, the
then Trade Representative, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, was assigned to
negotiate with the European Commission in order to restore those GSP
privileges and, by way of negotiation, Thailand’s position was to negoti-
ate this issue in conjunction with the recent Thai Airways Interna-
tional’s purchase of new aircraft from European manufacturer Airbus
(Pongvutitham 2004).59 In the media, former Prime Minister Thaksin
reportedly instructed Thai Airways International to delay the purchase
of $ 2 billion worth of Airbus aircraft and consider Boeing aircraft in-
stead in retaliation for the unsettled deal on GSP privileges for Thai
shrimp (Matthews 2003). Evidence later showed that the government
used the same Airbus order to accelerate negotiations on Thai exports
of poultry and pet birds as well as some food and farm products (Tardy
and Lott 2004). This strategy succeeded because in June 2005 Thailand
regained its GSP privileges in six sectors: (i) fish, (ii) prepared food-
stuffs and beverages, (iii) plastics and rubber, (iv) footwear, (v) electrical
equipment, and (vi) glass and ceramic products (Office of Commercial
Affairs 2005).
This incident supports liberal arguments that the EU has an incentive
to protect the domestic markets, which can be witnessed in its attempts
to manage and revise the existing patterns of trade regimes with third
countries.60 A concrete example reveals that the EU has repeatedly at-
tempted to switch some of its import regimes from a licensing system
to a ‘first come, first served’ approach. From an economic point of view,
a ‘first come, first served’ situation gives the EU more control over its
import quotas and make it less liable to be negotiated individually with
third countries. Moreover, it is obvious that this change could lead third
countries to be more competitive among each other. For instance, in
March 2004, the EU initiated negotiations with Thailand on the modifi-
cation of the current import regime for manioc, which had its origins
in the 1982 EC-Thailand Cooperation Agreement that specifically pre-
scribed the approaches of ‘export certificates’ and ‘import licenses’.61 In
order to switch the import regime to a ‘first come, first served’ ap-
proach, the EU’s Directorate General for Agriculture eagerly requested
a series of consultations with the Department of Foreign Trade under
the Thai Ministry of Commerce, in the hope of coming to a formal
agreement with Thailand within the framework of a new Cooperation
Agreement or a Letter of Understanding.62 Although they were aiming
for an agreement with Thailand to take effect by mid-2005, this was
made difficult by the manioc, which was regarded as one of the most
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sensitive crops by the Thai government, which seemed to be concerned
with the ad valorum level of security payable for exceeding quotas,
which bound EU negotiators to the rules set by the Directorate General
for Taxation and the Customs Union.63
The Thai government, from a liberal view, was also hoping to manage
and, to some extent, protect its domestic markets via its bilateral rela-
tions with the EU. An example of the negotiations on duty reductions
of marble and granite show that Thailand had certain import restric-
tions on marble and granite, which required importers to obtain author-
ization from the Ministry of Commerce in advance and restricted im-
ports to a specific amount of approved construction projects.64 This ap-
plied to marble blocks (HS 25.15), cut and polished marble and granite
(HS 68.02).65 Since this non-automatic licensing system was not in line
with the GATT’s obligations under Article XI and the WTO Licensing
Agreement, the EU repeatedly raised this issue on a number of occa-
sions including the ministerial or senior officials’ meetings and the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism.66 In the meantime, while Thailand
was able to remove the duties on marble blocks in January 2003, the
EU continued to request further tariff reductions for cut and polished
marble and granite, which would significantly generate more value
added.67 The then Commissioner for External Trade, Pascal Lamy,
brought this point regarding discretionary import regimes to the discus-
sions with the Thai Minister of Commerce Wattana in March and April
2003 and once again in September 2004.68 Although, after the first
meeting in 2003, the Thai administration managed to reduce the im-
port duties on unpolished marble and granite blocks from 50% to be-
tween 20% and 8.75%, one should note that the Thai government was
reluctant to totally open the marble and granite markets.69 The Thai As-
sociation of Marble and Granite shared this view, despite a couple of
counter-arguments, and preferred delaying the market opening at that
time because of their concern about a possible flood of Chinese and In-
dian imports.70
In liberal terms, the evidence also suggests that both the EU’s and
Thailand’s trade policies have been driven by the interests of business-
people and may have taken a form of ‘engaging’ that varies across sec-
tors depending on the degree of organizational patterns and interest
structures.
On Thailand’s side, poultry exporters have been by far one of the
strongest lobbying groups, for example.71 In fact, Thailand not long ago
became the largest exporter of cooked poultry to the EU as it exports
rose to E 176.5 million in 2003 and E 265.86 million in 2005 out of an
EU total of E 277.2 million in cooked poultry imports and E 384.73 mil-
lion, respectively (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2006c). There is evidence to suggest that when poultry products are on
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the negotiation table, the interests groups and the businesspeople in-
volved will have a strong incentive to raise their concerns and look out
for appropriate government engagement. Soon after the accession of
ten new member states to the EU, Thailand – along with Brazil – has
begun to exercise her negotiating rights as a main exporting country of
poultry to the EU markets according to the GATT’s Article XXIV Para-
graph 6, by which the EU is bound to achieve in negotiations with its
partners mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment for any in-
crease in rate of duty (ibid.). It is interesting to note that the EU and
the Thai government reached an agreement after only two days of nego-
tiations on quotas for cooked and salted poultry, for which, more speci-
fically, Thailand has been granted annual export quotas totaling 160,033
tons of cooked poultry and 92,610 tons of salted poultry provided that
cooked poultry imports are subject to a reduced in-quota tariff rate of
8% (formerly 10.9%) and an out-of-quota rate of E 1024 per ton, while
salted poultry imports are subject to an unchanged in-quota tariff rate
of 15.4% and an out-of-quota rate of E 1300 per ton (ibid.). These quo-
tas, especially the reduced in-quota tariff rate for cooked poultry, are
said to be beneficial for Thailand in maintaining a margin for the
growth in its cooked poultry exports.72 Later, at the outbreak of avian in-
fluenza, there was evidence that a majority of trade negotiations were
focused on poultry products, as mentioned in chapter IV.1.2. In re-
sponse, the EU only temporarily suspended raw meat imports but con-
tinued to allow the importation of cooked meat products, a measure
that satisfied Thailand and appears to be the least trade restrictive mea-
sure available (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2004e).73
On the EU side, it is also possible to observe its trade policies that
are linked with the engagement of businesspeople. As the above-
mentioned example of the EU’s attempts to amend Thailand’s marble
and granite import regime demonstrates, the European Commission ac-
tively engages in this case on behalf of its member states, of which
Spain has been particularly interested in exporting cut and polished
marble and granite into the country.74 The fact that the EU has also
been unwilling to offer any margin for maneuver on milled rice during
the above-mentioned negotiations on rice import regimes, and is far
less reluctant to make a deal for husked rice than milled rice can be ex-
plained by the EU’s internal market structures with its relatively strong
milling industry and because the EU is itself an importer of husked rice
but an exporter of milled rice.75
More broadly speaking, engagement politics also gives rise to the
trade-off dynamics in the negotiations across issues – also called cross-
issue negotiations. For example, as the negotiations on milled and
husked rice duties proceeded, the EU first considered an offer from
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within the same sector, which would include a reduced rate on out-of-
quota duties for broken rice in order to make its deals on milled and
husked rice duties more acceptable.76 But the Thai response was rather
reserved because of the country’s difficult standpoint on milled rice and
so the government presented a counter-proposal for negotiations across
sectors.77 As things stood, Thailand and the EU managed to reach an
agreement for milled rice in conjunction with canned tuna and sardines
(see also Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006b).
More specifically, both parties agreed that Thailand was to be granted
duty-free status for 1816 tons of canned tuna, 1410 tons of sardines,
and 1200 tons of milled rice from EU markets.78 Moreover, the EU
managed to combine the import regime for rice with a ‘first come, first
served’ approach so that, besides the country-specific quotas, all rice im-
porters would be subject to annual tariff rate quotas of 7 tons of paddy
rice, 1,634 tons of husked rice, 25,516 tons of semi and wholly milled
rice, and 31,788 tons of broken rice.79
The constructivist aspects of collective identity formation are observa-
ble only to a lesser extent, however. There is evidence that the EU has
attempted to promote human rights among its trading partners– speci-
fically labor rights – and the adoption of certain environmental stan-
dards through the GSP’s special incentive arrangements. More specifi-
cally, the requesting countries – if criteria are met – will be granted ad-
ditional import tariff preferences for certain products and/or the
temporary cancellation of particular sector ‘graduation’ – that is, the
preferential tariffs for a third country are suspended because of its
above-threshold export performance after a specific period of time – un-
der the general arrangements (European Commission 2003b). In the
process of examining the requests, the European Commission takes
into account domestic legislation that incorporates the substance of in-
ternational best practices – such as the core standards of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation or the standards of International Tropical
Timber Convention – and expects to see that necessary implementation
measures are instituted (ibid.). The impact appears to be modest as
Thailand has yet to submit an application for any of the special incen-
tive arrangements, although, as will be discussed in more detail below,
the prospects of these arrangements may play a role in the upcoming
FTA negotiations between the EU and the ASEAN countries.
IV.2.2 The Increasing Relevance of Bilateral Investment
The EU-Thailand bilateral investment relations have been asymmetrical
insofar as the EU ranks third among Thailand’s investment partners
throughout most of the 1990s until just recently, while there are only a
few Thai companies with any significant foreign investments in the
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EU. Thus far, the investment approaches of the EU and Thailand have
been shaped mainly by business interests, a point that supports the lib-
eral ‘engaging’ argument. There are at least two crucial sets of logic be-
hind the current EU investment decisions favoring Thailand, both of
which imply the increasing relevance of engagement politics of both
Thailand and the EU. First, EU investors hope to build up an export-
oriented production base for regional markets and elsewhere.80 In this
regard, it is clear that Thailand – although not a place with the lowest
labor costs in the region – offers a combination of skilled labor in cer-
tain high value-added and high technology sectors and relatively low
production costs.81 The Thai Board of Investment’s statistics illustrate
that the EU investments are mainly in three Thai manufacturing sec-
tors: (i) electrical and electronics (31%), (ii) light gemstone and jewelry
industries and textile manufacturing (26%), and (iii) metal products
and machinery (16%) (Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land and Board of Investment of Thailand 2004). By and large, the
EU’s FDIs in manufacturing are relatively stable in Thailand, suggest-
ing the relevance of the latter’s export-oriented industry overall (ibid.).
Secondly, EU investors are also interested in Thailand’s domestic
markets regarding their capacity to absorb the EU FDI products locally
because compared to the rest of the region, Thailand is not only a rela-
tively wealthy economy but also has modern consumption patterns.82
In practice, EU investments in the Thai service sectors accounted for
about 1% of total EU export-oriented investments in Thailand in the per-
iod 1994-2003 (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
and Board of Investment of Thailand 2004). This implies that EU in-
vestments in services are expected to primarily serve domestic markets
and play a less important role in export figures (ibid.). Although statisti-
cally disputable, a great deal of the EU FDIs in Thailand appear to be
increasingly concentrated in the service sector with figures of 11% in
1994 rising to 35% in 2003, which is in line with the general trends on
both sides that c. 65% of the EU’s FDI outflows and 52% of Thailand’s
FDI inflows have coincidentally been predisposed toward services
(ibid.).83
The liberal argument of engaging politics can be linked to the notion
of correcting domestic ‘market failures’ insofar as recent developments
of market conditions in Thailand have been in the interests of EU com-
panies leading to the EU’s engagement in some cases. In the views of
the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of
Investment of Thailand (2004), the modest trend of EU FDIs in Thai-
land is traceable to domestic economic conditions, for which, in order
to increase FDI inflows, the Thai government may consider adopting
certain measures to improve its investment climate and focus on parti-
cular investment sectors such as the service sector and the high-value-
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added, high technology sectors, which include telecommunications, lo-
gistics, health services, regional head offices, and wholesale and retailing
(ibid.). Thus far, several domestic measures have been promoted – some
of which were eventually enacted to eliminate technical barriers and thus
make Thailand a generally more attractive place for foreign investments.
For example, in November 2001 Thailand adopted the ‘Telecommunica-
tions Business Act’, which set a 25% limit on foreign equity participation
in this service sector, in response to the WTO and GATS Schedule of
Commitments that restrict foreign equity participation for the providers
in telecommunications services and database access services at the re-
spective limits of 20% and 40%.84 The European Commission has
played an active role in pushing this legal step and has focused on the
future implementation of Thailand’s WTO commitments to introducing
certain market access elements in the subsequent Communications
Act.85 Furthermore, since Thailand had the so-called ‘Foreign Business
Act’, which generally set a limit on foreign equity participation at a max-
imum of 49%, the EU has repeatedly attempted to discuss this issue
with Thai authorities to remove the 25% foreign ownership stipulation
from the aforementioned Telecommunications Business Act.86
Moreover, it has become apparent that the Thai government had an
incentive to politicize certain domestic market issues through its invest-
ment relations with its major foreign partners. The above telecommuni-
cations case included evidence to suggest that the relevant authorities
came into contact with various private sectors and indeed was influ-
enced by pressures from both domestic and foreign actors including
European companies. In fact, the above-mentioned adoption of the Tele-
communications Business Act also gave rise to a new regulatory frame-
work to promote full competition and establish an independent body of
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).87 Apparently, the
two state enterprises – the Communications Authority of Thailand
(CAT) and the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) – which at
the time dominated international data services and domestic telephone
services, respectively, were about to be privatized and opened to market
competition.88 The privatization of these long-established state enter-
prises immediately became one of the most hotly debated discussions
in the Thai mass media and academic literature and based on historical,
political and economic arguments.89 Most importantly, the private com-
panies – whether they were local or foreign – were then permitted by
the NTC to convert their CAT or TOT concessions in licenses.90 This
move was very crucial and urgently pursued by the private companies
because the existing system required that they acquire concession con-
tracts from the CAT or TOT and then pay annual fees including access
charges in accordance with the revenue-sharing agreements.91
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On the EU side, this telecommunications case also demonstrates the
relevance of coordinating mechanisms between EU institutions and the
member states, with the former engaging on behalf and in the interest
of the latter. Indeed, the move in which the European Commission and
its Delegation in Bangkok decisively took collective action toward the
Thai government can be seen as the engagement politics of the Com-
mission, insofar as it acknowledged the issue of foreign ownership as
being of great concern and interest to European companies in Thai-
land.92 In a meeting with former Prime Minister Thaksin in June
2002, for example, the then Commissioner for External Trade, Pascal
Lamy, was positive about the amendment proposal that the Thai Cabi-
net had passed on to the House and the Senate.93 Later, it became evi-
dent that the Commission was very concerned with the fact that the re-
form proceeded very slowly, especially after the French company, Or-
ange, decided to pull out of the Thai market.94 France Telecom
announced that the situation became critical for Orange in late 2003 as
the company’s balance sheets showed large debts allegedly due to the
access charge and revenue sharing procedures, so that even with contin-
ued cash injections or the 49% foreign equity participation clause, Or-
ange would never be in a position of control.95 Furthermore, the afore-
mentioned concessions to licenses conversion system was further com-
plicated as the revenue-sharing arrangements were replaced by new
regulations on excise taxes and interconnection charges.96
Realist explanations, in contrast, may instead stress the influence-
seeking patterns in Thailand’s and the EU’s foreign policy approaches,
although only to a limited extent. For example, that the EU’s invest-
ments are inclined to focus on the service sectors is apparently related
to a high degree of speciality of the EU that can allow it to sectorally as-
sert its influence, particularly in four leading sub-sectors: (i) financial
intermediation, (ii) real estate and business activities, (iii) transport, sto-
rage and communication, and (iv) trade and repairs (Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand and Board of Investment of Thai-
land 2004). It is not very surprising that the EU actively sought to in-
crease the concentration level of EU investments in the Thai service sec-
tors, since it should also be noted that the level thus far has been rela-
tively low compared to that in Southeast Asia (ibid.).
More clearly, the Thai government’s FDI policy can also be consid-
ered influence-seeking in its efforts to attract more EU FDI shares in
East and Southeast Asia, although thus far the country – notwithstand-
ing ASEAN as a group – has never been the main investment destina-
tion for EU FDI flows (Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand and Board of Investment of Thailand 2004). The EU’s major
investment destinations have been the US, EFTA, and Latin America
(ibid.). In 2002, the US attracted 46% of total EU foreign investments,
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EFTA and Latin America each received about 11% each, while East Asia
as a whole accounted for 6% (ibid.). However, when it comes to East
Asia, the presence of China seems to play an important role in re-
directing EU FDI trends within the East Asian region (ibid.). The EU
FDI stocks in China increased almost tenfold from 2.3 billion ECUs in
1995 to E 20 billion in 2002 while those in ASEAN grew only 2.7-fold
from 20 billion ECUs in 1995 to E 54 billion (ibid.). Also, in more gen-
eral terms, China’s growth increased nine-fold from 1995 to 2002 and
showed an increase in the proportion of world imported FDI stocks
from 6% to 8% between 1995 and 2002 (ibid.). The ASEAN’s collective
shares of FDI inward stocks decreased from 8% to 6% during this
same period (ibid.). Thailand – despite the China factors – has been
able to maintain a constant share of 10% of EU investments in ASEAN,
which accounts for 2 billion ECUs in 1995 and about E 5.5 billion in
2002 (ibid.).
The constructivist believes that the bilateral investment policy of the
EU and the Thai government can be discussed in the promotion of cer-
tain international values and norms. For example, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the EU has encouraged Thailand to strengthen its
enforcement of intellectual property rights to improve the country’s in-
vestment climate – which is, of course, mostly to the benefit of EU
businesses – such as those that took place during the bilateral senior of-
ficial meetings as well as the frameworks of the EC-ASEAN – later
called TREATI – Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of Invest-
ment of Thailand 2004). Thailand has also already adopted the ‘Optical
Media Control Regulation’ to combat piracy and counterfeiting, as well
as certain measures to reach a sustainable system of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection.97 Moreover, in April 2004, the Thai government
adopted the ‘Geographical Indication Protection Act’ designed to protect
specific goods with qualities and/or reputation due to their geographical
origin (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006a).98
Preparations for this Act meant that the European Commission and
Thailand worked together during the 2nd EC-ASEAN Technical Assis-
tance Programme on Intellectual Property Rights (ECAP II) with an
available budget of E 5 million managed by the European Patent Office
in Munich.99 As far as norms and practices are concerned, the intro-
duction of this Act is considered very positive because the Royal Thai
Customs not only reacted to the complaints of intellectual property
rights owners; they also reported any suspected imported and exported
goods directly to the Thai Department of Intellectual Property.100
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IV.2.3 The EU and Thailand in the Asian Crisis
On the EU side, the European Commission’s first responses were criti-
cized for underestimating the actual impact of the Asian Crisis on Eur-
ope’s economies, for example, as pointed out by Bridges (1999: 458), in
January 1998 the then European Commission President Jacques Santer
predicted that the crisis would have only a ‘slight’ direct effect and at
the same time Commissioner of Monetary Affairs, Yves-Thibault de Sil-
guy, forecasted that it would ‘only [have] a marginal impact on growth
in Europe’. However, soon after the crisis developed, its global reach be-
came more widely acknowledged thus underlining more clearly the in-
creased global trade and financial interdependence. The crisis had a glo-
bal market dampening effect on exports, which was due to the sudden
erosion of purchasing power and an inevitable rise in unemployment
and poverty incidences in the effected countries as well as an increase
in imports because the competitiveness of these countries’ exports was
driven up by their currency depreciation (ibid. 459). As a consequence,
EU economic activities in the affected Asian countries including Thai-
land slowed down and its bilateral trade deficits rose – although to vary-
ing degrees – across sectors and across countries (Nicolas 2000: 127;
Bridges 1999: 459). The resulting import contraction in Asia – as evi-
denced by governments’ austerity measures and weakening domestic
demand – indeed had a trade impact on the EU economies. For in-
stance, German, French and Italian exports decreased by 4%, 10%, and
22% respectively between 1996 and 1998 (Nicolas 2000: 127, 129).
Moreover, after the baht’s dramatic devaluation there is evidence to sug-
gest that Thai exports, at least in a short run, had become more compe-
titive and increased significantly, for example, Thai apparel exports to
the EU rose by 44% in the first three quarters of 1998 (Bridges 1999:
460). Asian imports to most of the major EU member states increased
significantly so that in the first quarter of 1998 Germany, France and
Italy experienced an increase of roughly 13%, 13% and 30% respectively
(Nicolas 2000: 129).
In power-based arguments, realists are less specific than liberals in
their explanations of the differences between the various EU bilateral
responses across affected countries. As we mentioned in IV.1.1, while
the EU’s contribution to crisis management was modest, it is observa-
ble that the EU was less active in Thailand than in some other affected
countries like South Korea and, in general, only reluctantly pursued
new major assistance initiatives on its own. Compared to the cases of
the US and Japan, the impact of the Asian Crisis on the EU was rela-
tively limited, which can in part be explained in terms of (i) a relatively
small share of its trade with Asia and (ii) the partially offsetting effect
induced by other components of aggregate demand (Nicolas 2000:
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127). However, the view that the European economies were relatively
less affected by the Asian Crisis than the US and Japan does not repre-
sent the entire story of the EU’s modest role in the various crisis man-
agement efforts. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the EU
did not allocate the same available resources to crisis management in
Thailand as in some other affected countries. Under the Council Regu-
lation (EC) no. 815/2003 of 8 May 2003, for example, the EU managed
to introduce a so-called ‘crisis clause’ which was implemented via a
GSP regulation amendment to the benefit of three crisis-affected coun-
tries: Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela (Official Journal of the Eur-
opean Union, C 223 E, vol. 46, 19/09/2003).101 More specifically, the
‘crisis clause’ was designed to be applied to the GSP regulation so that
the scheduled removal of tariff preferences would not apply to the bene-
ficiary countries, which had experienced a real gross domestic product
decrease of at least 3% (ibid.). As a result, in contrast to the ASEAN
countries, the three Latin American countries continued to benefit from
low-tariff privileges in the new GSP scheme that would have otherwise
been removed in accordance with the criteria of development and spe-
cialization indexes.
On the investment front, realists are tempted to regard the post-crisis
investment climate as providing the EU with an opportunity to assert
its influence and balance Thailand’s FDIs whilst liberals would rather
argue that European investors were given an incentive to engage in
these trends under profitable market conditions. In the period 1997-
1999, the crisis was mostly considered ‘an investment opportunity’ due
to the relatively good value of the acquisition of assets (Delegation of
the European Commission to Thailand and Board of Investment of
Thailand 2004). However, FDI statistics show very modest results.
Although it was already possible in 1998 to see a clear increase in the
US, EU and Japanese investment inflows and thus an abrupt increase
in net FDI flows, it is also true that the EU still lagged behind the US
and Japan in the acquisition of distressed Asian firms and financial in-
stitutions (ibid.; Nicolas 2000: 131). In 1999, the EU’s investment in-
flows and net investment flows were ranked first,102 but the crisis ap-
parently introduced the ‘lagged effect’ on foreign investment trends in
2000 so that Thailand experienced a certain degree of disinvestment
from the US and the EU and its net investment figures showed a nega-
tive balance – i.e., net investment outflows – by 2002 (Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand and Board of Investment of Thai-
land 2004). This appears to be a temporary phenomenon caused by re-
patriation of profits by EU companies exclusively in 2002, so that by
the following year (2003) positive net investment flows had resumed
with E 12.6 million with investment flows of E 582 million or 9% of the
total inflows of E 6,464 million to Thailand (ibid.). Nonetheless, it
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should also be mentioned that the EU was aware of Japan’s strong in-
fluence in the region and that, at least between 1994 and 2003, the EU
continued to consider Thailand an attractive investment destination in
Southeast Asia despite the Asian Crisis (ibid.).
The constructivist have a difficult time finding empirical evidence of
the EU’s foreign policy achievements in building a collective identity or
socializing any particular values due specifically to post-Asian Crisis
management. The EU's role perceptions also seem rather unclear be-
cause of Thailand’s relatively small share in trade and investments. The
financial sector offered some evidence that European banks were highly
involved in the region hardest hit by the crisis. For example, European
banks held about 28% of Thailand’s total external commitments in June
1997 and German, British, French and Belgian bank loans to Asia ac-
counted for about 1.8%, 2.3%, 2.5%, and 4.0% of their respective GDPs
(Nicolas 2000).103 Although the EU was aware of the increased eco-
nomic interdependence between European and Asian countries and the
need to promote an active ‘regional role’ for the euro, the view that the
euro could be introduced as the main reserve currency in Southeast
Asia has yet to become a reality (ibid.).
Let us now turn to Thailand’s side. The Thai response to the Asian
Crisis was undoubtedly timely and focused. For most policymakers this
was a matter of the country’s economic survival. Knowing that the gov-
ernment had a tradition of maintaining the exchange rate at 25 baht per
dollar, it is not surprising that the decision to float the Thai baht on July
2, 1997 led to a sudden change and a series of significant complications
in the country’s economic development, notwithstanding – almost im-
mediately – the near depletion of the country’s international reserves
(Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of In-
vestment of Thailand 2004). For Thailand there is no doubt that the
government aimed primarily at wanting to resolve the problems of li-
quidity and restoring markets for exports. Nevertheless, Thailand had to
face a number of macroeconomic constraints including the vast depre-
ciation of the baht and, consequently, the high level of inflation, the
IMF-prescribed interest rate increase, a series of non-performing loans
in the financial sector, the insolvencies of several major corporate and
financial institutions, the sudden decrease in asset prices and manufac-
turing activities as well as the spread of negative social impact (ibid.).
From a realist perspective, the response of a state in a crisis situation
is principally driven by national survival and self-interest. Thus, one
would expect that Thailand would seek to strengthen its bilateral rela-
tions with the major economic powers – particularly, the US, Japan and
the EU – as a way to improve its relative positions bilaterally or in regio-
nal or multilateral settings elsewhere. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Thailand, for example, requested that the EU President consider
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measures to help overcome the Asian Crisis in January 1998, which in-
cluded, first, to ‘consider extending loans to restructure industrial and
agricultural production in a medium- or a long-term period’, second, to
‘consider providing development aid for Thailand and the Asian coun-
tries in various fields which are important to social and economic devel-
opments in these countries’, third, to ‘consider providing technical as-
sistance in the areas of finance and banking’, fourth, to ‘consider, as a
special case, increasing funds under the European Communities’ In-
vestment Partner for Thailand and Asia in order to encourage more
joint ventures between Thailand, Asia and the EU’, and, fifth, to ‘encou-
rage top executives of large private companies in Europe, which have
the potential to invest in Thailand and Asia to expand their investments
in Thailand and Asia’ (cited in Bersick 2004: 216-217).
It was in this situation that the Thai government’s strategic attempts
to instrumentalize its bilateral dialogues with the EU can be seen as a
weak-state version of influence-seeking foreign policy behavior, which is
referred to as ‘voicing opportunities seeking’. Even if the EU was deter-
mined to contribute to the management of the crisis mainly through
the IMF, the bilateral relations with the EU were not negligible because
the EU member states together still assume, as previously mentioned,
near 30% of total quotas and thus total voting rights, while the US and
Japan account for 18.25% and 5.67% respectively (Nicolas 2000: 135).
Moreover, it is important to note that there was a subsequent request
made by the Thai government, along with its Malaysian counterpart,
that the EU consider engaging in the creation of a new fund that pro-
motes EU trade and investments in Asia – in part because the proposal
of Asian Monetary Fund had been turned down in 1997 (ibid. 135, 138).
This initiative was raised at the ASEM Summit in London in April
1998 and thereafter gave rise to the establishment of the ‘ASEM Trust
Fund’, which amounted to $ 43.8 million in June of that same year
(ibid.). It is striking that the European Commission became the largest
contributor to the ASEM Trust Fund 1, which in turn was administered
by the World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region with the main objec-
tives of facilitating the recovery of the affected countries and providing
financial support for necessary reform programs in the two areas of (i)
social welfare and safety nets and (ii) financial and corporate restructur-
ing (World Bank 2007a).
In more general terms, although it seems that Thailand relied rela-
tively significantly on regional and intra-ASEAN investments during the
early stages of the Asian Crisis, the contributions from other foreign in-
vestors including the Europeans was insignificant in several ways. In
the background, the Thai approach traditionally holds on to its princi-
ples of flexibility and pragmatism and implicitly incorporates the ele-
ments of the politics of ‘equidistance’ (Cheow 1986: 747; Rüland
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2001a: 1026). It was suggested that the Thai government begin to ex-
plore further alternatives in trade policy that would promote closer eco-
nomic cooperation and guarantee foreign exchange earnings in the
longer run via its EU bilateral relations and those it has with other ma-
jor players (Chirathivat and Mallikamas 2004: 40-41). The Asian Crisis
is, in fact, in many ways considered an important driving force behind
the Chuan government’s attempts to conclude several market access
agreements and later – as will be discussed below – the FTA trends with
a groups of countries (ibid.; see also Nagai 2003).
The liberal arguments were right to argue that the Thai government
may find an incentive to introduce an economic policy that – in the
form of inward-looking engagement – could be expected to contribute
to the correction of domestic ‘market failures’. For example, an implica-
tion of the Asian Crisis can be observed in the new shareholding struc-
tures of the EU investment projects in Thailand. In the wake of the cri-
sis, the Board of Investment of Thailand was urged to approve consider-
ably more EU-owned projects in order to solve credit illiquidity by
injecting foreign capital into its economy (Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand and Board of Investment of Thailand 2004).
This was definitely one of the most radical changes in the Thai invest-
ment policy, especially considering the country’s traditional attitudes
and regulations, which used to give a clear preference to joint ventures
rather than wholly EU-owned investment projects (ibid.). In 1996, there
were 15 wholly EU-owned projects versus 62 joint ventures involving at
least 10% foreign capital, which were approved by the Thai Board of In-
vestment (ibid.). This proportion inversely became 43 to 42 in 1997 and
even 65 to 14 in 2001 (ibid.). Moreover, between 1997 and 2000, more
than 50 EU companies pushed through internal re-structuring mea-
sures related to equity ownership ratios between Thailand and the EU
majority (ibid.). The Board made an official announcement in Novem-
ber 1998 giving permission to foreign investors to hold shares in all of
the investment zones including those that had previously been re-
stricted (ibid.).
Moreover, Thailand’s corporate sector became increasingly important
because of the potential effect its performance would have on foreign
investment decisions. The developments prior to the crisis reveal that a
lot of Thai companies are family owned, which often leads to inaccurate
accounting practices and a concentration of shareholders and manage-
ment structures among family members or ‘inside shareholders’ (Jinar-
at and Quang 2003). As a consequence, poor ‘corporate governance’
was a significant cause of the Asian crisis in 1997 and thereby consid-
ered functionally crucial in the subsequent crisis management and re-
covery attempts (ibid. 22-23; see also Trairatvorakul 1999). Foreign in-
vestors including European companies see the need for Thailand to im-
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prove its regulations such as creating a new set of accounting standards
in line with international best practice and to promote improvements in
disclosure standards and practices, as well as a way to decry the lack of
transparency and enhance good governance overall (Jinarat and Quang
2003). It is no coincidence that these moves have also been in the inter-
est of Thai businesses, boosting performance and, more importantly, in
attracting foreign investments (ibid.). Meanwhile, the Thai government
has plans to address the issues of corporate governance on a national
agenda, the Stock Exchange of Thailand has initiated a relevant pro-
gram to improve corporate governance supervision and – together with
the Securities Exchange Commission and the Bank of Thailand – has
proposed significant reforms in the corporate sector regarding disclo-
sure standards and the structure of the board in particular (ibid.).
The constructivist explanation, in contrast, is only applicable to a lim-
ited extent to the Thai government’s approach toward the EU during
the Asian crisis. While the EU’s contribution was modest, the Thai re-
sponse was clearly affected by post-crisis economic recovery efforts.
Constructivists may explain their foreign policy behavior in terms of im-
proving mutual awareness and recognition. As mentioned above, the
principles of non-intervention seem to have prevailed, thus the EU’s ap-
proach remained reserved and there is little evidence to suggest that the
EU’s relations with Thailand came to form collective identity in spite of
many interaction opportunities.
IV.2.4 Thailand’s Response to the European Economic Integration
Thailand is aware of, and concerned with, the transitional dynamics
and the consequences of Europe’s integration processes. During the
time period of this study, there were at least two major events involving
European economic integration, which had a significant impact on the
developments of EU-Thailand relations: the Fifth Enlargement and the
introduction of the euro. The following subsections will focus on Thai-
land’s responses to these two events and their implications for bilateral-
ism.
IV.2.4.1 The Fifth Enlargement
It is important to note that the fifth enlargement of the EU was very dif-
ferent from the fourth: The accession negotiations concluded by the
European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002, and the subse-
quent Accession Treaty signed in April 2003, gave the green light to
membership for ten new countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia – which, contrary to those who became members in the fourth
round of EU enlargement, were overall less liberalized and had smaller
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trade flows and higher import tariffs than the EU average.104 Together,
the EU-25 represents a large single market of more than 450 million ci-
tizens and accounts for about 18% of world trade and 25% of the
world’s GDP whereby the ten new member countries added a total po-
pulation of more than 100 million and a gross domestic product of
E 457 billion, figures that highlight the relative economic significance
of the new member states (European Commission 2004c; Wisaweisuan
et al. 2005).
Realists might expect that EU enlargement would basically raise the
Thai government’s concern about maintaining its relative positions,
both politically and economically. The fact that the new member states
are economically comparable to Thailand in relation to their exportation
patterns and overall economic performance obviously underscores the
increased competitiveness involved in exporting to the EU’s markets.105
More importantly, the Thai government seems to have pursued an
influence-seeking foreign policy through its negotiating rights via the
WTO provisions on compensatory mechanisms. According to GATT Ar-
ticle XXIV Paragraph 5, the EU is obliged to ensure that the Union’s
duties and other trade regulations ‘shall not on the whole be higher or
more restrictive’ than those prior to the accession of the ten new mem-
ber states (European Commission 2004c).106 Moreover, the negotia-
tions are expected to take place within a limited period of time because
GATT Article XXVIII contains a provision that when no agreement can
be reached prior to the EU’s withdrawal or modifications of relevant
concessions, third countries are allowed to withdraw substantially
equivalent concessions no earlier than 30 days and no later than 6
months after the EU’s withdrawal or modifications (ibid.). As men-
tioned earlier, in practice, there were a few cases in which Thailand was
left at a disadvantage after EU enlargement. The EU’s first negotiations
with Thailand were initiated in November 2004, in which both sides
met to discuss general procedures and approaches.107 In the case of
poultry products, for example, Thailand and Brazil are the main coun-
tries with negotiating rights in the EU, and the EU and the Thai admin-
istration reached an agreement on quotas for cooked and salted poultry
after two days of negotiations.108 Subsequent negotiations in 2005 and
2006 have dealt with the import regimes of various goods such as poul-
try, rice, canned tuna, and sardines, all of which have since been fina-
lized.109 It is also obvious that, apart from the tariff negotiations, some
of the import regimes have been modified from an import license sys-
tem to a first-come-first-served approach (see above).
From the realist perspective, EU enlargement not only presents a
broader area of possible cooperation in general but also provides the
Thai government with the possibility of exploring new economic rela-
tionships with the new member states. The enlargement process has
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led to the extension of the EU trade regime to the ten new member
states, which refers to a single set of rules, tariff rates, trade regulations
and administrative procedures (European Commission 2004c).110 While
the trade liberalizing effect of EU enlargement is unquestionable within
the EU itself, enlargement also gave rise to increased opportunities and
greater choice in the EU-25 single market and that, for Thailand, this
step has been particularly promising because the country, which is par-
tially eligible for the EU’s GSP schemes, may benefit from the exten-
sion of the GSP regimes to the new member states.111
However, the evidence seems to support the liberal argument of the
Thai government’s engagement in response to Thai business interests
is accurate. Bilateral trade between the EU-25 and Thailand has de-
creased slightly in real terms – from E 20,789 million in 2001 to
E 20,590 million in 2005 but this becomes more significant in relative
terms as the EU’s shares in Thai imports decreased from 13.11% in
2001 to 9.44% in 2005 and its shares of Thai total exports also de-
creased from 17.13% to 13.85% during the same period (European Com-
mission 2006f). Moreover, the EU’s message to ‘[make] sure that all
[its] trade partners will indeed grant to the new Member States the
same treatment they give to the current ones, from the 1st of May and
without any disruption’, meaning that the ten new member states need
to adopt all of the details of the Common Commercial Policy – particu-
larly EU bilateral trade agreements, multilateral trade commitments
and obligations, common external tariffs, and trade defense measures
(European Commission 2004c). This situation clearly raised the Thai
government’s concerns about the EU’s automatic application of trade
defense measures for the new member states.112 In the European Com-
mission-Thailand Senior Officials’ Meeting in 2004, the engagement of
the EU and Thai government saw both parties discuss the impact of EU
enlargement in greater detail with regard to different trade defense
measures such as antidumping cases and countervailing duties.113 In re-
sponse, the EU refers to its formal notification of the application of
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures in the Official Journal of the
EU no. 2004/C 91/02 and gives exporters an opportunity to request a
review of these measures in case there are any perceived significant
changes.114 Interestingly, although the EU believes that this approach
does not pose any economic problems for Thai exporters, there was a
company, Tuntex Ltd., which requested an enlargement review purport-
ing to be affected on their exports of polyester staple fibres to two new
member states, Estonia and Poland.115
It is apparent in the liberal tradition that Thai authorities are moti-
vated by domestic interests and therefore pay most of their attention to
the trade impact of EU enlargement on the performance of their busi-
nesses. Despite the argument of simplified market access, traders and
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investors from third countries face higher regulatory standards in the
ten new member states such as the protection of intellectual property
rights, government procurement regulations and the conduct of compe-
tition policy (European Commission 2004c). In the Wisaweisuan et al.
(2005) study, the implications of EU enlargement have been particularly
significant for certain industries including textiles and apparel, automo-
bile and parts, electric and electronic products and food, in which Thai
exporters probably have a comparative disadvantage against their coun-
terparts in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Trade statistics by
product type, in fact, reveal that the EU imported less agricultural pro-
ducts and textiles and clothing from Thailand both in real and relative
terms since this enlargement, that is, EU imports of Thai agricultural
products, decreased from E 1,990 million (15.5%) in 2001 to E 1,803
million (13.9%) in 2005 while its imports of Thai textiles and clothing
also decreased from E 1,362 million (10.4%) in 2001 to E 1,186 million
(9.2%) in 2005 (European Commission 2006f). The Thai government,
however, has actively engaged in pinning down cooperation projects in
the form of organized seminars and workshops, mostly with the EU it-
self, through the TREATI programs such as the seminar on food safety
rules in May 2004, the workshop on sanitary and phytosanitary issues
in the fisheries sector in June 2006 and the workshop on EU standards
and technical regulations in the electronic and electrical equipment sec-
tor, also in June 2006.
There is very little evidence to suggest that Thai foreign policy is in-
terested in forming a collective identity in relation to EU enlargement.
In a study conducted among Thailand’s business elite, it is noted that
the perception of their concerns is particularly traceable to the new
member states’ relatively low costs of labor and production and, in a
way, the prospects that they can become ‘substitute production bases’ at
the expense of Thailand (Holland et al. 2005: 12).116 In a sense, the dy-
namics of the EU single market not only generate an internal shift of
trade balance, as realists would argue, but also serve as an important
factor affecting changes in the EU’s roles in bilateral trade and invest-
ment relations with Thailand (ibid. 12, 13). Nevertheless, the constructi-
vist approach has been relatively promising in explaining mutual recog-
nition mechanisms and the pragmatic aspects of Thailand’s foreign pol-
icy toward the EU, as seen in the quick conclusion of the compensatory
adjustment agreement on cooked and salted poultry quotas.
IV.2.4.2 The Euro
The Thai government’s response to the introduction of the euro was in
line with the country’s traditional principle of preserving political – and,
in this case, financial – autonomy. From the realist point of view, the
euro has been closely watched in terms of an alternative currency that
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can pave the way for a balancing strategy toward the traditional use of
US dollar in the region. In statistics from 2004, the comparison be-
tween the euro and the dollar illustrates that the euro remains relatively
stable while, after the euro’s introduction, the US dollar underwent a
period of currency depreciation.117 The trend of dollar depreciation was
also observable against other major currencies such as the Swiss franc,
the British pound, the Japanese yen and the Canadian dollar: Between
early 2002 and late 2004, the dollar depreciated more than 30% versus
the euro, while in depreciation the last quarter of 2004, was approxi-
mately 6%.118 Statistically, from 2002 to mid-2003, the euro appreciated
against most currencies while the dollar continued to depreciate, which
means that the euro contributed significantly to the correction of a sin-
gle currency’s undervaluation otherwise, but since then, the euro has
not changed dramatically compared to other major currencies except
the dollar.119 For Thailand, the case of its own currency seems to be far
from pursuing a hard peg to any foreign currencies. However, Thailand
has been viewed for some time as maintaining, if any, a managed float
against the dollar rather than the euro, with the Thai baht appreciated
from 2002 to 2004 only 10% against the dollar but 38% against the
euro.120
The Thai government’s engagement, for liberals, primarily serves as
a response in support of the Thai business community – e.g. in terms
of providing exchange rate flexibility as well as drawing on the stability
of the euro compared with the dollar’s developments. Among the major
players, it is noted that the EU plays an important role in addressing
the issues of external imbalances as a result of the dollar’s deprecia-
tion.121 In the above-mentioned study by Martin et al. (2005: 14), the in-
terviews with members from the business elite demonstrated that the
future of the euro economy depends on its economic performance com-
pared to the US dollar.
Here again, there is no direct evidence to support the constructivist
argument of Thailand’s identity-building foreign policy, but it does
seem that the Thai government became more familiar with the EU’s in-
ternal mechanisms on financial management during the various dialo-
gues. For example, in a December 2004 meeting, the EU Finance Min-
isters, the President of the European Central Bank and the Commis-
sioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs discussed European
conditions for enhancing a stable path toward economic recovery and
growth as well as ways to guard against exchange rate volatility and clut-
tering.122 In an effort to reduce global imbalances, the meeting empha-
sized the adoption of suitable economic policies and a functioning mon-
itoring system, i.e., in a broader context, the so-called ‘Stability and
Growth Pact’ which, more specifically, is a rule-based fiscal framework,
which brings the national budgetary disciplines in line in order to en-
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hance monetary policy cooperation and monetary and price stability
within the EU, and the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, which is designed
to provide the standard fluctuation margins of approximately 15% be-
tween the euro central rates and the currencies of the participating non-
EU countries.123
IV.2.5 Developing Private Initiatives
In a theoretical debate, it seems that liberalism has gained a certain de-
gree of credibility in foreseeing the increased role of the private sector.
However, we can expect realists and constructivists to also make a sig-
nificant contribution to explaining the trade policies of both parties:
Realists may have difficulty transcending state-centric views, but they
undoubtedly provide useful insights on the strategic moves toward in-
fluence-seeking and voicing-opportunities-seeking bilateral trade poli-
cies. Constructivists seem relatively successful in applying ideational
factors to help understand the EU and Thai approaches regarding col-
lective identity formation or rhetorical action.
From a liberal perspective, it is evident that ‘networking’ has become
increasingly significant recently as a key concept in the promotion of
business-to-business links between the EU and Thailand. The engage-
ment of the European Commission and the Thai government is consid-
ered a way of encouraging the active participation of the private sector.
For instance, the ‘EU-Thailand Partenariat 2005’, which took place in
Bangkok in November 2005, was successfully organized and co-fi-
nanced by the European Commission and the Royal Thai Government
to bring together over 400 European and Thai SMEs and to provide
match-making opportunities for them.124 The most important areas of
interest for EU SMEs’ included electronics, ICT and software, fashion
and design, energy and alternative energy, and high value-added ser-
vices such as tourism, healthcare and spas, printing, research and devel-
opment, and environmental conservation.125 The Commission’s ‘Eur-
opeAid’ Cooperation Office launched a similar region-wide program
called ‘Asia Invest’ which provides a platform for face-to-face dialogues
between businesspeople in the private sectors in the EU and participat-
ing Asian countries and is supposed to lead to strong business links
and long-term economic cooperation.126 The EU-Thailand Partenariat is
mainly supported by the EU’s ‘Asia Invest II Programme’, which is de-
signed to pursue the objectives of (i) increasing economic cooperation
between Asia and the EU, (ii) encouraging investment flows and (iii)
fostering mutually beneficial trade relationships and investment be-
tween Thai and European companies.127
Another example can be found in the ‘Asia Invest Forum 2005’,
which was held in Bangkok a few days prior to the EU-Thailand Parte-
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nariat and was comprised of plenary sessions and workshops on achiev-
ing best practice in bilateral trade and investment facilitation (European
Commission 2006c). It managed to gather European and Asian busi-
ness organizations – such as the European and Asian chambers of com-
merce and business associations and intermediaries in industry, trade,
investment and finance – as well as the relevant local authorities, en-
abling the forum to stimulate the networking opportunities and discus-
sions about the future orientation of EU-Asian economic cooperation
and it is hoped that it will increase the active involvement of relevant
businesspeople and private actors (ibid.).
The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also proposed another initia-
tive to promote business impulses for future developments in EU-Thai-
land relations.128 During the 8th European Commission-Thailand Se-
nior Officials’ Meeting in Brussels in June 2002, Thailand presented a
proposal to launch the ‘Thailand-EU Business Forum’ with the hope of
providing a platform for dialogues between industries from both
sides.129 To this purpose, the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce,
Industry and Banking was assigned to prepare the forum’s formation,
and the Federation of Thai Industries acted as a project coordinator
among the European Chambers of Commerce (Joint Standing Commit-
tee on Commerce 2006). Four main functions were identified for the
Thailand-EU Business Forum: (i) to create a result-oriented forum, (ii)
to define policy and guidelines that can be supported on a board basis,
(iii) to assist in shaping a sound environment to facilitate trade and in-
vestment activities between Thailand and the EU, and (iv) to define
areas of cooperation such as technical assistance, capacity building in
the implementation of WTO commitments and in the adjustment to
EU standards.130 As things now stand, the Thailand-EU Business For-
um meets with the European Chambers of Commerce in Bangkok
every four months and is comprised of 12 members, that is, four repre-
sentatives from the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai
Industries and the Thai Bankers’ Association, whereby the Department
of European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Board of In-
vestment of Thailand, Ministry of Commerce, also participate in an ad-
visory capacity (ibid.).
Realists believe that the negotiations have led to the establishment of
an EU Chamber of Commerce, because the EU’s approach clearly has
an influence-seeking goal to strengthen the positions of itself versus its
main competitors in Thailand. Thus far, the EU has made serious ef-
forts to establish the EU Chamber of Commerce because, as things
stand, in contrast to other ASEAN+3 countries, Thailand is currently
the only one with laws that continue to hinder the establishment of the
EU Chamber of Commerce.131 That is, four main legal restrictions un-
der Thailand’s existing laws have hampered the formal establishment
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of a European Chamber of Commerce: First, the location of any Cham-
bers of Commerce is restricted to the Bangkok area; second, it is not
possible for a Chamber of Commerce to accept members outside the
Bangkok area; third, there are restrictions on the occupations of Cham-
ber members; and fourth and most importantly, the Chamber of Com-
merce Act literally gives the rights to a nation to set up only one Cham-
ber of Commerce that is associated to its own nationality.132 On this last
point, the EU and individual member states appear to demonstrate a
difficult case, so that the EU, as an influence-seeking organization, has
sought high-level negotiations on the legal revisions with the relevant
authorities. The Ministry of Commerce has responded by assigning the
Department of Business Development the responsibility for making the
revisions to the Chamber of Commerce Act and setting up a committee
that works toward that purpose along with the Thai Chamber of Com-
merce, which takes part in this process on behalf of Thai industry.133 As
things stood in mid-2006, Thai authorities were able to ease the first
three restrictions, while the amendment on the last and most important
point remains unresolved.134
Arguably, here again, the liberal view points out that the establish-
ment of a European Chamber of Commerce can be considered the re-
sult of EU engagement that primarily benefits businesspeople. Since
the EU and Thai business communities have continued to grow in size
and diversity, it is very important to set up a European Chamber of
Commerce, which would perform the function of a collective referential
and advisory body in order to deliver ‘unbiased’ perceptions of and re-
sponses to EU-related issues.135 More specifically, with reference to its
economic and political integration dynamics, the EU, given the diverse
interest structures of the member states, also repeatedly emphasizes
the argument of enhanced EU-level coordination in dealing with issues
that go beyond the competence of the member states’ Chambers of
Commerce.136 In practice, the European industry has shown an interest
in actively participating in the consultations with Thai authorities dur-
ing the process of revising the laws.137 Furthermore, on the Thai side,
the prospects of an EU Chamber of Commerce is also dependent on
the Thai government’s engagement politics, which are influenced
mainly by business interests. While Thailand’s FTA policy has been
open to ad hoc initiatives and the policymakers are likely to respond to
the interests of businesspeople rather than long-term national strategies
(Sally 2004), a European Chamber of Commerce can be regarded as a
key platform for the prospective FTA negotiations insofar as the private
sectors on both sides play a crucial role in providing the perspectives of
commerce and industry and are thus represented in an equal man-
ner.138
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The constructivist explanation seems to be helpful with regard to the
promotion of certain ideas and norms through private sector dialogues.
Between the EU and Thailand, matchmaking events such as the EU-
Thailand Partenariat may help enhance mutual understanding and raise
one party’s profile in the perception of the other. At the same time, both
the EU and Thailand hoped to identify best practices in their bilateral
trade and investment relationships. As far as the establishment of the
EU Chamber of Commerce is concerned, constructivists prefer to argue
that its existence connotes a strategic behavior of state less than a sym-
bolic act of building collective identity and representation on the EU’s
side. Moreover, the aim of embedding EU-level industry representation
seems to be particularly relevant to the EU’s single position because, of
the EU-25 member states, it is remarkable that 14 currently do not have
a Chamber of Commerce on their own while the other 11 do in a variety
of forms and capacities.139 However, it is worth noting that, although in-
vestment policy seem to play an increasing role in bilateral relations,
the areas of trade and investment promotion remain in the hands of
the member states because of the question of competence.140 Further-
more, there is still a great variety of business interest schemes among
the member states themselves, insofar as the investments from the UK,
the Netherlands and France have mostly focused on electrical and elec-
tronic products while those from Germany and Italy prefer metal pro-
ducts and machinery (Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land and Board of Investment of Thailand 2004: 39).
IV.2.6 Future of FTA Strategies
The main questions involve how each theoretical school can adequately
explain the underlying dynamics of the EU’s and Thailand’s FTA policy
and whether an EU-Thailand FTA will ever become a reality. The EU
also has a long tradition that includes a customs union and free trade
area initiatives, which can be traced to the formation of the EU itself. In
its early stages, the EC’s two important objectives for establishing RTAs
used to include (a) preparation for EU membership as in a series of Eur-
ope agreements, and (b) development purposes as in the Lomé-Cotonou
agreements with the ACP countries and subsequent economic partner-
ship agreements (EPAs).141 In the 1990s, the EU began to pursue three
other objectives: (c) political developments as in the Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreements with the Western Balkans region, (d) security and
trade as in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements including
the MEDA bilateral funds, and (e) market opening and securing trade as
in a number of trade agreements with Mexico, Chile, South Africa,
GCC, or Mercosur.142 In contrast, the Thai government views bilateral-
ism and bilateral FTAs in particular as a new policy tool to broaden its
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network of economic partnerships (see also Dent 2006: 120-121).
Although Thailand used to give priority to the GATT and WTO negotia-
tions throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Thai government
became increasingly interested in exploring the practice of economic bi-
lateralism (ibid.). Still, it was not until the late 1990s that a significant
change in its trade policies occurred, as in its proposal for an FTA pro-
ject between Thailand and the Czech Republic in 1994 and 1995, and
discussions about another project between Thailand and Israel in De-
cember 1996 (ibid. 121; see also Nagai 2003). Later, the initiation of a
series of bilateral FTA negotiations of former Prime Minister Thaksin’s
administration was one of its major foreign policy achievements (Na
Thalang 2004).
From a theoretical perspective, realists would argue that the EU and
Thailand have been sensitive to the new constellation of international
trade relations and, although they are both committed to the Doha De-
velopment Agenda, it becomes increasingly apparent that the two par-
ties are aware of and seek to explore the possibilities of influence-seek-
ing or voicing-opportunities-seeking through their bilateral channels.
In the EU’s case, the first responses to the new trends were rather re-
served because the stakes at the WTO were undoubtedly high, which
colored the EU’s commitment to the multilateral institutions, making it
reluctant to negotiate new bilateral FTA deals. However, after the disap-
pointing results in Hong Kong, it is clear that the EU became particu-
larly aware of the challenges emerging from a new wave of bilateral
FTAs and an overall ever more competitive world. In a speech in Berlin
on September 18, 2006, Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, em-
phasized the need for the EU to ‘go beyond the EU’s existing bilateral
free trade agreements, by establishing a case for new free trade agree-
ments designed to deliver more open markets and fairer trade condi-
tions in new areas of growth, particularly in Asia.’143 A Member of Eur-
opean Parliament, Sajjad H. Karim, sharply criticized the EU’s reluc-
tance to reconsider its bilateral approaches and pointed out that it was
an opportunity to generate a balance against the US and other major
players otherwise:
Meanwhile, US President George W. Bush has joined the pil-
grimage to the ‘new India’, walking into the warm embrace of a
pro-Washington administration and brokering a quite frankly
worrying nuclear deal. Moreover, with the suspension of the
Doha round, the EU has stood by and watched whilst other re-
gional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, have moved quickly to get their houses in order and
court the likes of India and China, in case there is a real need
for a ‘plan B’.144
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The balance-of-power logic motivated strategic policy shifts toward new
bilateral economic relations and in principle may also be used in the
EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations. The partnership with Thailand will play
an important role, in this regard, by providing the EU with access to
Southeast Asia and consequently an approach to maintaining the global
reach and improving its market shares in the region. Furthermore, rea-
lists believe that the EU will assert its economic influence on its part-
ners to achieve specific self-interested goals, which strategically includes
certain issues essential to the bilateral FTA negotiations. For instance,
since the EU proposes that any progress in agriculture needs to be ac-
companied by progress in other, non-agricultural areas such as services
and the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations145 issues
including tariff reduction formulas, sectoral tariffs, non-tariff barriers
and environmental goods, thus making it very likely that these issues
will be brought up for discussion during the EU’s FTA talks (see also
WTO 2007). However, it is still too early to gauge what the results of
the FTA will be since both sides have been very careful in submitting
details of the various FTA components.
In the Thai case, the realist interpretation must be understood in the
context of Thailand’s diplomacy, which is noteworthy because of two
important characteristics: (i) the flexibility of ‘bending with the wind’
and (ii) the fundamental ‘patron-client’ relationship (Cheow 1986: 747;
Rüland 2001a: 1026). The first one reveals a pragmatic policy orienta-
tion – e.g., the politics of equidistance – based on the country’s sensitiv-
ity to any change in regional power relations (Rüland 2001a: 1026). The
second allows Thailand to seek a strategic partnership with the world’s
dominant powers in order to guarantee its own security as well as
maintain the overall balance of power in Thailand and the Southeast
Asian region (ibid.). While over the last few decades the country’s out-
ward-looking economic policies have played an important role in disse-
minating its growth strategy and export-oriented development paths,
the threatened breakdown of the WTO negotiations and China’s acces-
sion to the WTO precipitated a change in Thailand’s FTA policy (Chir-
athivat and Mallikamas 2004). The selection of Thailand’s FTA partners
explains the administration’s attempts in this regard, to build strategic
relationships with the core members of other regional organizations, e.
g., Brazil, India, South Africa, Czech Republic, Bahrain and the US
who are the core members of the Mercosur, the South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Co-operation, the South Africa Development Commu-
nity, Central European Free Trade Agreement, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, the NAFTA, respectively – the patterns that support the realist
argument of influence-seeking FTA strategy as a way to enhance closer
economic links and strong political leadership (ibid.; Dent 2006: 121).
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As far as voicing-opportunity foreign policy is concerned, it is possi-
ble that the Thai administration may seek a bilateral FTA with the EU
to strengthen its own positions in some other regional or international
initiatives. For example, between the EU and ASEAN there exists a vari-
ety of region-to-region frameworks such as the so-called ‘Trans-Regional
EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative’ (TREATI), which focus on dialogues and
regulatory cooperation projects in areas such as sanitary and phyto-
sanitary standards in agro-food and fisheries products, industrial pro-
duct standards and technical barriers to trade in the electronics sector,
forestry and wood-based products, trade facilitation and cooperation on
investment (European Commission 2007f; see also EU-ASEAN TREATI
Regional Workshops on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Issues in Fisheries
Products 2006). The Thai government is expected to have an incentive
to focus on some of these particular areas of interest. In practice, it has
benefited from some cooperation projects between the European Com-
mission and the ASEAN such as ‘ASEAN-EC Intellectual Property
Rights Co-operation Programme’, ‘EC-ASEAN Standards, Quality, and
Conformity Assessment Co-operation Programme’, and ‘EC-ASEAN Co-
gen Programme’ (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2007g).
From a liberal perspective, the FTA strategy can largely be explained
by the EU’s and the Thai government’s engagement that is mainly dri-
ven by converging interests of relevant players on both sides. While the
EU’s economic development can obviously be attributed not only to the
growth of domestic demand but also, more significantly, to the contin-
ued growth of European exports, the EU’s bilateral FTA negotiations
can be seen as an engagement to support external trade relations with
particular countries.146 In its communiqué ‘A New Partnership with
South East Asia’, the European Commission (2003c) considers one of
the criteria for the EU-ASEAN FTA to be the underlying mutual eco-
nomic interest between the two business communities.147 It is hardly
surprising that through bilateral dialogues, the EU has occasionally at-
tempted to resolve several issues on trade barriers and regulatory differ-
ences facing European companies, in order to promote their business
performance record in foreign markets, as mentioned above. Later, as
the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations began to slow down, the EU made its
intention clear that it was going to engage a bilateral channel in the in-
terest of EU business communities, as proposed by the European Com-
misssion’s Director-General of Trade, Phillipe Meyer: ‘We want to go
ahead rapidly with the individual talks, in particular with Thailand, as
we see many limitations in region-to-region FTA negotiations. To talk
with the whole of ASEAN for 10 years is too long. We need to ensure
facilitation for our business sectors and consumers’ (cited in Pra-
truangkrai 2009a).
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Similarly, on the Thai side, while it is clear that FTA initiatives can be
seen as the government’s engagement policies to raise the country’s
business benefits from broader inter-regional and global trade networks,
an agreement with the EU can significantly contribute to providing
greater market access for its exports aboard and for meeting the de-
mands for imports of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods in
local settings (see also Chirathivat and Mallikamas 2004). For example,
because of the slow progress made in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations,
Thailand’s leading exporter of seafood and canned products, Thai
Union Frozen Products, has urged the Thai government to engage in
bilateral FTA negotiations with the EU in order to boost the competi-
tiveness of Thai exporters (Pratruangkrai 2009b).148 Also in the Doha
Round, Thailand’s main interest in new bilateral FTAs is likely to re-
main in the market access negotiations to improve access to the mar-
kets of developed countries in particular. With respect to anti-dumping
measures, for instance, it is clear that the Thai administration has an
interest in tightening the rules on anti-dumping investigations and
measures because of several bilateral concerns in fisheries products,
which face high subsidies from the EU, Japan and Korea (Sally 2004).
Like realists, the liberals also expect a bilateral FTA to contain certain
WTO-plus elements that go beyond the current WTO obligations. Both
schools do not reject the possibility that besides the simple removal of
tariffs new bilateral FTAs may also include common disciplines for a
broad range of regulatory areas such as customs procedures, standards,
sanitary questions, competition, services, or government procurement.
But while the realists stress the voicing-opportunities-seeking strategy
and the strategic moves of a state’s bilateralism, the liberal theorists
would consider this widening scope a response to the utility-maximizing
problems of all of the state and non-state players involved. Here a bilat-
eral FTA would serve public responses to achieve a deeper integration in
terms of further liberalization in goods and services and regulatory har-
monization. Interestingly, the question has been raised on the EU’s re-
served attitudes toward new bilateralism as the EU itself is obviously
aware of the advantages of being the initiator and, in other words, the
disadvantages of being a late comer. It should be noted that the European
Commission formally needs the negotiating mandate from the European
Parliament and the Council. Moreover, the Commission’s reluctance to
negotiate new bilateral FTAs can also be explained with the argument
that available resources be allocated among the priority areas of multilat-
eral negotiations, specifically the Doha Development Round.149
The prospects of building a collective identity as postulated by con-
structivists are rather unclear and thus less predictable. In their view, a
bilateral FTA, while integrating two markets, may give rise to increased
interaction and thereby collective identity formation in socioeconomic
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and sociological terms. The EU and Thailand also hope to build up trust
as well as promote certain values and mutual understanding between
their respective business communities. It is very important that in its
communiqué ‘New Partnership with South East Asia’, the European
Commission (2003c: 3) explicitly states:
New bilateral agreements with countries of the region should all
contain the ‘essential element’ clause regarding human rights,
while the EU and particular countries in the region may decide
to launch Human Rights-specific bilateral dialogues.
Of the two the EU seems to pursue a trade policy of more value-based
orientation, which can be seen in the EU’s GSP special incentive ar-
rangements that are supposed to create market incentives for third
countries to enhance ecological values and promote the protection of
human rights. It is possible that similar conditional proposals may be
discussed in the expected FTA negotiations. In practice, the EU has
granted additional tariff preferences for the imports of certain products
under the general arrangements or temporarily postponed the GSP gra-
duation of a particular sector to the benefit of the countries that incor-
porate the International Labour Organisation’s eight core labor stan-
dards and those that conform to sustainable forest management in gen-
eral and the standards of the International Tropical Timber Convention,
respectively (European Commission 2003b).150
As things stand, an EU-Thailand FTA is rather unlikely in its present
form but not impossible as a bilateral complement to the EU-ASEAN
FTA.151 Reportedly, the EU does not regard bilateral and multilateral
FTAs as competitive but rather as a complementary means for reaching
more ambitious goals. The former are aimed at adding value to the lat-
ter, specifically the WTO negotiations, thus there is a multilateral frame-
work with a supplement of bilateral negotiations in a way that a bilateral
EU-Thailand agreement may be accommodated within the broader EU-
ASEAN framework. Indeed, the ASEAN countries are encouraged to
support multilateral discipline in various issues such as agricultural
subsidies and to consider extending the scope of FTA components, e.g.,
in trade facilitation, customs regulation, technical barriers to trade, gov-
ernment procurement, or sanitary and phytosanitary measures.152
Consequently, in April 2005, the EU Trade Commissioner and the
ASEAN Economic Ministers agreed to launch a so-called ‘Vision Group
on ASEAN-EU Economic Partnership’ in order to specifically explore
the feasibility of an ASEAN-EU FTA. After five meetings of its mandate,
the Vision Group submitted a final report in May 2006 and, in princi-
ple, gave three recommendations: (i) that ‘the agreement should be
comprehensive, balanced, and consistent with the WTO rules and obli-
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gations’, (ii) that ‘special and differential treatment for less developed
ASEAN countries should be accorded, and differentiated timeframes
for implementation of the agreement should be adopted’, and (iii) that
‘the agreement should constitute a single undertaking, implemented by
the parties as an indivisible whole’ (ASEAN-EU Vision Group 2006).
The European Commission (2006g) in general welcomed the report
and its proposal of a broad-based, group-to-group approach. The Coun-
cil (2007) adopted the conclusion on the recommendations to open the
FTA negotiations with the ASEAN countries in April 2007, and later,
the EU-ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Consultations held in Brunei Dar-
ussalam in May 2007 announced the intention to launch the EU-
ASEAN FTA negotiations. To date, a series of rounds of negotiations
have already taken place since July 2007, but there has not been much
progress due mainly to different levels of development, capacity and in-
terest among the individual ASEAN members (Pratruangkrai 2009a;
2009b).
Thailand’s responses to bilateral FTAs used to be relatively positive,
in particular during former Prime Minister Thaksin’s administration.
However, it should be noted that some criticism was voiced after the
conclusion of the Thailand-Australia FTA in 2004 and particularly dur-
ing the negotiations of the Thailand-US FTA since mid-2004. Evidence
suggests that the Thai administration has become more careful about
further moves to initiate a bilateral FTA with any major economic
powers including the EU. Against this background, it is expected that
the government would prefer FTA talks on a region-to-region basis, i.e.,
preferably in the EU-ASEAN framework, and that Thailand’s bilateral
FTAs in the future will probably not take the form of the Thailand-Aus-
tralia FTA or the US-Singapore FTA because of Thailand’s defensive at-
titudes toward liberalization in the services sector as well as domestic
regulatory reforms (see also Sally 2004).153 As of September 2006,
since Surayud’s administration decided to stop all on-going negotiations
as well as all of the negotiated but still unsigned deals. According to the
Foreign Minister and the former chief negotiator for the Thailand-US
FTA, Nitya Piboonsongkram, any progress in FTA talks will be put on
hold until after the country’s next election (Wong-Anan 2006). Accord-
ing to Director-General of the Trade Negotiations Department, Nunta-
wan Sakuntanaga, Thailand’s policy to pursue bilateral trade talks re-
mains rather unclear, however, so that the responsible authority has to
wait for the government’s mandate regarding further negotiations
(Pratkrungkrai 2009b).
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IV.3 EU-Thailand Development Cooperation
The EU-Thailand development cooperation is changing – and, in many
ways, has already changed – from a donor-recipient relationship to that
of an economic cooperation and a partnership between donors. The
first subsection in this section gives a theoretical explanation to the dis-
appearance of their traditional development projects in order to set the
background of development cooperation of this bilateralism and estab-
lish the new trends for the later analysis. The second subsection turns
to consider the new roles of the Thai government as an emerging do-
nor, following former Prime Minister Thaksin’s official statement in
December 2003. As an example, the third subsection focuses on new
cooperation schemes in higher education to underscore the thesis of
post-development cooperation.
IV.3.1 The Fading of Traditional Development Projects
The aim of this subsection is to deliver a theoretical foreign policy ex-
planation of why conventional development projects faded away. The
EU bilateral cooperation relationship with Thailand has undergone sig-
nificant changes, so that the form it has today is very different from the
one it had in the early days in the 1970s. This was at a time when Thai-
land and the European counterpart – then European Economic Commi-
nity – were just beginning their first cooperation projects, in which the
latter mainly provided assistance to the latter in crop diversification and
boosting farmers’ income (Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand 2007a, 2007b). Later, since Thailand began to experience sig-
nificant economic growth in the 1980s, the EU has increasingly modi-
fied its bilateral cooperation programs in order to support the country’s
economic and social developments (ibid.). Development cooperation as
strictly defined in the most conventional terms was thought to be ‘out-
dated’ by the late 1990s, so that today’s main areas of cooperation in-
stead include (i) a knowledge society, (ii) health, (iii) environment, (iv)
economic cooperation, and (iv) social support and refugees.154
From a realist perspective, the change in EU-Thailand development
relations is expected to be the basis of the influence-seeking foreign
policy behavior of the two parties involved. Empirically, there is not
much evidence to suggest the power-based balancing motivations in
this area of bilateral cooperation, however. It was once noted in an inter-
view that the EU was working toward balancing its visibility against
other major players in third countries.155 In some partner countries
such as Cambodia and Vietnam, there is a so-called pledging session in
which the donors come together and publicly announce their total de-
velopment finances for the next budget year – not surprisingly, this
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event is very interesting for the partner government.156 To make a long
story short, now that the procedures have been changed to allow the
European Commission to submit a ‘joint pledge’ on behalf of the mem-
ber states, the EU has become the largest donor and suddenly receives
more coverage in the media.157 Although this case does not apply di-
rectly to Thailand, it could illustrate the interests of the EU in seeking
influence and balancing its positions among other major powers
through its new accents on development cooperation projects. However,
the extent to which the EU’s visibility may be interpreted in terms of
power incentives and power-based politics is very questionable, and
much less – if applicable – is the question how the increased visibility
can prompt it to assert more influence toward a third country.
Considering Thailand’s approaches toward the EU’s development
policy, there is some evidence to suggest that the government is seeking
to ‘voice opportunities’ for new initiatives through this bilateral channel
at other regional and multilateral levels. For example, as things now
stand, EU-Thailand cooperation in science and technology is not only
bilateral in form but can also benefit from the EU’s interregional initia-
tives with ASEAN, ASEM, or Asia as a whole. In practice, it is possible
that the Thai government is strategically placing an emphasis on parti-
cular areas of interest and that its dialogues with the EU can be instru-
mentalized in identifying and promoting certain cooperation programs
within those regional initiatives. In fact, it is clear that Thailand has
benefited from a wide range of EU-ASEAN cooperation projects such as
‘EU-ASEAN COGEN Programme’, ‘EU-ASEAN Standards, Quality and
Conformity Assessment Cooperation Programme’, and ‘EU-ASEAN En-
ergy Facility’ as well as the Asia-wide cooperation projects such as ‘Post-
graduate Technological Studies Programme’, ‘Asia Information and
Communication Technology Programme’, and ‘Asia Pro Eco Pro-
gramme’ (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2007m,
2007n).
From a liberal perspective, the programmatic departure from the
1970s EU-Thailand development projects can be explained in terms of
converging interests of actors on both sides that rationally lead to the
corresponding engagement of the EU and the Thai government in the
reinforcement of a cooperation partnership. In a way, their domestic in-
terest patterns play an important role in the foreign policy-making pro-
cesses and in the arrangements of particular decisions on cooperation
programs. For example, the EU has proposed the ‘Framework Pro-
grammes for Research, Technical Development and Demonstration’, of
which – the 6th and 7th Framework Programmes in particular, demon-
strate the EU’s efforts to allocate a considerable amount of publicly
funded resources to boost research and development cooperation be-
tween partners among the member states as well as the third countries
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(European Union 2007a; European Commission 2002; Community Re-
search and Development Information Service 2006; Euroactiv 2004).158
At this point, it is clear that the EU’s interests in promoting a coopera-
tion framework in science and technology as well as a new conception
of entrepreneurship and innovation policies in principle coincide with
those of Thailand. The Thai government has shown strong interests
specifically in the area of information technology – as evidenced by the
Thai National Science and Technology Development’s participation in
the 6th Framework Programme’s call for proposals process for several
projects such as training programs in disaster management, informa-
tion technology for disabled computer users, or e-safety in road trans-
port (Mission of Thailand to the European Communities 2005). As sta-
ted by the Royal Thai Embassy and the Mission of Thailand to Eur-
opean Communities in Brussels as well as the Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand in Bangkok, Thailand should also
be able to benefit from further cooperation opportunities in other areas
such as nanotechnologies, material sciences or renewable energy (ibid.;
Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2007f).159 The ex-
tent to which Thailand manages to make use of the 7th Framework Pro-
gramme launched in January 2007 remains to be seen in the next few
years, however.
In this light, demand-driven patterns may also explain the changes in
recent cooperation projects. Bilaterally, the European Commission has,
for example, launched a project titled ‘EU-Thailand Economic Co-opera-
tion Small Projects Facility (SPF)’ for the implementing period of Octo-
ber 2004 to December 2007. This SPF project encourages individual
institutions – such as NGOs, local authorities, business associations,
universities and think tanks – to apply for EU funds for the projects
that are small and of limited duration yet strategic, innovative and
highly tangible (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2007c, 2007d). As stated in the National Indicative Programme 2002-
2004 (European Commission 2004a), this is designed to be a demand-
driven process insofar as the Thai grantees have to go through a ‘call
for proposals’ mechanism. In practice, the SPF projects have been man-
aged by the Delegation of the European Commission in Bangkok,
which has given rise to about 13 projects per year (European Commis-
sion 2004a). There are six main areas, on which the SPF proposals are
expected to focus: (i) support to the Thai administration and companies
to adapt to the EU legislation underlying bilateral trade and investment,
(ii) implementation of the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration’s com-
mitments, (iii) other relevant issues in the EU trade policy for the Thai
audience, (iv) support for mutual market access and facilitation of Thai-
land’s investment environment; (v) vocational training to improve in-
dustrial outputs’ quality; and (vi) promotion between the EU and Thai
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R&D organizations within the former’s Framework Programme (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand 2007d; European
Commission 2004a: 4).
Not surprisingly, a general trend reveals that new cooperation pro-
grams such as those in science and technology have been oriented to
address trade-related issues. In liberal terms, this is not only because of
the business interests on both sides but in part because the current
trade relations appear to raise some crosscutting concerns in relation to
other policy fields. The food safety discussions, for example, illustrate
the links between trade and economic cooperation leading to a series of
supportive cooperation programs. With the outbreak of Avian Influenza,
it was no coincidence that Commissioner for Health and Consumer
Protection, Markos Kyprianou, visited Thailand in November 2005 with
an agenda to discuss the implications of, and preparations for Avian In-
fluenza and relevant flu pandemics. The converging interests between
the EU and the Thai government are evident in the latter’s attempts to
maintain bilateral trade in poultry products and the former’s efforts to
serve the domestic interests in terms of consumer protection and mar-
ket stability. As a consequence, the EU affirmed to suspend only tem-
porarily uncooked poultry imports but would continue to allow cooked
products (see above). In addition, the EU explicitly invited the Thai side
to consider bilateral collaboration in the areas of general hygiene, food
and feed control, for which the European Commission later managed
to organize a new training facility under the regulation on food and
feed controls (Regulation no. 882 and 2004).
In addition, given a number of new EU regulations and directives
such as regulations on traceability, residues in food products, and ani-
mal drugs, the Integrated Product Policy, the Registration Evaluation
and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH), or the directives of Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and Restriction of the use
of certain Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment
(RoHS), liberals would expect Thailand’s response to be driven by the
interests of the Thai importers who will be – both directly and indirectly
– affected in a way to comply with those measures at some point (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand 2007e).160 The Inte-
grated Product Policy (IPP) is a good example of this. The IPP is aimed
at reducing the products’ environmental impact throughout their life cy-
cle, that is, from cradle to grave (European Commission 2007a; Office
of Commercial Affairs 2007b). In several on-going pilot projects, the
European Commission is now in the process of identifying product
groups with the greatest environmental impact and those that show en-
vironmental improvement as well as evaluating certain policy instru-
ments for effective IPP implementation (ibid.).161 As things now stand,
although the EU currently encourages its member states to follow the
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IPP’s main ideas and technical procedures on a voluntary basis only, it
plans to implement this IPP through specific policies such as greening
public procurement, product labeling, eco-design, the environment
management system or legislations on waste and chemicals (ibid.).
Although the EU is very unlikely to require the same from third-country
importers, it can only hope that price mechanisms and the associated
psychological effects among consumers can create an incentive for
those importers to introduce environmentally friendly products that cor-
respond to the production standards of, and – if applicable – maintain
their competitiveness on the EU market (ibid.).162
Moreover, it is clear that non-state actors, particularly NGOs, play an
increasingly important role in the EU-Thailand cooperation projects.
The trends seem to go beyond the realist notion of state-centric political
activities, so that a series of initiatives funded by the European Com-
mission are designed and implemented in close cooperation with var-
ious private actors and institutions. These trends of EU engagement
can be observed especially in the areas of civil society, forestry, environ-
ment and human rights (see also Delegation of the European Commis-
sion to Thailand 2007a). As we have already mentioned in the above
section, the EU’s humanitarian aid projects along the Thai-Burmese
borders essentially rely on the local work of NGOs such as Médecins
Sans Frontiers, Malteser Hilfsdienst, Action Nord Sud and Thailand
Burma Border Consortium. More specifically, the participation of both
international and local NGOs is important for the work at the grassroots
level such as in the providing of sanitation, basic foodstuffs, cooking
fuel and medical services to displaced people from Burma (ibid.).
This organizing scheme that shifts away from the realist state-centric
style of cooperation projects is also illustrated by the EU’s attempts to
inject new inputs of different experience and skills through the partici-
pation of local communities, NGOs, academic institutions or business
associations. Another example can be found in the ‘Asia Urbs’ program
which, launched in 1998, has been funded by the EU to strengthen co-
operation between local authorities of its member states and 15 Asian
countries (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2007i).163 This program will include either two-year development pro-
jects or six-month studies that focus on improving living and environ-
mental conditions in urban areas (ibid.). In the case of Thailand, Lam-
phun Municipality in the North of Thailand was selected for this pro-
gram in 2004 in partnership with two European municipalities: Sorgue
in France and Wettenburg in Germany (EU Today, no. 26, March
2006). Not only does the local authority benefit from the EU’s financial
support, it is very crucial that it also includes the exchange of technol-
ogy, know-how and management skills, for example, in composting
household organic waste, raising awareness of waste separation, build-
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ing garbage banks in schools and a wastewater treatment plant along
the Kuang River (ibid.). The cooperation between the three municipali-
ties fits under the framework of the ‘Integrated Urban Environment
Plan’, which is aimed at contributing to several issues of environmental
conservation, rehabilitation and management (ibid.).
Another example is the EU’s funding of a two-year ‘Electricity Net-
work Upgrading Programme’ (ENUP) for the purpose of providing its
cooperation partners with technology in electricity distribution. A tangi-
ble result of this program for Thailand is the installation of a ‘Distribu-
tion Dispatching Centre’ in Phuket, which is supported by Siemens
AG’s electrical technology. In a speech held at an asset hand-over cere-
mony in December 2005, HE Friedrich Hamburger, the Ambassador
and Head of the Delegation, stressed the possibilities that this project
could promote European technology to a third country’s benefit and
that it could help strengthen EU-Thailand business cooperation (EU To-
day, no. 26, March 2006, 13).
The constructivist explanation seems to complement the realist and
liberal ones regarding the roles of ideas and values. For constructivists
the change in development policy conduct seems inherent to the pro-
cess of building a collective identity, which represents a dynamic and
endogenous process in itself. Between Thailand and the EU, coopera-
tion projects in the area of ‘uprooted people and social support’ demon-
strate that Thailand’s assistance has increasingly been discussed in the
political context of international values and norms. Similarly, ‘health’
undoubtedly has become one of the key areas in the cooperation pro-
grams, so that the traditional conduct of health and humanitarian aid
projects has been extended to displaced people along the Thai-Burmese
borders and thus begins to touch upon some of the elements of human
rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.164 Another example can be
found in the area of environmental cooperation, which has placed an
emphasis on the essential dynamics of mutual understanding and rais-
ing awareness in the promotion of a sustainable environment. In a bi-
lateral channel between the EU and Thailand, it is clear that pragmati-
cally environmental cooperation goes beyond traditional development
projects so that environmental issues begin to be integrated into almost
every priority area of the new development programs including trade-
related development, regional integration and cooperation, social sector
programs, transport, rural development, food security, institutional ca-
pacity building, and good governance (European Commission 2001a:
22).
Along this line, constructivists would also be able to explain the fad-
ing of traditional cooperation projects by pointing to the creation of mu-
tual knowledge and the so-called ‘joint visibility’ between the EU and
Thailand. In the EU’s responses to the tsunami, for example, the estab-
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lishment of the Andaman Forum has been widely praised for the EU’s
efforts in the coordination of tsunami-related development projects as a
part of the EU’s ‘Coastal Habitats and Resources Management’
(CHARM) project in Thailand (United Nations Team in Thailand
2006).165 In February 2005, the European Commission organized a
workshop in Phuket that brought together most of the donors, NGOs,
the affected fishing communities, and local authorities in order to con-
duct a needs assessment and discuss the details of the Andaman Forum
(European Commission 2007k). Not only does this new forum help the
member states to identify and follow up on the impacts of their projects
on the tsunami-affected communities, it may also play a key role in pro-
moting the EU’s visibility in Thailand and, to a certain extent, in sup-
porting the mutual understanding between them.
IV.3.2 Thailand’s New Roles in Trilateral Cooperation
In December 2003, former Prime Minister Thaksin publicly declared
Thailand a developed country and refused any further foreign assis-
tance. In the speech, he openly instructed senior officials in the relevant
departments to assume a ‘no more begging bowl’ position, which made
it clear that Thailand no longer saw itself as needing development assis-
tance – especially financial assistance – from aboard (Bangkok Post, 1/
12/2003). His statements, which immediately became a point of discus-
sion for both Thai and foreign audiences, appeared to be unclear re-
garding, first, the on-going projects which had been agreed upon prior
to his speech and, second, his ideas on Thailand’s new roles and the
way in which it was to resume future cooperation with foreign partners
(ibid.). For better or worse, though, there was no doubt that the situa-
tion was about to change significantly. The fact that Thailand is no long-
er qualified for the ‘recipient’ status according to the Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) criteria was taken by the then Prime Minister
as an argument of Thailand having reached a status of developed coun-
try and so a donor in development cooperation.166 As one of the newly
emerging donor countries along with Singapore, Taiwan and some Gulf
states, Thailand began to gain the EU’s attention and new prospects for
development cooperation between the EU and Thailand were discussed
under such keywords as ‘co-donor scheme’ and ‘trilateral cooperation’
in particular.167 More specifically, the European Commission (2003c)
has proposed this modality of external assistance in its communiqué ‘A
New Partnership with South East Asia’ as follows:
… we should introduce new forms of cooperation allowing the
EC and Member States willing to participate in joining efforts
with more developed countries of South-East Asia to assist
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poorer ones. This could be achieved, for instance, through paral-
lel financing of jointly defined modular programmes. The Com-
mission will propose involving the richer ASEAN countries at
the strategic programming stage of our cooperation and sign
Memoranda of Understanding with those prepared to engage in
so-called ‘trilateral cooperation’ (20-21).
Between the EU and Thailand, the idea of trilateral cooperation in prac-
tice is widely discussed but has yet to become a reality. In the Southeast
Asian region, the first European Commission trilateral cooperation pro-
ject with an ASEAN country was the joint training program on ‘Credit
Skills in Retail Banking’ in Vientiane with the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of Singapore (Delegation of the European Commission to Singa-
pore 2007). As the experience of the EU-Singapore cooperation in Laos
has shown, it remains difficult to find an area of mutual interest and to
lay down implementation modalities of possible trilateral cooperation
activities given their specific financial and procedural regulations.168
For Thailand, the discussions focus on the choice of recipient countries
as well as the procedural context of trilateral cooperation because while
the Thai government may be interested in the EU’s contribution to the
existing regional projects such as ‘Ayeyawady, Chao Phraya, Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy’ (ACMECS), the European Commission
is interested in setting up trilateral cooperation initiatives with Thailand
specifically in Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.169
From a realist viewpoint, the conduct of trilateral cooperation could
have significant political implications for strategic foreign policy deci-
sions as well as for the regional and subregional socio-political develop-
ments. In the case of Thailand, after its rapid growth and impressive
economic performance, both parties seem to agree that the Thai govern-
ment should be able to initiate development strategies toward other de-
veloping countries and assume a regional role step-by-step to bridge the
development gaps among the Southeast Asian countries. However,
there is little evidence to suggest that the influence-seeking foreign pol-
icy behavior of one party has an effect on the other party’s conduct in
development policy and projects. Although the Thai government has
sought to encourage the EU to participate in the subregional initiative
of ACMECS, this first step of project identification does not demon-
strate any clear power-based interests in the country’s development stra-
tegies. Moreover, the EU’s procedures of ‘open tendering’ does not al-
low the European Commission to buy services from its co-donor by
pooling – or else using its own – financial resources in any trilateral
technical assistance initiatives.170 As a consequence, the opportunistic
policy of government procurement is less likely to occur here because
the two parties are expected to consider ‘parallel co-financing’ as a way
152 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
to identify and individually finance particular agreed-upon components
of the cooperation projects.171 Besides, it is always noted by the Eur-
opean Commission that trilateral cooperation is not an objective in itself
but a means toward cooperation objectives, which have been identified
in the development strategy of recipient countries or in the European
Commission’s Country Strategy Papers and the National Indicative Pro-
grammes.172
In contrast, liberals seem more convincing in their argument of the
converging interests of relevant actors based on their non-power incen-
tives. For them, the conduct of trilateral cooperation makes it possible to
explore more efficient uses of scarce resources as well as donors’ comple-
mentarities, to the benefits of the recipient country. Consequently, the
commitment of the EU and Thailand may realize the potential of the
above-mentioned co-donor scheme and establish new cooperation pat-
terns in the bilateral relations in terms of conducting and financing the
training facilities in the region by an ASEAN partner.173 The European
Commission considers it very important that the donors initially orga-
nize an exchange of views on project identification and expected results
and that in the subsequent phases each of them is encouraged to main-
tain its own procedures and implementing modalities.174 It is thus
mentioned that the EU finds it more reasonable to promote trilateral co-
operation in the areas of human resources development, institutional
capacity building, or infrastructure development and that because of
this specific scope of trilateral cooperation, the engagement trend holds
possible the wider participation of actors involved, including front line
officers and non-state actors.175
For constructivists, trilateral cooperation may represent more than ra-
tional foreign policy behavior and thus may include a decision formed
by ideas and identities. That the European Commission and the Thai
government can jointly be involved and possibly arrive at an interaction
and transfer of knowledge and experience in development projects is
likely to contribute to the process of building a collective identity and
raising their profiles and images. In support of the latter argument,
Thailand is very keen on the concepts of trilateral cooperation as a way
to establish its role as a donor country regionally and internationally.176
From the EU’s perspective, if trilateral cooperation becomes a reality, it
should not only focus on the recipient country in question, but should
also significantly benefit Thailand in terms of an exchange of views and
experiences as a donor.177 In a sense, through that interaction and the
possibility of social learning, it is very likely that the Thai government
may be familiarized with its new roles as a donor as well as with their
identities that are accordingly ‘socially constructed’ in the donor com-
munity. For instance, by way of a precaution, the Paris Declaration,
which was endorsed by over 100 countries and organizations in March
THE EU, THAILAND, AND NEW BILATERALISM 153
2005, can serve here as international norms that are organized around
five key principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing
reassessment and estimate target, and mutual accountability (see, for
more details, chapter V.3.3). The European Commission, it was further
noted, would prefer to work with Thailand – alongside other major na-
tional and international donors – in order to address development is-
sues in a more structured way.178
IV.3.3 Higher Education: An Example of Post-Development Cooperation
The thesis of ‘post-development cooperation’ has been raised to discuss
a modified and more sophisticated version of development cooperation
activities. The later trends show that once a country has reached a cer-
tain level of development, the traditional forms of development coopera-
tion obviously become ‘outdated’.179 The parties involved evidently seek
new specific areas of mutual interest so as to promote sustainable eco-
nomic and social developments, provided that the donor-recipient rela-
tionships have more or less changed to those of partnership. Higher
education has been listed on the priority areas of post-development
agenda and represents two or more parties’ attempts to promote mutual
knowledge and recognition with a new focus on the higher ends of edu-
cation cooperation. As far as financial resources are concerned, the Eur-
opean Commission in principle follows the National Indicative Pro-
grammes for Thailand based on the Council Regulation (1992, no. 443/
95) on economic cooperation with the developing countries in Asia and
Latin America, the so-called ‘ALA Regulation’. It is important to note
that less financial resources are expected to be involved here and that
both parties mostly follow a co-financing scheme in case of ad-hoc or
additional cooperation activities such as meetings, workshops and other
related events.180
In the theoretical discussions, higher education illustrates an impor-
tant area of cooperation in which the interests of the EU and Thailand
seem to go beyond the traditional development agendas. For realists,
the Thai government’s support of the cooperation between Thai and
European universities can be explained by its interest in bringing the
EU into play, with a view to restoring a more balanced number of Thai
student flows to other countries than those that had previously had
stronger bases like the US, the UK and most English-speaking coun-
tries. Likewise, the EU would also have an incentive to strengthen its
position in the Thai academic domain.181 Several recent efforts of the
EU, in line with the Bologna Process, such as the Erasmus Mundus
programs, have been designed to strategically promote the competitive-
ness and attractiveness of the European higher education systems, for
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instance, by enhancing organizational transparency and unburdening
recognition procedures (European Commission 2006b).
For liberals, more significantly, cooperation in higher education re-
presents an area of mutual interest that, to a considerable extent, gives
rise to active engagement on both sides in a variety of cooperation pro-
grams. With respect to bilateral university-to-university and individual-
to-individual relations, the EU and Thai government’s engagement may
be driven by non-power incentives and individual academic interests. In
practice, for example, the European Commission has announced the
Erasmus Mundus program, which, as a part of the ‘European Pro-
gramme of Academic Excellence and Worldwide Student Mobility’, was
established to provide EU-funded scholarships for potential students
from third countries to pursue a two-year Master’s course in at least
two universities in different member states (European Commission
2006a). More importantly, the EU has proposed the so-called Thailand
Window initiative, which is designed to benefit Thai students in parti-
cular, with E 3.2 million of the E 230 million set aside by the global
Erasmus Mundus program to fund about 90 scholarships.182 The same
program also offers funding for Thai scholarly research undertaken in
the EU for three-month periods (ibid.). This cooperation in higher edu-
cation is meant to benefit Thai candidates in general, by offering a wide
variety of courses and academic possibilities at various European uni-
versities. Meanwhile, for the EU’s part, the active engagement in this
kind of bilateral program can be partly understood in a wider context of
the EU’s domestic agendas, for example, the targets identified under
the so-called ‘Lisbon Agenda’ that will promopt the EU to become a
knowledge-based economy that is also as dynamic and competitive as
possible by 2010.
Furthermore, in liberal terms, cooperation in higher education opens
up a new level of bilateral engagement, which goes beyond the state-to-
state relationships to include individuals and scholars at the individual-
to-individual and university-to-university levels. In this regard, the EU’s
‘Asia Link Programme’ aims to establish and strengthen networks and
cooperation projects at European and Asian higher education institu-
tions, including about 20 Thai institutions. This is a ‘demand-driven
process’ in the sense that the participating institutions have to identify
and work on projects of mutual interest in areas of human resource de-
velopment, curriculum development and institution and system devel-
opment.183 As things stand, Thailand is still eligible along with seven
other ASEAN member states to participate in the ‘Asia Link’ initiative
and apparently continues to deliver strong representation, so that as of
2004, the Asian Institute for Technology coordinates at least two pro-
jects: on gender and public policy studies and geo-environmental engi-
neering.184
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Along this line, another element within the Asia Link initiative, the
European Higher Education Fair, which has taken place in Bangkok an-
nually since November 2004, has become a great success in raising
awareness and attracting the interests of Thai students to a wide range
of higher education opportunities in the EU. Based on the Bangkok De-
legation’s 2004 fair statistics, 55% and 15% of the students searched
specifically for more details on specific Master’s and Ph.D. programs,
respectively. The European university representatives, that primarily re-
cruit students and promote their universities, also expressed overall sa-
tisfaction because of the high numbers of visitors at the fair and the
subsequently established contacts.185 The fair itself is referred to as ‘a
new era of collaboration in higher education’ because its arrangements
have brought together European university representatives as well as
Thai and regional participants, which provides an opportunity for the
latter to gain first-hand information from the former.186
For constructivists, it is clear that cooperation in higher education
such as demonstrated by the Erasmus Mundus Programme seems very
promising for the process of mutual recognition and identity building
in Thailand. The prospect is that some of the students who are trained
in the EU may return to accept roles as Thailand’s future leaders or key
decision makers.187 It is also possible that the EU may increase its pro-
file and influence through this kind of exchange program. Public events
such as the European Higher Education Fair are certainly meant to con-
tribute to the promotion of the EU’s broad coverage and representation
in Thailand. In fact, the EU seems to be aware of this point, thus the
fair was presided over by both the Ambassador of the EU presidency
and the Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Commis-
sion’s Delegation to Thailand. Empirically, it is still too early to assess
the long-term implications that this type of cooperation in higher educa-
tion may have for the process of building collective identity. However,
these cultural and intellectual exchanges have hardly been a two-way
process, so that, for example, there have been asymmetrically much
fewer European exchange students in Thailand than the other way
around.188
Chulalongkorn University has introduced a new B.A. and a new M.A.
program in European Studies, the latter is the first of its kind in South-
east Asia and consists of a one-year full-time international program that
is taught by distinguished European and Asian faculty for graduates
with a focus on the EU and European integration (Graduate School of
Chulalongkorn University 2007; Wiessala 2002: 139). It is very signifi-
cant that many of the graduates of these programs have become staff
members of international organizations and EU-related institutions
such as the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mission of Thailand to
the European Communities, the Delegation of the European Commis-
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sion to Thailand, and various European embassies (Graduate School of
Chulalongkorn University 2007). They have thus already made an im-
portant contribution to Thailand’s improvement of EU awareness and
inter-comprehension. Moreover, in 1999, the Centre for European Stu-
dies was upgraded to accommodate the facilities of the European Docu-
mentation Centre and its own publication series including the Journal
of European Studies (Wiessala 2002: 139). On the EU side, it has pro-
vided about E 4 million in support and has been used by the Thai Eur-
opean Community Studies Association to promote academic exchange
and cooperation between the two parties (ibid.).
Moreover, the latest EU projects are designed to have real practical
implications for the process of mutual understanding and, to some ex-
tent, identity building. For example, the EU has also funded the ‘Hu-
man Resource Development through Problem-based Learning’ project
within the framework of the above-mentioned ‘Asia Link’ initiative (EU
Today, no. 26, March 2006). This project introduces an alternative
learning method to traditional memorization, with the concept of ‘pro-
blem-based learning’ allegedly providing in-depth knowledge and pro-
blem understanding in thorough thinking process (ibid.). One of the pi-
lot projects took place at Walailak University in Thailand’s Southern
Province Nakhon Sri Thammarat (ibid.). The university organized a ser-
ies of workshops and training programs, for example, a training pro-
gram organized for six Walailak professors at Lund University and Eras-
mus University who upon their return to Thailand held a workshop to
share their experiences with about 50 colleagues in Nakhon Sri Tham-
marat (ibid.). As University Rector Dr. Supat Poopaka noted, the ‘pro-
blem-based learning’ method may be introduced in certain classes in
the first stage and then applied to other appropriate areas of study – this
seems like an important step in Walailak University’s educational re-
form (ibid.).
IV.4 Summary
A state's motivation for adopting the conduct of new bilateral foreign
policies can be explained differently from each of the realist, liberal and
constructivist theoretical perspectives. At the unit level, the analysis of
EU-Thailand relations can be summarized as follows:
The realist school seems to have re-gained credibility in explaining
the policy shift away from the campaigns for multilateralism toward a
more explicit use of bilateral power instruments and power politics. Tra-
ditional realists have taken a rather skeptical stance on multilateral insti-
tutions and multilateralism in general, thus it is not all that surprising
that with the emergence of new bilateralism they expect that great
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powers will once again exploit their advantages over smaller nations in
bilateral negotiations and that all of the parties involved will seek to im-
prove their relative positions in the hierarchical structure of interna-
tional politics. Thailand has a long tradition of foreign policy and diplo-
macy. As history has shown, the Thai approach can be described as very
skillful and is highly valued in terms of flexibility and pragmatism. In
the FTA strategies or in the management of tourism and migratory
flows, the EU can meanwhile be regarded as just another major regio-
nal player and bilateral relations with the EU mainly contribute to the
government’s balancing strategies and influence-seeking policies. In a
regional context, several attempts such as the proposed establishment
of ‘Southeast Asian Centre of Expertise on Avian Influenza’ in Thailand
and the promotion of the ASEM Trust Fund initiative after the Asian
crisis serve as examples of voicing-opportunities-seeking foreign policy.
On the EU’s side, the realist explanation may be less applicable be-
cause of certain politically sensitive issues such as the situation in the
South and recent domestic political developments in Thailand, the EU
mostly restricts itself to raising concerns through informal bilateral dia-
logues. However, some evidence of the EU’s influence-seeking behavior,
as expected by realists, can be found in the initiatives on environmental
cooperation, the compensation negotiations after the accession of the
new member states and partly the informal dialogues on Burma. While
the EU has evidently been concerned with its political and economic po-
sitions in relation to other major regional powers, the EU's balancing
strategy must be understood in the context of its efforts – particularly in
the recent bilateral cooperation projects to improve its visibility and im-
age in the (sub-)region.
Comparatively speaking, the concepts of commercial liberalism,
which focus on the market incentives of a new bilateral foreign policy,
seem more convincing in the case of EU-Thailand engagement in the
trade-related areas of cooperation. Commercial liberal theory, after all,
underscores the positive effects of trade and the possibility for states to
benefit from world economic growth, its explanation of new bilateral-
ism is relatively optimistic put in the context of converging non-power
interests of the two parties involved. Emphasis in EU-Thailand relations
is always placed on the fact that an integral part of this bilateralism is
bilateral trade which has continued to increase, so that in 2003, the EU
became Thailand’s third most important trading partner, after the US
and ASEAN, accounting for c. 15% of Thailand’s total trade. Meanwhile,
Thailand’s exports to the EU doubled between the mid-1990s and 2003
to some E 11 billion (Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land 2005). The EU’s and the Thai government’s engagement covers a
wide variety of policy areas. Not only have trade relations with the EU
given rise to cooperation projects in several areas of science, technology,
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R&D and higher education, they also contribute to the strengthening of
bilateral dialogues and relations in general. Moreover, this liberal per-
spective has been helpful in considering, despite the limited role of the
state, the contribution of individual actors and interest groups to the
analysis of the foreign policy-making process. It was apparent that the
EU and the Thai government became aware during the Asian crisis of
the importance of international cooperation and that the relevant autho-
rities should begin to actively accommodate the policy-making interests
of non-state actors, particularly in the business world. The EU and the
Thai government are increasingly encouraging the participation of non-
state actors – not only in economic but also socio-political matters – in
the form of business-to-business as well as individual-to-individual net-
works. This can be seen in, for example, the establishment of Thailand-
EU Business Forum, the ‘Asia Invest’ initiatives – including the ‘Asia
Invest Forum’ and the ‘EU-Thailand Partenariat’ – and the ‘Asia Link
Programme’. Moreover, with regard to the provisions of humanitarian
assistance to ethnic minorities and displaced people along the Thai-Bur-
mese borders, there has been a clear increase in participation of non-
state actors including individuals, interest groups and NGOs such as
‘Médecins Sans Frontiers’ or the ‘Thailand Burma Border Consortium’.
The contribution of constructivism is mainly to review a state’s for-
eign policy making process as a social act and thus underscore the roles
of identities and interests involved in the intersubjective construction of
new bilateral relations and international reality. The fact that the Thai
government has produced a series of post-Asian crisis efforts to regain
financial credibility and raise its economic profile regionally and inter-
nationally can not only be interpreted as a rational response to political
pressure and business interests but also as a value-driven approach to
the integration of international norms and best practices. In this pro-
cess, the Thai government has evidently made a series of efforts to re-
gain credibility and to enhance its image both regionally and interna-
tionally. The subsequent attempts of the government, it seems, go in
line with the country’s development profiles, by which, from a role-the-
oretical perspective, the Thai government begins to establish its new
roles as an emerging donor country and a subregional power. The per-
ception and prescription of these roles in part contributes to the Thai
approach toward EU-Thailand relations, for example, in the issues sur-
rounding Burma and the ideas of trilateral cooperation. Furthermore, as
far as the process of identity formation is concerned, the constructivist
explanation significantly complements the rational schools with the dy-
namics of complex learning and mutual recognition – as in the ‘Asia
Urbs’ initiatives and several cooperation projects in higher education.
For the EU, its visibility is not viewed as one of the strongest in Thai-
land and the EU’s relatively modest contribution during the Asian crisis
THE EU, THAILAND, AND NEW BILATERALISM 159
has been a point of contention regarding its image in the Southeast
Asian region. As things now stand, the EU’s representation – for its
own part and that of non-state actors – has been rather underexplored
from the process of collective identity formation though combined in
several efforts such as the Commission’s negotiations with Thai autho-
rities on the establishment of ‘EU Chamber of Commerce’. Nonethe-
less, there is some evidence to suggest that the EU in its bilateral rela-
tions with Thailand has taken on the roles of promoting human rights,
democracy and good governance in Southeast Asia, which was infor-
mally discussed in relation to the issues of ethnic minorities and dis-
placed people along the Thai-Burmese borders.
There is an intriguing puzzle of why EU-Thailand relations have not
become as strong bilaterally as they could have and thus far been more
problem-oriented – as in the trade negotiations on specific commodities
such as rice, poultry, shrimps or granite and marble – than long-term
policy-oriented. Combining the approaches of the EU and Thailand re-
veals that while EU engagement is mostly focused on business inter-
ests, the Thai government has a subtler, traditional interest in preser-
ving balances of power and promoting regional security. In this view,
there seems to be a difference between the political and economic rela-
tions with regard to their approaches and programmatic developments.
One way to strengthen their bilateral relations is thus that the EU – de-
spite some institutional constraints – might consider assuming politi-
cally a more decisive role in Southeast Asia. Yet, as things now stand,
the EU and Thailand have been more successful in sharpening their bi-
lateral trade and investment policies rather than deepening the existing
political dialogues.
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V EU-Thailand Relations in the
International Context
This chapter focuses on the roles that EU-Thailand relations play in the
international arena, thereby conducting a functional analysis of this bi-
lateralism according to the proposed functions of balancing, institution-
building, rationalizing, agenda-setting and identity-building (see also
Rüland 2001b). It is organized in three sections, each of which repre-
sents a level of interaction that ranges from regional, interregional to
global. The examples included in each section are chosen because of
their relevance and with a view to reaching the widest possible coverage
of EU-Thailand relations.
V.1 EU-Thailand Relations and Regionalism
It has become increasingly apparent that EU-Thailand relations are
partly designed to contribute to the development of regionalism in
Southeast and East Asia. As an overview, the first section highlights the
significance of bilateralism that has been foreseen in the EU’s strategies
toward Asia and ASEAN in particular. The second section underlines
the roles played by the EU’s bilateral relations with the Thai govern-
ment in supporting ASEAN’s efforts of regional integration and related
developments, as will be discussed in the context of TREATI and trilat-
eral cooperation. The third section discusses the potential implications
of new economic bilateralism for the developments of regionalism in
Southeast Asia. In a wider context of ASEAN+3, then, the fourth section
focuses on the functions performed by bilateralism in response to the
‘China factors’ and the rise of ‘Plus Three’ countries.
V.1.1 Bilateralism in the EU’s Asian Strategies
Formal relations between the EU and ASEAN were first established in
1972. From the European perspective, ASEAN – in spite of its greatly
heterogeneous backgrounds of internal political conflicts, religions, po-
pulation structures, and stages of development – early on adopted a si-
milar orientation of anti-communism and a market economy and thus
illustrated a regional organization that was very important strategically
for the political stability of Southeast Asia (Hing 1999; Phatharodom
1999). Having said this, however, it is worth noting that the more cru-
cial impulses toward ever-closer relations between the two regions seem
to have emerged from the Asian side. With the accession of the United
Kingdom into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, there
was evidence that the initial dialogues were mainly pursued by two
ASEAN states, Malaysia and Singapore, and that their active engage-
ment can be explained in terms of their postcolonial links to the Com-
monwealth as well as the fear of losing the benefits associated with
them (Dent 1997 and 1998: 502).
To bring EU-Thailand relations into the picture, it was during this
time that their relations were predominantly focused on trade relations
but it is empirically unclear to what extent the EU and Thailand have
functionalized these bilateral relations during the development of
ASEAN. The EU and Thailand in the beginning were basically in sup-
port of the establishment of the EEC-ASEAN dialogues. In fact, it was
the initiative proposed by the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher and ‘active[ly]’ supported by the Thai government that gave
birth to the first EEC-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 1978
(Genscher 1982: 12; von Stechow 2003: 7). In retrospect, the establish-
ment of the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations
(SCCAN) in June 1972 established the first informal relations and regu-
lar contacts between the EEC and ASEAN. The main task of SCCAN,
which was comprised of the Commerce Ministers of the five core
ASEAN members, was to discuss and seek market access for their pro-
ducts in the EC’s Common Market and ensure the benefits of the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (Phatharodom 1999: 238). Later, in May
1975, the ASEAN-EEC Joint Study Group (JSG) was formed to look into
the possibility of closer cooperation and to promote collaborative efforts
between the two regions. But it was only after Thailand, along with
some other ASEAN countries, invited the European Community (EC) to
attend the first ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1977 that the EC
became a formal dialogue partner and thus ASEAN's first dialogue part-
ner (Berthier 1998). As mentioned above, the first ASEAN-EEC Minis-
terial Meeting (AEMM) occurred in Brussels in November 1978. More-
over, in 1979, the EC established the first Delegation of the European
Commission in the Far East in Bangkok, through which the relations
between the EC and ASEAN were expected to improve in terms of
managing coordination and sharing information, and, as a conse-
quence, ASEAN received more attention thereby raising its profile on
the EC priority list (Phatharodom 1999: 241). The second AEMM was
in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980, during which the two sides agreed to
formalize their relations and signed the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agree-
ment (ibid.).
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It was already during the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement,
that it became apparent that the EU considered its bilateral relations
with the Southeast Asian countries as significant as a balancing element
to establish and strengthen regional institutions. The Agreement expli-
citly stresses the commitment of the two parties to the efforts ‘to create
and to strengthen regional organizations committed to economic
growth, social progress and cultural development and aiming to provide
an element of balance in international relations.’ On the European side,
in particular, it was clear that close cooperation with the Southeast
Asian nations was important for the regional economic development of
ASEAN. Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the Agreement, for example, notes that
the European Community hoped that development cooperation was
going to ‘contribute to ASEAN’s efforts in enhancing its self-reliance
and economic resilience and social well-being of its people through pro-
jects to accelerate the development of the ASEAN countries and of the
region as a whole.’
In practice, throughout the 1980s EU-Thailand relations efforts were
made to promote crop diversification and improve farmers’ incomes in
line with Article 4 Paragraph 3 of the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agree-
ment, which foresaw the focus of regional development cooperation
projects in the areas of food production and supplies, rural develop-
ment, and education and training facilities (see also Delegation of the
European Commission to Thailand 2007a, 2007b). From a Thai per-
spective, the formalization of EC-ASEAN relations in 1980 did not only
promote group-to-group cooperation activities in support of regional-
ism. It also strategically contributed to the balancing politics of the
Southeast Asian region, with another external major power brought into
play after a series of subregional political incidents such as the 1975
Communist victory in South Vietnam (Phatharodom 1999: 238-239).
Although indirectly bilateral, EU-Thailand relations, in the context of
the 1980 EC-ASEAN Agreement, have supported several elements that
are relevant to advancing the institutionalization of EU-ASEAN rela-
tions. For example, as stated in Article 5, the ‘Joint Cooperation Com-
mittee’, with its own procedures and work programs, would probably
promote and review cooperation activities and provide consultations
alongside the ministerial- and parliamentary-level meetings (ibid.;
Dreis-Lampen 1998: 135ff.).1 Sub-committees were also organized in
specific areas such as ‘Trade, Economic and Industrial Co-operation’,
‘Science & Technology’, and ‘Forests’. By the late 1980s, the EC had es-
tablished ‘Joint Investment Committees’ in all of ASEAN’s capitals
(Dreis-Lampen 1998: 126; Rüland 2001b: 13). As will be discussed later,
the Agreement of 1980 also emphasized the adoption of specific ar-
rangements in line with international norms and rules. Article 1 reaf-
firms the commitment of the two parties to the GATT’s ‘Most Favored
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Nation’ treatment, which, in principle, emphasizes the non-preferential
character of the cooperation agreement and has established the objec-
tives for economic and development cooperation projects (Berthier
1998; Phatharodom 1999: 242).
Needless to say, the end of the Cold War was a benchmark for the
construction of a new world security order. While from the economic
perspective, ASEAN has become a very promising group in Southeast
Asia, the EU made considerable progress in regional integration via the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Commission’s communiqué ‘Towards a
New Asia Strategy’ (European Commission 1994) was drafted in this si-
tuation. It is not surprising that the ‘new’ priority areas included
strengthening the EU’s economic presence in Asia, developing dialo-
gues on regional political and security matters and promoting the fra-
mework for trade and investments as well as regulatory cooperation. In
a sense, the EU seemed to be very aware of the balancing dynamics of
the region at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. As a conse-
quence, EU-Thailand relations are not only propelled by economic inter-
ests but aimed at contributing to the development of regionalism, as
noted in a communiqué: ‘The main thrust of the present and future
policy in Asia is related to economic matters. However, this major com-
ponent of the Union policy has to be presented in the framework of the
political and security balance of power in the region’ (ibid.).
Quantitatively, the EU’s contribution in the Southeast Asian region
occurred mainly through the bilateral channels of individual ASEAN
states rather than via a regional approach of the ASEAN as a whole. Be-
tween 1976 and 1995, the European Community, and later the EU, allo-
cated funds totaling E 1.007 billion to the Southeast Asian region, of
which E 102.065 million (10.13%) went to ASEAN and the rest to the in-
dividual ASEAN member states (European Commission 1996). Statis-
tics show that EC funding was distributed among ASEAN member
states as follows: Brunei (E 0.119 million, 0.01%), Indonesia (E 265.916
million, 26.41%), Malaysia (E 7.509 million, 0.76%), the Philippines
(E 269.549 million, 27.15%), Singapore (E 2.770 million, 0.28%), Thai-
land (E 223.940 million, 22.56%) and Vietnam (E 120.926 million,
12.18%) (ibid.). It is obvious that during this period some ASEAN indi-
vidual member states received even larger amounts of funding than the
ASEAN as a whole did. EC funding to ASEAN can be categorized as
economic cooperation (E 85.425 million), development cooperation
(E 12.227 million) and for other areas such as drugs and refugees
(E 2.776 million and E 1.637 million, respectively) (ibid.). Here, eco-
nomic cooperation mainly covered the improvement of the general co-
operation framework (E 26.815 million), trade and investment facilita-
tion (E 20.309 million), and business-to-business cooperation (E 37.534
million). Development cooperation concentrates on the areas of the en-
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vironment (E 0.600 million), rural production (E 7.027 million) and
rural services (E 4.600 million) (ibid.). In comparison, the distribution
of the EC funding to Thailand in three categories was similar to the
aforementioned EC funding to the ASEAN as a whole, except for the
fact that the former was weighted in favor of particular development
areas of cooperation such as forests, irrigation and rural infrastructure
(ibid.).
The launch of ASEM in Bangkok in 1996 clearly reveals another as-
pect of institutionalized relations between the EU and ASEAN, as will
be discussed in greater detail below. However, for the ASEAN countries
including Thailand, an important question remains as to what the im-
plications of this ASEM process and new institutional settings are for
its existing relations with the EU. The fact that negotiations to modify
the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement had been blocked because
of human rights issues in East Timor since 1992 and also because of
critical remarks about the over-generalized geographical views of Asia
as noted in the 1994 communiqué ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’, the
European Commission (1996) responded by drafting a new strategy
concept under the communiqué ‘Creating a New Dynamic in EU-
ASEAN Relations’ in July 1996. Here again, from the viewpoint of the
European Commission, relations between the EU and ASEAN and its
member states were expected to bring the balancing dynamics to the re-
gion, as noted in the communiqué: ‘ASEAN represents a point of bal-
ance in the region and Europe can help strengthen it in this role’ (ibid.
8). The EU was relatively positive about ASEAN’s enlargement efforts,
expecting that EC-ASEAN relations would contribute to the integration
of the latter’s new members in general and, if applicable, promoting a
market economy and democracy norms as well as cooperation in areas
of mutual interest such as maritime security, denuclearization, and the
fight against drugs (ibid. 10-11). In a way, there is evidence to suggest
that EU-ASEAN relations as ‘the core relationship of the ASEM’ were
recognized by the European Commission and the individual EU mem-
ber states (Forster 1999b: 257).
During the years that followed, the European Commission published
two comprehensive strategy papers on Asia and Southeast Asia: the
2001 communiqué ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for En-
hanced Partnership’ (European Commission 2001c) and the 2003 com-
muniqué ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’ (European Com-
mission 2003c). These two communiqués mainly reveal the efforts to
establish an up-to-date approach to enhancing EU-ASEAN relations.
More specifically, the 2001 communiqué foresaw six action points for
the region as a whole: (i) promoting peace and security, (ii) fostering
trade and investment ties, (iii) addressing poverty and social issues, (iv)
supporting democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for
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human rights, (v) contributing to global partnerships such as the UN
and the WTO, and (vi) strengthening the EU’s presence in Asia. Inter-
estingly, this 2001 communiqué emphasized the significance of bilater-
alism for the developments of Southeast Asian regionalism and vice ver-
sa. Under the second point, the Commission suggested that external
trade and investment flows be strengthened through ‘further develop-
ment of bilateral economic relations with Asian partners’ as a way of
gaining market access, to promote a favorable climate for trade and in-
vestments and to lower technical barriers to trade (16). The communi-
qué also acknowledged the significance of regional organizations that
promoted bilateral trade and investments in order to strengthen its rela-
tions with regional groups such as ASEAN, for they are viewed as ‘a
force for liberalisation and progress on trade and investment issues’
(ibid.).
The 2003 communiqué concentrated more on Southeast Asia as a re-
gion. Both the EU and ASEAN remain committed to regional integra-
tion and related shared values and interests in addressing issues that
ranged from trade and investments to non-conventional issues such as
terrorism, environmental degradation, diseases, and organized crime
(European Commission 2003c). It is apparent that the Thai positions
can be understood in the context of ASEAN. More importantly, this
2003 communiqué proposes several new instruments – such as TREA-
TI and trilateral cooperation – that were expected to improve the EU’s
relations with ASEAN and the individual ASEAN countries and also to
promote the regional integration within the framework of the Initiative
for ASEAN Integration. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the EU’s ap-
proach to regional integration, diplomatically and academically, is highly
regarded by most observers including ASEAN member states. The Eur-
opean Commission also explicitly made plans to discuss the possibility
of ‘new bilateral agreements’ with some Southeast Asian countries and
to launch the EU’s ‘new visibility strategy’ for reaching out to both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental audiences in the region. The subsec-
tions that follow will focus on the implications of these mechanisms for
the development of ASEAN’s regional integration as well as regionalism
in East and Southeast Asia.
V.1.2 EU-Thailand Relations and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration
In the words of EU Trade Commission Peter Mandelson, the EU has
been ‘a fellow believer, and practitioner, of the benefits of regional inte-
gration’ (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2005c).
Rüland (2001b: 17) refers to one of the EU’s early roles as ‘an external
federator’, who promotes the strengthening of regional cooperation
through certain development projects. The aim of this subsection is to
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assess the extent to which EU-Thailand relations are instrumentalized
in support of ASEAN’s own efforts to achieve further regional integra-
tion. Launched by the ASEAN leaders in November 2000, the ‘Initiative
for ASEAN Integration’ (IAI) Programme was aimed at bridging the de-
velopment gap between the ASEAN member states, particularly be-
tween the ASEAN-6 countries and the four new members: Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). It is clear that ASEAN as a group
has promoted several efforts to stimulate the subregion’s growth and
enhance regional solidarity (ASEAN Secretariat 2007a). At the ASEAN
Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002, the ASEAN accordingly
endorsed the six-year ‘IAI Work Plan’ comprising 48 projects in four
priority areas of infrastructure development, human resources develop-
ment, information and communication technology and the promotion
of regional economic integration in the CLMV countries (ibid.).
The Commission’s communiqué ‘A New Partnership with South East
Asia’ revealed the strategic importance of the ASEAN’s regional integra-
tion, thereby pointing to the possibilities of its bilateral and regional ap-
proaches in support of the integration processes of ASEAN (European
Commission 2003c). Moreover, it is interesting to see a certain degree
of similarity in the expected areas of cooperation between ASEAN and
the EU. In brief, the communiqué contains six areas of strategic priori-
ties: (i) supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism, (ii)
human rights, democratic principles and good governance, (iii) main-
streaming justice and home affairs issues, (iv) injecting a new dyna-
mism into regional trade and investment relations, (v) continuing to
support the development of less prosperous countries, and (vi) intensi-
fying dialogues and cooperation in specific priority areas (ibid.). In the
EU’s later attempts to support the ASEAN’s IAI projects and the devel-
opments of regional integration, two important mechanisms – ‘Trans-
Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative’ (TREATI) and trilateral coopera-
tion – are worth further investigation:
V.1.2.1 Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI)
Thailand, as one of the ASEAN countries, is in a position to benefit
from the EU’s ‘Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative’ (TREATI)
framework. In principle TREATI – as proposed by the European Com-
mission in the 2003 communiqué ‘A New Partnership with South East
Asia’ – is designed to provide a region-to-region cooperation framework
for the economic relations between the EU and ASEAN. To reinforce
trade-related dialogues and regulatory cooperation, this framework is ex-
pected to set down regional activities and workshops on various issues
such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards in agro-food and fisheries
products, industrial product standards, and forestry and wood-based
products as well as crosscutting issues of trade facilitation, market ac-
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cess and investments. From the EU’s perspective, not only could the
EU strengthen its positions as the third biggest source of imports and
the second largest export destination of ASEAN, but the logic of TREA-
TI itself is said to be ‘closely linked to ASEAN’s own drive for economic
integration’ (European Commission 2007l).
From a neorealist point of view, EU-Thailand relations in the TREATI
are expected to perform a balancing function vis-à-vis relations between
the EU and other individual ASEAN countries. However, there is still
not much evidence to suggest that notion, with particular regard to sev-
eral TREATI projects on ASEAN’s regional integration. This is probably
because the Thai government has mostly played the same participant
role as other fellow ASEAN members while the EU also appears to be
driven by business interests, which can result in a series of project
activities and workshops (see also Delegation of the European Commis-
sion to Thailand 2004c, 2004d). Moreover, under the TREATI frame-
work, the EU’s efforts are allegedly committed to proportionality and
mutual reward and the actions to be launched seem to follow the princi-
ple of reciprocity beyond the orientation of balancing in the Southeast
Asian region.
The attempts of both the EU and Thailand to align TREATI activities
with the ASEAN roadmaps reflects the neo-institutionalist interpreta-
tion, in which their bilateral relations contribute to the development of
regional economic integration. Thus far, the focus of the TREATI fra-
mework has focused on ASEAN’s integration efforts in the areas of
electronics, agro-foods, fisheries and wood-based products as well as in
the cross-sectoral areas of trade facilitation and investments (European
Commission 2007l). In his speech ‘The EU-Thailand Partnership –
bringing ASEAN and Europe closer together’ in Bangkok in April 2005,
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson pointed out the significance
of cooperation between the EU and Thailand for developing the basis
for ASEAN’s integration efforts: ‘I see [the TREATI framework] as our
offer to ASEAN to develop a partnership for regional integration, estab-
lishing greater transparency and understanding between the two re-
gions’ (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2005c).
Furthermore, as viewed by the Council, the introduction of TREATI
seemed to respond to ASEAN’s dynamic growth in the world economy
and thus revealed the interest of the EU in proposing a kind of ‘trade
action plan’ to strengthen its trade and investment relations with this
region since the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement (European
Commission 2004d). In a further step, the TREATI activities were also
expected to help strengthen ASEAN’s regional integration, which can
‘permit serious consideration to be given to entering into a free trade
agreement’ (European Commission 2003c).
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In addition, the neoliberal theorists would also highlight the impor-
tance attached to the European Commission-Thailand Senior Officials’
Meeting as one of the important ‘launching pads’ for identifying and
preparing cooperation projects under TREATI.2 Because of its relative
economic strength and various hub functions, the Thai government was
expected to play a crucial role in this process, particularly in the areas of
cooperation of (i) technical regulations, standards, and conformity as-
sessment procedures, (ii) tourism, and (iii) wood products and sustain-
able forestry management.3 Moreover, a series of ‘EU-ASEAN TREATI
Regional Workshops’ have been held in Bangkok ever since the TREATI
was introduced by the European Commission in 2003, which includes,
for example, the introductory seminar ‘TREATI – the Trans-Regional
EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative: What It Means for Business’ in March
2004, the seminar on food safety rules in May 2004, the workshop on
sanitary and phytosanitary issues in the fisheries sector in June 2006
and the workshop on EU standards and technical regulations in the elec-
tronic and electrical equipment sector also in June 2006. The fact that
Thailand has hosted a variety of TREATI regional seminars and work-
shops illustrates the relevance of EU-Thailand relations in its support of
the EU initiatives, although they are supposed to focus on and benefit
ASEAN in general. The last example of workshops on EU standards and
technical regulations in the electronic and electrical equipment sector
make it clear that the European Commission came to cooperate and co-
host the event with the Department of Foreign Trade of the Thai Minis-
try of Commerce and the National Metal and Materials Technology Cen-
tre of the Thai Ministry of Science and Technology. Furthermore, these
seminars and workshops significantly brought together exporters, tra-
ders, exporting industry representatives, experts, local authorities as well
as inspection bodies from both sides and made it possible for them to
cooperate beyond the traditional levels of public institutions (Delegation
of the European Commission to Thailand 2004c, 2004d).
A constructivist would emphasize that TREATI was primarily de-
signed to be a regional dialogue mechanism. This includes the relations
between the EU and the ASEAN countries that promote mutual under-
standing through exchanges of experience in bilateral and regional ac-
tivities and workshops and, in a sense, contribute to defining the roles
of the two parties in and commitments to trade-related and regulatory
cooperation. The prospects for the identity-building function, however,
depend on the extent to which the EU and Thailand can identify the
areas of mutual interest and collectively act within the TREATI’s frame-
work. As things now stand, the EU only drafted the TREATI action plan
in mid-2006, which is expected to further concretize the framework for
EU-ASEAN dialogues on trade-related and regulatory issues (Mission of
Thailand to the European Communities 2006a).
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V.1.2.2 Trilateral Cooperation
The concept of trilateral cooperation is also present in the above-men-
tioned communiqué ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’, in
which the EU recognized the considerable difference in the levels of de-
velopment of ASEAN countries and therefore saw the possibility of co-
operating with the more developed ASEAN countries to provide assis-
tance to the less developed nations. In this respect, this idea of coop-
erating trilaterally not only brings about cooperation between the EU
and two ASEAN countries as such but also represents the EU’s contri-
bution to supporting the efforts of ASEAN to narrow the development
gap among its member states. More specifically, in practice, the EU pro-
posed the involvement of the donor parties in ‘jointly defined modular
programs’ and through a co-financing scheme. The more advanced
ASEAN countries that were ready to cooperate were asked to work to-
gether with the EU on strategic programming and, formally – if applic-
able – to sign a corresponding Memorandum of Understanding.4
From a neorealist interpretation, EU-Thailand relations may play an
important role in strategically instrumentalizing the possibility of trilat-
eral cooperation and contributing to the balancing dynamics of the
Southeast Asian region. As mentioned earlier in chapter IV.3.3, the Thai
government has shown an interest in discussing this concept with the
EU, however, concrete cooperation programs have yet to be established.
As there was a discussion about the EU’s possible contribution to the
existing regional projects such as ‘Ayeyawady, Chao Phraya, Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy’ (ACMECS), the Thai government
seemed to be reconsidering the impact of the EU’s involvement in sub-
regional stability and the implications for the region in general. Thus
far, in Southeast Asia, the EU’s trilateral cooperation projects are only
found in the forms of ‘joint technical assistance programmes’ and ‘third
country training programmes’ with the Singaporean government.5
While neorealists would expect EU-Thailand relations to perform the
balancing function in the development of ASEAN integration, their neo-
liberal colleagues would argue for the significance of these bilateral rela-
tions in terms of their institution-building and rationalizing functions
to the benefits of the recipient country and ASEAN as a whole. With re-
spect to the rationalizing function, to draw together two donors in a tri-
lateral cooperation project can be seen as an attempt to explore a more
efficient, thus rationalized, use of scarce resources as well as comple-
mentarities between the two donors while addressing development-re-
lated issues foreseen by the multilateral fora. Because of the available
human resources and training facilities in the field, it seems under-
standable that the EU sees the particular potential of the co-donor
scheme in the areas of human resource development, institutional capa-
city building and infrastructure development. It should be noted that,
170 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
although trade-related and economically driven, the EU’s assistance allo-
cated to less advanced ASEAN countries may also serve to support the
above-mentioned TREATI and ASEAN’s economic and institutional in-
tegration efforts. Although not much has been achieved in terms of in-
stitutionalizing via this trilateral channel, it is evident that Thailand and
the EU have also taken the first steps through a series of bilateral dis-
cussions including the seminal workshop on aid effectiveness that was
held in Bangkok in October 2006. This event – as hosted by Thailand
International Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – pro-
vides the opportunity for traditional donors, the representatives of insti-
tutions involved and other relevant national and international agencies
to address the challenges in the implementation of the Paris Declara-
tion.6
A concept that is closely related to trilateral cooperation are the ‘twin-
ning arrangements’, which were also introduced in the 2003 communi-
qué from the European Commission (2003c). They have provided an-
other channel for the promotion of cooperation – and, in some cases,
creating partnerships – between the European and ASEAN public insti-
tutions and non-state actors. The Council firmly believes that this initia-
tive may be helpful for the improvement of the delivery of development
assistance to the region and encourage the cooperative involvement be-
tween national institutions (see also European Commission 2004d). In
Southeast Asia, the Thai government has had the opportunity to pio-
neer the ‘EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Pro-
gramme (ECAP II) Twinning Initiative’, which – as funded by the EU’s
ECAP II – is aimed at creating a practical network of Geographical Indi-
cations (GIs) between current and potential producers as well as respon-
sible institutions – both public and private – in the EU and ASEAN
countries. This step in EU-Thailand relations may also contribute to the
orientation of ASEAN producers, as noted by Jean-Jacques Bouflet, Min-
ister-Counsellor of the Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land: ‘The protection of geographical indications promises to generate
potentially significant benefits for local producers, SMEs and indigen-
ous groups and it is clear that many ASEAN products (rice, silk, coffee,
textiles, fruits, etc.) stand to gain from the use of GIs in national and in-
ternational markets’ (cited in Delegation of the European Commission
to Thailand 2006a). Moreover, the EC-ASEAN Regional Seminar and
Exhibition on the Protection and Promotion of GIs titled ‘Lands of Tra-
dition and Opportunities’ was hosted in Bangkok in June 2006 and or-
ganized by the ECAP II and the Department of Intellectual Property
Rights, the Thai Ministry of Commerce, and the ASEAN Secretariat
(ibid.).7 The twinning initiative may also create a direct partnership for
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the protection and promotion of GIs such as the expected collaboration
in the matter of Thai silk between the Thai Queen Sirikit Institute and
the French Interprofession of Champagne (ibid.).
For constructivists, EU-Thailand relations are regarded as pursuing
the value-based orientation of trilateral cooperation, in which the EU
and Thailand may form a collective identity of co-donors and promote
certain values such as sustainable social and economic development. As
discussed in the above unit-level analysis, the Thai government has per-
ceived its new roles as an international donor country, which has led to
the introduction of a new set of development programs in the region
and subregion. As previously mentioned, the concept of trilateral coop-
eration is not only meant to benefit a recipient country as such, but,
through the interaction and exchange of views, the Thai government be-
comes familiar with its new roles as an emerging donor and thus help
define its social identities in the donor community.8 While the EU wel-
comes this development, the concept of trilateral cooperation can also
be regarded as a helpful approach for the EU in the Southeast Asian re-
gion:
Given the diversity of the countries of the region, the flexibility of
the new mechanism is a great strength, enabling it to facilitate
progress, rather than being restrictive. An example is the prag-
matic approach to determining on what level to proceed with
each sectoral issue with each country, rather than dogmatically
asserting an exclusively regional or bilateral framework (Eur-
opean Commission 2003c: 28).
This statement suggests that the contribution of the EU-Thailand bilat-
eral relations to the regional cooperation framework is not only crucial
for constructing the political and economic interest of trilateral coopera-
tion but also important in terms of pragmatism and a complex learning
process. On the EU’s side, the European Commission (2003c) empha-
sizes the fact that the conduct of trilateral development cooperation in
the ASEAN countries remains committed to the priority areas of good
governance, human rights, the environment and forestry, trade-related
technical assistance and counter-terrorism and that the resulting pro-
jects should be arranged in line with the Initiative for ASEAN Integra-
tion. In this regard, the Council also ‘confirm[ed] the EU’s essential in-
terest in a stable and democratic South East Asia’ (see also European
Commission 2004d).
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V.1.3 The EU’s FTA with the ASEAN Countries: Region-Divergent or
Region-Convergent?
The distinction between ‘region-divergent’ and ‘region-convergent’ bila-
teralism, as postulated by Dent (2006), theorizes the implications of
new bilateralism for the development of regionalism. The thesis of re-
gion-divergent bilateralism refers to the impact that new bilateral rela-
tions has in undermining the integratory development of regional orga-
nizations or the region as a whole (ibid. 86). From a theoretical view-
point, this interpretation of new bilateralism rests upon the neorealist
notion, in which bilateral relations can strategically become an instru-
ment of power used to retain an institutional balance within a region
and, as a consequence, so that the balancing and counter-balancing dy-
namics do not lead to any deeper cooperation but rather an opportunis-
tic (re-)alignment of two interested parties. Moreover, if the objectives
are inconsistently set at the bilateral and regional levels, one can predict
that bilateralism will lead to intra-regional rivalries and – in some cases
– a gaping development divide (ibid.). In contrast, the thesis of region-
convergent bilateralism is based on the views that as long as bilateral-
ism and multilateralism are pursued toward compatible objectives the
former will rationally complement the latter and that this rationalization
process can subsequently bring about sub-structural patterns of new bi-
lateral ties in support of the development of regionalism (ibid. 84-85).
The ‘lattice regionalism’ phenomenon (ibid.), which metaphorically
gives an account of the aforementioned positive dynamics of bilateral-
ism in relation to regionalism, can therefore be understood in the neo-
liberal institutionalist tradition insofar as the two parties involved are
likely to contribute to rationalizing intra- and interregional relations and
establishing a broader institutional cooperation framework.
From a neorealist perspective, there is evidence to suggest that, with
regard to the EU’s attempts to establish new bilateral agreements, EU-
Thailand relations may provide further balancing dynamics within the
Southeast Asian region. The Council pointed out that ‘[it] supports the
Commission’s call for rebalancing the overall relationship with South
East Asia by offering the possibility of bilateral agreements with inter-
ested countries whilst confirming the strong EU commitment to sup-
port the process of ASEAN integration’ (cited in European Commission
2004d). As things now stand, the EU and Thailand find themselves in
the final stages of negotiating a bilateral Framework Agreement, which
is not only expected to provide a comprehensive, far-reaching frame-
work for their bilateral dialogues and cooperation projects but also to
give the two parties ‘a stronger, deeper and more structured relation-
ship’ (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006g). It
is noted that as soon as these framework agreements also become the
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pre-conditions of the EU-ASEAN FTA proposals, the EU-ASEAN FTA is
likely to consist of separate – or supplementary – bilateral agreements
with the seven ASEAN countries. Meanwhile, it is hardly surprising that
negotiations regarding framework partnerships and cooperation agree-
ments are currently in progress between six ASEAN countries – Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – and
probably Vietnam very soon as well.
The question is whether the EU-Thailand Framework Agreement will
play an important role in the developments of the EU’s Southeast Asian
strategies. It is noteworthy that Thailand and Singapore were the first
two ASEAN member states to confirm their intention to launch negotia-
tions on bilateral ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreements’ with the
EU during the 5th ASEM Summit in October 2004 (European Commis-
sion 2004e). ASEAN has recently been criticized for its adoption of
‘ASEAN-x formula, which – as an opt-out clause – is aimed at providing
comfort to the ‘slow mover’ fellow member states while allowing those
who are ready to cooperate to advance in the integration agendas as
planned.9 Alongside this ‘ASEAN-x’ formula, the ‘2+x’ approach, which
– as later introduced mainly by Singapore and Thailand – also offers
the opportunity for any two ‘fast mover’ countries to work together in
specific sectors, yet only increases EU skepticism about whether this
formula can be widely used as there may be a certain degree of internal
fragmentation among the ASEAN member states in the future.10 At the
time, a move toward that concept of ‘ASEAN-3’, which – if this becomes
a reality – would leave ASEAN’s three least developed countries out,
can be argued not only as a way to avoid premature liberalization but
also as an inference drawn to present ‘an elegant way around’ with re-
gard to Burma’s politics (Maes 2007: 15; see also Euractiv 2007).
Institutionalists expect EU-Thailand bilateral relations to contribute to
the establishment of institutions or the rationalizing of the EU-ASEAN
relations in support of ASEAN’s efforts regarding regional integration.
Although it may be too early to assess the institution-building function
of EU-Thailand bilateralism in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations at this
time, it is obvious that the EU and the individual ASEAN member
states including Thailand are all cautious about the potential benefits of
institutions but have been ready to set up some if necessary. In re-
sponse to the European Commission’s adoption of the mandate for the
EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, for example, the ASEAN countries agreed
to establish a ‘Joint Committee’ that will focus on setting up the frame-
work for these negotiations in terms of their programmatic schedule
and time frame (Office of Commercial Affairs 2007a).
On the ASEAN side, cooperation within the Sub-Committee on Trade
of the ASEAN Brussels Committee is expected to increasingly strength-
en over the course of FTA negotiations. With respect to the rationalizing
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function, it is evident that the pre-negotiations of the EU-ASEAN FTA
rely heavily on the above-mentioned ‘new bilateral framework agree-
ments’ such as the one between the EU and Thailand. In a way, the on-
going negotiations of the bilateral partnership and cooperation agree-
ments (PCAs) with several ASEAN member states, including Thailand,
are merely regarded by the Council as a means of intensifying the EU’s
relations with ASEAN (Council of the European Union 2007). The
Council has also suggested that the conclusion of the EU-ASEAN FTA
be subject to the conclusion of these bilateral PCAs with the ASEAN
member states and that the resulting FTA and the PCAs be coherent in
support of the EU-ASEAN relations (ibid.).
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest an agenda-setting func-
tion insofar as certain issues of bilateral concern to the EU and Thai-
land are likely to be accommodated in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations.
At an early stage of negotiation, for instance, the Thai representative
was concerned with the ‘rules of origin’ issues in the EU-ASEAN FTA
negotiations, for it is likely that a new form of ‘rules of origin’ – as cur-
rently being drafted by the European Commission – may introduce the
value-added principle and some changes in the new Certificate of Ori-
gin (Form A) in order to improve the existing system under the GSP
scheme (Office of Commercial Affairs 2007a).11 Interestingly, as men-
tioned by Sandra Callagan, Deputy Head of Unit-Coordinator for
ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Brunei, the EU has indeed
designated this aspect of the ‘rules of origin’ as one of the issues that it
will concentrate on during the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations (Mission
of Thailand to the European Communities 2007). In October 2008, it
became apparent that the EU even expected to see an exchange of offers
with Thailand, Singapore and Brunei, which involved initial terms and
conditions with a list of products to be included for tariff reduction, as
a further step to establishing an agenda for the EU-ASEAN FTA nego-
tiations (Kanoksilp 2008).
As things now stand, it seems that the organizational differences be-
tween the EU and ASEAN may lead to a protracted process, as ASEAN
Secretary General Ong Keng Yong also observed:
They [the EU] have defined rules and established practices for
every sector and product and it will take a long time for us from
ASEAN to digest and conclude acceptable arrangements for both
sides. It’ll be a long, drawn-out process (Financial Express, May
16, 2007).
In fact, Ong Keng Yong himself believed that the EU-ASEAN FTA is
likely to close a deal in as early as 2015 – the year of the ASEAN goal of
creating a single market for its 10 member states (ibid.). This 2015 tar-
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get date must be understood in the context of ASEAN’s own efforts
within the framework of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).12 This ap-
proach to ASEAN’s regional economic integration seems very promis-
ing to outside observers including the EU, although the steps taken
thus far are incomparable to that of the European Community some
decades before.13 As far as the path toward a more rules-based and ef-
fective organization is concerned, the Bali Concord II as negotiated by
the ASEAN leaders in October 200314 and subsequently, the ASEAN
Charter, which was formally enacted in December 2008, have become
key institutional frameworks that strive for the realization of an ASEAN
Community by 2015.
In contrast, constructivists would emphasize the significance of bila-
teralism in terms of ideas and identities, which the two parties – the
EU and Thailand – have associated or have been associated with in a
so-called endogenous process of collective identity formation. In a sense,
it is possible to see bilateralism from either the region-divergent or re-
gion-convergent point of view depending on the actors’ interpretations
of social reality and through mutual definition. In this constructivist no-
tion, one would expect that the relations between the major negotiating
parties including the EU and Thailand would bring along certain inter-
ests and norms and help to define ideas and identities accordingly with-
in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations. Although, in practice, there is thus
far not much evidence to suggest the identity-building function of bila-
teralism within the FTA talks, the political situation in Burma stands
out regarding the issues of human rights, migration and the promotion
of democracy, while, as mentioned above, Thailand’s approach has been
very cautious toward its neighbor. Minister-Counsellor of the Trade Sec-
tion of the Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Jean-
Jacques Bouflet, for example, points out that the Burma issues are cru-
cial in the proceedings of FTA negotiations and that the EU member
states continue to support political reforms in the country (Pratruangk-
rai 2006). Upon authorizing the European Commission to start nego-
tiating an FTA with ASEAN in April 2007, the European Parliament
(2007) clearly ‘[urges] the Council and the Commission to continue
their constructive relationship with ASEAN countries and to ensure that
the EU-ASEAN free trade negotiations are used as a vehicle to increase
pressure on the SPDC to establish a civilian and democratic govern-
ment’. Later, the European Parliament also adopted the report ‘Trade
and economic relations with the countries of South East Asia (ASEAN)’,
drafted by a British Member of the European Parliament, Glyn Ford,
which once again requires conditions that the resulting FTA must meet
with regard to sustainable development, the fight against fraud and re-
spect for human rights, suggesting that Burma should not be allowed
to be part of this agreement (European Parliament 2008).
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V.1.4 China Factors: EU-Thailand Relations and East Asian Regionalism
In a luncheon speech during his first official visit to Thailand in April
2005, the then EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, pointed out
the relevance of EU-Thailand relations in relation to the rise of China
and the economic developments in the region, as follows:
Thailand’s increasing dynamism and economic growth in recent
years has been impressive. Nonetheless, it is clear that Thailand,
like the rest of ASEAN, cannot afford to rest on their laurels,
especially when faced with the unrelenting competition coming
from China. I have been impressed by the dedication and for-
ward-planning demonstrated by the Thai government. The conti-
nuing economic health of Thailand is naturally one of its main
preoccupations, and it is good to know that its attention is also
being given to EU-Thai trade relations (Delegation of the Eur-
opean Commission to Thailand 2005c).
Although China had already come into contact with ASEAN because of
some security concerns such as the South China Sea issues by the early
1990s, the increasing role that China plays can to a large extent be ex-
plained by looking at the Asian crisis. The fact that China did not de-
preciate the Yuan and actively participated in international efforts to
help the affected countries in Southeast Asia during the Asian crisis is
said to have significantly improved its influence and image in ASEAN
(Kreft 2000: 27). In the economic sphere, further important steps to-
ward East Asian regionalism can be found in at least three incidents: (i)
ASEAN inviting China, Japan and South Korea to the ASEAN+3 meet-
ings and approving their regular participation in this group thereafter,
(ii) the materialization of the so-called ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ and (iii)
the recent FTA negotiations between ASEAN and East Asian countries.
To give an overview, as far as the FTA negotiations are concerned,
ASEAN and China signed the ‘Framework Agreement on Comprehen-
sive Economic Co-operation between ASEAN and China’ in November
2002.15 Two years later, during the 10th ASEAN Summit in November
2004, the two parties quickly came to sign two further related agree-
ments, which are the ‘Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between ASEAN
and China’ and the ‘Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of
the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
between ASEAN and China’, both of which would then enter in force
on January 1, 2005.16 The other two ‘Plus Three’ countries – Japan and
South Korea – have also noticeably been engaged in negotiations with
ASEAN. Like China, Japan signed the ‘Framework for Comprehensive
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Economic Partnership between ASEAN and Japan’ in November
2002.17 The signing of the ASEAN-China agreements is seen as very
important to Japan with regard to how it negotiates with ASEAN, so
that, at the same summit, both parties confirmed the schedule that the
start of negotiations on trade in goods would begin in April 2005, and
conclude two years thereafter and would agree to the establishment of
the ASEAN-Japan FTA by 2012.18 South Korea, in contrast, had only
been in the FTA negotiations with Singapore at the time of the 10th
ASEAN Summit. However, it also showed strong interest in participat-
ing in the negotiations with ASEAN in early 2005.19
From the neorealist perspective, EU-Thailand relations will produce
the balancing dynamics in the development of East Asian regionalism,
in particular with regard to the rise of China. The EU and Thailand, as
regional players, are obviously responding to the competition that China
and the other two East Asian countries have intensified for the ASEAN
countries and within the ASEAN+3 grouping in general. As mentioned
above, their recent efforts between the EU and Thailand, in response,
have been to consider adopting certain measures to improve its invest-
ment climate and focus on particular sectors of investment such as ser-
vices and high value-added, high technology sectors, which include tele-
com, logistics, health services, regional head offices, and the wholesale
and retailing (see chapter IV.2.2). In a sense, their investment relations
illustrate that ASEAN has been sensitive to China’s competition in view
of the possible diversion of investment flows. Within the region,
ASEAN’s share of the EU’s FDI stock – in contrast to that of the +3
countries – has declined from 55% in 1995 to about 50% in 2002.20
The rapid growth of EU FDI stock in the +3 countries is also unmistak-
able, because, in 1995, EU FDI stock was worth about E 15 billion while
that of ASEAN about E 20 billion, but by 2002, both the ASEAN and
the +3 countries had EU FDI stock worth some E 54 billion each (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of Invest-
ment of Thailand 2004). Of the +3 countries, China has been seen as
the major factor in explaining the growth of EU FDI stock in East Asia
(ibid.). Evidently, China’s share of EU FDI outflows increased nearly
three-fold from E 787 million to E 2.570 billion between 1995 and 2002
while that of the ASEAN countries increased from E 1.852 billion to
E 2.760 billion over the same period (ibid.). In terms of FDI stocks, EU
FDI stocks in China have experienced a sharp 900% rise from E 2.3 bil-
lion in 1995 to E 20 billion in 2002 while ASEAN’s EU FDIs stocks
also increased but at a slower rate of 270% – from E 20 billion in 1995
to E 54 billion in 2002 (ibid.). Thailand has remained relatively unaf-
fected by this development, however.21 The statistics reveal that within
ASEAN, Thailand’s share of EU FDI flows – except during the Asian
crisis period – continued to remain steady at roughly E 0.6 billion be-
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tween 1995 and 2002 (ibid.). Regarding the amount of FDI stocks,
Thailand also has seen an increase in its EU FDI stocks at a rate
roughly the same as in most ASEAN countries. More specifically, Thai-
land has experienced an increase in real terms from E 2 billion in 1995
to E 5.5 billion in 2002, which remained approximately 10% of EU FDI
stocks in ASEAN (ibid.).
Moreover, the idea of accommodating China and Japan in the
ASEAN+3 framework can be traced to the Malaysian Premier Ma-
hathir’s proposal in 1990, in which he attempted to create a so-called
‘East Asian Economic Group’ as a competing trade bloc to APEC (Rü-
land 1996: 61). Although the proposal could not resist the strong oppo-
sition of the US and had to be modified in the ‘East Asian Economic
Caucus’ to that of a consultation function among APEC’s Asian mem-
bers, it is clear that the ASEAN countries early on were seeking ‘a bar-
gaining-chip’ to be used against the extra-regional powers including the
EU and the US in particular (ibid.). In the ASEM and the ARF, as will
be discussed in greater details below, it is apparent that the EU and
Thailand have been supporting the extension of the region-to-region
dialogues to the East Asian countries. The recent efforts by the ASEAN
countries to explore the possibility of free trade arrangements with Chi-
na can be seen as their ‘double-binding’ strategy toward the latter (Kang
2003; Archarya 2003 and 2004: 153, in: Rüland 2005a: 551). The deci-
sion of the ASEAN countries including Thailand to grant the ‘Market
Economy Status’ to China seems to have softened the EU’s positions to
a considerable extent, thus smoothing the way for the EU to advance in
the FTA negotiations.22 It should also be noted that the future of East
Asian regionalism depends on the ASEAN relations with China and Ja-
pan and that, in support of neorealist arguments, they also establish in-
creased balancing dynamics within the region:
it becomes increasingly evident that the participation of China
and Japan in APT [ASEAN Plus Three] is double-edged sword.
While it may promote East Asian cooperation where common in-
terests exist, it is also a recipe for inviting rivalries and conflicts
into the cooperative forums of the region. With intensifying
Sino-Japanese competition, APT is not only becoming increas-
ingly intertwined with Asian regional powers’ geo-political and
security interests it is also shifting from an outward-oriented bal-
ancing institution to an arena for intraregional balancing games
(Rüland 2006a: 162-163).
Beyond the balancing dynamics, there has been a discussion about
‘hedging’, i.e., the attempt of a state to bind a rising, threatening power
when the state’s position seems uncertain (Chung 2004). According to
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Chung (ibid.), the rise of China in the economic and security spheres is
expected to give rise to a certain amount of uncertainty among the
ASEAN countries – indeed, is China ‘a threatening military hegemon’
or ‘a friendly economic partner’? – and thus it is very likely that the
ASEAN countries may adopt a ‘hedging’ type of foreign policy behavior
in an attempt to maximize one’s own economic benefits and reduce se-
curity risks. In this respect, China’s role in Southeast Asia makes it ob-
vious that both the EU and Thailand have a clear interest in integrating
China into the international system, both politically and economically.
This argument can be supported by at least three developments as ob-
served in, first, a recent EU-Thailand project of trying to feed China’s
expanding demand for wood pulp and paper industry based on a more
integrated, effective and transparent use of natural resources, second,
the European Commission’s project with the Thai, Chinese and Vietna-
mese governments in stimulating prefabricated environmental package
systems in the relevant business models and investments in Asia and,
third, the recent effort by the European Commission to build up the
EU-Asia network of competence enhancement on public private part-
nerships in infrastructure development with China, Germany, India,
Thailand and the UK (Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land 2006g).
By contrast, neoliberal institutionalists would expect EU-Thailand re-
lations to perform institution-building, rationalizing or agenda-setting
functions in East Asian regionalism. According to Chirathivat (2006:
101), bilateralism has played a significant role in spanning a trend of re-
gionalism to East Asia, with ‘almost without exception’, be it a large or
small country. Thus far, evidence suggests that the EU and Thailand
both support the regional efforts in the areas of mutual interest and that
their bilateral cooperation activities can, under certain circumstances,
lead to a positive development in East Asian regionalism. For example,
the issues of intellectual property rights enforcement demonstrate that
it is possible for the EU and Thailand to bilaterally discuss the issues
when necessary and seek cooperation partners within ASEAN. Ironi-
cally, the evidence suggests that since China is often the cause of ser-
ious concerning intellectual property rights issues in the region, the
EU’s recent efforts have been to raise these issues in bilateral and regio-
nal dialogues and to build up relevant cooperation activities with the
governments of other East and Southeast Asian countries. The EU has
recently appointed a new ‘Regional Representative for Taxation and
Customs’ within the Delegation of the European Commission to Thai-
land. The current holder of this post, Pierre Faucherand, has pointed
out that his tasks include promoting EU customs policy in third coun-
tries and to provide them with necessary assistance – e.g., in developing
a more efficient targeting system – based on the EU’s own experience
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(EU Today, April 2007: 18). When he was asked in an interview why
the EU chose Bangkok, he pointed out:
Trade in fakes is a serious problem and has expanded quickly.
The main source is China but others also cause concern. A main
worry is the diversion of goods through other countries. It is
therefore important from a customs perspective to try to address
the issue in countries surrounding China (ibid.).
It is apparent that from his viewpoint, the regional efforts of the EU in
China and the ASEAN countries can be closely linked to the establish-
ment of an effective system that protects intellectual property rights
(ibid.). In the ‘IPR Enforcement Survey’ presented by the European
Commission in October 2006, China was clearly identified as the EU’s
main priority while five ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam – have ‘high levels of production,
transit and/or consumption of IP infringing goods’ (Mission of Thai-
land to the European Communities 2006b; European Commission
2006h). More specifically, the main issues in Thailand seem to include
(i) copyright piracy, (ii) counterfeit of trademarks, (iii) infringement of
designs, and (iv) patent infringement, so that, between the EU and
Thailand, the former hopes to set up annual dialogues among intellec-
tual property rights experts within the TREATI framework thereby en-
couraging the Thai government to raise the standards of the intellectual
property protection nationally and regionally (ibid.). Thailand has thus
far benefited from the EU-funded initiative ‘EC-ASEAN Intellectual
Property Rights Cooperation Programme’ (ECAP II), in which the EU
mostly provides technical assistance in intellectual property rights-re-
lated activities of the ASEAN countries with the aim of improving the
latter’s relevant domestic administration and enforcement measures
(ibid.; Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006g).23
Another example can be found in attempts by the EU to support the
Mekong River Commission, to which the Thai government belongs as
one of the founding members. Established with the Agreement on the
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Ba-
sin in 1995, the Mekong River Commission is supposed to help protect
the environment and natural resources, to promote the Basin’s ecologi-
cal balance and aquatic conditions and – together with the Mekong
Greater Subregion – to coordinate the development efforts in the subre-
gion (Mekong River Commission 1995, cited in Dosch and Hensen-
gerth 2005: 279). The positions of the EU and its member states re-
garding the promotion of subregional stability and security have been
reaffirmed by both the European Commission and the Council, as
noted by the latter: ‘The Council welcomes the stabilising and conflict
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preventing function of subregional organisations like the Mekong River
Commission. The improvement of regional stability and security is also
the best way to address the problem of WMD proliferation as laid down
in the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’
(European Commission 2004d). In this light, the above-mentioned ex-
ample of the European Commission’s initiative to establish an EU-Asia
network of competence enhancement on public private partnerships in
infrastructure development with China, Thailand, Germany, India, and
the UK can also understood in the institutionalist tradition, along with
the project of the European Commission to develop food and agribusi-
ness training in the Mekong region in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia,
and China or another project to build up a Euro-Asian network for qual-
ity, organic and unique food marketing in China, Thailand, Austria,
Italy and the UK (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
2006g).
The constructivist explanation, at this point, has relatively less evi-
dence to suggest the identity-building function of EU-Thailand relations
in the ASEAN+3 context. Nevertheless, from the above-mentioned ex-
ample of the prospects of EU-Thailand customs cooperation, it becomes
apparent that the EU’s focus in the East and Southeast Asian regions
has been increasingly directed at strengthening dialogues with Thailand
and other ASEAN countries and, so, promoting communication and
mutual understanding between them. Besides, it is clear that the recent
trends of economic regionalism in East Asia gradually reveal ASEAN’s
emerging perception of its economic future in conjunction with the
need to develop relations with China and that the inclusion of China
and Japan in the ASEAN+3 framework would provide the opportunity
for building up ‘strategic trust’ in the process of mutual definition (Gil-
son 2006: 222; Haacke 2002: 27).
V.2 EU-Thailand Relations and Interregionalism
The rise of interregionalism in the late-1990s poses a question on the
relevance of bilateralism to these new region-to-region relations. It is
clear that the EU and the Thai government are two important actors on
the European and Asian sides, respectively. The first chapter stresses
the importance of bilateralism in the EU’s interregional responses to
the Asian crisis, particularly within the frameworks of the ASEM Trust
Fund and the European Investment Bank. The next two sections will fo-
cus on the functions performed by the EU-Thailand interaction in two
interregional institutions, which seem to be the most relevant as well as
the best known frameworks in the Europe-Asia relations, namely ASEM
and the ARF.
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V.2.1 Implications of the Asian Crisis: The Cases of the ASEM Trust Fund
and the European Investment Bank
While chapter IV.2.3 provided the analysis of the approaches of the EU
and Thailand in response to the Asian crisis individually, this section
continues to focus on the contribution of their bilateralism to crisis
management at the interregional level. Thailand, one of the most af-
fected countries, was clearly driven by self-interest and national survival.
The Thai government – so realists predicted – would certainly seek to
instrumentalize its bilateral relations with most of the major regional
players including the EU and EU member states. For neorealists, with
respect to crisis-driven change in regional power structures, the bilater-
alism between Thailand and the EU performs an institutional balancing
function in their interregional relations in response to the Asian crisis.
The relevance of ASEM to post-Asian crisis management is observable
insofar as, although modest, the EU’s main contribution was channeled
through the ASEM initiatives. Apart from the adoption of the ‘ASEM
Trade and Investment Pledge’, which reconfirmed the common posi-
tions not to introduce any protectionist measures in the wake of the cri-
sis, the creation of the ‘ASEM Asian Financial crisis Response Trust
Fund’ at the London Summit in 1998 seemed to be one of the EU’s
most tangible achievements, with the European Commission being the
largest contributor together with eight individual EU member states in-
cluding the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Den-
mark and Luxembourg (see also European Commission 2007m; World
Bank 2003).
Most importantly, it should be noted that the idea of ASEM Trust
Fund can be traced back to the proposal of the Thai and Malaysian gov-
ernments, in which the EU was requested to consider creating a new
fund to promote trade and investment relations with Asian countries
and to support the recovery efforts of affected countries (Nicolas 2000:
135, 138). It is noteworthy that the earlier proposal by Asian Monetary
Fund had been turned down in 1997 (ibid.). In practice, the EU and the
ASEAN countries managed to create the ASEM Trust Fund at the sec-
ond ASEM Summit in London in April 1998 (ibid.). More importantly,
the EU is by far the largest contributor to the trust fund in both phases,
accounting for about 45% of the total E 84.6 million (EU Today, De-
cember 2006: 10). The fund was comprised of two phases, with the sec-
ond one being established after the completion of the first in March
2001 and coming to end in August 2006.
Furthermore, the bilateral impulse from the EU and the Thai govern-
ment has played a ‘rationalizing’ role in the identification and imple-
mentation of some post-crisis recovery projects under the ASEM trust
funds, which are in effect a regional initiative of the ASEM process.
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Within the ASEM Trust Fund I, 77 projects were approved and 71 were
implemented, totaling $ 44.20 million in funding. Nine of the projects
were executed in Thailand: (i)‘Revival of Corporate Sector’, (ii) ‘Impact
of Financial Crisis on School Attendance’, (iii) ‘Poverty Alleviation & So-
cial Protection Mechanisms’, (iv) ‘Financial Sector Advisory Services’,
(v) ‘Empowering Thai Communities to Improve the Environment’, (vi)
‘Rural Development Impacts of the Crisis’, (vii) ‘Developing Govern-
ment Capability to Monitor, Evaluate & Support Implementation of Ex-
ternally-Funded Projects during the Crisis’, (viii) ‘Improving Govern-
ance & Social Services through Public Administration Reform’, and (ix)
‘The Thailand Institute of Directors’ (World Bank 2003). In a regional
comparison, in the ASEM Trust Fund I, Thailand received only the fifth
largest allocation (approximately $ 5.85 million or 13.2%) of the seven
beneficiary countries – after Indonesia (16.4%), the Philippines (16.3%),
China (13.8%) and Vietnam (13.3%) but ahead of South Korea (11.3%)
and Malaysia (4.9%) (ibid.).
In the transition between the first and the second ASEM Trust Fund,
it becomes apparent that EU-Thailand relations have gained a rationaliz-
ing dynamics insofar as the subsequent fund concentrated on the social
sector – with the proportion of implemented projects in the social sec-
tor to those in the financial and corporate sector increasing slightly
from about 2:1 to 3.6:1 – further emphasizing the internationally ac-
cepted importance of social protection and poverty alleviation programs
in the country’s post-crisis development (World Bank 2003; World Bank
2006). The 2nd ASEM Trust Fund, as of April 2006, was comprised of
71 projects, totaling some $ 39.1 million, of which 10 projects worth
some $ 7.3 million were allocated to Thailand (World Bank 2006). In
Thailand, the projects into five categories, each consisting of one to four
projects: (i) ‘competitiveness’ (4 projects: a. ‘Out-of-Court Meditation
Capacity Building’, b. ‘Thailand’s Preparation for Financial Services Lib-
eralization’, c. ‘Strategy and Implementation for a Competitive Financial
Sector in Thailand’ and d. ‘Skills and Competitiveness for Poverty Re-
duction in the Northeast’), (ii) ‘human and social capital’ (3 projects: a.
‘Strengthening Social Protection for the Working Population, the Poor
and the Vulnerable in Thailand’, b. ‘Education Reform’ and c. ‘Stimulat-
ing Voluntary Counseling and Testing Services and Early Recruitment
into Antiretroviral Therapy’), (iii) ‘poverty and inequality’ (1 project: ‘Ca-
pacity Building and Strategy for Poverty Reduction’), (iv) ‘natural re-
sources and environment’ (1 project: ‘Participatory Watershed Manage-
ment for Ping River Basin’) and (v) ‘governance’ (1 project: ‘Strengthen-
ing Governance and Social Services through Public Sector’) (Ministry of
Finance, Thailand 2006). In the second phase, it should be noted that
under the concepts of ‘country development partnerships’, Thailand
was also a contributor, providing cash and in-kind contributions to
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match the World Bank’s contributions and engaging in the process of
identifying objectives, inputs and the expected outcomes of activities
(World Bank 2006).
Moreover, EU-Thailand relations, in the context of the ASEM Trust
Fund, are not only directed toward the economic recovery as mentioned
but the fund itself also ‘forms part of the broader ASEM effort to en-
hance relations between Europe and East Asia’ (World Bank 2003: iv).
As far as the institution-building function is concerned, several projects
implemented at the national level may lead to the creation of further ad-
ministrative or decision-making bodies. The idea of establishing the ‘In-
Country Steering Committee’, for instance, which was manifested in the
second trust fund and was widely accepted among donor and recipient
countries, was the result of the European Commission’s proposal as one
of the lessons learned from the ASEM Trust Fund I that there should be
more ownership in each recipient country, particularly at the monitoring
and programming stages of activities (World Bank 2003: 35).
Furthermore, in the case of Thailand, the projects supported by the
ASEM Trust Fund have evidently generated a positive impact on the
country’s own recovery efforts, contributing to the rationalization of re-
gional restructuring concepts at the national level, as the Chairman of
Thailand’s In-Country Steering Committee (ICSC) observed:
The Chairman of Thailand’s ICSC shares the view of various
Thai agencies that the project funding made available by ASEM
TF [Trust Fund] has played a significant role in the development
of the Thai economy, helping to improve competitiveness and al-
leviate poverty incidence. Many of the initial studies funded by
ASEM TF have been expanded into much larger projects, funded
by the Government’s own budget. … As the ASEM TF draws to
an end, Thailand strongly encourages ASEM member countries
to continue such cooperation to support sustainable development
in the region (World Bank 2007b).
Moreover, based on the Thai experience it was considered very impor-
tant and fruitful to coordinate the national efforts in partnership with
other donors including other governments and non-governmental stake-
holders (World Bank 2003: 53). The fact that this committee consists of
representatives from the recipient country, the donor countries and the
World Bank and is in charge of drafting country strategy notes and pro-
gram priorities makes it institutionally possible for the Asian partners
to monitor operation progress as well as to administer certain grants in
the second phases of operation (ibid.).
In comparison, since 1993, the EU has also made it possible for the
Southeast Asian countries including Thailand to benefit from the Eur-
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opean Investment Bank (EIB)’s grants (Forster 1999b: 258; European
Commission 2003c). In retrospect, the access of Thailand and some
ASEAN countries to the EIB grants has been discussed since the EU-
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1992, as a part of the so-called ‘1992
Program’ (Phatharodom 1999: 244). In fact, the role of EIB as ‘the
EU’s investment financing arm in the ALA’ (European Commission
2003c: 51) increasingly attracts the attention of third country govern-
ments where, for example, several ASEAN countries have requested the
EIB’s support in the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation
Programme. The EIB operations have been concentrated in the areas of
mutual interest including private sector and EU foreign direct invest-
ments, upstream infrastructure investments and other investments with
regard to the environment, social conditions and regional integration
(ibid.). The statistics show that between 1993 and 2002, the EIB lent
E 800 million to four countries in Southeast Asia – Indonesia (E 300
million), the Philippines (E 290 million), Thailand (E 155 million) and
Vietnam (E 55 million) of a of E 2.898 million to all of the Asian and La-
tin American participants (ALA) (ibid.). Sectorally, the EIB loans to the
four ASEAN countries can be grouped in six areas of activities: airports
(E 80 million), industry including telecommunications (E 168 million),
oil and gas (E 230 million), power (E 142 million), water and sewerage
(E 150 million), and global loans to SMEs (E 30 million) (ibid.).24
While the ASEM trust fund and the EIB are both designed to follow
a project-oriented – and, in many ways, rationalizing – approach to
funding bilateral and regional activities related to international coopera-
tion in third countries, the latter appears to be more responsive when it
comes to the question of bilateral elements and balancing dynamics in
the region. In a way, for example, the argument of ‘burden sharing’ can
be found in the EIB’s operation scheme in Asia. The EIB increasingly
operates under the so-called ‘risk sharing guarantee scheme’, which im-
plies the coverage of commercial risk by the prime rate guarantee and
that of political risk – such as non-tranferability of currency, expropria-
tion and civil strife – by the EU budgetary guarantee (European Com-
mission 2003c). This scheme illustrates another mechanism of risk
management, in which EIB grants include a certain degree of risk cov-
erage for the participating Asian countries (ibid.). It is evident that 55%
of the EIB operation in Asia has thus far – despite a 30% level sug-
gested by the Council – followed this scheme and, in the ASEAN con-
text, the political risk coverage is mostly tied to the framework agree-
ments that were signed with four ASEAN countries – namely, Indone-
sia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (ibid.). Moreover, during the
ALA III mandate for 2000-2007, the EIB restricted its financing contri-
bution to a 50% ceiling of total project costs, although in case of limited
resources it might also offer loans below the requested amounts (ibid.).
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From a constructivist viewpoint, EU-Thailand relations can be under-
stood within the context of forming a collective identity in an interregio-
nal framework such as ASEM. In this sense, the creation of the ASEM
Trust Fund not only represents a rational response to the Asian crisis
but attaches its relevance to the process of mutual recognition through
interaction, as someone once mentioned: ‘The Fund was not viewed as
an injection of capital, but rather a vehicle to provide expertise (espe-
cially from Europe)’ (World Bank 2003: iv). However, there seems to be
less evidence to suggest that the contribution of EU-Thailand relations
is specifically aimed toward the process of collective identity formation.
As an example, one of the projects made available by ASEM Trust Fund
I continues to focus on the establishment of the ‘Thailand Institute of
Directors’, which is said to be the first of its kind in East Asia, establish-
ing a ‘train-the-trainer’ program to assist the Thai authorities with cor-
porate education modules (World Bank 2003: 25). At first glance, this
project undoubtedly contributes to the institution-building function but
upon looking more closely, it suggests that the logics of the project un-
derscore the sharing of experiences and knowledge on corporate gov-
ernance and that educational programs are expected to play a defining
role in the improvement of the performance of executives and board
members and the promotion of corporate best practices (ibid.). The in-
stitute contributes to the positive development of corporate governance
and this is considered very important because once improvements in
corporate governance are introduced they are difficult to reverse
(ibid.).25
V.2.2 EU-Thailand Relations in the ASEM Process
The ASEM process is in fact seen as an important channel, in which
the EU and Thailand represent two crucial actors, respectively in Europe
and Asia and, as seen in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, their bilateral
relations to some extent play an important role in the crisis manage-
ment and in the development of interregional relations in general. The
first ASEM Summit held in Bangkok in March 1996 not only gave a
clear signal of the increasing relevance of interregionalism, but with it,
one notes that the parties involved had to find a way to accommodate
their bilateral relations in this interregional context. The EU’s positions,
which seemed very promising in support of all three – political, eco-
nomic and cultural – pillars of the ASEM process, were determined to
promote the ASEM’s function as a ‘political catalyst’ in the interregional
dialogues, as follows:
… the ASEM process can not be seen as a substitute for other bi-
lateral and multilateral fora linking Asia and Europe. ASEM
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should primarily function as a political catalyst for achieving mu-
tual understanding and enhanced awareness through dialogue
(European Commission 1997).
Interestingly, prior to the Asian crisis, the EU saw the four ASEM eco-
nomic priorities as follows: (i) ‘further dialogues in the Senior Officials
Meeting on Trade and Investment (SOMTI) on how Asia and Europe
can best promote global trade liberalisation within the WTO’, (ii) ‘im-
plementation of the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and Invest-
ment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP)’, (iii) ‘consolidation of the business
dialogue, emphasising the central role of the Asia-Europe Business For-
um (AEBF)’, and (iv) ‘intensified cooperation in the field of customs’
(ibid.). However, as the Asian Crisis erupted in July 1997, the focus of
ASEM’s economic pillar was expanded beyond these four priority areas,
for the interregional dialogues have been overshadowed by their atten-
tion given to the economic recovery of affected ASEM member coun-
tries and other post crisis-related matters. The subsections that follow
are organized in accordance with the ASEM’s three-pillar structure: a
political, economic and cultural pillar.
V.2.2.1 Political Pillar
While the ASEM as an ‘institution’ has been described – and, in some
cases, criticized – as ‘soft’ in terms of structural weaknesses and the
ASEM’s relative lack of tangible outcomes or binding commitments,
the relevance of bilateral meetings between the heads of government
alongside the ASEM process has been widely accepted and, in a way, ir-
onically referred to as another raison d’être for this interregionalism
(see also Rüland 2006a; Reiterer 2006). In other words, the logic be-
hind the ASEM process obviously embraces the participants’ attempts
to strengthen their bilateral relations in addition to advancing the devel-
opments of interregionalism as such. As Reiterer (2006) asserts, the
ASEM can be recognized as very crucial for the EU’s relations with the
ASEAN member countries because of the possibility of these bilateral
meetings, for example, the Commissioner of External Relations Benita
Ferrero-Waldner met all of her Asian counterparts within two days of
the 7th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kyoto in May 2005. The
importance attached to such bilateral dialogues illustrates their promis-
ing functions for the developments of region-to-region relations, in
which the ASEM participants including the EU and Thailand remain
openly committed to engaging in a very broad set of political issues,
ranging from ‘tackling environmental issues’, ‘addressing human
rights’, ‘security and anti-terrorism co-operation’ to ‘addressing interna-
tional and regional developments’, ‘dealing with global threats’ and ‘re-
inforcing the multilateral system’ (European Commission 2007m).
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The neorealist argument focuses on the sensitivity of states to struc-
tural changes and suggests their adoption of balancing strategies to im-
prove their relative power positions. As regards the relevance of bilateral
relations in the ASEM process, it is to be expected that the bilateralism
of the EU and Thailand contributes to the balancing dynamics in the
development of interregionalism. For its own part, the EU seems to be
well aware of the significance of the ASEM process in the balancing
trends in East and Southeast Asia, as mentioned in Commission’s com-
muniqué: ‘The Asia-Europe summit meeting was very much initiated
by South-East Asians, highlighting their desire to balance their relation
with the United States and to engage East Asia in a proper multilateral
dialogue’ (European Commission 2003c: 15). Bilaterally, between the
EU and Thailand, it is probably no coincidence that the Thai Foreign
Minister recently arranged to meet with his Portuguese counterpart on
the sidelines of the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hamburg in
May 2007, not least of which because Portugal was about to assume the
EU presidency in the second half of that year (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Thailand 2007d).
Moreover, EU-Thailand relations have been instrumentalized to
achieve a more balanced relationship between the European and Asian
ASEM participants. As mentioned above, the Thai side could raise the
concerns on double standards about ASEM membership after the
ASEAN’s and the EU’s enlargements, as the former spokesman of the
Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly asserted: ‘While the EU insists
that its 10 new members have to be admitted into ASEM, they refuse to
apply the same standard for the Asian side. They pick and choose our
ASEAN new members, not admitting Myanmar’ (Asian Economic News,
June 28, 2004). This could be seen as one of the EU’s attempts to bind
bilateral issues such as its relations with Burma within the interregional
framework. In response, in July 2004, the General Affairs and External
Relations Council reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to the ASEM pro-
cess and its willingness to find an acceptable solution for the ASEM
Summit in Hanoi (European Commission 2004d). As a consequence,
the appointment of Hans van den Broek as the Special Envoy of the
Presidency was expected to spur the process of consultation with other
ASEM countries on Burma’s membership.
For institutionalists, bilateralism is regarded as a contributing trend
to intra- and interregional cooperation in terms of its institution-
building, rationalizing and agenda-setting functions. As regards the ra-
tionalizing function, for instance, the EU has been active in the ASEM
process to encourage all participating countries including Thailand to
adopt the Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism
and the Cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism at
the fourth ASEM Summit and subsequently to ratify and implement all
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12 international conventions and protocols on counter-terrorism at the
ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2005, in the way to support the
UN’s roles in the fight against international terrorism (European Com-
mission 2007m).26
It is also evident that certain Thai government initiatives have been
supported by the European Commission and sometimes along with
some EU member states – either in the form of expert assistance or
both sides being co-supporters of specific initiatives, as in the following
examples: First, while Thailand was the main player in the establish-
ment of the ‘Asia-Europe Environment Technology Centre’ (AEETC),
the relevance of EU-Thailand relations is clearly observable in that the
Thai government received the expert assistance from the European
Commission and Japan between October 1996 and March 1997 and
could subsequently initiate small-group meetings of experts to discuss
the AEETC pre-proposals in Bangkok in May and October 1997 (Eur-
opean Commission 2002d). The Thai government formally received the
AEETC mandate at the second ASEM Summit in London in April 1998
and had the official opening along with the second Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Bangkok in March 1999 (European Commission 2002d).
The AEETC follows ‘a pragmatic and modest approach’ aimed at provid-
ing policy guidance and research and development coordination – given
the priority activities in the areas of megacities and bio-remediation as
well as in enhancing public involvement in environmental matters and
supporting the anticipation, management and remediation of major nat-
ural disasters – in order to promote partnerships and networking, so
that these expert meetings were held ten times until 2002 before they
became a part of the ‘ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting’ (Eur-
opean Commission 2006i). As far as financial and in-kind contribu-
tions to the AEETC core operations are concerned, the European Com-
mission has also been very involved since the earliest stages: As of De-
cember 2002, the European Commission had allocated a grant of
E 3.25 million, of which E 1.0 million went to three large conferences
and the other E 2.25 million to the Project Premium Fund, and, it
ended up as the largest single contributor to a total budget of some
E 5.3 million (ibid.; Transnational Institute 2009). However, it should
be noted that most ASEM members had stopped funding the AEETC
by 2002 (Gilson 2002). It is also significant that the ASEM process
gave birth to the ‘Pilot Phase Guidance Group’, which met twice in
1998 to review the guiding principles for the establishment and opera-
tions of the AEETC and to select its director and deputy director and
continued to meet seven times after that over this three-year pilot peri-
od until October 2002 (ibid.).
Another example that concerns the environment was the attempts by
both the EU and Thailand to develop linkages with the science and
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technology interests to support the objectives and priorities of the Asia-
Europe Cooperation Framework 2000. As illustrated above, in the EU’s
initiative on ‘Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade’, it seems that from the EU perspective, Thailand was in a posi-
tion to promote sustainable forestry management in the region. Held in
Chiang Mai in April 2002, the ‘ASEM Workshop on Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Forests’ focused on discussions about establishing
the ‘Project Forum’ that would bring together researchers, government
officials, representatives from the private sector and related institutions
and funding agencies to establish a basis for joint research and develop-
ment activities in ASEM forest cooperation (European Commission
2002e).
Third, in relation to the fight against financial crime, the Thai and
British governments played an important role as the co-sponsors who
presented the ‘Anti-Money-Laundering Initiative’ at the third ASEM
Summit in 2000. The European Commission and the Netherlands
agreed to provide further financial support, so that as of December
2002, contributions totaled some E 1.3 million (European Commission
2002f). Furthermore, the Thai and British governments and the Eur-
opean Commission signed the Memorandum of Understanding in Sep-
tember 2002 (ibid.). By the second ASEM Summit in 1998 and at the
Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Frankfurt in January 1999, it was already
generally agreed that the ASEM process should contribute to interna-
tional anti-money laundering efforts (ibid.). The initiative not only
aimed to promote anti-money laundering cooperation between Europe
and Asia in general but also strengthen the capacity of existing institu-
tions or develop new ones with sustainable institutional capacity in the
latter region (ibid.). Within the framework of this initiative, the ASEM
process has thus far managed to organize two meetings, the first one
serving as the official launching of the initiative in Bangkok in Septem-
ber 2002 and the second was an ASEM Symposium on ‘Underground
banking and alternative remittance services’ in Berlin in October 2003
(European Commission 2006i). Thailand also chaired a steering group
that was established to oversee the project (ibid.). Subsequently, the lo-
gic for this initiative was explained in part in the recommendations by
the international ‘Financial Action Task Force’ (FATF) on anti-money
laundering measures.27
With regard to the new issue of migration, as the EU and Thailand
become increasingly aware of the fact that a growing portion of the mi-
gration flows from Asia to Europe involved human trafficking, the Thai
government had a clear interest in setting up an interregional initiative
to address the issues of trafficking and the exploitation of women and
children, which, as has already been mentioned in chapter IV.1.4, had
certain affinities with the positions expressed in the European Commis-
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sion’s communiqué ‘Integrating Migration Issues in the European Un-
ion’s Relations with Third Countries’ (European Commission 2002i).
The ASEM ‘Initiative to Combat Trafficking in Women and Children’
was originally proposed by the governments of Sweden, Thailand and
the Philippines and adopted at the third ASEM Summit in Seoul in Oc-
tober 2000. These governments also prepared a ‘Progress Report’ to be
presented at the ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting, the Ministerial Con-
ference on the Co-operation for the Management of the Migratory
Flows, and the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, thereby establishing the in-
itiative framework in terms of an action plan and follow-up activities
(European Commission 2002f). Within the ASEM framework, the is-
sues of trafficking in women and children have been voiced formally in
various official documents and statements by the Chairman, for exam-
ple, the Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework III 2000 (Paragraph 14),
the Chairman’s statements of the second and third Foreign Ministers’
Meetings in Berlin in March 1999 (Paragraph 13) and in Beijing in May
2001 (Paragraph 15), and the third ASEM Summit in Seoul in October
2000 (Paragraph 9) (ibid.).28 Bangkok hosted the ‘seminar on the gen-
der dimension of trafficking in persons’ in October 2002 and the ‘con-
ference on the rehabilitation, repatriation and reintegration of victims
of human trafficking’ in March 2003 (ibid.).
From a constructivist viewpoint, the bilateralism between the EU and
Thailand may contribute to the formation of a collective identity in the
ASEM process. There is some evidence that the two parties’ were aware
of ideas and norms such as democracy, good governance and respect
for human rights, however, the ASEM’s political pillar seems to focus
on improving mutual understanding and initiating interregional dialo-
gues at almost all levels. In relation to the AEETC framework, the Thai
government later came up with a proposal to establish the ‘Asia-Europe
City Governors’ Forum’ at the ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting in Lon-
don in February 1998 (European Commission 2002e). Endorsed by the
subsequent Senior Official’s Meeting in Bangkok in October 1998, this
proposal was to establish a network of megacities in the ASEM member
countries, so that the participants could exchange views and experiences
and provide technical assistance in support of the concepts of sustain-
able development in the megacities (ibid.). However, the initiative was
withdrawn and was scheduled to be discussed within the AEETC frame-
work (ibid.).
For the EU’s own part, the European Commission published a work-
ing document in June 1997, in which the ASEM process might contri-
bute to ‘retain[ing] the EU as the European core of ASEM’ (European
Commission 1997). The European Commission’s communiqué ‘Toward
a New Asia Strategy’, had already noted that, one of the EU’s objectives
with regard to relations with Asian countries was to ‘[encourage] decen-
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tralised cooperation between the institutions which are the basis of a
pluralistic civil society. Such cooperation has in the context of the Union
been a powerful force in the shaping of the European identity’ (Eur-
opean Commission 1994). Not surprisingly, in response to human
rights and good governance issues, several bilateral and regional initia-
tives were launched, although the ASEM process, as thematicized else-
where, did not consider the series of ASEM symposia on human rights
and the rule of law to be one of the official ASEM activities (European
Commission 2002g). In the run-up to the fifth ‘Informal ASEM Sym-
posium on Human Rights and the Rule of Law’ in May 2003, for exam-
ple, it is important to note that the Thai government hosted a meeting
on the implications of direct foreign investment for human rights and
development in February 2003, which was in part supported by the
Asia-Europe Foundation (ibid.).
V.2.2.2 Economic Pillar
The Asian crisis produced two important lessons: first, the ASEAN
countries are actually economically very vulnerable to external forces
and, second, that regional responses only marginally helped further
their recovery efforts at the national levels (see also Rüland 2000). The
EU is expected to come to grips with its allegedly modest contribution
during the crisis and more importantly with new economic challenges
arising from the post-crisis economic developments in the East and
Southeast Asian region. As far as the ASEM process is concerned, dis-
cussions continue to address the crucial question of the ASEM’s value
added and, in a way, how to bring together an emerging framework of
interregionalism and the continued relevance of bilateralism, as empha-
sized in the speech by former Trade Commissioner Chris Patten at the
European Parliament’s plenary session in September 2002: ‘Selecting
issues where there is an "ASEM added value" is key, to avoid overlap-
ping agendas. So, defining what should be dealt with bilaterally, in the
regional context or multilaterally is an important task’ (European Com-
mission 2002b). Beyond the area of ‘managing a crisis’, the European
Commission (2007m) points to six specific priorities for new economic
activities including (i) ‘promoting economic multilateralism’, (ii) ‘pro-
moting trade and investment’, (iii) ‘fostering dialogue on financial is-
sues’, (iv) ‘promoting dialogue with the business sector’, (v) ‘pursuing
closer economic partnerships’, and (vi) ‘addressing the social dimension
of globalisation’.
From a neorealist perspective, bilateral relations can be seen as part
of dynamics that drive an institutional balance in the interregional con-
text. As noted, the EU and Thailand represent two important actors in
their respective regions of Europe and Asia in the ASEM process. How-
ever, neorealists contend that the two parties primarily pursue a self-
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interested approach to improving their own positions and are less likely
to promote any deeper cooperation in the ASEM process. An example
can be found in the Thai government’s proposal for the ‘Asia Bond’ in-
itiative at the Fourth ASEM Summit in 2002, in which the instrumenta-
lization of the bilateral relations with the EU and the EU member states
– so the neorealist might argue – seems to support the balancing and,
in a sense, counter-balancing dynamics between the Asian ASEM mem-
ber countries and their European counterparts. In former Prime Minis-
ter Thaksin’s speech at the East Asian Economic Summit in Kuala Lum-
pur in October 2002, it became apparent that the Thai government was
well aware of the gradual shifts in the region’s power structures and
aimed at strategically introducing the ‘Asia Bond’ initiative in support
of the Asian positions: ‘While the EU seems to offer Eurocurrency and
Eurobond to us in Asia, is it an appropriate time for us to offer Asian-
bond to our European partners? Given the strength of Asia in terms of
population and foreig[n] reserves, our European partners should have a
good reason for optimism of this initiative’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2007b).
In addition, the logic of balancing behind the bilateral relations can
well explain the two parties’ opportunistic attempts to improve their re-
lative positions at the interregional level. As Roloff (2006: 26) observed:
‘interregionalism is a defensive strategy. It seeks to balance regionalism
and multilateralism. Hence, regionalism is a negative stimulator for in-
terregional cooperation.’ With regard to access to Thai markets, the
then Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, delivered ‘The EU-Thai-
land – bringing ASEAN and Europe closer together’ speech during his
first official visit to Bangkok in April 2005 that emphasized the pro-
spects of EU companies improving their competitiveness and subse-
quently entering ASEAN markets:
Thailand is also a member of ASEAN, hence its strategic impor-
tance as a potential point of access to other markets in the re-
gion. Increasingly, EU companies will look to invest in Thailand
and indeed other countries in the region, with a longer term,
broader perspective, seeking to take advantage of each country’s
unique strengths and competitiveness within ASEAN as a whole
(Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2005c).
It is apparent from this comment that EU-Thailand relations can be un-
derstood in a context of strategically driven interregional order and that,
in a sense, this bilateralism is expected to contribute to the EU’s compe-
titiveness in the region.
By contrast, institutionalists seem more optimistic about the possibi-
lity of promoting cooperation through institutions. Within the ASEM
process, there have been several bilateral efforts to introduce initiatives
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that contribute to the institution-building, rationalizing or agenda-set-
ting functions in interregionalism. It is obvious that in EU-Thailand re-
lations, the Thai government has worked together with the EU in set-
ting the agenda, predominantly with the European Commission and
some EU member states in the process of identifying the objectives and
activities of the projects and proposing them to official ASEM meetings.
The following are three examples of bilateral collaboration in support of
ASEM economic initiatives. First, within the ASEM’s Trade Facilitation
Action Plan (TFAP), Thailand and the European Commission along
with South Korea are the main proponents to bring issues concerning
‘standards’ into the ASEM’s economic agenda and they subsequently es-
tablished the first corresponding TFAP technical meeting in 1998 (Eur-
opean Commission 2002c). It was an important achievement to orga-
nize a series of regular ‘Meetings on Standards and Conformity Assess-
ment’ (SCA): The first one took place in Belgium in September 1998,
the fourth one in Thailand in February 2000 and they continue to be
held regularly, with the most recent one, the twelfth, taking place in
Austria in May 2006 (ibid.). Cooperation between the Thai government
and the European Commission also made a crucial contribution to the
recent ‘Seminar on Geographical Indications’ in Bangkok in June
2006, within the framework of ‘Working Group on Intellectual Prop-
erty’.29 This seminar is the first of its kind to promote the concepts of
Geographical Indications in the region and possibly later in a global
context.
The third example can be found, although indirectly, in the Thai gov-
ernment’s attempts to develop a forum for addressing public debt man-
agement issues, which is in line with the European Commission’s
(2007m) views on the ASEM’s priorities to ‘fostering dialogue on finan-
cial issues’. Thailand proposed the establishment of the ASEM Public
Debt Management Forum, which is expected to provide a channel for
experts on the debt management of ASEM member countries to explore
issues of common interest and share their views and experiences (Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark 2004). The proposal, which was en-
dorsed by the ASEM Deputy Finance Ministers Meeting in Tokyo in De-
cember 2000, stresses the importance of developing public best prac-
tices and guidelines in debt management in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis. It also foresees the possibility of holding further relevant semi-
nars and workshops as well as study tours and twinning arrangements
(Ministry of Finance, Thailand 2000). The Forum has been held four
times since its adoption at the third Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Kobe
in January 2001, the first occurred in Chiang Mai in November 2001,
the second in Copenhagen in September 2002, the third in Seoul in
October 2003, and the fourth in London in December 2005 (European
Commission 2006i).
EU-THAILAND RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 195
Constructivists offer a reflectivist explanation of how bilateral rela-
tions support the roles played by ideas and norms in the process of
building collective identity at the interregional level. Since the first
ASEM Summit in Bangkok in 1996, the ASEM process has always em-
phasized the importance of the so-called ‘Bangkok spirit’, which con-
sists of three components: (i) informality, (ii) flexibility and (iii) pragma-
tism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2007c). The constructivist
argues that bilateral contacts in the ASEM process may promote dialo-
gues and to some extent support elements of complex learning. Most of
the above-mentioned ASEM workshops and seminars – e.g., the Meet-
ings on Standards and Conformity Assessment, the Seminar on Geo-
graphical Indications and the ASEM Public Debt Management Forum –
between the EU and Thailand have contributed significantly to mutual
awareness and understanding among the parties involved and particu-
larly those who initiated them. Here again, the above-mentioned initia-
tives contribute to the process of raising mutual awareness and compre-
hension although the extent to which they can proceed with the process
of collective identity formation is empirically rather unclear.
V.2.2.3 Cultural Pillar
Within the ASEM process, the EU and Thailand early on recognized
the significance of strengthening interregional cultural links beyond the
mere economic and political, as stated in the Chairman’s Statement of
the first ASEM Summit in 1996.30 Cultural, social and intellectual co-
operation between Europe and Asia, the so-called third pillar of the
ASEM process, focuses on relevant dialogues and people-to-people con-
tacts, which the European Commission explicitly regards as ‘indispensa-
ble to the promotion of mutual understanding and avoidance of con-
flicts’ (European Commission 2007m). In the EU’s views, the recent
work of this pillar includes (i) ‘promoting dialogue on cultures and civi-
lisations’, (ii) ‘promoting interfaith dialogue’, (iii) promoting under-
standing and people-to-people exchanges through ‘the Asia-Europe
Foundation (ASEF)’, (iv) ‘developing Asia-Europe education co-opera-
tion’, (v) ‘developing cooperation on science and technology’, and (vi)
‘reaching out to civil society and the wider public’ (ibid.). There have also
been several extra efforts produced alongside the ASEM process to create
further channels for interregional dialogues among civil society groups,
parliamentarians and trade unionists, which are known as the Asia-Eur-
ope People’s Forum, the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership and the
ASEM Trade Union Summit, respectively (ibid.).
Compared to the other two pillars, the ASEM’s cultural work seems
to show relatively less evidence that supports the neorealist's arguments
regarding the balancing function of bilateralism. Apparently, EU-Thai-
land relations have been accommodated within a broader framework of
196 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
interregional dialogues and cooperation activities, so that they are to a
lesser extent strategically driven beyond the idea of raising the ASEM’s
visibility in the region. For institutionalists, it seems more obvious that
bilateralism performs rationalizing and institution-building functions
that foster coordination in this field of ASEM cultural collaboration. In
the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) framework, it is evident that the
EU and Thailand have played a supportive role to promote interregional
cooperation through several initiatives in the field of culture, intellectual
and people-to-people exchanges (European Commission 2007m; see
also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2007i). The interaction be-
tween the EU and Thailand mainly occurred in a series of culture-re-
lated events hosted by the Thai government, which included the third
ASEM Youth Camp on August 26th-September 8, 2001, the Asia-Eur-
ope Puppet Festival in Bangkok on July 16th-22, 2002, and the Asia-
Europe Cultural Policy Seminar also in Bangkok on June 24th-27, 2004
(European Commission 2006i). Moreover, the first ASEF Roundtable
Meeting on the topic ‘Finding the Path from Johannesburg’, which was
held in Bangkok in September 2003, is another attempt to encourage
the engagement of civil society in the implementation of the ‘World
Summit on Sustainable Development’ (WSSD) principles (United Na-
tions Environment Programme 2003).
The neoliberals’ argument regarding agenda-setting can point to the
‘Seminar on Information and Telecommunications Technology’ as a
clear example in which cooperation between the European Commission
and the Thai government has led to a new ASEM initiative and thereby
created another platform for interregional relations between Europe and
Asia. This initiative can be traced to the proposal of the Thai government
on ‘Asia-Europe Information Technology and Telecommunications Pro-
gramme’, which was presented at the second ASEM Summit in 1998
(European Commission 2006i). The Thai government was then ap-
pointed as the chief coordinator at the same Summit (European Com-
mission 2002h). The initiative received further support from the Eur-
opean Commission and was reformulated as the ‘Seminar on Informa-
tion and Telecommunications Technology’ at the third ASEM Summit in
2000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2007e). In practice, this
seminar, which was held in Bangkok in May 2001, focused mostly on e-
government, e-administration and e-procurement issues (European
Commission 2002h).
It later became evident that the ‘Trans-Eurasia Information Network’
(TEIN), which was originally launched as an ASEM initiative in 2001,
brought about the idea of linking the research networks between France
and South Korea, representing the first important attempts to create
and promote a collaboration network between Asia and Europe.31 In
Phase II, 2004 to 2007, the initiative TEIN2 was recognized as South-
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east Asia’s first large-scale research and education network. It offers a
much wider circle of participants including – on the Asia Pacific side –
China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong and Australia.32 Not only does the
TEIN2 initiative help to connect the research and education networks in
the Asia-Pacific region, it is also designed to establish direct intercon-
nections with their European counterparts via two high-speed routes lo-
cated in Copenhagen and Frankfurt (EU Today, April 2007; Delegation
of the European Commission to Thailand 2006f). The links enable an
innovative form of conducting scientific experiments and sharing scien-
tific instruments, access to digital libraries and databases, and a series
of e-learning activities, and have been of great benefit to researchers
and the international research community as a ‘gateway’ to regional
and global research collaboration (EU Today, April 2007). The European
Commission allocated E 10 million, approximately 80% of the TEIN2
total budget, while the TEIN2 project is also supported by Japan, South
Korea, Singapore and Australia (ibid.).
Thailand’s two research and education networks – ThaiSarn and Un-
iNet – are currently linked to the pan-European GEANT2, which is the
most advanced research and education network (EU Today, April 2007;
Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006f). This link-
ing of the Thai networks with TEIN2 was carried out by the Thai Minis-
try of Information and Communication Technology and operates under
the name of ‘ThaiREN’ (Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand 2006f). Erik Habers, Counsellor of the Delegation of the Eur-
opean Commission to Thailand, believes the ThaiREN network is an
important member of TEIN2 and the TEIN2 initiative may ‘[serve] as
an influential tool for driving innovative applications as well as promot-
ing regional development and integration’ (cited in ibid.). Thailand has
been linked to TEIN2 in June 2006, with connecting speeds of 155
mbps, or 155 times faster than the average high-speed home Internet
connection, providing an improved international bandwidth that is ne-
cessary for rapid mass data transfers (ibid.). Moreover, in the case of
the intra-regional transfer, data connections will also become easier and
much faster because it no longer needs to go through the US and back
again (EU Today, April 2007). Thailand has greatly benefited from the
TEIN2 initiative in the areas of remote learning, mapping services, dis-
aster warning, and telemedicine, which includes such services as live
surgery broadcasting (ibid.).33
From a constructivist perspective, the process of collective identity
formation is expected to proceed in an endogenous manner that em-
braces the dynamics of mutual definition between bilateralism and in-
terregionalism. This process is a cognitive one, stressing the relevance
of ideas and norms and the possibility of complex learning on both
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sides. In the field of culture, although the EU and Thailand are evi-
dently involved in a series of ASEM initiatives, some of the initiatives
are only less likely to form long-term collective identity in the Southeast
Asian region. This was noted in the 2006 ‘Overview Report on ASEM
Initiatives – Evaluation and Recommendations for Future Improve-
ments’34 that while several new initiatives strengthen the ASEM’s visibi-
lity, they tend to be spontaneous in nature and lack regular follow-up ac-
tivities and are often only of interest to the ASEM member countries
that have proposed or co-sponsored the initiative and only to a much
lesser extent to those not involved in either way. This seems in part true
for some of the above-mentioned initiatives such as the Asia-Europe
Puppet Festival in Bangkok in July 2002 and the Asia-Europe Cultural
Policy Seminar in Bangkok in June 2004.
With respect to the EU’s attempts to raise its profile in Southeast
Asia, some of the new cooperation projects are being planned to pro-
mote university-to-university cooperation and intellectual links among
academics and experts. In the 1994 communiqué ‘Toward a New Asia
Strategy’, the European Commission had already pointed out one of the
objectives: to ‘[strengthen] Higher Education and training links with
Asia, including University Co-operation schemes targeted into specific
technological, policy and management studies and [emphasize] the im-
plementation of joint or mutually recognised post-graduate pro-
grammes, joint-research projects and university-industry co-operation
activities. These will include, inter alia, support to European and Asian
Studies Centres and joint Management and Technical training pro-
grammes, implemented whenever possible with the active participation
of European and Asian companies’ (European Commission 1994). This
relates to the goal of ‘improving European expertise on Asia’, which, in
turn, can be seen as another step toward improving mutual awareness
and comprehension between Europe and Asia. Within the ASEM fra-
mework, the Thai government has in the past joined the ‘ASEM Duo
Programme’, initiated by France, Singapore and South Korea, in which
fellowship grants were provided to European university students and
teachers for their studies and work in Asia and vice versa (European
Commission 2007m).
V.2.3 Managing the ARF: The EU and Thailand in Regional Security
Dialogues
EU and Thailand membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
which signifies that the two parties’ are interested in promoting regio-
nal peace and stability, enables them to explore the different functions
of their bilateral relations in this interregional forum. Established in
1994, the ARF is said to be the most far-reaching regional security for-
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um in Asia, as far as its membership and focus of discussions are con-
cerned. It represents a more inclusive approach to regional security
than the ASEM, comprising 10 ASEAN member states, 13 ASEAN dialo-
gue partners – including the EU along with other strategic regional
players from Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, North and South
Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia to the US – and an ob-
server country, Papua New Guinea (see also Forster 1999b). With re-
gard to the ARF’s objectives, the initial efforts were to create a venue
for multilateral and bilateral dialogues and cooperation activities and to
gradually develop the forum from a stage of confidence building to that
of preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution (ASEAN Regional Forum
2007a). Besides, the ARF framework is especially designed to accom-
modate both ‘track one’ and ‘track two’ diplomacy. The former refers to
the annual official Foreign Ministers’ Meetings supported by the ARF
Senior Officials’ Meetings and the Intersessional Support Groups (ISG)
on Confidence Building Measures, with the latter covering non-official
regional security seminars and workshops attended by academics, ex-
perts and think-tank members from the ARF member countries (Eur-
opean Commission 2005a).
From a neorealist point of view, EU-Thailand relations are expected
to perform a balancing function in their interplay with other ARF mem-
bers or regional organizations, with a view to a more ‘balanced’ constel-
lation of the existing regional security order. That the Thai government
plays a key role on the ASEAN side – e.g. in July 1994 Thailand was
the host of three important meetings starting from the ASEAN Miniter-
ial Meeting, the Post Ministrial Meeting between ASEAN and its dialo-
gues partners to the ARF –, has made EU-Thailand relations particularly
relevant to the ARF framework (Snitwongse 1995: 199). In retrospect,
EU-Thailand relations within the ARF may be understood from the
viewpoint of Thailand’s changing strategic orientation toward major re-
gional powers. It is noted that since the relatively strong security ties
with the US used to provide a guarantee of regional stability during the
Cold War period, there was clearly the need to re-adjust an institutional
balance thereby bringing about new patterns of governing interregional
relations – including those within the ARF framework (see also Narine
1997; Weatherbee 1993). Upon the launch of ARF in 1994, the Thai
government was apparently preoccupied with ‘concerns for domestic
politics and regional security’, which became the reason for rejecting
the US request to station its pre-position ships in the Gulf of Thailand,
in a way to avoid misunderstanding with other ASEAN and ARF mem-
bers including the EU (Snitwongse 1995: 200).
Later on, the evidence also shows that EU-Thailand relations are
greatly driven by Thailand’s concern about ASEAN’s leadership within
the ARF – particularly because of the ASEAN enlargement, which raises
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certain concerns about increasing internal heterogeneity, and because
of the Asian crisis in 1997, which seems to have weakened some of the
member states (Harris 2002: 129).35 To maintain ASEAN’s control and
centrality in the ARF, EU-Thailand relations are regarded as helpful in
pursing a co-chairing arrangement between a non-ASEAN member and
an ASEAN member in ARF Intersessional Support Groups (ARF ISGs)
(Harris 2002: 129; see also Wanandi 1998: 59).36 As the EU became
the co-chair of the 2004-2005 ARF ISGs, the relevance of bilateralism
was partly underscored to the extent that the European Commission
saw this opportunity as crucial in promoting its own views in the forum
and supporting the overall reinforcement of the ARF’s roles (European
Commission 2005a).
Meanwhile, institutionalists would argue that bilateral relations are
more likely to promote deeper cooperation under the ARF framework
through their institution-building, rationalizing and agenda-setting dy-
namics. The relevance of EU-Thailand relations is evidenced by how
the two parties have played a supportive role in the ARF’s interregional
cooperation in terms of the ARF agenda and institutions. While Thai-
land has served as a key player in ASEAN, it is apparent for the EU that
bilateral relations are crucial for strengthening and, to some extent, co-
ordinating dialogues within the ARF framework. For instance, the EU
has shared the ASEAN idea of creating an ‘ARF Unit’ within the
ASEAN Secretariat, which may formally participate in all ARF meetings
and serve as a reinforcing body for the coordination of ARF activities
(European Commission 2005a). Not only is this development expected
to promote continued cooperation among ARF participating countries
and the Chair, the ‘ARF Unit’ would also improve the effectiveness of
the ARF as a whole (ibid.). This idea, which appeared as part of the con-
cept paper ‘The Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair’, was discussed in
greater detail at the 10th ARF Ministers’ Meeting in June 2003 (ibid.).37
EU-Thailand relations, it seems, are in an important position to support
the ARF Unit’s realization, however, they have to be well coordinated
with other relevant multilateral and bilateral forces involved including
the EU’s relations with individual ASEAN countries and most impor-
tantly in the consensus-building process among the ASEAN countries
themselves. As a matter of fact, the significance of the rationalizing
function of bilateralism has been explicitly noted by the Council that
‘whilst the EC-ASEAN Co-operation Agreement of 1980 and fora like
ASEM, ARF and bilateral relationships currently provide useful opportu-
nities for dialogue and cooperation, the New Partnership strongly re-
commends that efforts should be made for rationalisation and speciali-
sation of agendas proposed under each forum’ (European Commission
2004d).
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Considering the rationalizing function of bilateralism, the evidence
also suggests that, in certain areas of interest such as counter-terrorism,
the EU has actively participated in the ARF ISG meetings and that the
EU’s relations with Asian member countries including Thailand may
consequently contribute to the exchanging of views and information as
well as cooperation among experts (European Commission 2005a). In
addition, with respect to different levels of interaction, the European
Commission regards it as very important to coordinate multilateral and
bilateral efforts, which have been made through global and regional in-
stitutions such as the UN, ASEAN, ASEM or APEC as well as in the
EU’s bilateral relations with individual countries in the region (ibid.).
An example can be found in the ARF’s efforts to reach a consensus on
piracy, which is not only related to the issues of regional security but
also shows significant implications for the region’s trading partners in-
cluding the EU (European Commission 2003c: 45). The ARF meetings,
along with the EU-ASEAN Conference on Maritime Security in 2002,
have focused on the need to develop regional maritime security strate-
gies and to strengthen multilateral cooperation (ibid.). In this respect,
the relevance of EU-Thailand relations is related to the EU’s positions
towards ASEAN, so that should this bilateralism assume a more deci-
sive role, it may contribute to improving the exchange of information
and – if applicable – to preparing a regional consensus on maritime se-
curity measures and related commitments. For, although called upon by
the International Maritime Organisation in 2002, the ASEAN countries
have yet to reach any cooperation agreement on combating piracy and
armed robbery against ships. The EU as one of the main users of the
sea lanes has a clear interest in supporting concerned countries through
sharing specific expertise – e.g., ship tracking systems, maritime police
authorities, and the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators – and
providing country needs analysis and training (ibid.).
Moreover, Thailand’s status as a ‘Partner of Cooperation’ and a mem-
ber of the ‘Asian Contact Group’ in the OSCE implies that EU-Thailand
relations are in a multi-layered context of security dialogues coordinated
with those at the ARF meetings. For example, Thailand and the OSCE
managed to co-organize the OSCE-Thailand Conference on the Human
Dimension of Security in Bangkok in June 2002 (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Thailand 2005). To follow up on human trafficking issues, the
Thai government organized the conference ‘Sharing of Experiences in
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings: Opportunities for Coopera-
tion’ in June 2005 (Virameteekul 2006). Since this conference brought
together high-level representatives and experts from the OSCE member
countries and partners of cooperation as well as those from ARF mem-
ber countries, it was an opportunity for the participants to share their
views and experiences and to discuss the various measures to combat
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human trafficking (ibid.). In 2006, the Thai government again played
an important role by co-hosting a subsequent OSCE-Thailand Confer-
ence ‘Challenges to Global Security: From Poverty to Pandemic’ (ibid.).
The message from this conference concerning the emergence of non-
traditional security threats in Southeast Asia and elsewhere also in-
cluded the importance of ‘root cause’ examinations of global security
and the increasing relevance of regional cooperation (ibid.).
There seems to be little evidence to support the constructivist notion
of a collective identity-building function of EU-Thailand bilateralism in
the ARF. However, with respect to their aforementioned roles as regio-
nal actors, the EU and Thailand both participate in the ARF’s interregio-
nal dialogues and promote ideas and norms in the process of mutual
recognition. As seen regarding the issues concerning Burma’s domestic
politics, it is evident that given the above mentioned positions of the
EU and Thailand, they seem to agree on the relevance of the situation
for regional stability and the need to redress the issue of democratic
progress in Burma (European Commission 2005a).
Constructivists stress the relevance of dialogues as communicative
acts, noting that one of the ARF’s objectives as stated in the first Chair-
man’s Statement in 1994 is ‘to foster constructive dialogue and consul-
tation on political and security issues of common interest and concern’
(ASEAN Regional Forum 2007a). From this background, the 10th ARF
Ministers’ Meeting in 2003 particularly mentioned ‘the usefulness of
the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and consulta-
tions’ and ‘the cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on poli-
tical and security issues’, both of which had been discussed in terms of
the ARF’s achievements (ibid.). In practice, the EU-Thailand interaction
can be observed in several ARF meetings and events, which the Thai
government played an active role in hosting like the 2nd Inter-sessional
Meeting on Disaster Relief in February 1998, the ARF Expert Group
Meeting on Disaster Relief in January 1999, the ARF Train the Trainers
Seminar ‘Towards Common Approaches to Training in Disaster Relief’
in January 2000, the 2nd ARF Seminar on the Law of Armed Conflict
in August 2001, the ARF Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism in April
2002, and the ARF Seminar on Missile Defense in October 2005
(ASEAN Regional Forum 2007b, 2007c).
Moreover, the fact that the ARF framework is designed to accommo-
date ‘track two’ activities, along with the ‘track one’ official activities,
underscores the dynamic of non-state interaction. In a sense, the coexis-
tence of ‘track one’ and ‘track two’ meetings also contributes to the
principles of flexibility and pragmatism and, to some extent, the process
of complex learning. The EU’s recognition of diversity among Southeast
Asian countries offers an account of the attempts to ‘anchor its dialogue
and cooperation with the region in a flexible framework’ (European
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Commission 2004d). Thailand has hosted several ‘track two’ activities
on transnational crime such as the 2nd Council for Security Coopera-
tion in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group Meeting on Transnational
Crime in October 1997, CSCAP Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy in
February and March 1999, the 5th CSCAP Working Group Meeting on
Transnational Crime in May 1999, Law Enforcement Cooperation in
the Region Related to Cyber Crime and Trafficking in the Region in Oc-
tober 2000, 12th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Transna-
tional Crime in November 2002, so it was probably no coincidence that
the Thai government also arranged to host the Inter-sessional Support
Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes in April 2005
(ASEAN Regional Forum 2007a, 2007d).
V.3 EU-Thailand Relations and Globalism
In the multiple-level settings of international relations, it is apparent
that EU-Thailand relations can also be understood in the context of the
interplay between bilateralism and multilateral institutions at the global
level. The first section focuses on the roles played by EU-Thailand rela-
tions in the UN institutions, as mostly regards political and develop-
ment-related issues. The next section discusses the implications of this
bilateralism for WTO-related matters, which range from some bilateral
trade issues such as anti-dumping duties, the compensatory negotia-
tions after EU enlargement to the latest discussions on the EU’s FTA
with the ASEAN countries. The third section presents an example of
the interaction between the EU and Thailand in the implementation of
the 2005 Paris Declaration, thereby highlighting the fact that they are
both donors in the international donor community.
V.3.1 EU-Thailand Relations and the UN
EU-Thailand political dialogues have become increasingly important,
since although their trade relations remain the chief focus, it is clear
that both the EU and Thailand seek to address several political issues of
mutual concern and have recognized the bilateral channel of interaction
in international fora such as the UN.38 With regard to Southeast Asia,
the EU’s concerns are based on the increasing relevance of new security
challenges and the very nature of them that need bilateral or regional at-
tention, as mentioned in the European Commission’s communiqué ‘A
New Partnership with South East Asia’:
As a major player on the international scene, the EU supports
political stability, economic prosperity and the rule of law. This
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encompasses overcoming such challenges as ensuring law enfor-
cement, controlling migratory movements and fighting organised
crime in close cooperation with partner countries and interna-
tional organisations such as the OECD and the United Nations.
Issues of migration and asylum, trafficking in human beings,
money laundering, piracy and counterfeiting need to be incorpo-
rated systematically into our regional and bilateral dialogues with
South-East Asia (European Commission 2003c: 18).
Thailand’s regional roles in Southeast Asia are an important factor in
giving further momentum to EU-Thailand relations in the international
system. According to Counsellor of the Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand, Erik Habers, the EU’s relations with Thailand
and other ASEAN countries have been strengthened thereby accommo-
dating a diverse set of regional and international issues: ‘The partner-
ship between the European Union and the countries of Asia is growing
ever closer. It is based on cooperation across a broad range of issues, in-
cluding trade and investment, the promotion of human rights, democ-
racy and good governance, and with a focus on the environment and the
alleviation of poverty. … As one of the leading nations of ASEAN, Thai-
land is a key partner of the European Union’ (Habers 2003). In the field
of development cooperation, for instance, the traditional bilateral chan-
nel between the EU and Thailand has been extended toward multiple-le-
vel interaction in a much wider context while both parties now increas-
ingly engage in a co-funding scheme of collaboration (ibid.).
From a neorealist perspective, EU-Thailand relations are expected to
assume a balancing dynamic in response to changes in Southeast Asian
regional or international power structures. Although there is not much
evidence to suggest that the EU and Thailand have performed a balan-
cing function against each other or a third party within the UN, an ex-
ample can be found in their responses with regard to the fight against
terrorism. In this light, the Council has already confirmed the EU’s re-
gional strategies in this fight against terrorism:
The Council stresses the EU commitment to supporting and en-
hancing regional co-operation to fight terrorism and to share its
experience in the fight against terrorism. The EU is prepared to
consider support for any willing country in the region in the con-
text of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 and relevant
UN conventions. The EU encourages its partners in South East
Asia to combat terrorism with a comprehensive strategy, includ-
ing on issues of political, socio-economic and financial govern-
ance (in European Commission 2004d).
EU-THAILAND RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 205
For the EU, the focus on Southeast Asia has been greatly affected by
the Bali attacks in 2002 and the regional security challenges emerging
from them. As of mid-2003, the EU’s contribution totaled E 21 million
for two ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia and the Philippines, to
support counter-terrorism measures particularly in border management
and capacity building of the judiciary (European Commission 2003c:
12, 16). In the case of Thailand, as mentioned earlier, the EU has been
aware of Thailand’s regional roles and was impressed by the fact that
General Vinai Pattiyakul was the chief of the UN Transitional Adminis-
tration for East Timor, but there is not much evidence to suggest other
specific measures beyond exchanges of views and information.39 Evi-
dently, the European Commission’s meeting with General Vinai in De-
cember 2004 highlighted the EU’s interests in the assessments of the
Thai government on East Timor issues, considering that the EU
seemed to have a positive feedback ready on his characters from his
time as head of the UN force.40
Institutionalists believe that bilateral relations between the EU and
Thailand contribute to institution building, rationalizing and agenda-
setting in the international system. Several rationalizing efforts in EU-
Thailand relations have been made to maintain the UN’s main roles in
the fight against international terrorism. For example, at the fourth
ASEM Summit, the EU was active in the ASEM process to encourage
other ASEM participants to adopt the Declaration on Cooperation
against International Terrorism and the Cooperation Programme on
Fighting International Terrorism and subsequently ratify and imple-
ment all 12 international conventions and protocols on counter-terror-
ism (European Commission 2007m).41 Along this line, the EU’s at-
tempts to reach a consensus on piracy among the participating coun-
tries of the ARF meetings and the parallel EU-ASEAN Conference on
Maritime Security in 2002 also demonstrates the relevance of bilateral-
ism in addressing regional security issues such as maritime security
and their implications for the international system (European Commis-
sion 2003c: 45).42 In fact, the EU has shown a clear interest in bilater-
ally and multilaterally supporting concerned countries by sharing speci-
fic expertise including ship-tracking systems, maritime police authori-
ties, and the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators as well as
providing for needs in analysis and training (ibid.).
Similarly, the fact that both the EU and Thailand are participants in
the Kimberly Process suggests another channel of bilateral interaction
in the implementation of the UN General Assembly Resolutions 55 and
56 on so-called ‘blood diamonds’. The aim is to establish an interna-
tional control regime for the import and export of rough diamonds in
order to ensure that they do not provide revenues to rebel movements,
violent conflicts and wars. After the UN General Assembly had first
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adopted a resolution in support of the creation of the ‘Kimberley Pro-
cess Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds’ on December 1, 2000,
the WTO managed to approve a waiver for trade measures taken under
that certification scheme from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2006
(European Commission 2007h; Kimberley Process 2007a).43 Thailand,
as a trade-only participant in the Kimberley Process, maintains the need
to comply with the Kimberley Process regulations and relevant UN re-
solutions, whilst the EU has played a key role in this process as the
Chair since January 1, 2007 as well as the Chair of the Kimberley Pro-
cess Working Group on Monitoring that is responsible for the imple-
mentation of the aforementioned certification scheme (ibid.; Kimberley
Process 2007b). Although the interaction between the EU and Thailand
has not been much documented, it has been noted that the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme has contributed significantly to promoting
cooperation between the Thailand’s diamond industry and the responsi-
ble government authorities including the Department of Foreign Trade
and the Customs Department (Kimberley Process 2007b).
In the area of development cooperation, the importance attached to
bilateralism is clearly observable in one of the guiding principles of the
EU’s development policy: ‘Most of EC development assistance shall be
implemented through bilateral channels, which allow for a real policy
dialogue and reform in social sectors’ (European Commission 2003c:
20). With regard to a rationalizing function of bilateralism, the Eur-
opean Commission (ibid.) particularly emphasizes the practical advan-
tages of bilateral development projects in terms of their real impacts on
recipient countries. EU-Thailand efforts to protect the environment and
natural resources, for instance, seem to emphasize the EU’s priorities
in the implementation of the Doha Development Agenda and other re-
lated multilateral environment agreements including the Convention on
International Trades of Endangered Species, the Kyoto Protocol, the
Convention on Biodiversity and the Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion (Hamburger 2005). The EU-funded ‘Small Grants Programme for
Operations to Promote Tropical Forests (SGP PTF) Thailand’ is based
on the United Nations Development Programme’s earlier achieve-
ments. Erik Habers, Counsellor of the Delegation of the European
Commission to Thailand, in his speech at the launching ceremony and
workshop for the first nine grantees in Thailand in December 2003 sta-
ted: ‘Looking to the success of the Global Environment Facility (or GEF)
Small Grants Programme, managed by the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, the European Union and UNDP agreed to co-operate
on a similar approach for tropical forests. And so this programme was
born’ (Habers 2003). The outcome was the EU-UNDP Grant Agree-
ment (ASI and B7-6201 and 1B and 99-0158) formally signed by the
European Commission and the United Nations Development Pro-
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gramme (UNDP) in December 2000, according to which, the SGP PTF
is funded by the European Commission for a period of five years as of
January 2003 and managed by the UNDP through an executing agency
at the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Graduate Study and Research in
Agriculture (SEARCA) (Small Grants Programme for Operations to Pro-
mote Tropical Forests in Southeast Asia 2007a).
It is apparent that, when considering the rationalizing function of bi-
lateralism, the ‘SGP PTF Thailand’ is mainly designed to translate the
internationally defined goals of environmental sustainability via devel-
opment activities at the community level, as the following objectives are
specifically formulated for operations in the South and Southeast Asian
regions: (i) to ‘act as catalyst to promote and demonstrate community-
based management and resource-use in tropical forests’, (ii) to ‘draw
lessons from local experience and support the spread of successful
community-level strategies and innovations’, and (iii) to ‘build grass-
roots-level capacity to tackle problems that contribute to forest destruc-
tion and degradation through partnerships and networks’ (ibid.). In a
local setting, it is very crucial that the ‘SGP PTF Thailand’ differentiates
the nature of projects in accordance with their geographical focus. For
example, while the projects in the North and the Northeast of Thailand
emphasize forest management following community documentation
and local wisdom, those in the South are mainly dedicated to the post-
tsunami reconstruction efforts to combine livelihoods and manage
mangrove forest and beachfront plantations (Small Grants Programme
for Operations to Promote Tropical Forests in Southeast Asia 2007b). It
is also evident that, when considering the institution-building function,
the EU-funded SGP PTF in Thailand managed to create the so-called
‘National Steering Committee’ in early 2003 and that this mechanism
has been highly regarded, as Erik Habers (2006) asserted: ‘The most
important structure within the programme is the National Steering
Committee. This is made up of dedicated professionals who work on a
voluntary basis to overview all aspects of the programme, often with
very significant inputs of time and effort’.
The European Commission has also promoted the concepts of sus-
tainable consumption as they relate to the environment, following UN
guidelines to develop an environmentally friendly production of goods
and protect relevant consumer interests in partner countries (Delega-
tion of the European Commission to Thailand 2006g: 76). The project
titled ‘Capacity building for implementation of UN guidelines on consu-
mer protection in Asia’, to which the EU contributed E 330,000 of the
total budget of E 440,000 under the Asia Pro Eco Programme frame-
work for the implementation period November 2003-September 2005,
is aimed at improving environmental performance and technological
partnership in the economic sectors and promoting sustainable invest-
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ments in Thailand and 11 other target Asian countries (ibid.). The Uni-
ted Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), as the executing agency,
conducted a review of best practices studies in sustainable consumption
in six European countries including Denmark, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden and a matching review of those Asian
countries in the implementation of such measures, and then organized
a regional seminar for representatives of relevant institutions in all of
the target countries, then presented the reviews including the discus-
sions of their applicability to Asian conditions, and concluded the find-
ings in a regional strategy to implement the UN guidelines to be dis-
tributed among national stakeholders (ibid.). The Thai government, as
one of the beneficiaries of this project in the region, has been offered
the UNEP’s support in developing national action plans for the imple-
mentation of the UN guidelines (ibid.).
From a constructivist point of view, EU-Thailand relations should
underscore the significance of the ideas, interests and norms of the
identity-building process in an international system. In its pragmatic
aspects, it is evident that the EU and Thailand have concentrated in
part on a series of political dialogues in improving mutual awareness
and comprehension. For example, in the context of the political situa-
tion in Burma, it is apparent that, within various interregional and
global frameworks, the EU and the ASEAN countries have touched
upon certain norms of good governance, respect for human rights
and the rights of ethnic minorities and displaced people. The EU has
also emphasized the importance of creating a channel of bilateral
interaction and the relevance of bilateralism to the international sys-
tem regarding human rights issues in Southeast Asia: ‘In order to
examine human rights issues in greater depth, the EU and a particu-
lar South-East Asian country may also decide to initiate a bilateral dia-
logue specifically on human rights. This dialogue should be con-
structed in such a way as to enable the partners to establish confi-
dence and explore possibilities for cooperation, as well to join forces
on issues of common concern in international fora, including the
United Nations’ (European Commission 2003c: 17). Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, the EU’s GSP special incentive arrangements,
which encourage participating countries to adopt certain international
norms through market incentives that include additional tariff prefer-
ences or temporary cancellation of sectoral GSP graduation, must fol-
low the core standards of labor rights of the International Labour
Organisation and the standards of environmental sustainability of
International Tropical Timber Convention (European Commission
2003b).44 In practice, the impacts of these measures seem rather mod-
est, however, because Thailand has been very careful when it comes to
sensitive political issues and has not submitted an application for any
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of the special incentive arrangements thus far (see also Office of Com-
mercial Affairs 2003). Moreover, in the process of norm diffusion, it
would be difficult to identify the EU’s contribution compared with that
of other players involved at the end of the day.
V.3.2 EU-Thailand Relations and the WTO
Since the importance of the WTO is widely accepted, it is apparent that
the EU’s bilateral trade relations with ASEAN are strategically con-
ducted in line with multilateral arrangements, as clearly stated in one
of the Council’s Conclusions in January 2004:
The Council stresses that the multilateral system should remain
the EU's number one priority to harness globalisation and to de-
liver on the EU's trade policy objectives. It therefore underlines
the importance of putting the WTO negotiations back on track
and moving the multilateral system forward by further market
opening and strengthened multilateral rules. The EU and
ASEAN should therefore pool their efforts to effectively make
progress on all parts of the Doha Development Agenda in order
to ensure that the results of the negotiations are balanced and to
the benefit of all members (European Commission 2004d).
Within the WTO framework, the fact that the EU acts as a negotiating
party in its own right also implies a certain degree of relevance for its
bilateral relations with a third country in multilateral trade rounds. In
retrospect, the EU and Thailand as an ASEAN member state already
confirmed ‘their willingness to contribute to the expansion of interna-
tional trade in order to achieve greater economic growth and social pro-
gress’ early on in the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and,
more specifically, Article 3 Paragraph 3(a) emphasizes that the two par-
ties involved ‘shall … cooperate at the international level and between
themselves in the solution of commercial problems of common interest
including trade related to commodities.’ Article 1 of the 1980 EC-
ASEAN Cooperation Agreement stresses the key element of the bilat-
eral commercial relations insofar as it prescribes the provisions of the
GATT’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to particular matters of
customs duties and charges, the regulations regarding customs clear-
ance, transshipment and payments, direct and indirect taxes, and other
related regulations of the internal markets (see also Phatharodom 1999:
242).
The WTO provisions have been highly relevant to both the EU and
the Thai government from their earliest stages, so that – in support of
the argument of the rationalizing function of bilateralism – they occa-
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sionally address issues of mutual interest at the bilateral level. At the
time, the Thai government was particularly concerned about (i) the pro-
visions for trade in goods such as anti-dumping, countervailing duties
and safeguard clauses and (ii) – with regard to the EU’s enlargements –
the regulations of compensatory adjustments as already mentioned
above. Regarding the former issues, it should be noted that while the
EU has moved from being a major user to being a target of anti-dump-
ing measures, Thailand appears to have concerns regarding fisheries
products that began facing higher competition because of an increase
in subsidies from mainly the EU, Japan and Korea.45 However, in the
neorealist view, the fact that Thailand joined the group ‘Friends of Anti-
dumping Negotiations’ – along with Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Nor-
way, Switzerland, India and Colombia – in calling for the acceleration
of WTO negotiations on anti-dumping rules, with the aim of strength-
ening the rules in anti-dumping investigations and measures (Sally
2004; Bridges Weekly 2005) can be seen in a wider context of WTO
anti-dumping negotiations, thus ultimately balancing out the positions
among agriculture-exporting countries.46
Concerning the second issue, the EU-Thailand dialogues have inten-
sified in relation to the former’s fifth enlargement. In support of the ra-
tionalizing argument, the evidence suggests that the two parties were
bilaterally able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on compensa-
tory adjustment in accordance with the relevant WTO provisions. More
specifically, GATT’s Article XXIV Paragraph 5 obliges the EU to make
sure that the Union’s duties and other trade regulations ‘shall not on
the whole be higher or more restrictive’ than those prior to the acces-
sion of ten new member states (European Commission 2004c). Other-
wise, Article XXIV Paragraph 6 includes a provision that a third country
will be granted negotiating rights to agree on compensation adjustment
(ibid.). The negotiations are expected to occur on a tariff-line-per-tariff-
line basis whereby both parties are required to take into account any
corresponding duty reductions on the same tariff line in other constitu-
ents of the union (ibid.).47 Moreover, the negotiations will take place for
a limited period of time, because GATT Article XXVIII contains a provi-
sion that when no agreement is reached before the EU’s withdrawal or
modification of relevant concessions, the third countries are allowed to
withdraw substantially equivalent concessions no earlier than 30 days
and no later than 6 months after that withdrawal or modification (ibid.).
The first negotiation session with Thailand was initiated in November
2004, in which both sides met to discuss general procedures and ap-
proaches.48 Thailand and Brazil are the main countries in the poultry
sector to have negotiating rights with the EU. The EU reached an agree-
ment with Thailand on quotas for cooked and salted poultry after two
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days of negotiations.49 Subsequent negotiations in 2005 and 2006 have
dealt with the import regimes of various items such as poultry, rice,
canned tuna, and sardines, most of which have been finalized since.50
As an argument of agenda-setting, bilateral cooperation between the
EU and the Thai government on ‘Geographical Indications’ (GIs) de-
monstrates an example, in which bilateral cooperation may promote the
protection of intellectual property rights at the international system le-
vel. As previously mentioned, in June 2006, the Thai government be-
came one of the pioneers when it hosted the EC-ASEAN Regional
Seminar and Exhibition on the Protection and Promotion of GIs titled
‘Lands of Tradition and Opportunities’ and participated in the ‘EC-
ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme (ECAP
II) Twinning Initiative’ (Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand 2006a).51 Moreover, the fact that the Thai government adopted
the ‘Geographical Indication Protection Act’ in April 2004 provides pro-
spects for a workable national legal framework for the protection of spe-
cific goods that have qualities or reputations based on their geographi-
cal origin (ibid.).
Moving on to the prospects of EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, it cannot
be emphasized enough that the EU was first reluctant to initiate new bi-
lateral FTA negotiations during the Doha Round, considering the WTO
to be the main channel of free trade. Against this background, EU
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s speech ‘The EU-Thailand –
bringing ASEAN and Europe closer together’, during his first official
visit to Thailand in April 2005, is crucial in illustrating the EU’s efforts
to re-assess the relevance of bilateral free trade agreements for the inter-
national system, as follows:
We recognize the interest of many countries in the region, in-
cluding Thailand, in negotiating bilateral FTAs. The EU itself is a
strong user of FTAs, believing that multilateral and regional pro-
cesses can be mutually reinforcing. Nonetheless, we remain con-
vinced that the multilateral approach through the WTO will bring
the widest benefits to the largest number of countries. It is an
approach well worth pursuing. FTAs should be seen as comple-
mentary to the WTO and not as an alternative. But with the end
of the WTO multilateral round in sight, Asia and in particular
ASEAN are high on my radar screen as potential candidates for
FTAs (cited in Delegation of the European Commissioner to
Thailand 2005c).
The implications of bilateralism and multilateralism for one another are
undeniable. From a theoretical perspective, the functions of bilateralism
is best explained by the neorealist and neoliberal views on its implica-
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tions for the developments of the international trade order, with the for-
mer stressing the balancing function and the latter suggesting the insti-
tutional-building, rationalizing and agenda-setting functions. In the con-
text of relations between Europe and Asia, while the liberalizing efforts
at the regional level are expected to clearly produce economic benefits
for the parties involved, the logic of preferential trade arrangements
may also eventually lead to discrimination, trade diversion and the frag-
mentation of the international system (Avila 2003).
In the neorealist view on balancing, the logic of the recent wave of re-
gional liberalization in East Asia and elsewhere can be traced to and
thereby underscore the advantages of so-called ‘competitive liberaliza-
tion’ following the opening up of markets and the easing of regulations
within the group – with possible disadvantages for an outsider country
(Chirathivat and Mallikamas 2004: 40). As mentioned above, the lack
of tangible results at Cancun in 2003 and Hong Kong 2005 has led a
series of WTO members to reconsider their external trade strategies
and a general drift away from multilateralism. It should be emphasized
that some of the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 countries recently evolved from
a ‘catching-up-country’ into an ‘endogenous-growth-country’ status and
that the EU allegedly ‘has reacted to this shift in world competitiveness
towards Asia amongst other things by forming a strategic partnership
with members of this region’ (Koubek 2006: 274). In one of its conclu-
sions on the recommendations to open FTA negotiations with ASEAN
countries, India and South Korea in April 2007, the Council of the Eur-
opean Union (2007: 1) apparently saw the justification for these new bi-
lateral agreements arguing in favor of their balancing function against
its main competitors:
While respecting the priority of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions, Free Trade Agreements with countries of ASEAN, India
and the Republic of Korea should be taken forward rapidly to im-
prove the external competitiveness and market access conditions
of European industries on these important markets vis-à-vis glo-
bal competitors.
In this light, the EU’s arguments for creating the recent bilateral FTAs
support the description of them as ‘new competitiveness-driven FTAs’
(Transnational Institute 2007; see also Mandelson 2006b). Further-
more, the nature of bilateral agreements also requires a certain degree
of reciprocity between the two parties involved. From the European
Commission’s perspective, the EU, as EU Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson once noted, ‘need to support reformers in emerging econo-
mies who want to use external trade pressure to maintain positive
change in their countries. And we need to do so, frankly, because Eur-
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opeans will expect to see our own openness reciprocated by those with
whom we trade’ (Mandelson 2006a: 6).
From the institutionalist perspective, the evidence seems to suggest
that the institution-building and rationalizing functions of new bilateral-
ism are applicable in explaining the FTA talks between the EU and the
ASEAN countries while the agenda-setting function is less likely in par-
ticular at an early stage of FTA negotiation. Interestingly, the EU and
ASEAN had been aware of the mutual benefits that would result from
their FTA. According to independent research released by the European
Commission in April 2007, the three new FTAs will probably generate
additional benefits of some 40% to the Doha Round if successfully con-
cluded. While between the EU and ASEAN, EU exports to ASEAN are
expected to increase by 24.2% and ASEAN exports to the EU by 18.5%
and that both sides also stand to gain from other components of the ne-
gotiated FTA such as the liberalization of non-tariff barriers (European
Commission 2007; See also Bangkok Post, dated May 2, and 2007).
Adopting the mandate to negotiate FTAs with ASEAN, India and South
Korea, the then EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson believed:
‘Combined with a successful conclusion to the Doha Round, these
agreements will open new markets to EU businesses and give a valu-
able boost to global trade’ (cited in Bangkok Post, May 2, 2007). The
same study also suggests that – assuming that the ASEAN is already
fully liberalized regarding goods except for some sensitive products,
and has cut barriers in the service sectors by 50% – the biggest gains
for the EU and the ASEAN countries are expected to come from the lib-
eralization of ‘business services’ insofar as the former may experience a
29% increase (about E 7.9 billion) and the latter an 80% increase
(about E 14 billion) (European Commission 2007n). The trade diversion
effects of the EU’s FTAs with ASEAN countries, India and South Korea
will probably remain ‘minimal’, although the one with ASEAN coun-
tries may cause a certain degree of trade diversion from China and In-
dia (ibid.).
Although their FTA negotiations may not create a new institution in
the WTO framework as such, the path leading to it is likely to generate
necessary impulses for deeper cooperation, as seen in a variety of bilat-
eral cooperation activities including workshops and seminars. The Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand (2007c) views the key
priority in the field of economic cooperation and development the provi-
sion of ‘technical and capacity building assistance to help Thailand im-
plement its WTO commitments’. An example can be found in the EU’s
willingness to informally support recent attempts by the Thai govern-
ment to implement its commitments within the frameworks of the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary matters and the Codex
Alimentarius, for example, the EU hoped that it could provide regular
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discussion and an exchange of information on legislation, certification
and inspection procedures.52
In view of its rationalizing function, the new bilateralism apparently
serves as a more efficient channel than the WTO does to address cer-
tain globally-oriented issues and is also in a more flexible position to
take action through bilateral cooperation activities. The EU-ASEAN FTA
will probably generate some ‘pluses’ for the WTO’s Doha Round nego-
tiations, which is emphasized in the Council’s conclusions on its re-
commendations to open the FTA negotiations with the ASEAN coun-
tries: ‘the EU should aim at a new generation of WTO compatible Free
Trade Agreements that extend beyond present agreements and build to-
wards future multilateral negotiations, with the intention to strengthen
the multilateral trading system. They should be ambitious and compre-
hensive and comprise far-reaching liberalisation of trade in goods and
services, and investment. Special attention will be given to the elimina-
tion of non-tariff barriers’ (Council of the European Union 2007).
At the same time, it is apparent that the EU and Thailand may aim to
promote trust, mutual awareness and understanding between business
communities. For constructivists, it seems obvious that the prospects of
bilateral free trade agreements are not primarily limited to economic
benefits and institutional developments but can also be combined with
the dynamics of value-based interactions and collective identity forma-
tion. It is clear that the EU has pursued some trade policies of value-
based orientation, for example, in its communiqué ‘A New Partnership
with South East Asia’, the European Commission (2003c: 3) noted:
‘New bilateral agreements with countries of the region should all con-
tain the "essential element" clause regarding human rights, while the
EU and particular countries in the region may decide to launch Human
Rights-specific bilateral dialogues’. Moreover, the EU’s efforts to pro-
mote regional integration among and with developing countries can
also be seen as pursuing a goal of integrating them into the interna-
tional trade system (Reiterer 2006: 243). This idea was officially stated
in the Council’s conclusions on the recommendations to open FTA ne-
gotiations with the ASEAN countries, as follows:
The new WTO-compatible Free Trade Agreements with emer-
ging countries should contribute to improving competitiveness
and growth in Europe and globally and support further integra-
tion of partner countries into the international trading system
(Council of the European Union 2007: 1).
At this stage of the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, it seems too early to
assess the extent to which normative elements such as those in the
GSP’s special incentive arrangements mentioned above may be applied
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and to identify the implications that the outcomes may have for the pro-
cess of identity formation. The EU and Thailand have been active in the
negotiations of this prospective FTA. However, their bilateral relations
seem to focus at most on certain aspects such as labor rights, so that it
is doubtful if these relations would eventually contribute to the forma-
tion of any long-term collective identity (see also Knottnerus 2007).
V.3.3 The EU and Thailand in the Donor Community:
The Implementation of the Paris Declaration
The European Commission and the Thai government, along with some
90 countries and 40 participating organizations and civil society organi-
zations, adopted the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ in March
2005. In brief, the Paris Declaration (2005) is comprised of five con-
cepts: ownership, harmonization, alignment, management for results,
and mutual accountability.53 In the view of Ambassador Dr. Friedrich
Hamburger (2006), Head of Delegation of the European Commission
to Thailand, EU-Thailand relations seem very promising because the
EU is a well established donor and Thailand recently became one and
thus may explore the implications of the Paris Declaration for regional
cooperation projects and specifically for the international donor com-
munity. Thus far, the European Council has welcomed the possibility of
trilateral cooperation in EU cooperation activities in Southeast Asia and
has declared the EU’s readiness to provide assistance in line with the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (European Commission 2004d). More-
over, as Head of the Operations Section of the Delegation of the Eur-
opean Commission to Thailand Andrew Jacobs (2006: 17) has asserted,
the EU donors have reached the so-called ‘European Consensus on De-
velopment’ and, with it, have introduced further cooperation measures
that include the proposed ‘Road Maps for Aid Effectiveness’, which
raises the awareness of and establishes certain guidelines for the EU’s
cooperation activities, including those with Thailand and Southeast
Asian countries. Jacobs (ibid.) also underlines Thailand’s role as fol-
lows: ‘EU donors are particularly keen to work closely with emerging
donors such as Thailand, who are major players in Asia, providing con-
siderable support to their less-developed neighbours’.
In an overview, it may be worth reviewing development cooperation
engaged in the Thai government. Thailand’s contribution in the form
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to c. $ 167 million
in 2003, that is, roughly 0.13% of the country’s gross national income
(Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency et al. 2006:
3). While this ODA level is comparable to that of OECD countries and
significant for a middle-income country, it is emphasized that the pro-
portion it has allocated to the least developed countries, according to
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Thai ODA, is c. 94% of allocations, which is far above the OECD’s aver-
age of 26% (ibid.). The recent focus has been on cooperation activities
in less developed countries and, with the EU and some other donors,
there have been discussions about the rationalizing strategies of trilat-
eral cooperation. As far as modalities are concerned, Thailand’s devel-
opment cooperation programs are conducted through bilateral, trilateral
and regional channels and in the form of South-South cooperation,
partnership cooperation with other donors, and North-South-South co-
operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2006b). The Thai gov-
ernment regards its neighboring countries as priorities in the list of tar-
get countries but, at the same time, also provides development assis-
tance to countries in other regions including Africa and South Asia
(Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency 2007a; Thai-
land International Development Cooperation Agency et al. 2006).
Most of the recent and on-going bilateral projects focus on technical
cooperation and training courses such as supporting the Mae Fah
Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage in its implementation of the
sustainable alternative livelihoods development project in Afghanistan,
the Thailand-Sri Lanka Technical Cooperation Programme as a contri-
bution to the latter’s rehabilitation process, the Thailand-Bhutan Hu-
man Resources Development Programme and the Thailand-Jordan
Technical Cooperation Programme in the fields of agriculture, tourism,
and trade and investment (Thailand International Development Coop-
eration Agency 2007a, 2007c). Moreover, there are also training courses
on community empowerment for senior- and middle-level officials from
Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan, the development of small scale fishery
projects in marine capture and fish processing and a training course on
gem-cutting in Madagascar, projects for the improvement of rice pro-
duction techniques, the development of effective control measures for
Malaria and HIV-AIDS and the improvement of existing surveillance
and monitoring systems and the development of small scale fisheries
and aquaculture in Mozambique (ibid.). Other projects include the de-
velopment of sustainable agriculture in the Kingdom of Lesotho, train-
ing courses on export promotion and fish aquaculture in Egypt, bilateral
technical cooperation programs in the fields of agriculture, tourism,
and narcotics control in the CIS (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajiki-
stan), training programs in medicine, fisheries, rice production and
agriculture in Cuba, and the Thailand-Peru Technical Cooperation Pro-
gramme in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, and tourism (ibid.).
The main criticism is that only 8% of the Thai ODA is directly allo-
cated to the social sectors compared to a 20% target for OECD coun-
tries and that the Thai approach focuses mostly on soft loans rather
than on grants and a portion of these is tied to the purchase of goods
and services (Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency
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Country Thai International Cooperation Program (TICP) FY 2005 (1000 baht)
Bilateral
Program
Thai
International
Postgraduate
Program
Annual
International
Training
Courses
Trilateral and
Regional
Cooperation
Program
Total
TICP
Southeast Asia
– Cambodia
31,250 1,056 2,798 1,556 36,660
– Lao PDR 43,529 2,319 1,267 1,132 48,247
– Myanmar 4,501 2,754 2,768 1,743 11,766
– Vietnam 24,915 2,097 2,601 1,988 31,601
– Brunei – – 31 – 31
– Indonesia 1,709 2,200 1,426 851 6,186
– Malaysia – – 180 267 447
– Philippines – 98 1,820 854 2,772
– Singapore* 10 – 206 – 216
– Timor Leste 2,696 – 1,070 178 3,944
East Asia
– China
5,498 – 1,165 632 7,295
– Hong Kong – – 77 – 77
– Japan – – 16 – 16
– Korea, PDR – – 317 – 317
– Korea, Rep. – – 158 – 158
– Mongolia 214 – 762 484 1,460
South Asia
and Middle East
– Afghanistan
783 – 1,233 215 2,231
– Bangladesh 551 645 2,431 402 4,029
– Bhutan 1,207 2,068 1,767 618 5,660
– India – – 233 85 318
– Iran 514 – 664 182 1,360
– Jordan 598 – 206 – 804
– Maldives – – 207 – 207
– Nepal 912 2,768 1,521 731 5,932
– Pakistan – – 772 613 1,385
– Palestine – – – – –
– Sri Lanka 1,128 1,805 1,148 783 4,864
The Pacific
– Australia
– – 16 – 16
– Fiji – – 197 – 197
Africa
– Bukina Faso
1,593 – – – 1,593
– Djibouti 460 – – – 460
– Egypt 2,032 – 159 – 2,191
– Ethiopia – – 283 – 283
– Kenya 1,678 – 798 77 2,553
– Madagascar 2,286 – 58 135 2,479
– Mauritius 662 – 70 – 732
– Mozambique 5,041 – – – 5,041
– Nigeria 177 – – – 177
– Senegal 112 – – – 112
– Sudan 714 – – – 714
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et al. 2006: 3-4). The latter point seems to related to the Paris Declara-
tion principle of ‘alignment’. This will be discussed in greater detail be-
low.
The neorealist explanation focuses on the responses of states to struc-
tural changes in the international system, so that one would expect EU-
Thailand relations to be strategically driven and, in a sense, focused bal-
ancing against other regional and international players. The Thai gov-
ernment considers the relations with traditional donors, including the
bilateral ones with the EU, to be crucial for improving its performance
in development cooperation at the international system level, as noted
by Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency’s Director
General Piamsak Millintachinda (2006: 14):
Since we are modestly a very small emerging middle-income do-
nor, partnership cooperation with other developed countries has
Country Thai International Cooperation Program (TICP) FY 2005 (1000 baht)
Bilateral
Program
Thai
International
Postgraduate
Program
Annual
International
Training
Courses
Trilateral and
Regional
Cooperation
Program
Total
TICP
– Swaziland – – – 115 115
– Tanzania 86 – – – 86
– Uganda 242 – – 94 336
CIS and Latin America
– Argentina
133 – – – 133
– Belize 388 – 519 – 907
– Brazil 115 – – – 115
– Chile 122 – – – 122
– Colombia 493 – 624 – 1,117
– Costa Rica – – 385 – 385
– Cuba – – 466 – 466
– Ecuador – – 318 – 318
– Guatemala – – 282 – 282
– Mexico 253 – – – 253
– Panama 135 – – – 135
– Paraguay 157 – – – 157
– Peru 143 – – – 143
– Saint Lucia – – 180 – 180
– Uruguay 146 – – – 146
Eastern Europe
– Tajikistan
– – 118 – 118
Others 3,029 – 3,445 2,489 8,963
Total 140,212 17,810 34,762 16,224 209,008
Source: Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency (2007b), modified by
author. http://www.tica.thaigov.net/tica/resources/ticp2005.xls, accessed in August 2007.
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been our key modality to extend our shared experiences and
knowledge to assist other developing countries.
As a consequence, the concepts of trilateral cooperation seem increas-
ingly attractive to both Thailand and the EU. The Thai government has
positioned itself as an emerging donor that used to receive development
assistance, which probably highlights the strategic importance of pro-
viding technological transfers to recipient countries in the region and,
at the same time, benefiting from the expertise of the EU and other tra-
ditional donors (see also ibid.). The EU and the Thai government are
well aware of their regional roles in Southeast Asia and that, at first
glance, bilateralism will probably make a significant contribution to pov-
erty eradication efforts (Millintachinda 2006). The joint activities be-
tween the Thai government and the EU will probably lead to improve-
ments in pursuing the development needs and priorities of partner
countries, but this bilateralism may also strengthen the former’s rela-
tions with other donors in those partner countries (Thailand Interna-
tional Development Cooperation Agency et al. 2006: 2).54
Unlike the neorealist views on balancing, institutionalists seem more
concerned with the coordinating efforts of the bilateral parties, thus
they expect EU-Thailand relations to perform institution-building or ra-
tionalizing functions in the international cooperation framework. The
European Commission has welcomed Thai efforts to implement the
Paris Declaration and to adopt some of the proposed measures for aid
effectiveness at the regional and international levels. For example, the
above-mentioned criticisms regarding the fact that only 8% of Thai
ODA is directly allocated to the social sectors compared to a 20% target
for OECD countries and that the Thai approach mostly focuses on soft
loans, as noted above, have been raised in the context of the ‘alignment’
principle of the Paris Declaration (Thailand International Development
Cooperation Agency et al. 2006: 3-4).55 The Paris Declaration, as UN
Assistant Secretary-General and UNDP Regional Director for Asia and
the Pacific Bureau Dr. Hafiz Pasha (2006: 16-17) observed, ‘is an impor-
tant instrument for increasing the quality of aid. It is the commitment
of the donors and developing countries to undertake reforms of aid
management, through measuring their success – or failure – at making
aid more effective with a set of indicators and targets for 2010. These
targets are designed to track and encourage progress at the global level
across all aid modalities, which shall be guided by development strate-
gies and priorities established by partner countries themselves.’
The Thai government’s on-going bilateral projects – despite their
technical development nature – can also be considered supportive of
OECD norms such as human rights, rule of law and good governance.
Although it seems too early to assess the EU’s contribution to the Thai
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process of internalizing those norms as proposed by the OECD or the
Paris Declaration, with respect to the Millennium Declaration and the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, a global framework for im-
proving the conduct of development cooperation) the EU and its mem-
ber states and the Thai government have played significant roles in sev-
eral bilateral and multilateral initiatives, with the latter being particu-
larly active in promoting the ‘MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for
Development’ (Thailand International Development Cooperation
Agency et al. 2006; Parsha 2006). Thailand is one of the middle-in-
come countries that has stressed the relevance of South-South coopera-
tion activities in the achievement of MDGs by 2015. Thailand was also
the first non-OECD country to submit a report on its MDG 8 contribu-
tion in September 2005 (ibid.). The possibility of the EU cooperating
with the Thai government to provide assistance to some of the less de-
veloped Southeast Asian countries is regarded as an important step in
rationalizing their bilateral relations in accordance with internationl
principles on development cooperation partnership. Yet, insofar as the
European Commission does not have any specific criteria for the choice
of a recipient country in trilateral cooperation, it can be argued as more
reasonable to consider cooperating with countries in the region such as
Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam whilst cooperation with African countries
is also possible but may be justified only under certain conditions.56
Furthermore, the institutionalist arguments are supported by the
Thai governments attempt to set up a multilateral channel for dialogues
on the implementation of the Paris Declaration. More specifically, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand International Development Coop-
eration Agency hosted the workshop ‘Aid Effectiveness: From Paris to
Bangkok’ in Bangkok on October 5, 2006 (Thailand International De-
velopment Cooperation Agency et al. 2006). This event was an initiative
of the Thai government and supported by the Delegation of the Eur-
opean Commission to Thailand and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), in cooperation with the World Bank (ibid.). It
should also be noted that the workshop managed to bring together re-
presentatives from government agencies and relevant institutions in-
cluding – on the Thai side – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minis-
try of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Minis-
try of Interior, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Education,
the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
and the Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation
Agency, and – from abroad – the European Commission, the United
Nations Development Programme, the Asian Development Bank, the
World Bank, the Agence Française de Développment, the Canadian In-
ternational Development Agency, Japan International Cooperation
Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the embas-
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sies of the EU member states, Australia, Japan and Vietnam (ibid.). This
long list of attendees not only reflects the increasing interests in aid
management for regional and international development activities but
the significance of Thailand’s new roles and relations among traditional
donors including the EU in the international system. As Piamsak Milli-
ntachinda (2006: 15) observed in his opening remarks: ‘I am looking
forward to materializing the phase ‘From Paris to Bangkok’, not for the
benefit of Paris or Bangkok but the global community at large’.
Constructivists would generally underscore the relevance of norms
and ideas regarding the formation of identities and interests of the ac-
tors involved in the bilateral interactions between the EU and Thailand
in a donor community. Thailand, Dr. Hafiz Pasha (2006: 5 noted, has
‘within a generation’ moved from being a recipient country to being an
emerging donor, which not only suggests the opportunity to learn from
the experiences of established donors such as the EU and its member
states but, to go a step further, to share its experiences with other emer-
ging donors including China, India and some Central European coun-
tries. The Paris Declaration, which is based on the Rome Declaration
on Harmonisation in 2003 and the Marrakech Principles on Managing
for Development Results in 2004, illustrates the agreement among do-
nors and partner countries to more effective aid delivery and result-
based management and, for the Thai government, also sends an impor-
tant signal regarding the country’s new role in the international com-
munity (Millintachinda 2006). The adoption of the Paris Declaration in
2005 implies the commitments of the European Commission and the
Thai government to relevant guiding principles based on a list of devel-
opment targets and indicators. Against this background, their bilateral
relations may contribute to the perception of Thailand’s changing role
as a new donor in the international community, by which both sides are
likely to face similar challenges in the implementation of the Paris De-
claration. Moreover, the events such as the above-mentioned workshop
‘Aid Effectiveness: From Paris to Bangkok’ in October 2006, is not only
an institutionalist argument for the creation of a new forum but also
serves as one of the important steps in bringing the actors involved to-
gether in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, to promote further ex-
changes of views and experiences.
V.4 Summary
The analysis of EU-Thailand relations at the international system level
was conducted using arguments from the three schools of international
relations: neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism.
The study, which has focused on the balancing, institution-building, ratio-
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nalizing, agenda-setting and identity-building functions of new bilateral-
ism derived from these three theoretical schools, can be summarized as
follows:
The neorealist theory suggests that in response to changes in regional
power structures, EU-Thailand relations principally perform a balancing
function, which can be pursued not only between each other but also
toward a third party – be it a country or a group of countries. At the re-
gional level, the initial EC-ASEAN dialogues began in as early as the
1970s, making it apparent that the then EEC considered its bilateral re-
lations with the Southeast Asian countries including Thailand a signifi-
cant balancing trick, especially against a background of the prospective
accession of the UK in the EEC in 1973, in which Malaysia and Singa-
pore showed active engagement because of the benefits associated with
their postcolonial links to the Commonwealth (Dent 1997-98: 502).
Within ASEAN, EU-Thailand relations have to some extent contributed
to the maintenance of a balance of this regionalism, as can be observed
in part with the conception of trilateral cooperation and later the estab-
lishment of the EU FTA with the ASEAN countries. By the way, while
the EU-ASEAN FTA discussions show a certain degree of internal frag-
mentation among ASEAN states themselves, this FTA – if it ever hap-
pens – will be seen as the Thai and ASEAN response to the competition
of China and the other two East Asian countries and their rising trade
figures as ASEAN shares have shown a decline in their EU FDI stocks
in East Asia. The EU and Thailand are currently in the final stages of
negotiating a bilateral framework agreement which will only provide a
comprehensive, far-reaching framework for their bilateral dialogues and
cooperation projects but also improve the relative positions of both par-
ties in ‘a stronger, deeper and more structured relationship’ (Delegation
of the European Commission to Thailand 2006g).
However, the extent to which EU-Thailand relations perform a balan-
cing function seems to vary greatly depending on the level of interac-
tion. There is slightly less evidence at the interregional level to suggest
EU-Thailand relations have a balancing function within the ASEM or
the ARF than at the regional level. Their bilateralism has, however,
played an important role in advocating Thailand’s access to the Eur-
opean Investment Bank and proposing various projects during the im-
plementation of the ASEM Trust Fund, which, although modest, can be
regarded as the EU’s most tangible contribution in the region during
the post-financial crisis period. The Thai government’s proposal to in-
troduce an ‘Asia Bond’, for example, was aimed at strengthening the
Asian ASEM members’ positions against those of its European counter-
parts. The fact that the Thai government is a key player on the ASEAN
side also makes this bilateralism very relevant for the EU in its promo-
tion of its role in, for example, co-chairing the ARF Intersessional Sup-
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port Groups. At the global level, the EU and Thailand perform the bal-
ancing function to a lesser against each other through the UN or the
WTO, except for certain trade-related issues such as the WTO anti-
dumping negotiations that polarize most agricultural countries. Other-
wise, their bilateral relations are in line with international efforts, such
as the fight against terrorism, whilst the prospective EU’s FTA negotia-
tions with the ASEAN countries is competitiveness-driven to maintain a
balance in international trade relations.
Neoliberal institutionalists, meanwhile, can provide more evidence
that EU-Thailand relations have contributed to international cooperation
thereby performing the functions of institution-building, rationalizing
and agenda-setting. Since their earliest relationship in the 1970s, the
EU and Thailand have been mentioned as two important actors that
helped establish the EEC-ASEAN dialogues. In fact, the first EC-ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in 1978 was proposed by German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and ‘active[ly]’ supported by
the Thai government (Genscher 1982: 12; von Stechow 2003: 7). In the
ASEAN context, the Thai government and the EU clearly support
ASEAN’s own regional integration efforts, with the former having
hosted a series of EU-funded TREATI projects for interested ASEAN
countries such as the seminar on food safety rules and the workshops
on sanitary and phytosanitary standards in the fisheries sector and on
EU standards and technical regulations in the electronic and electrical
equipment sectors. More significantly, in the aftermath of the Asian cri-
sis, EU-Thailand relations evidently played a crucial role in proposing
the creation of the ASEM Trust Fund in 1998, in which the EU’s contri-
bution – using a project-oriented approach – ranged from the revival of
the corporate sector, the reduction of poverty and social inequality to
the protection of natural resources. Later, during the ASEM process, bi-
lateral cooperation between the EU and the Thai government has also
given a boost to a series of institution-building ASEM initiatives such as
the establishment of the ‘Asia-Europe Environment Technology Centre’
and the proposal for the ‘Asia-Europe Information Technology and Tele-
communications Programme’, which was later integrated into the
‘Seminar on Information and Telecommunications Technology’.
The EU and Thailand, with regard to the rationalizing function, have
always underscored the relevance of bilateralism as an important chan-
nel for addressing regional and international concerns – in both the po-
litical and economic fields. Their bilateral relations significantly pro-
mote WTO-related activities such as the introduction of the Geographi-
cal Indication concepts and the formation of the Thailand-EU Business
Forum, which not only aims to assist the adjustment of Thailand’s pri-
vate sectors to EU standards but also to define areas of cooperation in-
cluding technical assistance and capacity building for the implementa-
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tion of the country’s WTO commitments. Likewise, the EU often en-
courages its bilateral partners to adopt certain international codes of
conduct, for example, to ratify the 12 conventions and protocols on
counter-terrorism or to reach an agreement on cooperation against pi-
racy and armed robbery against ships. In the field of development pol-
icy, several bilateral programs – e.g., the EU-funded SGP PTF Thailand
– are designed to pursue internationally defined goals of environmental
sustainability through community-level resource-efficient development
projects. At this stage, bilateralism’s agenda-setting function is observa-
ble only to a lesser extent. The example of the introduction of the Geo-
graphical Indications shows not only that EU-Thailand relations actively
supported the adoption of these concepts into Thai national legislation
in 2004, they have also attempted to promote them at the regional level
through the second EC-ASEAN Technical Assistance Programme on In-
tellectual Property Rights (ECAPII) framework.
From a cognitive approach, constructivists believe that an important
function of EU-Thailand relations is to form a collective identity and
interests through interactions at the international system level.
Although empirically less accurate, the constructivist explanation is very
helpful by complementing the rational views with some cognitive
aspects. The formal and informal political dialogues between the EU
and Thailand could improve mutual awareness and comprehension of
the norms of good governance, respect for human rights and the rights
of ethnic minorities and displaced people and that given the positions
held by the EU and Thailand, they now share a common view regarding
the relevance of the situation for regional stability and the need to re-
dress Burma’s democratic progress (European Commission 2005a).
Thailand and the EU have with the adoption of the Paris Declaration in
2005, become committed to the same guiding principles based on a list
of targets and indicators. This means that EU-Thailand relations can
contribute to the integration of the latter into the donor community –
as was already discussed in the section on concepts of trilateral coopera-
tion. Furthermore, the constructivist explanation becomes even more
credible because of its argument regarding the dynamics of complex
learning. Furthermore, the EU-funded TREATI is, at first glance, de-
signed to be a regional dialogue mechanism and the ASEM process also
mostly promotes dialogues, which allows the EU and Thailand to estab-
lish trust and promote mutual awareness and understanding through
the exchange of experience, e.g., in the Meetings on Standards and
Conformity Assessment, the Seminar on Geographical Indications and
the ASEM Public Debt Management Forum. Moreover, these dialogues
and some of the new cooperation projects that promote university-to-
university cooperation and intellectual links among academics and ex-
perts are helpful for the EU in raising its profile in the region.
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VI Conclusion
Towards a New Bilateralism? The Case of EU-Thailand Relations
Following the prefacing arguments about the conceptualization of new
bilateralism, this section of the conclusion summarizes the pros and
cons of EU-Thailand relations as representative of new bilateralism
based on their practical implications and the relevance of them to the
international system. It should be possible to conclude from the outset
that EU-Thailand relations in principle belong to a recent trend in new
bilateralism despite certain limitations regarding their international pre-
sence and diverging programmatic approaches.
The first supporting argument lies in the new qualities of the rele-
vant actors in both the EU and Thailand. While economists would not
consider the two parties to be ‘natural’ trading partners, the importance
of their bilateral relations seems to complement the new arguments on
reconstructing hub-spoke bilateralism and accentuating the pre-existing
EU-ASEAN relations. Thailand’s efforts – mainly during the Thaksin
government – to initiate a number of bilateral free FTA negotiations
with countries across regions and the EU’s recent emphasis on certain
new strategic bilateral relations, well beyond its conventional arrange-
ments with neighboring countries, regional organizations and close
partners such as the US, give a strong signal that an emerging new bila-
teralism relies less on historical relations and geographical proximity
than on converging interests, political background and good personal
relations. More importantly, on the EU’s part, EU Trade Commissioner
Peter Mandelson’s message in his speech in Berlin in September 2006
and later the Council’s conclusion in the recommendations to open
FTA negotiations with the ASEAN countries in April 2007 are clear en-
ough to reflect the strengthening of the EU’s actorness. It also signals a
high degree of pragmatism among the relevant actors in the trend of
new bilateralism.
Second, the EU and the Thai government have obviously agreed on a
much wider range of political and trade-related dialogues and coopera-
tion activities. Here the free choice of relevant issues and how they are
combined plays a very important role in introducing new patterns of ne-
gotiations across operating sectors and policy fields, as was discussed in
a series of recent bilateral GSP-related negotiations. The economically
dominating agendas of bilateralism gradually begin to accommodate
more issues that have been impeded under the WTO, or the so-called
WTO-plus issues, for example, the EU-Thailand cooperation on intellec-
tual property rights as seen in the introduction on Geographical Indica-
tions. Similarly, in the political sphere, their bilateral dialogues have
started to take into account sensitive political values, demonstrating a
substantial modification regarding security understanding that is no
longer limited to the primordial conduct of military resources and thus
reveals the increasing importance of non-conventional security issues
such as the environment, human security, migration and counter-terror-
ism. For example, the EU continuously seeks to promote through avail-
able channels certain norms such as good governance, respect for hu-
man rights and particularly the rights of ethnic minorities and dis-
placed peoples in the case of Burma. In the field of bilateral
development cooperation, the gradual disappearance of traditional EU
development projects in Thailand has seen the rise of a new generation
of cooperation programs including ‘Capacity-Building for Implementa-
tion of UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection in Asia’, a long list of
trade-related seminars and workshops in the TREATI and ASEM frame-
works such as on food safety rules or sanitary and phytosanitary stan-
dards in the fisheries sector, as well as a new cooperation scheme in
higher education.
Third, the multi-level nature of EU-Thailand relations creates new
possibilities for the bilateral parties to interact at a number of parallel
levels ranging from individual-to-individual, the EU-ASEAN dialogues,
the ASEM summits and ministerial meetings, the ARF’s ‘track-one’ and
‘track-two’ meetings to the global fora including the UN and the WTO.
For obvious reasons, this new trend is self-explanatory insofar as bilat-
eral initiatives drive and are being driven very quickly by the recent de-
velopments of international relations. The attempt to break down a
comprehensive multilateral agenda into several single issues, which
Smith and Tsatsas (2002: 29) have termed ‘multiple issue-specific alli-
ances’, has an important advantage for the two parties in that it focuses
on a particular issue and at a particular level, on the basis of mutual in-
terest. There are a number of examples in EU-Thailand relations includ-
ing the ‘Seminar on Information and Telecommunications Technology’
co-supported by the European Commission and the Thai government
as an ASEM initiative and the EU-funded ‘Asia Urbs’ initiative in envir-
onment conservation and management between Lamphun Municipality
and the two European municipalities of Wettenburg (Germany) and
Sorgue (France). Likewise, several institutions have been created in sup-
port of the principles of flexibility and reciprocity, as in the formation of
228 THE EU-THAILAND RELATIONS
the Thailand-EU Business Forum and the EU’s request to establish an
‘EU Chamber of Commerce’ in Thailand.
However, there seem to be at least two reasons that explain the appar-
ently curved path of EU-Thailand relations toward new bilateralism and
the view that these bilateral relations might not appear so dynamic as
they could become. The first reason can be found in a foreign policy
analysis at the unit level and is that – especially in trade-related matters
– these bilateral relations have thus far followed a problem-oriented ap-
proach rather than certain other strategic policies. While the EU’s en-
gagement is mostly driven by business interests and run through a spe-
cific internal division of competence, the Thai government’s main inter-
ests have been more subtly intertwined between preserving a balance of
power and promoting regional security both in political and trade-re-
lated matters. We can thus argue that their diverse preconditions and
the differences in their programmatic approaches have to some extent
complicated the developments of this bilateralism.
The second argument is that the ‘relevance’ of bilateralism differs
greatly across the regional, interregional and global levels, and so does
its ‘significance’ and the attractiveness for both parties to explore certain
functions ascribed to new bilateralism. Thailand’s crucial regional roles
make it very important for the EU to consider Thailand’s positions and
to promote corresponding aspects of their bilateral relations in South-
east Asia. The functional analysis illustrates that in interregional fora
such as the ASEM and the ARF, the China factors and some of the re-
cent regional security issues have blurred the picture of the interplay
between bilateralism and multilateralism to a certain extent. In this con-
nection, the relevance of EU-Thailand bilateralism can only be felt to an
even lesser extent at the global level, in international institutions like
the UN and the WTO. In most cases, the balancing function of this bi-
lateralism has evidently been outperformed by the rationalizing func-
tion. Since the two parties interact in an ever broader and multi-level
framework, their efforts are likely to address certain issues of mutual
concern and facilitate the implementation of some internationally de-
fined goals and commitments.
New Bilateralism and the Making of Foreign Policy
Realists appear to be more precise in explaining the opportunistic for-
eign policy behavior of state than their liberal and constructivist collea-
gues when it comes to the emerging trend of new bilateralism. The rea-
list arguments concerning self-interest, survival and Realpolitik tradi-
tionally provide a significant conceptual basis for the rise of new
bilateralism and the crisis of multilateralism. However, while the policy
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option of new bilateralism will probably allow great powers to exploit
their advantages over smaller nations, it is interesting to observe that
the latter often eagerly seeks out bilateral negotiations, as witnessed in
several bilateral free trade agreements. For this pattern of behavior, lib-
erals – following the same assumption of rationality as realists – offer
another explanation that extends the state-centric perspective to an in-
creased role of other players, whose converging interests – as greatly ob-
served in international trade – can prompt the engagement of states.
This liberal notion may serve here as a contestant and at the same time
complementary approach insofar as it questions the validity of hierarch-
ical patterns in the international system and decidedly accommodates
domestic interests and non-state actors in an analysis of foreign policy
making. By contrast, while the constructivist explanation seems to be
the least accurate as far as the empirical evidence on identity formation
and rhetorical action is concerned, this approach interestingly under-
scores the substantial dynamics of improving mutual recognition and
understanding and, more importantly, re-confirms the view that there is
a very high degree of pragmatism involved in the new bilateralism
trends.
The main findings of our case study suggest that the EU and the
Thai government have apparently pursued a foreign policy that reflects
a gradual change in domestic interest structures and political motiva-
tion and that their bilateral relations increasingly assume qualities in
line with the new bilateralism trend. The findings can be summarized
in the following five points:
First, the realist school has evidently re-gained much credibility in ex-
plaining the policy re-shifting from the campaigns for multilateralism
back to a more explicit use of bilateral power instruments, for all of the
parties involved clearly seek to improve their relative positions in the
hierarchical structures of international politics. In a way, Cheow’s
(1986) description of Thailand’s foreign policy as ‘similar in scope but
different in content’ is still applicable to part of the country’s foreign
policy developments that greatly follow the same traditional principles
such as that of ‘equidistance’ and ‘bending with the wind’. Thus, as rea-
lists see it, influence-seeking and voicing-opportunities-seeking foreign
policies are not unprecedented and have become highly relevant in
practice. Thailand’s sensitivity to changes in regional power relations
and her long tradition of flexible and pragmatic foreign policy can be
observed in her bilateral strategies toward the major players, including
the EU, and was especially evident in Thailand’s response to the Asian
crisis, the country’s recent FTA policies and the management of tour-
ism and migratory flows. On the EU’s side, however, some of the re-
sponses may have been security-oriented with respect to regional secur-
ity challenges and their potential global impacts. When it comes to cer-
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tain politically sensitive issues such as the situation in the South and re-
cent domestic political developments in Thailand, the EU often restricts
itself to raising concerns through informal bilateral dialogues and that
it only pursues power-based interests in seeking to influence the Thai
government or other Southeast Asian states to a lesser extent.
Second, a counter-argument to the realist explanation, the recent
trend of bilateralism has been increasingly driven by economic interests
in view of an ‘engaging’ strategy of the parties involved. The oft-dis-
cussed lack of tangible results at Cancun in 2003 and Hong Kong
2005, which signaled that the Doha Development Agenda was not
going to be completed on time, created a significant incentive for a
number of WTO members to manage their commercial ties bilaterally,
on the sidelines of multilateral negotiations. The basic principles of flex-
ibility and reciprocity can be traced to the long tradition of bilateralism
itself, which apparently enables the participating parties to negotiate on
an ad hoc case-by-case or product-by-product basis and ensure a high
degree of reciprocity (Ruggie 1993: 9). In the proliferation of several
new bilateral FTAs and bilateral relations, Thailand’s economic perfor-
mance clearly explains the resulting market incentives and the growing
interests of EU business communities in both areas of trade and invest-
ments, so that the argument for ‘engaging’ greatly contributes to under-
standing the active involvement of states driven by business interests
and so the emergence of new economic actors in world economy. Not
only do their bilateral relations contribute to the strengthening of busi-
ness links and networks as such, this bilateralism also gives rise to bi-
lateral cooperation projects in other areas such as science, technology,
R&D and higher education. Moreover, the view that the EU plays more
an economic than a political actor seems to gain ground, as earlier ob-
served in the increased engagement of relevant EU institutions, particu-
larly the European Commission.
Third, the enthusiastic embrace of bilateralism is partly due to the in-
creased participation of non-state actors in the foreign policy-making
process. Provided that this development is actively encouraged by the
states themselves, the participation of non-state actors in areas such as
trade-related matters or humanitarian assistance not only creates a vari-
ety of issue-specific and local tasks but also facilitates policy coordina-
tion between the private sector and the responsible government authori-
ties, illustrating the possibility of extending the traditional views of
state-to-state relations to include state-firm and firm-firm dimensions of
diplomacy (Strange 1992; see also Tavornmas 2006). During the 1997
Asian crisis, it became obvious that the EU and Thailand’s business
communities posed an important challenge to any increased participa-
tion of the private sector in commerce and industry as a way to improv-
ing regional and international coordination. In this connection, the idea
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of establishing a European Chamber of Commerce has been accelerated
by the growing size and diversity of business communities, which be-
gan to call for a collective referential and advisory body on each side, as
also being encouraged in the prospective FTA negotiations.1 The Thai
government and the EU have also openly welcomed the work of non-
state actors in other fields of cooperation, in, for example, cross-border
issues with a considerable portion of cooperation projects on the treat-
ment of Burmese displaced people having been carried out by transna-
tional NGOs and non-state actors.
Fourth, the day-to-day running and long-term establishment of new
bilateral relations – once initiated by the vision of chief executives – very
much follows the domestic political tradition to develop in the hands of
responsible ministerial bureaucrats. The theory of bureaucratization,
which focuses on a process that copes with the issue-specific complexity
of social and national benefits, helps to explain the logic behind the
work of specialized bureaucratic institutions in terms of efficiency, pol-
icy credibility and delegation legitimacy. Accordingly, the study shows
that EU-Thailand relations have mainly relied on the interaction be-
tween the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the European
Commission. Both of these have undergone their own processes of bu-
reaucratization and have reached a certain degree of professionalism.
Moreover, these bureaucratic institutions have been successful as coor-
dinating bodies, for example, in the negotiations surrounding lifting
the ban on poultry products after the outbreak of Avian Influenza,
which required coordination mechanisms that included the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Public Health, on the one hand, and
the Directorate-Generals for External Relations, Trade and Health and
Consumer Protection, on the other.
Fifth, there is a very high degree of pragmatism involved in the mak-
ing of foreign policy within the new bilateralism, to which a series of
pairs of countries have responded actively and purposefully. The con-
structivist school is thus promising with regard to its arguments on so-
cial learning and mutual recognition. Following these arguments, a pro-
cess of foreign policy making is expected to develop the dynamics of
problem solving, which – through communicative acts – have gone be-
yond a state’s adaptation to constraints or imitation of successful mod-
els, as well as the understandings of non-material incentives such as de-
sire for acceptance, symbolic legitimacy and status (Ruggie 1998; Sedel-
meier 2004; Barnett 2005). In EU-Thailand relations, pragmatic
elements can be found in Thailand’s foreign policy and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the EU’s, e.g., the proliferation of bilateral FTAs are not only dri-
ven by the exogenous utility-maximizing interests of the actors involved
but partly interpreted as foreign policy in response to social factors in-
cluding peer pressure. Similarly, in the field of development coopera-
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tion, the Thai government has begun to establish its new roles in line
with the country’s development profile as an emerging donor country
and a subregional power. Therefore, the instances of ‘Asia Urbs’ initia-
tives, the cooperation projects in higher education and the proposed
concepts of trilateral cooperation are all the more significant in terms of
familiarizing the Thai government with its new roles in the interna-
tional community.
New Bilateralism and the International System
While the realist school of foreign policy theory may, in many ways, of-
fer the most convincing explanation of a state’s new bilateral orientation
at the unit level, the same conclusion cannot be drawn at the interna-
tional system level. In the theoretical discourse, the extent to which the
balancing function can be performed by new bilateralism depends on
the possibility of the two parties to pursue their specific interests and
goals at a particular level of interaction – be it regional, interregional or
international, while taking into account the corresponding structural
and institutional constraints. In comparison, the rationalizing function
suggested by neoliberals has become increasingly important with regard
to the efficiency-driven orientation of the two parties and their formal
commitments to certain multilateral fora. Similarly, like stepping
stones, the institution-building and agenda-setting functions of neolib-
erals are increasingly observed in relation to the bilateral parties’ sup-
port for initiatives of mutual interest, although sometimes only sponta-
neously and euphorically. In contrast, the identity-building function as
postulated by constructivists has rather unclear evidence, particularly
when it comes to identifying the contribution of bilateral interaction –
with all cognitive elements involved – in a process of internalizing ideas
and norms. In most cases, however, the flexible and, to some extent, ad
hoc nature of new bilateralism seems to inhibit a long-term perspective
of identity formation.
The functional analysis of EU-Thailand relations as conducted in
chapter V has further illustrated some general trends of new bilateral-
ism, which can be summarized as follows:
First, the neorealist explanation remains relevant as long as the new
bilateralism trend does not lead to any deeper stages of international co-
operation, proclaiming that the parties involved are ultimately driven by
national interests, both in political and economic terms. In retrospect,
the lessons from the Asian crisis underlined that while regional re-
sponses could hardly further their recovery efforts, the affected ASEAN
countries have sought new bilateral solutions to heal their economic
vulnerability, with not much evidence to suggest the prospect of estab-
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lishing a long-lasting institution regionally or internationally (see also
Rüland 2000). In a sense, the 1997 Asian crisis has subsequently been
regarded as an important impulse for the parties involved to re-manage
their bilateral relations, e.g. when it comes to ASEAN+3, as a by-product
of the Asian crisis, in relation to the China factors and the rise of ‘Plus
Three’ countries. Similarly, in the EU-ASEAN context, EU-Singapore
and EU-Thailand relations, which have been on forefront of accelerating
ASEAN liberalization and negotiating bilateral FTAs with extra-regional
countries, have not led to a region-wide institutionalizing process yet,
although each of them began to negotiate a bilateral partnership and co-
operation agreement with the EU, while five other ASEAN countries –
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – also
queued up for their own similar negotiations. This development illus-
trates a balancing trend of new bilateralism, resting on the competitive
nature of states and their respective pursuit of regional stability in
Southeast Asia.
Second, new bilateralism tends to perform a ‘soft’ version of the bal-
ancing function, which – as part of the neorealist interpretation – not
only paves the way for a balance of power in international relations, but
can also maintain it on a short-term basis and transcend otherwise sub-
stantial commitments to institution-building. The findings thus support
the concepts of ‘soft balancing’ or ‘institutional balancing’, as recently
introduced by (2005: 71), Pape (2005: 36) and Rüland (2006a: 50), in
which the focus has gone beyond military buildups, war-time alliances
and military-related technology transfers to presuming the dominance
of non-military – institutional and diplomatic – resources. In reality, on
the economic front, EU-Thailand relations have clearly focused on re-
sponding to the rise in trade volume by the East Asian countries and
the decline in ASEAN’s share of the EU FDI stocks in East Asia. Their
efforts demonstrate an example of a security-related, but less military-
dominated approach than the traditional conduct of balancing strategy.
Likewise, the EU-Thailand Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,
once signed, will not only strengthen EU-Thailand relations but will
also re-assert an institutional balance among relations between ASEAN
countries and the EU.
Third, the neoliberal functions are very promising, particularly the in-
stitution-building and rationalizing ones, since new bilateralism allows
the two parties to pool their resources, reinforce reciprocity and pro-
mote rules and norms in a more flexible manner. Moreover, at higher
levels of interaction, the ‘rationalizing’ function may actually outper-
form the neorealist function of ‘balancing’, given that most interna-
tional actors, including here the EU and the Thai government, openly
recognize the significance of international frameworks such as the
UN’s leading roles in the fight against terrorism and the WTO as the
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most desirable forum for free trade negotiations. In retrospect, EU-
Thailand relations have significantly contributed to a series of regional
and international events, ranging from urging Thailand’s access to the
European Investment Bank (EIB), defining ASEM Trust Fund projects
to promoting the concepts of Geographical Indications and supporting
the establishment of the Asia-Europe Environment Technology Centre,
the Thailand-EU Business Forum and the ASEM Seminar on Informa-
tion and Telecommunications Technology. Later in the prospective FTA
negotiations, the rationalizing function of EU-Thailand relations is also
likely when it comes to specific international issues such as the liberali-
zation of business services that would be in their mutual interest.2
Fourth, the recent proliferation of bilateral and regional FTAs raises
doubts about the ‘agenda-setting’ function of the new bilateralism, as in
cases of sensitive issues, key players rarely go beyond ‘rationalized’ ac-
tivities of their mutual interest. During the EU’s pre-negotiations with
ASEAN countries, for instance, the EU and Thailand were first in a po-
sition to raise issues of mutual concern such as the rules of origin,
which had been previously discussed in their bilateral negotiations of
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Yet, the developments that
followed showed that bilateralism found it difficult to gather momen-
tum at higher levels of interaction and was therefore carried out with
less and less agenda-setting implications. Attention is, for example, paid
to politically sensitive issues such as human rights, the rights of ethnic
minorities and good governance, in particular when it comes to Bur-
ma’s political situation. That the ASEM process and later the EU-
ASEAN FTA negotiations have considered leaving out ASEAN’s three
least developed countries, as called ‘ASEAN Minus Three’, is thus not
only expected to avoid premature liberalization but to present rather ‘an
elegant way around’ Burma’s politics (Maes 2007: 15).
Fifth, new bilateralism intensifies the use of bilateral dialogues on an
ad hoc and reciprocal basis and thereby incorporates the principles of
flexibility and pragmatism, at the price of limiting far-reaching commit-
ments. From a constructivist perspective, the prospects of the identity-
building function and the dynamics of mutual definition that lead to it
depends on the extent to which the actors involved can identify the
areas of mutual interest and actually arrive at some interaction. On the
one hand, EU-Thailand activities under several other frameworks have
significantly developed a dialogue mechanism, which is relevant to im-
proving mutual awareness and understanding both bilaterally and at the
regional level. Such activities range from the ASEM meetings on stan-
dards and conformity assessment, the seminar on geographical indica-
tions, the Asia-Europe cultural policy semiar to the establishment of
university-to-university cooperation and intellectual links among aca-
demics and experts. One the other hand, a series of proposed initiatives
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have been claimed as being spontaneous and ignoring regular follow-up
activities. Within the TREATI and ASEM frameworks, for instance, EU-
Thailand relations have contributed to issue-based workshops and semi-
nars on such as food safety rules, sanitary and phytosanitary standards
in the fisheries sector or the EU standards and technical regulations in
the electronic and electrical equipment sectors. In practice, most of
these are viewed as short-lived by nature, thus unlikely to provide the
long-term dynamics of mutual recognition and complex learning.
New Bilateralism: The ‘Building Block’-‘Stumbling Block’ Debate
The proliferation of new bilateral relations – as observed in the great
number of new bilateral FTA agreements and the brisk pace at which
they have been concluded – seems to pose a structural challenge to the
international system. However, the policy drift away from multilateral-
ism toward bilateralism is not unprecedented, for the multilateral order
of the international system has always been cautious about any return
to bilateralism because of the obvious attractiveness of bilateral instru-
ments and power politics. This final section of the conclusion thus pro-
vides a summary of the practical implications of EU-Thailand relations
and thus addresses a final question about whether new bilateralism is
more of a ‘stumbling block’ or a ‘building block’ in the international
system. In brief, the study has shown that EU-Thailand relations only
rarely perform a balancing function and can over the long term contri-
bute significantly to regionalism, interregionalism and other related in-
ternational bodies. Therefore, the description of ‘building block’ seems
to be more accurate than that of a ‘stumbling block’, with the pros and
cons as follows:
On the one hand, it is obvious that EU-Thailand relations are for-
mally designed to serve as a building block because of specific func-
tions of institution-building, rationalizing and agenda-setting at the sys-
temic level. Examples of EU-Thailand relations’ institution-building
function can be found from their early interaction on, to name but a
few, both sides have played a crucial role in the formalization of the
EEC-ASEAN dialogues in the 1970s or in the creation of the ASEM
Trust Fund in April 1998. In addition, both under the TREATI frame-
work and in the ASEM process, the EU and the Thai government have
cooperated bilaterally on several activities such as the TREATI seminar
on food safety rules, the establishment of Asia-Europe Environment
Technology Centre, and the ASEM Seminar on Information and Tele-
communications Technology. Seen from a rationalizing function point
of view, EU-Thailand relations have obviously been recognized as pro-
viding an important channel for the discussion of regional and interna-
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tional concerns such as the Thailand-EU Business Forum, which serves
as a place for the two parties to address various issues arising from the
process of implementing their WTO commitments. Last but not least,
there is also evidence to suggest that Thailand and the EU are in a posi-
tion to perform an agenda-setting function, for instance, as seen in
their efforts to actively promote the concepts of Geographical Indica-
tions at the regional level in 2006.
It is also apparent at the unit level that both the EU and the Thai gov-
ernment have attached great importance to regional and international
cooperation, for which, their commitments to international principles,
norms and best practices are clearly in accordance with their member-
ships in corresponding interregional and international institutions such
as the ASEM, the ARF, the UN and the WTO. In this respect, the study
has shown that these commitments of EU-Thailand relations can
further support their performance of the above neoliberal functions,
both in the short and long term and at different levels of interaction. In
addition, from a constructivist, role-theoretical viewpoint, the drive to-
ward trilateral cooperation has been prompted by the efforts of the Thai
government to establish a new role as an emerging donor and the EU’s
response to this new role perception within the donor community. The
concepts of trilateral cooperation are thus crucial for the strengthening
of EU-Thailand dialogues and integrating the latter into the donor com-
munity, as both sides have adopted the Paris Declaration in 2005 and
are committed to the same guiding principles of economic and social
sustainability, based on resource-efficient targets and specific guiding
development indicators.
Moreover, it is important to note that while it performs a rationaliz-
ing function, new bilateralism can make significant contributions to
promoting exchanges of views and experiences and strengthening inter-
regional networks within the international system. Meanwhile, the EU-
Thailand business-to-business and individual-to-individual networks
have begun to emerge bilaterally, with domestic market incentives hav-
ing caused converging interests of actors involved. Examples can be
found in the annual EU-Thailand Partenariats and the Thailand-EU
Business Forum. In the field of higher education, the university-to-
university exchanges have been very promising thus far, for both among
students and faculty, as noted in the EU-funded ‘Human Resource De-
velopment through Problem-Based Learning’ project between Walailak
University in Nakhon Sri Thammarat and two other European universi-
ties, while the recent popularity of the Erasmus Mundus scholarship
confirms its first success toward this goal.
On the other hand, there are certain obstacles that prevent new bila-
teralism from functioning properly as a building block, thus it can, in
certain ways, also contribute at some point to a stumbling block within
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the international system. If the use of the term stumbling block to de-
scribe new bilateralism can be understood as moving along three suc-
cessive stages, from ‘decreasing enthusiasm for multilateralism’ to
‘seeking new bilateralism as a safety network’ and ultimately as ‘reject-
ing multilateralism for bilateralism’, the study shows that the recent
trend of new bilateralism is moving but has yet to reach the later stage.
After all, the 1997 Asian crisis is often regarded as the birth of new bi-
lateralism, with the affected countries in the Asia-Pacific region increas-
ingly recognizing and exploring the options of new bilateralism. Later
on it became clear that the enthusiasm for multilateralism dropped sig-
nificantly after the disappointing results at Cancun in 2003 and Hong
Kong in 2005, hinting that it would be a long road to the Doha Round’s
conclusion. Against this background, it is not surprising that bilateral-
ism has attracted more and more attention in international relations.
For instance, EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, during his
speech in Berlin in September 2006, underlined the need for the EU
to re-consider its FTA strategies with Asian countries.
Furthermore, neorealists predict that as long as a wave of new bilater-
alism is not effectively coordinated but pursues opportunistic (re-)align-
ment of two parties, those bilateral ties are more likely to advance on an
institutional balance rather than any deeper cooperation, which could
develop a stumbling block in the international system. In the case of
EU-Thailand relations, their balancing function is mostly directed to-
ward East and Southeast Asian regionalism, as, for example, in the con-
ception of trilateral cooperation and the establishment of the FTA be-
tween the EU and the ASEAN countries. However, the extent to which
a balancing function is performed by new bilateralism may vary signifi-
cantly at different levels of interaction including regional, interregional
and global fora. It may also depend chiefly on the two parties’ political
and economic relevance at each level of interaction. In this light, it is
not surprising that new bilateralism’s balancing act has been observed
only to a limited extent in relation to interregionalism and globalism, e.
g., the ARF, WTO or UN.
Further explanations can be found at the unit level. The call for
strengthening the principles of flexibility and reciprocity are meant not
only to improve the positions of great powers to exploit their advantages
over smaller nations but also to allow states to more directly respond to
changes in regional power relations. In this light, the realist school of
International Relations has re-gained much credibility in its disregard
of any sustainable form of international cooperation in the long run
and thus effectively predicting the current crisis that multilateralism is
undergoing.
There is evidence to suggest that the EU and the Thai government
have themselves chosen for a problem-oriented approach to new bilater-
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alism rather than a strategic policy in support of any specific long-term
vision. Thailand’s skillful diplomacy in terms of her flexibility and prag-
matism underscores the relevance of bilateral strategies to seeking in-
fluence and sensitively maintaining balanced relations among regional
powers. At the same time, there is a specific need for the EU to come
to grips with its modest contribution during the crisis and, more impor-
tantly, with the new economic challenges emerging from post-crisis de-
velopments in the East and Southeast Asian region. Moreover, the fact
that the EU is recognized as a much stronger economic than political
actor seems to explain its prejudice toward a more trade-oriented ap-
proach to EU-Thailand relations.
After all, the underexplored potential of EU-Thailand relations makes
it relatively difficult to assess what the overall impact of their specific
type of bilateralism, and new bilateralism in general, will be on the in-
ternational system. In reality, some of the bilateral initiatives thus far
proposed appear to be only loose arrangements based on a non-binding
nature and various declaratory statements, which is sometimes referred
to as a ‘proto-regime’ (Rüland 2005a: 558; Aggarwal 1993). This is most
easily seen in the development of investment strategies and the man-
agement of tourism and migratory flows. The description is not that dif-
ferent from created by scholars like Bhagwati (1995; see also Bhagwati
and Panagariya 2003), who – with a focus on bilateral trade and invest-
ment relations – have described a ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon, which
is comprised of a variety of rules and regulations among single bilateral
agreements. For constructivists, it also becomes apparent that the stage
of improved mutual awareness and understanding is not always trans-
lated to the process of mutual definition and thus it questions the new
bilateralism’s function of building up specific long-term collective iden-
tity. In the case of the EU, as it faces the internal institutional con-
straints on its foreign policy competence, there is some evidence to sug-
gest that the EU has mostly restricted itself to raising concerns through
informal bilateral dialogues in cases of certain politically sensitive is-
sues.
While the time frame of this study, roughly from 1997 to 2007, was
carefully chosen to cover a fruitful period of EU-Thailand relations, it is
obvious that the new bilateralism chapter remains unfinished, with
some significant developments still ongoing such as the EU-ASEAN
FTA negotiations or Thailand’s domestic politics after the coup in Sep-
tember 2006. Further research would have room to accommodate later
relevant developments in EU-Thailand relations within the constructed
theoretical framework, which would also help to revisit the functional
debate if the new bilateralism trend was going to permanently hinder
the return to multilateralism. From a theoretical perspective, to broaden
the research project’s horizons over a longer period of time does not ne-
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cessarily provide us with more comprehensive coverage, but, more im-
portantly, it provides a greater probability for interaction that could lead
to a longer-term commitment between the two parties. The normative
concept of ‘lattice regionalism’ as introduced by Dent (2003; see also
Dent 2006), for instance, attaches great importance to a rationalizing
process, which, given the complexity of new bilateral relations, can
eventually level those preferential trade arrangements to a new kind of
regionalism, thus preparing the ground for further multilateral trade
negotiations. For the sake of their bilateral relations, a long-term bilat-
eral dialogue may also contribute to confidence-building efforts and
thus improve mutual awareness and comprehension. It may also end
up internalizing norms in the long run, for example, by promoting a
regular schedule of interaction and follow-up activities as well as dialo-
gues among state and non-state actors, given the emerging challenges
from a wave of new bilateral FTAs and an overall more competitive
world.
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Notes
I Introduction
1 Dent (2006a: 121) notes that there was a proposal of a FTA project between Thailand
and Czech Republic in 1994 and 1995 and that another project between Thailand
and Israel was discussed in December 1996.
2 For an overview on previous and current FTA negotiations, see the Thai govern-
ment’s official website at http://www.thaifta.com/english/index_eng.html, accessed
in June 2007; See also another country report at http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.
php3?id_rubrique=117, accessed in June 2007. More information on the progress of
the Thailand-Peru FTA negotiations, see Thai News on 4/11/2006, available at
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6389, accessed in June 2007.
3 Speech by Peter Mandelson at the Churchill Lecture, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin,
September 18th, 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/spee-
ches_articles/sppm114_en.htm, accessed in September 2006.
4 In the study of foreign policy, the bureaucratic politics model has been applied in a
series of lengthy works on specific empirical events (Halperin and Kanter 1973; Beard
1976; Bergerson 1980, cited in Welch 1998).
II Depicting New Bilateralism
1 For this point, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Ru¨land’s lecture in political economy:
‘The New Free Trade Bilateralism [Der neue Freihandelsbilateralismus]’, held at the
University of Freiburg on January 19, 2006.
2 Indeed, in bilateral commercial relations, Pasvolsky (1936: 280) regards the discrimi-
natory character as the major criterion to differentiate agreements that are ‘bilateral
in form’ (‘formal bilateralism’) from those that are ‘bilateral in substance’ (‘substan-
tive bilateralism’).
3 Examples given by Ravenhill (2003: 303) of the industries that have been directly af-
fected and later actively engaged in political action are the automobile or fishery in-
dustries in Japan.
4 To name a few examples of the US’ bilateral agreements on intellectual property
rights, the US-Taiwan Agreement on Intellectual Property Protection (1993), the US-
Vietnam Establishment of Copyright Relations Agreement (1997), or the US-Nicara-
gua Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1998).
5 For example, a long list of Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreements (FIPAs) can be found under http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/fipa_l-
ist-en.asp, accessed on March 18, 2005.
6 Ruggie (1993: 10) raises this argument while distinguishing multilateralism from bi-
lateralism.
7 For this point, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Ru¨land’s seminar: ‘Security Interests
between Germany and Asia in the Age of Terrorism’ [Deutsch-asiatische Sicherheit-
sinteressen im Zeitalter des Terrorismus]’, held at the University of Freiburg on Janu-
ary 31, 2006.
8 To this point, it is noted that the new institutions are not designed to replace bilateral
alliances but work together with them, although it is possible that the former replace
the latter in the long run (Emmers 2004: 8).
9 Along this line, Umbach (2004: 15) offers a similar characterization of new dimen-
sions of threats caused by international terrorism: (i) an increasing dominance of re-
ligiously motivated terrorism, (ii) a geographic shift away from Europe and Latin
America to Northern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia, (iii) the
increasing global nature of international terrorism, (iv) escalating warfare strategies,
which might make use even of weapons of mass destruction, (v) inseparability of in-
ternal and external security of states being potential targets, (vi) new networks with
internationally organised crime and making use of weak and failed states as opera-
tional bases, (vii) increasing relevance of non-state actors, and (viii) hybrid terrorist-
criminal groups as the result of convergence of terrorist groups and organised crime.
10 In this regard, the ‘coalition of the willing’ is sometimes mockingly given the name
‘coalition of the billing’ (Singer 2005).
11 The German development policies toward Indonesia prioritizing among others the
latter’s sociopolitical developments with four accents on health, economic reform,
transport, and decentralization. For further details, see http://www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id=14&land_id=61, ac-
cessed in April 2006.
12 The EU also has been in regular consultations on human rights issues with other
countries such as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia or New Zealand on the semi-an-
nual basis. The consultations are claimed to play an important role in the later hu-
man rights meetings at the United Nations. For further details, see also ‘The EU’s
Human rights & Democratisation Policy’: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ rela-
tions/human_rights/intro/index.htm#1, accessed in March 2006.
13 For example, the US’ engagement can be seen as an important external factor in the
establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Bilaterally, the
US and Thailand agreed on the Thanad-Rusk Joint Communique´ in 1962 and the
Thai-US Special Logistics Agreement in 1963 to improve Thailand’s transportation
system. Later in the 1960s, both parties also signed some memoranda of understand-
ing with regard to security issues in Indochina (Chinwanno 2004).
14 For further details, see also the GTZ’s website at: www.gtz.de, accessed in March
2006.
15 The six focus areas of ECOTECH are (i) developing human capital, (ii) developing
stable, safe and efficient capital markets, (iii) strengthening economic infrastructure,
(iv) harnessing technologies for the future, (v) safeguarding the quality of life
through environmentally sound growth, and (vi) developing and strengthening the
dynamism of small and medium sized enterprises. For further details, see also
http://www.apec.org/apec/news___media/fact_sheets/esc___ecotech.html, accessed
in March 2006.
16 The 33 countries are Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, the EU, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Ka-
zakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Roma-
nia, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.
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For further details, see also http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/science/fs-s&t_um-
br_agrmts_990421.html, accessed in March 2006.
17 For example, Thailand initiated the ‘Early Harvest Scheme’ within the China-Thai-
land Free Trade Agreement (2003) to remove tariff barriers on some fruits and vege-
tables such as longan, durian and mango. For further details, http://thailand.prd.go.
th/the_pm_view.php?id=614, accessed in March 2006.
18 See also Dobson (2001: 1010-1011) for the background of the bilateral negotiations on
dispute settlement mechanisms.
19 The MFN principle is not new, however. In fact, the ‘nondiscrimination’ trade clause
was mentioned in several contexts back in the 19th century, for example, the UK’s
trade policy generally opted for ‘nondiscrimination’ and later, unilateral trade liberali-
zation after the 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws; the Anglo-French commercial treaty of
1860 contained a provision that would grant any privilege or tariff reduction to a
third party (Frankel 1997: 2). For further details, see also Irwin (1993: 92-95).
20 For this point, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Ru¨land’s lecture ‘The New Free Trade
Bilateralism [Der neue Freihandelsbilateralismus]’, held at the University of Freiburg
on January 19, 2006.
21 Notably, Singapore imposed zero tariffs on all US imports while the US had its du-
ties on Singapore’s imports ‘phased-out’. For further details, see http://www.ustr.gov/
Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2003/Quick_Facts_US-Singapore_Free_Trade_Agree-
ment.html, accessed in March 2006.
22 For these points, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Ru¨land’s lecture ‘The New Free
Trade Bilateralism [Der neue Freihandelsbilateralismus]’, held at the University of
Freiburg on January 19, 2006.
III The Conceptualization of New Bilateralism
1 In this context, Moul (1973: 496) points out an example of a sociological study con-
ducted by Robinson (1950), which concludes that ecological inferences cannot be
substituted for individual correlations, and neither can accurate inferences be made
between ecological and individual relationships.
2 The debate assumed a simplified viewpoint on the concept of the ‘level of analysis’ it-
self, while some authors suggest focusing on the causality between units of analysis
across levels in a wider and more complex scheme (see also Buzan 2005: 211-212).
3 Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 33-34) point out that the links between the two con-
cepts can lead to a so-called ‘process of structuration’. More specifically, the same
authors (ibid. 37-38) also propose a set of requirements for actorness including (1)
Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles; (2) the ability to
identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; (3) the ability effectively
to negotiate with other actors in international system; (4) the availability of, and capa-
city to utilize, policy instruments; and (5) domestic legitimation of decision processes,
and priorities, relating to external policy. This is based on Sjo¨stedt’s concept of actor-
ness (1977).
4 ‘Europeanization’ is a multi-faceted term and a contested concept. While it can be
helpful in understanding recent developments of the EU, some authors have yet to
accept it as an organizing concept (see also Kassim 2000). For an informative survey,
see Olson (2002).
5 The principal-agent approach emerges from the study of economic organization, in
which a firm may see the need to ‘internalize’ and ‘contractualize’ the relations be-
tween the actors within it as a way to manage transaction costs and improve produc-
tion efficiency (Coase 1937; Moe 1984; see also Kassim and Menon 2002: 1-2).
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6 The term ‘neutral arbiter’ appears in Moravcsik (1993) and Hooghe (1993), as cited
in Kassim and Menon (2002: 6, 7).
7 It is important to note that the definition and measurement of national power are
disputable in the realist discourse, due technically to the multidimensionality of
power itself or the lack of a standardized measurement (Baldwin 2002). The in-
tended study does not discuss these matters in detail, however. For a survey on con-
cepts and measurements of power, see Baldwin (2002); Hart (1976).
8 Krasner’s and Gilpin’s state-centric versions of hegemonic stability theory are based
on Kinderberger’s work The World Depression (1973). While as an economist Kinder-
berger focuses on the economic incentives of the leading country, i.e., the hegemon,
in the management of international financial crisis, Krasner and Gilpin contend that
they are primarily the political, security interests that the hegemon pursues (see also
Gilpin 2001: 99).
9 The author is indebted to Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Ru¨land for this point, which was raised in
the discussions after Prof. Jain’s presentation on ‘The EU and India’ at the University
of Freiburg on October 25th, 2006.
10 It is important to note that historically, liberalism borrowed the concept of human
reason from the Enlightenment period, and the prospects of technology from the
scientific revolution, which took place in the 16th and 17th centuries (see also Zacher
and Matthew 1995).
11 For details, see also the surveys in Zacher and Matthew (1995), Nye (1988), or Keo-
hane (1989).
12 However, the Ricardo model is lax on the assumptions of factor endowments and
productivity levels. The Heckscher-Ohlin model (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933) deli-
vers insight into the determinants of comparative advantage based on the national
differences in relative factor endowments and suggests that nations are better off ex-
porting the goods, of which the production requires intensive use of the relatively
abundant factors (see also Deardorff 2006). The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper
and Samuelson 1941), which is a proposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, con-
tinues to hypothesize that factors used intensively in the production of exported
goods face an increase in demand and so the income, or the real wage, earned by
these factors increases (see also Gerber 2002: 64-65; Deardorff 2006). For instance,
if in relative terms industrial countries are abundantly endowed with skilled, and less
endowed with unskilled, labor compared to developing countries, the industrial coun-
tries are better off specializing in the production of the goods that requires relatively
intensive use of skilled labor, the demand for skilled labor in these countries will in-
crease, and the wages of skilled labor in the industrial countries are predicted to rise
and those of unskilled labor to fall (Gerber 2002: 77-78).
13 The concepts of ‘natural trading blocs’ were first used by Wonnacott, P. and Lutz, M.
(1989) and later by Frankel (1997) (see also Deardorff 2006).
14 I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Panitan Watanayagorn for this point, which was
raised during my field research in Bangkok in the summer 2006.
15 Economists classify five categories of market failures based on allocation and distri-
bution conditions which include allocatively: (1) public goods, (2) externalities, (3) nat-
ural monopoly, (4) imperfect information, and distributionally (5) social justice (Well-
isch 1999).
16 Some authors like Barnett (2005) believe that the attraction of constructivism arose
with its new methodological and theoretical insights as early as the end of the Cold
War. The term ‘constructivism’ itself, for example, can be traced to the writings of Ni-
cholas Onuf (1989), which later Wendt (1992) greatly supported and followed (see
also Ulbert 2003: 400; Barnett 2005).
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17 This does not mean that realists completely disregard the roles of social mechanisms.
As Morrow (1988: 89) points out, Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) recog-
nizes the two mechanisms of ‘competition’ and ‘socialization’ but asserts that they
only shape a state’s behavior, not its identity and interests.
18 According to Onuf (1989), there are major differences between regulative and consti-
tutive rules. The former do not change identity while the latter may (ibid.) The study
that follows does not go into details; however, it does take into account the constitu-
tive aspects of rules because if aimed at identity building, a state’s foreign policy is
more likely to adopt constitutive rules.
19 It is perhaps important to note that the ‘civilian power’ concepts are allegedly pre-
mised in part on the liberal views of cooperation. However, the presented classifica-
tion of the concepts within the constructivist tradition follows their theoretical role
application (Tewes 1997). Regarding the exact definition of the terms purposes, goals,
ends, interests, values and means, the original German versions are: ‘Gestaltungswille’,
‘nationale Zielsetzungen’, ‘internationale Zielsetzungen’, ‘verflochtene Interessen und uni-
versale Werte’, ‘spezifische außenpolitische Handlangsmuster’, and ‘außenpolitische Instru-
mente der Zivilmacht’ (Kirste and Maull 1996).
20 The Allison and Halperin (1972) article first appeared in a Princeton University Press
book that was edited by Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman in 1972. The book
was also issued as a supplement to World Politics, vol. XXIV, at about the same time
in the spring 1972. The page references remain the same in both versions.
21 Allison and Halperin (1972: 49) give an example of the essence of an organization’s
activity in that of flying for the Air Force.
22 The spectrum of institutionalized interregional relations, as Ha¨nggi (2006: 41) postu-
lates, consists – from the lower end – of (i) the relations between a regional organiza-
tion or a regional group and a third country, (ii) those between two regional organiza-
tions, (iii) those between a regional organization and a regional group, (iv) those be-
tween two regional groups, and (v) those of a group of states from more than two
core regions.
23 Van Langenhove (2005), for example, has compiled the characteristics of second gen-
eration regional integration as follows: (a) ‘deep economic integration plus political
elements’, (b) ‘multi-level governance’, (c) ‘devolution within states’, (d) ‘strong inter-
national legal framework’, and (e) ‘cooperation along many dimensions’.
24 For an overview on previous and current FTA negotiations, see the Thai govern-
ment’s official website at http://www.thaifta.com/english/index_eng.html, accessed
in June 2007; See also another country report at http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.
php3?id_rubrique=117, accessed in June 2007. More information on the progress of
the Thailand-Peru FTA negotiations, see Thai News on November 4, 2006, available
at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6389, accessed in June 2007.
25 As a matter of fact, Waltz (1979, 1986) introduces three definitions for the distinc-
tion between structures and units: (i) the ordering principle of the system, (ii) specifi-
cation of the functions of formally differentiated units, and (iii) the distribution of
capabilities across its units. However, the second definition appears only in domestic
structures while the first and third definitions may also be applied to international
structures (ibid.).
26 At this point, it should be noted that in the areas of security studies a distinction was
made between defensive and offensive alliances. While defensive alliances refer to a
situation in which states join military alliances to strengthen their positions against
the dominant power, offensive alliances describe the alignments of states that follow
the interest of hegemony (see, for details, Emmers 2004).
27 Based on instances where the European allies faced Germany in World War II and
the alignments of Western Europe with the US against the USSR after World War II,
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Walt (1988: 280) asserts that – despite the relatively weak power configurations of
Germany and the USSR in the respective cases – states are more likely to ally them-
selves with the less threatening power. Therefore, such ‘threat’ capabilities are only
one element in the calculation of state along with other conventional determinants
including proximity, offensive capability and intentions (ibid. 280-282).
28 Some criticisms have been raised against the concepts of ‘soft balancing’. Lieber and
Alexander (2005), for instance, claim that soft balancing is just normal diplomatic
friction, that defining and operationalizing it seems difficult, and that there is a lack
of evidence to suggest its emergence or to support the predictions of the concepts.
29 Pape (2005: 36-37), for example, has identified four common measures that states
can use to pursue their soft balancing objectives: (i) ‘territorial denial’, (ii) ‘entangling
diplomacy’, (iii) ‘economic strengthening’, and (iv) ‘signaling of resolve to participate
in a balancing coalition’.
30 For constructivists, the term ‘diffusion’ is in fact far-reaching not only because norms
but also strategies, beliefs, organizational models and practices can spread through-
out the population (see also Barnett 2005).
31 The concepts of epistemic communities have been applied to a wide range of studies
that investigates efforts dealing with environmental protection, the international
management of whaling, the international food aid regime, the institutionalization of
trade in services or the politics of banking regulation (see, for details, Haas 1992b;
Peterson 1992; Hopkins 1992; Drake and Nicolaidis 1992; Kapstein 1992, respec-
tively).
32 Constructivists provide a deeper meaning for ‘learning’ insofar as in the process of
foreign policy making, ‘learning’ not only embodies – as held by conventional theor-
ists – a state’s adaptation to relevant constraints and imitation of successful models,
but rather a dynamics of problem solving and communicative acts (Ruggie 1998:
868).
33 In Ricardo’s model, for example, some assumptions have been relaxed on factor en-
dowments and productivity levels. The Heckscher-Ohlin model (Heckscher 1919; Oh-
lin 1933) offers insight into the determinants of comparative advantage based on the
national differences in relative factor endowments and suggests that nations are bet-
ter off exporting the goods that require production methods involving intensive use
of the relatively abundant factors (see also Deardorff 2006). The Stolper-Samuelson
theorem (Stolper and Samuelson 1941), a proposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model,
hypothesizes that since factors used intensively in the production of exported goods
face increased demand, the income, or the real wages earned by these factors in-
creases (see also Gerber 2002: 64-65; Deardorff 2006).
34 Krugman (1989)’s model assumes that all nations and trading blocs are symmetrical
and that there are no natural trading blocs. Moreover, the model concentrates on the
effect of tariffs on consumption and world welfare, whereby each province (basic unit
of analysis) is expected to consume the products of all other provinces equally (ibid.).
35 This concept has thus far, been at work through the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Me-
chanism (Frankel 1997).
36 This – as will be discussed later – does not mean that the Article XXIV is completely
flawless, however. Frankel (1997) offers a counter-argument, which states that the
EC’s Common Agricultural Policy, has yet to produce significant efficiency gains or
positive impacts on world agricultural trade.
37 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
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1 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
2 In the South Korean crisis of November 1997, it is interesting to see that the four
European members of the G-7 economic powers were actually the first to offer help
to South Korea, even before the Japanese and the Americans (Bridges 1999: 458).
3 The term ‘sovereignty norm’, as posted by Wendt (1992: 413-415), appears in the con-
text of institutional transformation of states’ understandings of sovereignty and
power politics.
4 For example, in relation to post-crisis economic performance, it is generally argued
that there is a relationship between political change and macroeconomic politicking
(Pongsudhirak 1999). More specifically, the democratization of macroeconomic insti-
tutions may to lead the politicization of technocratism, which, in a ‘strong state’ sce-
nario, can damage the existing distribution of decision-making authority and political
leverage of the relevant agencies to the benefits of parliament, political parties and
politicians (ibid.).
5 Interview with Thomas Gnocchi, European Commission, Brussels, May 5, 2006.
Also available at http//:www.thaieurope.net, accessed in April 2007.
6 Background information, Brussels, April-May 2006.
7 Ibid. Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 This statistics is taken from the EU’s ‘Export Helpdesk’ website, http://export-help.
cec.eu.int/thdapp/comext/ComextServlet?languageId=EN, accessed in February
2007. Here, the product code for wood, articles of wood and wood charcoal is 44.
14 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
15 Ibid.
16 For the European Commission’s responses in the affected countries of Sri Lanka, In-
dia, Indonesia, Maldives and Thailand, see the separate links included in the follow-
ing web page: http://ec.europa.eu/world/tsunami/1_year_after/best_stories/index.
htm, accessed in March 2007.
17 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
18 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 25, 2006.
19 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
20 The subsequent meeting of the ASEAN public health ministers, in fact, confirmed
that other ASEAN member countries were only hesitant in reaching an agreement to
give the Thai government the corresponding mandate. Background information,
Bangkok, June-August 2006.
21 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 According to the ‘Communication on Conflict Prevention’, later adopted by the Eur-
opean Council as ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’, the EU’s
approach evidently attempted to embed development within security agendas and
would then consequently pursue preventive strategies, which brought about a shift
from crisis management to conflict prevention within the CFSP structures. Back-
ground information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
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26 Background information, June-August 2006.
27 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of the creation of the
Kimberley Process’ certification scheme for rough diamonds in December 2000, for
which the WTO also approved a waiver in December 2006 (European Commission
2007h).
28 Historically, Thailand is widely known for its diplomatic skills and efforts to maintain
the well-balanced relations between the French and British colonial powers in its im-
mediate neighboring countries during the imperialist period (see also Wiessala
2002: 137).
29 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006. Thailand seems to be very
sensitive as far as technical terminology is concerned. The terms ‘uprooted people’
and ‘displaced people’ are used here to avoid ambiguity in the status of these people.
30 It is to be noted that the EU’s approach itself has been revised several times in re-
sponse to Burma’s political and economic conditions. The punitive approaches of the
EU toward Burma became more nuanced in 2004 and that its restrictive measures
were re-selected in consideration of vulnerable population groups (European Com-
mission 2006d). Interestingly, the EU insists on visa bans and an asset freeze only in
cases involving senior military personnel, members of the government and their fa-
milies and it allows EU registered companies to make financial resources available to
their Burmese counterparts, except certain state-owned enterprises (ibid.). With re-
gard to bilateral investment, there is evidence to suggest that the EU-level decisions
on economic sanctions – unlike those imposed outright by the US – do not have a
profound impact on recent developments of European investments of the member
states in Burma (Haacke 2006: 79). For example, the French oil company Total,
which has been the largest European investor in Burma, remains active in a wide
range of projects including the Yadana gas project, the pipeline construction to Thai-
land, and the offshore joint production with six other foreign countries and the
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (ibid.). Interestingly, the EU’s sanctions do not inhi-
bit the activities of multinational companies, either (Hyndman 2001).
31 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
32 Ibid.
33 It is important to note that during the same period the governments of some EU
member states have also made a significant contribution to the TBBC funds, for ex-
ample, the Swedish government (17%), the Dutch government (8.4%), the Norwe-
gian government (4.9%), the Danish government (4.6%), the UK government
(4.2%), the Irish government (0.7%) (TBBC 2006: Table B2).
34 Speech ‘Supporting People – Assisting Transition’, held at Burma and Myanmar For-
um in Brussels on March 29, 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/
myanmar/intro/0606-landaburuspeech_29-03-06.pdf, accessed in March 2007.
35 For example, in 1997 the European Commission mentioned this point in its publica-
tion ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Europe’ (DOC/97/6).
36 It should be noted that the EU’s approaches toward Burma and the State Peace and
Development Council in particular vary to some extent across the EU institutions
themselves, with the European Parliament showing a far more ambitious and critical
stance than the European Commission and the European Council (Haacke 2006:
80, 123).
37 Background information, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok, August 2006.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 27, 2006.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. See also, for example, the Goethe Institute’s website: http://www.goethe.de/
uun/enindex.htm, accessed in March 2007.
51 See also, for more details, the GAATW’s website: http://www.gaatw.net/index.php?
option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=2&Itemid=59, accessed in March 2007.
52 At the ASEM 2 Summit in London in March 1998, for example, migration issues
were raised during the conference on the ‘Social and Political Dimensions of the
Asian Economic Crisis’. Chantavanich (1999) noted that the conference participants
presented a set of five policy recommendations for addressing the problematic conse-
quences of migration in the wake of the Asian crisis. It was important for them (i) to
stop the forced repatriation of migrant workers and (ii) to make available an ade-
quately enforced safety net for labors such as unemployment insurance, health care,
minimum wage legislation, the rights to organize, safe working conditions, and as-
sistance in re-training or locating jobs when unemployed (ibid.). Moreover, (iii) Asian
and European countries are encouraged to revise the negative views of workers and,
in particular, migrant workers, which follows that (iv) they are to have the opportu-
nity to participate in the formation of policies of their concern (ibid.). The argument,
especially during the Asian crisis, was (v) against all measures that put workers sav-
ings to bailing out companies or repaying foreign creditors (ibid.).
53 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. See also Council Regulation (EC) no. 797/2006 of 22 May 2006 amending
Regulation (EC) no. 1785/2003 as regards the arrangements for importing rice. Avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006R0797:
EN:NOT, accessed in August 2007.
56 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 More specifically, Thai Airways International planned to order eight Rolls-Royce
Trent-powered Airbus of A380s, A340-500, and A340-600 from the European Airbus
Industries and six Boeing 777-200 ERs from the US (Airline Industry Information,
November 23, 2004; Aviation Daily, on April 14, 2003, August 8 2003).
60 Taking one step back, the EU’s trade policy over the past few decades seem to focus
on the promotion and in part protection of the internal market. In the 1994 Com-
mission’s communique´ ‘Toward a New Asia Strategy’ (European Commission 1994:
1-2), it was already being pointed out that active participation by European companies
in Asian markets could create more jobs with higher qualifications for European
workers. Moreover, it is not surprising to see the deployment of a variety of defensive
trade measures. This can be traced back to the introduction of the Common Market
under the 1957 ‘European Economic Community’ (EEC) framework. Although the
EEC managed to eliminate all quotas and tariffs from goods by the year 1968, a con-
siderable range of non-tariff barriers based on regulatory differences between mem-
ber states remained and it was evident that future steps were put on hold due to the
far-reaching and uncompetitive positions of the national economies until the mid-
1980s (European Commission 2003a). It was the adoption of the Single European
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Act in 1986 that enacted the majority vote for certain decisions in the Council of
Ministers gave a renewed impetus for the opening up of national markets to achieve
the single market by adopting 280 critical rules and regulations (ibid.). The single
market was launched in 1992 and has thus played an important role in enhancing
the economic integration. The European Commission’s Directorate General for Inter-
nal Market and Services regularly amends and publishes the Internal Market Strate-
gies, the most recent of which sets out a ten-point plan to support current develop-
ments in the EU’s internal market for the years 2003-2006.1 In relation to trade with
third counties, this plan is also designed to protect the internal market including the
European businesses, the consumers and the environment by means of customs ser-
vices and several safety measures (ibid.).
61 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 25, 2006.
72 HE Friedrich Hamburger, Ambassador and Head of Delegation to Thailand (cited in
Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006c).
73 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Council Regulation (EC) no. 683/2006 on February 27, 2006.
79 Ibid.
80 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 7 and 27, 2006 (same interviewee).
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 There is a statistical discrepancy involved here regarding the Bank of Thailand’s defi-
nition of services. Although it generally states the largest shares of FDI inflows in
the Thai manufacturing sector, this calculation does not take into account FDI shares
that flow into the service sub-sectors including in trade, financial institutions, con-
structions, real estate, investment and holding companies and services in transport
and travel (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of Invest-
ment of Thailand 2004).
84 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. However, the progress on the Thai side was very slow, because, despite the fact
that the Thai cabinet proposed an amendment in May 2002 that was approved by
the House in November 2003, the Senate had yet to vote on this issue.
87 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
88 Ibid.
89 See, for an overview, Greacen and Greacen (2004).
90 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
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ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meetings (Phatharodom 1999: 244; Dreis-Lampen 1998:
135ff.).
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ficials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the International Trade Institute of
Singapore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PSB Corporation, the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Water Resources and the Agri-food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore
and were briefed on the implementation of ‘Enquiry Points’ to the WTO agreements
on technical barriers to trade as well as sanitary and phytosantary measures (ibid.).
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Nakhonchaisri Pomelo, Trang Roast Pork, Doi Tung Coffee, Phurua Plateau Wine,
Khao Tangkwa Pomelo, Surat Thani Oyster, Sri Racha Pineapple and Sangyod Rice
as well as some European products such as French Champagne and Peruvian Pisco
(Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006a).
8 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
June 30, 2006.
9 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
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10 Ibid.
11 This point is mentioned in the Office of Commercial Affairs (2007a), which was
written by an officer who, as a representative of Thailand in the Sub-Committee on
Trade of the ASEAN Brussels Committee, attended the meeting with the DG Trade
officials on May 15, 2007.
12 This initiative can formally be traced back to the ‘Framework Agreement on Enhan-
cing ASEAN Economic Cooperation’ and the ‘Agreement on the Common Preferen-
tial Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area’, which were signed at the
4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992 (see also European Commission
1996: Annex 4.1). The former contains the statements that all ASEAN member states
agreed to establish an ASEAN FTA within 15 years and that they set down further ob-
jectives of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade as well as exploring further
related measures to complement the overall trade liberalization. Moreover, the estab-
lishment of a ministerial-level AFTA Council, which is comprised of a nominee from
each member state and the ASEAN Secretary-General, creates an institutional ar-
rangement for supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation of AFTA
(ibid.). The latter Agreement, in greater detail, gives an account of the CEPT scheme
that sets time limits for the ASEAN member states to reduce their import tariffs for
the flows of specific goods within ASEAN, whereby it also allows them to exclude cer-
tain sensitive products for special arrangements.
13 In a direct comparison, it is evident that while the EU’s integration has achieved full
liberalization in a wide range of areas of trade in goods and services, capital markets,
labor markets and other measures such as competition law and monetary union in
its own realm, the ASEAN’s efforts have been only partially enacted in trade in goods
and – to a lesser extent – services and capital markets (Ravenhill 2007; see also Lloyd
and Smith 2004: table 4.1).
14 The target – as outlined in the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN and ASEAN
Vision 2020 – is to realize a single market and production base with free flows of
goods, services, investment and skilled labor as well as free flows of capital actors of
production. The 2004 ASEAN Summit’s introduction of 11 ‘Priority Integration Sec-
tors’ comprising (i) wood-based products, (ii) automotives, (iii) rubber-based products,
(iv) textiles and apparel, (v) agro-based products, (vi) fisheries, (vii) electronics, (viii)
e-ASEAN, (ix) healthcare, (x) air travel, and (xi) tourism is supposed to inject another
major impetus into the dynamics of trade liberalization. Within the underlying ‘Fra-
mework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors’, the leaders of the ASEAN
countries, including Thailand, also adopted further arrangements in the areas of
trade in goods, services, investments, rules of origin, customs procedures, standards,
facilitation of travel in ASEAN, movement of business persons and professionals as
well as dispute settlement mechanisms – all of which are designed to promote the
fast-track integration of selected sectors.
15 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
16 The former prescribes two tracks to help reduce and/or eliminate tariffs and, more
importantly, it covers all of the tariff lines that have thus far not been included in the
Framework Agreement’s ‘Early Harvest Programme’. The latter interestingly provides
a similar dispute settlement mechanism as that of the WTO with regard to the inclu-
sion of consultations, mediation and the use of arbitral tribunals as well as compen-
sation mechanisms. Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
17 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 As far as the investment relations with the EU are concerned, compared to North
and Latin American countries and the EFTA grouping, the Southeast and East Asian
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countries have attracted a relatively small share of EU FDI outflows, however (Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Thailand and Board of Investment of Thai-
land 2004). The US, for example, accounted for circa 45%-58% of total EU FDI out-
flows in the late 1990s and has thus been by far largest EU FDI destination, while
Latin American and EFTA grouping shares increased significantly from 5.7% in 1995
to 10.1% in 2000 and from 5.4% to 17.2%, respectively, while shares in Southeast
and East Asian countries, of EU FDI outflows during this same period remained
within the range of about 1% and 4% (ibid.). In addition, in the year right after the
Asian Crisis, in 1998, EU disinvestments also took place in the ASEAN member
states and the +3 countries (ibid.). From the EU’s outward FDI stock, the US, Latin
American counties and the EFTA grouping received respective shares of 46.6%,
10.8% and 10.7% in 2002 while the Southeast and East Asian countries accounted
for only 5.7% in that same year, which was slightly above that of the then acceding
countries (5.5%) (ibid.). This share of EU stock of outward FDI of Southeast and East
Asia was 7.7% in 1995 but has remained at roughly the 6% level since 1998 (ibid.).
21 In 2002, Thailand ranked third among destinations for EU FDI in Southeast Asia,
behind Singapore and Malaysia. Thailand had EU FDI stocks of E 5.5 billion (5.5%)
in 2002 while Singapore and Malaysia accounted for EU FDI stocks of E 30 billion
(55%) and E 8.1 billion (15%), respectively.
22 More specifically, because the ASEAN recognizes China’s Market Economy Status in
the ASEAN-China FTA deals, the latter is no longer subject to Sections 15 and 16 of
its WTO Protocol of Accession. Background information, Bangkok, June-August
2006.
23 From the EU customs perspective, a schedule is planned to introduce the ‘Authorized
Economic Operator’ (AEO) system by June 2008, in which economic operators will
be requested to provide information on all stages with a view to conducting a risk
analysis of the supply chains (EU Today, April 2007: 19). According to Faucherand,
the creation of a system similar to this AEO system can be of interest to the countries
in the East Asian region to promote security in international trade flows (ibid.).
24 The selection of projects follows the EIB’s criteria of the efficient use of resources,
technical viability, and financial and environmental sustainability, which are pursued
not only to support environmental and health situations in partner countries but also
to promote tariff reduction and improvement of services (European Commission
2003c). The last component of the global loans to SMEs can be traced to the recent
efforts of the EIB to strengthen the SMEs’ performance, thus it was expected to in-
crease for all ALA countries (ibid.).
25 Meanwhile, the Thailand Institute of Directors manages to rely on financial self-suffi-
ciency and is highly regarded both nationally and regionally in terms of its sustain-
ability and reproducibility, more than 700 executives, board members of public com-
panies and government officials participated in a number of 5½- or one-day programs
in December 2002, and this number continues to grow (World Bank 2003: 25). The
institute has conducted an evaluation of corporate governance practices in some Thai
companies, using the criteria of (i) rights of stakeholders, (ii) equitable treatment of
minority shareholders, (iii) roles of stakeholders, (iv) disclosure transparency, and (v)
board responsibilities. The results are not made public, however, one World Bank re-
port stated: ‘It is already apparent that the ASEM grant for the Thailand Institute of
Directors has led to improvements in corporate governance in the country that are
unlikely to be reversed in the future’ (ibid.).
26 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 6, 2006.
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27 Background information, Ministry of Finance, Bangkok, July 2006. See also the Eur-
opean Commission’s Communication ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’ (Eur-
opean Commission 2003c).
28 Cited in European Commission (2002f): the Chairman’s statement of the second For-
eign Ministers’ Meeting, Paragraph 13: ‘Ministers reiterated the importance, which
they attached to enhancing the ASEM dialogue on global issues such as … combating
violence against women and children in all its forms, including trafficking in women
and children and child prostitution and pornography’; the Asia-Europe Co-operation
Framework III 2000, Paragraph 14: ‘ASEM efforts should also address global issues
of common concern such as combating transnational crime, including money laun-
dering, the smuggling and exploitation of migrants, the trafficking of persons in par-
ticular women and children, international terrorism and piracy, and fighting against
illegal drugs’; the Chairman’s Statement of the third ASEM Summit, Paragraph 9:
‘Building on the conclusions of the Bangkok and London Summits and the Asia-Eur-
ope Co-operation Framework 2000, Leaders expressed their commitment … and traf-
ficking in persons, in particular of women and children for the purpose of sexual ex-
ploitation’; the Chairman’s Statement of the third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Para-
graph 15: ‘The Ministers recognized that trafficking in women and children was a
growing concern to all and welcomed the UN Convention against Transnational Or-
ganised Crime and its Protocols. ASEM Partners would intensify co-operation to
combat the hideous crime of trafficking in human beings with a view to ensuring re-
spect and protection of the rights of victims of trafficking, especially women and chil-
dren. The Ministers welcomed the action plan prepared by the Core Group Expert
Meeting on ASEM initiative on Trafficking in Women and Children’.
29 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 6, 2006.
30 Available at http://asem.inter.net.th/chairman/index.html#S4, accessed in June
2007.
31 See also, for more details, TEIN2’s website: www.tein2.net, accessed in May 2007.
32 Ibid.
33 TEIN2 may also be applied in other areas such as bio-informatics, climate modeling,
radio astronomy, e-learning and e-culture (EU Today, April 2007).
34 The report is available in a draft version, which is prepared by the Republic of South
Korea, http://asem6.navigo.fi/news_and_documents/en_GB/1146137012358/_files/
75311661924352021/default/Overview_Report_Republic%20of%20Korea.pdf,
accessed in June 2007.
35 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 6, 2006.
36 Ibid.
37 The Terms of Reference for the establishment of the ‘ARF Unit’, as adopted at the
ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting in June 2004, place an emphasis on the Unit’s four
main functions: (i) ‘to support the enhanced role of the ARF Chair, including interac-
tion with other regional and international organizations, defense officials dialogue
and Track II organization’, (ii) ‘to function as depository of ARF documents and pa-
pers’, (iii) ‘to manage database and registry’, and (iv) ‘to provide secretarial works and
administrative support, including serving as the ARF’s institutional memory’
(ASEAN Regional Forum 2004, 2005).
38 As for the other side of the coin, it is noteworthy that the UN is an international or-
ganization that primarily represents nations, for which the EU is not allowed to play
the role of a negotiating party as such and that the functioning of the EU’s bilateral
relations with third countries must be to a considerable extent understood in terms
of the member states’ individual strategies. For example, following the first formal
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session of the UN Security Council on Burma in September 2006, the EU expressed
its ‘[regrets] that China and Russia, supported by South Africa, vetoed a UN Security
Council draft resolution on Burma on 12 January 2007 and calls on the UN Security
Council to redouble efforts to obtain unanimous backing for a binding resolution re-
quiring the release of political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’ (Eur-
opean Parliament 2007). In this context, it was obvious that the EU had to rely on its
member states, particularly those that are permanent or non-permanent members of
the UN Security Council, to raise issues on Burma in the UN Security Council’s
agenda (see also Haacke 2006: 81).
39 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
40 Ibid.
41 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 7, 2006.
42 Although called upon by the International Maritime Organisation in 2002, the
ASEAN countries have yet to reach any agreement on cooperation against piracy and
armed robbery against ships (European Commission 2003c).
43 Other relevant UN resolutions include the UN General Assembly Resolution 56/263
on March 13th, 2002, the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/302 on April 15th,
2003, the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/290 on April 14, 2004, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 59/144 on December 15th, 2004, and the UN Security
Council Resolution 1643, on December 15th, 2005, the UN SC Resolution 1459 on
January 28th, 2003, the UN Security Council Resolution 1521 on December 22,
2003, and the UN Security Council Resolution 1579 on December 21, 2004 (Kimber-
ley Process 2007a).
44 See chapter IV’s note 150.
45 The WTO managed to revise its anti-dumping code of 1979 in GATT Article VI in
1994, also known as the WTO anti-dumping agreement, while the European Com-
mission responded with its own new of its anti-dumping legislation in January 1995.
This legislation left the ASEAN countries feeling that they were being unjustly tar-
geted because of subsequent increases in the number of products that would be sub-
ject to anti-dumping measures or under investigation (European Commission 1996,
annex 4, 4). The EU explains the anti-dumping cases in terms of business and indus-
try interests, that is, only when an industry submits a complaint with sufficient pri-
ma facie evidence is it possible for the European Commission to begin an investiga-
tion, whereby the raising trend of anti-dumping cases seems to be understandable gi-
ven that EU-ASEAN trade relations have increased significantly (ibid.). Background
information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
46 There seem to be significant differences between the moderates and the more ex-
treme camps within the ‘Friends Group’ itself, however, the EU’s efforts have contrib-
uted to the anti-dumping negotiations in general, while further encouraging the US
to provide active support in reinforcing the moderates’ positions. Background infor-
mation, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
47 Procedurally, the new member states also had to renounce their own bilateral free
trade agreements with third countries as well as amend their international agree-
ments and eliminate any trade or trade-related provisions that were in conflict with
EU policies (European Commission 2004c). Also, background information, Bangkok,
June-August 2006.
48 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 As previously mentioned, in preparing this Act, the European Commission and Thai-
land worked together at the 2nd EC-ASEAN Technical Assistance Programme on In-
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tellectual Property Rights (ECAP II) with an available budget of E 5 million managed
by the European Patent Office in Munich (Delegation of the European Commission
to Thailand 2006a). The first nine items to be registered with geographical details in-
clude Petchabun Sweet Tamarind, Nakhonchaisri Pomelo, Trang Roast Pork, Doi
Tung Coffee, Phurua Plateau Wine, Khao Tangkwa Pomelo, Surat Thani Oyster, Sri
Racha Pineapple, Sangyod Rice, French Champagne, and Peruvian Pisco (see above).
52 Background information, Bangkok, June-August 2006.
53 The Paris Declaration (2005) defines the five concepts as follows: (i) Ownership:
‘Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and
strategies and co-ordinate development actions’; (ii) Harmonisation: ‘Donors’ actions
are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective’; (iii) Alignment: ‘Donors
base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, insti-
tutions and procedures’; (iv) Managing for results: ‘Managing resources and improv-
ing decision-making for results’, and (v) Mutual Accountability: ‘Donors and partners
are accountable for development results’.
54 This point is a summary of the third point from the ‘Twelve Policy Messages’ pre-
sented at the workshop ‘Aid Effectiveness: From Paris to Bangkok’ in Bangkok on Oc-
tober 5, 2006 (in: Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency et al.
2006: 2).
55 Informal interviews, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 2006.
56 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
June 30, 2006.
VI Conclusion
1 Informal interview, Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand, Bangkok,
July 7, 2006.
2 As previously mentioned, under the circumstances, EU exports to ASEAN and vice
versa can be expected to increase by 24.2% and 18.5%, respectively. However, this re-
search study was conducted under the assumptions that the ASEAN was fully liberal-
ized regarding all goods except some sensitive products and has experienced a 50%
cut in the barriers governing the service sectors (European Commission 2007n).
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